Terakate Properties Limited v Develco Investments Limited (in Liquidation) & 28 others (Environment and Land Case 3 of 2009) [2026] KEELC 1657 (KLR) (5 March 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELC 1657 (KLR) REPUBLIC OF KENYA IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI ENVIRONMENT AND LAND CASE 3 OF 2009 AA OMOLLO, J MARCH 5, 2026 BETWEEN TERAKATE PROPERTIES LIMITED ..................................................... PLAINTIFF AND DEVELCO INVESTMENTS LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) ...... 1ST DEFENDANT KASARANI HILLS LIMITED ........................................................ 2ND DEFENDANT THE CHIEF LANDS REGISTRAR ............................................... 3RD DEFENDANT AND AGNES WANGUI MUCHERU & 25 OTHERS .................... INTERESTED PARTY RULING 1. 2. What is coming up before the court is the 1st Defendant/Applicants’ Notice of Motion dated the 20th April, 2022 seeking the following reliefs: a. Spent b. Spent c. The consent judgment entered by the parties hereto on 7th March, 2022, be varied and/or set aside together with any subsequent orders. d. Leave be granted to the 1st Defendant to amend its Defence and Counterclaim to include a crossclaim against the 2nd Defendant as per the annexed Draft. e. The costs of the application be provided for The Motion is premised on the grounds set out on the face of the Motion and supported by the Afidavit of George Weru, a duly licensed Insolvency Practitioner, and one of the joint Provisional https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/1657/eng@2026-03-05 1
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Liquidators of the 1st Defendant/Applicant with the authority of his co-Provisional Liquidator Muniu Thoithi. 3. He deponed that on the 7th March, 2022, the Plaintifi and the 2nd Defendant herein, on the one hand, and the Plaintifi and the 6th to the 26th Interested Parties, on the other hand, recorded a consent judgment substantially compromising the suit herein between the parties and marking this matter as closed. 4. The aforesaid consent also unilaterally declared the 2nd Defendant, the undisputed proprietor of the parcel of land known as Land Reference No. 11329 Kasarani (suit property) and proceeded to make provisions alienating the suit property to the Plaintifi and the 2nd Defendant. 5. According to Mr Weru, there is an obvious error on the face of the record in the said consent judgment, as the 1st Defendant had filed a defence and counterclaim against the Plaintifi. While the Plaintifi withdrew its suit against the 1st Defendant, the 1st Defendant's counterclaim remains unresolved in this matter. 6. He explained that they have since established that the transfer of the suit property from the 1st Defendant to the 2nd Defendant on or about 3rd June, 2011, was fraudulent, null, and void. The aforementioned information was not available to them at the time of recording the impugned consent judgment mentioned earlier. 7. He deposes that in light of the new and important information discovered as aforesaid, it has become necessary for the 1st Defendant to amend its Defence and counterclaim filed on 25th June 2009 to include a crossclaim against the 2nd Defendant. The consents recorded herein also need to be reviewed in light of the new evidence. 8. The 1st Defendant urged that the intended amendment is necessary to properly articulate and protect its proprietary rights over the property and will enable the court to efiectively and conclusively determine the real questions in controversy between the parties. 9. According to Mr Weru, the Respondents and the Interested Parties are in the process of extracting a decree with a view to executing the consent judgment, notwithstanding an apparent error on the face of the record. That, unless the orders are granted, the property faces a real and imminent risk of disposal or alienation in violation of the 1st Defendant’s proprietary rights. 10. In response to the Motion, the Plaintifi filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated the 23rd September, 2022 premised on the grounds that the Motion ofiends the provisions of Order 25 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, and as such, this court became functus oficio and ceased to have jurisdiction the moment the 1st Defendant ceased to be party vide a withdrawal on 7th March, 2022. 11. In response to the Motion, the Plaintifi, through its Directors Stephen Muriuki Maathai and Pius Mwangi Gukira, filed Replying Afidavits dated 22nd July 2025 and 30th September 2025 respectively. 12. They deposed that the 1st Defendant had actively taken part in the negotiations organised to align the parties’ interests and reach an amicable settlement of the dispute. According to them, a director of the 1st Defendant was present when the Plaintifi and the 2nd Defendant signed the consents dated 21st February 2022, and no objection was raised nor was the existence of any pending counterclaim disclosed. 13. It was further deponed that Mr. Paul Wafula, advocate for the 1st Defendant, was present in court on 7th March, 2022 when the said consents were formally adopted as an order of the court by Hon. Justice https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/1657/eng@2026-03-05 2
