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Court of AppealPartially Allowed· [2006] KECA 225 (KLR)

Shital Bimal Shah & 2 others v Akiba Bank Limited & 4 others [2006] KECA 225 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
17 March 2006
1,825 words in judgment
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The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal extended appeal filing time after a lawyer's honest mistake, but made the lawyer personally pay the costs.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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A single-Judge ruling of the Court of Appeal (Waki JA) delivered at Nairobi on 17 March 2006 in an application under rule 4 of the Court of Appeal Rules for extension of time for service of a notice of appeal lodged in the High Court on 12 May 2005. The notice was retained by the court for the Deputy Registrar's signature until 25 May 2005 and was then served on the 1st, 4th and 5th respondents on 25 May, the 3rd respondent on 26 May and the 2nd respondent on 30 May, the applicant's advocate Ms Njeri Mucheru-Oyatta having mistakenly believed that time for service under rule 76(1) ran only from the Registrar's signing and release of the notice; Mr Pheroze Nowrojee led her, and Ms Malik opposed for the respondent. The court held that the 1984 deletion of the 'sufficient reason' stricture from rule 4 left an unfettered discretion to be exercised judicially, not on whim or caprice; rules of court must prima facie be obeyed and extension must rest on material before the court. It rejected the respondent's submission that rule 4 cannot validate a document already filed in breach of the rules, holding that the rule operates 'whether before or after the doing of the act' and that deeming service in time is a legitimate consequence of enlargement. Although counsel's ignorance of a 25-year-old decision on the identical point was blameworthy, the mistake was a genuine error of law, the delay of 6, 7 and 11 days was not inordinate, the respondents were not misled, and prejudice could be met in costs. Time for service was extended as prayed (the withdrawn deeming-of-lodgement limb excepted), with costs of Shs 15,000/= ordered payable personally by the instructing advocate within 14 days, execution to issue in default.

Key legal issues

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01

Nature and scope of the discretion under rule 4 of the Court of Appeal Rules

Holding

Rule 4 confers an unfettered discretion, the 'sufficient reason' stricture having been removed by amendment in 1984; but the discretion must be exercised judicially, not on whim or caprice. Rules of court must prima facie be obeyed, and there must be material on which the court can exercise its discretion, failing which a party in breach would enjoy an unqualified right to extension that defeats the rules' timetable purpose.

Reasoning

The court traced the 1984 amendment that deleted 'sufficient reason' and held that the resulting discretion, though unfettered, remains judicial. Relying on Grindlays Bank International (K) Ltd v George Barbour and Ratnam v Cumarasamy per Lord Guest, it held that rules must prima facie be obeyed and that extension must rest on material before the court; otherwise parties in breach would have an unqualified right to extension, defeating the timetable function of procedural rules.

p. 2
02

Whether rule 4 permits a deeming order where the omitted step was discovered after the record of appeal was filed

Holding

Yes. Rule 4 applies 'whether before or after the doing of the act', so it is immaterial when the omission was discovered or whether the record has already been filed; once time is enlarged, the court may properly deem the essential step (here service of the notice of appeal) as done within the extended time. The respondent's contrary construction was a misreading of the rule and was overruled.

Reasoning

The court reproduced rule 4 and emphasised the words 'whether before or after the doing of the act' and the reference to time as extended. It rejected Ms Malik's submission that rule 4 cannot validate a record already filed in contravention of the rules, holding that construction a misreading. Enlargement of time carries with it the consequence that the essential step is deemed done within the time as extended, whether the application is made before or after filing.

p. 3
03

Whether the advocate's mistake of law was an excusable mistake justifying extension of time

Holding

A mistake of counsel must be excusable to enure to the applicant's benefit; total inaction disguised as mistake is rejected. The advocate's erroneous construction of rule 76(1), though blameworthy given a 25-year-old decision on the identical point and her late consultation of senior counsel, was a genuine error of law. Combined with the short delay (6, 7 and 11 days), absence of misleading of the respondents, and prejudice compensable in costs, the discretion was exercised in her favour.

Reasoning

The court acknowledged that mistakes come in all shapes and sizes and that some, such as total inaction disguised as mistake, have been rejected. Invoking Madan JA's discourse in Murai v Wainaina (No. 4) that a blunder on a point of law can be a mistake and the door of justice is not closed because an experienced person erred, it weighed the 6, 7 and 11 day delays, the respondents' lack of prejudice, and the interests of justice, granting extension while personally costing the advocate.

p. 2
04

Personal costs consequences of a culpable advocate's mistake

Holding

The costs occasioned by the application were assessed at Shs 15,000/= and ordered borne personally by the advocate seized of the matter, payable within 14 days, with execution to issue against the advocate in default.

Reasoning

Although the extension was granted in the interests of justice, the court marked its disapproval of the advocate's lack of diligence - she overlooked a 25-year-old decision on the precise point and waited more than a month before consulting senior counsel - by making the costs of the application personally payable by her rather than by her client, with execution in default of payment within 14 days.

p. 4

Legal principles established

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  • Rule 4 confers an unfettered discretion (the 'sufficient reason' stricture having been removed by amendment in 1984), but that discretion must be exercised judicially and not on whim or caprice
  • Rules of court must prima facie be obeyed; extension of time requires material on which the court can exercise its discretion, since otherwise a party in breach would enjoy an unqualified right to an extension, defeating the timetable purpose of the rules
  • Rule 4 operates 'whether before or after the doing of the act': where the court is inclined to enlarge time, it may properly deem the essential step (including service of a notice of appeal) as having been done within the time as extended, even where the omission was discovered only after the record of appeal was filed
  • A mistake of counsel, including a blunder on a point of law, may justify extension of time where it is excusable and the interests of justice dictate rectification; the door of justice is not closed because an experienced person erred, though total inaction disguised as a mistake will be rejected
  • A short delay in service of a notice of appeal that neither misleads the respondents nor causes irreparable prejudice is not inordinate, and any prejudice may be recompensed in costs
  • An advocate whose culpable mistake occasions an extension-of-time application may be ordered to pay the costs of that application personally, with execution issuing in default

Court orders

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  1. 1.Time for service of the Notice of Appeal lodged in the High Court on 12th May 2005 extended to 25th May 2005 in respect of the 1st, 4th and 5th Respondents; to 30th May 2005 in respect of the 2nd Respondent; and to 26th May 2005 in respect of the 3rd Respondent, so that the said notice of appeal is deemed to have been served in time
  2. 2.Costs of the application assessed at Shs 15,000/= to be borne personally by the advocate seized of the matter, Ms. Njeri Mucheru-Oyatta, payable within 14 days; in default, execution shall issue against the advocate

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Court of Appeal Rulesrule 4
  • Court of Appeal Rulesrule 75
  • Court of Appeal Rulesrule 76(1)
  • Court of Appeal RulesForm D

Cases cited (4)

  • Grindlays Bank International (k) Ltd v George Barbour
    Civil App. No. NAI. 257/95
  • Ratnam v Cumarasamy & Anor
    [1964] 3 All ER 933
  • Gulamhusen Cassam & Anor. v Shashikant Sachania & Anor.
    [1982-88] 1 KAR 24
  • Murai v Wainaina (No. 4)
    1982 KLR 38
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya
Jurisdiction invoked
Rule 4 of the Court of Appeal Rules - application to a single Judge of Appeal to extend time for the doing of any act authorised or required by the Rules, whether before or after the doing of the act

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Later judgments citing this (25)

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Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.

Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Shital Bimal Shah & 2 others v Akiba Bank Limited & 4 others [2006] KECA 225 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2006). . Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2006/225/eng@2006-03-17

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.