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S. Okong’o (as he then was), yet no objection was raised and no reference was made to the counterclaim dated 1st June 2009. 14. It was therefore argued that the matter was definitively resolved and that the court subsequently became functus oficio, and that the present Motion seeks to improperly reopen a dispute that had already been concluded through a binding agreement. 15. The Directors further averred that the consent orders have since been substantially implemented. Part of the suit property was transferred from the 2nd Defendant to the Plaintifi, resulting in the parties’ becoming tenants in common, while other portions were transferred to Kingdom Seekers Fellowship and Murare Holdings Limited. 16. The land was subsequently converted to Title No. Nairobi Block 181/2504 and partitioned into seventeen parcels, sixteen of which are now owned by third parties who are not parties to these proceedings. Some of the third parties have since transferred or charged their parcels of land to financial institutions. 17. They further deponed that the Plaintifi paid Kshs 30,430,000/= to the 6th–26th Interested Parties in satisfaction of the consent and that several third parties have since taken possession and undertaken substantial developments on the land. 18. In their view, reopening the matter would occasion grave prejudice to the Plaintifi and third parties and would undermine the constitutional imperative of promoting amicable settlement under Article 159(2)(c) of the Constitution. 19. The Plaintifi also argued that the 1st Defendant, being in liquidation, should have sought leave prior to initiating this proceeding. Further, the claim now being introduced is time-barred, and the correct course of action would have been to commence a new suit with leave where necessary. 20. They maintained that a consent order carries contractual efiect and can only be set aside on recognized grounds such as fraud, misrepresentation, non-disclosure or mistake, none of which have been demonstrated in the present case. Accordingly, the Motion was characterized as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court process, and the court was urged to dismiss it with costs. 21. The 2nd Defendant filed a Preliminary Objection dated 23rd September 2022, seeking to strike out the present Motion on the grounds that it is incompetent and cannot lie under the provisions of the law on which it has been brought. It also states that the 1st Defendant lacks the locus standi to seek the prayers sought in the Application, nor was leave sought before the filing of the Motion pursuant to Section 432 of the Insolvency Act 2015. 22. It was further contended that the proposed cross-claim against the 2nd Defendant is incompetent as it seeks to introduce an entirely new cause of action that is time-barred under the Limitation of Actions Act, and is merely an attempt by the 1st Defendant to defeat the 2nd Defendant’s defence of limitation. 23. It was also argued that the Application improperly seeks to introduce a new party into the counterclaim without leave of the court as required under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Rules, and that the purported appointment of George Weru and Muniu Thoiti as co-Provisional Liquidators of the 1st Defendant is invalid and contrary to the mandatory provisions of the law. 24. The 2nd Defendant equally filed a Replying Afidavit sworn on 23rd September 2022 by Gurdip Singh Rupra, a director of the 2nd Defendant. 25. He deponed that the Application is incompetent and an abuse of process as the 1st Defendant lacks locus standi; failed to obtain requisite approval under Section 432 of the Insolvency Act, 2015 and seeks https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/1657/eng@2026-03-05 3
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to introduce an untenable “cross-claim” which raises a new and time-barred cause of action contrary to the Limitation of Actions Act. 26. Further, it improperly seeks to enjoin a new party without leave under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Rules. He also questioned the validity of the alleged appointment of co-provisional liquidators under Section 437 of the Insolvency Act. 27. He deposed that the supporting afidavit was misleading for omitting that the 1st Defendant’s advocate was present when the consent was adopted on 7th March 2022 and raised no objection or reference to the counterclaim. 28. He denied that the consent unilaterally declared the 2nd Defendant proprietor, stating that it was entered into by the remaining parties after withdrawal of the suit against the 1st and 3rd Defendants. 29. According to him, the consent merely refiected the position obtaining since the 2011 transfer, which the 1st Defendant had not previously challenged and which he maintained was lawfully undertaken. The 1st Defendants shareholders and directors duly executed the transfer of the property in the 2nd Defendants favour and paid the stamp duty of Kshs 1, 800,000/= payable in respect of the transfer. 30. He maintained that the 1st Defendant was not party to the consent between the Plaintifi and the 2nd Defendant and therefore lacks standing to impugn it. 31. The deponent further stated that the 1st Defendant is estopped from alleging fraud, having previously denied the same, and that the alleged discovery of new information regarding the transfer is untenable since the transaction was within the 1st Defendant’s knowledge. In his view, the 1st Defendant is at liberty to pursue any such claim through a fresh suit. 32. He also deponed that the present Application was served nearly three months after it was filed, without any explanation for the delay. According to him, setting aside the consent would occasion significant prejudice by undoing years of negotiations and settlement efiorts, and would unnecessarily draw the Plaintifi and the Interested Parties into what is essentially a dispute between the 1st and 2nd Defendants. 33. He maintained that the proposed cross-claim is stale and time-barred, and that allowing the Application would be inequitable, prejudicial, and contrary to the principles governing the setting aside of consent judgments, urging the Court to dismiss the Application with costs. 34. The Interested Parties opposed the Motion through Replying Afidavits sworn on 10th November, 2022 and 20th November 2025 by Joseph Patrick Macharia Muroki on their behalf. 35. Mr Macharia deposed that the Application is vexatious and amounts to an abuse of the court process. They fully associate themselves with the averments contained in the Replying Afidavit sworn by Pius Mwangi Gukira on behalf of the Plaintifi, which, in their view, correctly sets out the factual and legal position. 36. He deposed that the impugned consent was recorded in open court on 7th March 2022, when the 1st Defendant was duly represented by Mr. Wafula, Advocate, who neither opposed its adoption nor objected to the withdrawal of the suit against the 1st Defendant. No intention to pursue the counterclaim was disclosed to the Court and that the 1st Defendant remains represented by the same firm of advocates. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/1657/eng@2026-03-05 4
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37. Pursuant to the consent, he explained, the Plaintifi settled the claims of the 6th to 26th Interested Parties by paying Kshs. 30,430,000/= in two instalments through Ngugi & Wamuyu Advocates, sums which were duly disbursed and expended. 38. He maintained that the payments were received as of right and that setting aside the consent will cause grave prejudice, particularly after more than twenty years of litigation. In his view, the 1st Defendant has no genuine intention of prosecuting the counterclaim. 39. He urged that the matter has been overtaken by events, the court is functus oficio, and the subject matter referred to in the counterclaim no longer exists in its original form. Submissions 40. The 1st Defendant/Applicant, in submissions filed on 15th January 2026, argued that although its counsel was present in court when the consent was recorded, the only consenting parties were the Plaintifi and the 6th–26th Interested Parties. Counsel contended that if the 1st Defendant had been a party to the consent, its concurrence would have been expressly recorded in the consent order. 41. Relying on Flora N. Wasike v Destimo Wamboko [1988] eKLR and Erick Gakuya Mwathaita v Maganjo Joshua Kago [2017] KEELC 1389, counsel submitted that a consent order has contractual efiect and is only binding on the parties involved. It was also argued that the declaration recognising the 2nd Defendant as proprietor of the suit land unlawfully afiected the 1st Defendant’s existing claim without proper adjudication, thereby infringing its right to be heard. 42. Counsel submitted that the 1st Defendant does not contest the consent to withdraw the suit against it and remains free to pursue enforcement of the costs awarded to it. 43. On the issue of amending the counterclaim, Counsel submitted that the position that the counterclaim was extinguished upon withdrawal of the suit is legally untenable, as a counterclaim constitutes a distinct and independent cause of action capable of subsisting even where the primary suit has been withdrawn. 44. Vide submissions dated the 23rd September, 2022 and 27th February, 2026, on behalf of the Plaintifi, Counsel submitting, guided by Order 25 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules and the decisions in Jubase vs Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & Anor [2022]KEHC 10047 (KLR), that a party’s right to withdraw his claim cannot be questioned and the court cannot prevent a party from withdrawing the matter. 45. On the threshold for setting aside a consent, reliance was placed on Brooke Bond Liebig (T) Ltd v Mallya (1975) EA 266, where the court held that a consent judgment may only be set aside on grounds such as fraud, collusion, lack of consensus, public policy, or any other reason that would justify rescission of a contract, none of which has been established in the present case. 46. Counsel further submitted that although Order 7 Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Rules permits a counterclaim to proceed notwithstanding discontinuance of the main suit, the counterclaim must be capable of independent determination. In this regard, reliance was placed on Muna & 5 Others v Boscardin & 5 Others (ELC Case 27 of 2020) [2022] KEELC 3133 (KLR) and Njogu v Mbutura (ELC Case E062 of 2021) [2023] KEMC 318 (KLR). 47. Counsel submitted that both the original counterclaim and the proposed amended counterclaim are wholly dependent on the subject matter of the main suit, which question was conclusively settled by the consent of 7th March, 2022 rendering them moot. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/1657/eng@2026-03-05 5
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48. The 2nd Defendant filed written submissions on 24th February, 2026. Counsel argued that a party must demonstrate a suficient legal interest in the subject matter, citing Khelef Khalifa El-Busaidy v Commissioner of Lands & 2 Others [2002] eKLR, it was submitted that the impugned consent was voluntarily entered into by the Plaintifi and the 2nd Defendant and was not vitiated by fraud, collusion, misrepresentation or illegality. Counsel also cited Flora N. Wasike v Destimo Wamboko [1988] eKLR. 49. Counsel further contended that the 1st Defendant was neither a party nor privy to the consent and therefore lacks standing to challenge it, relying on Gideon Kitavi Mbuuko & Another v Cosmas Mrombo Moka t/a Madaltex Enterprises [2019] eKLR on the doctrine of privity. 50. On the proposed amendment, Counsel submitted that the 1st Defendant’s counterclaim dated 1st June 2009 lies only against the Plaintifi and contains no claim against the 2nd Defendant. The consent conclusively settled the dispute and cannot be reopened to introduce a belated and time-barred crossclaim. If any claim exists, it should be pursued in a fresh suit. Analysis & Determination 51. Having considered the Motion, responses and submissions, the issues that arise for determination are: i. Whether the Application is competent and if so, ii. Whether the court should revoke and set aside the consent orders adopted on the 7th March, 2022? iii. Whether leave should be granted to the 1st Defendant to amend its amend its Defence and Counterclaim as per the annexed Draft? I. Whether the Application is competent? 52. In response to the Motion, the Plaintifi and the 2nd Defendant filed preliminary objections whose import was that the Application is incompetent and untenable in law. 53. They contended that following the withdrawal of the suit and adoption of the consent orders, the court became functus oficio and therefore lacked jurisdiction to entertain the present Motion. It was further argued that the 1st Defendant lacks locus standi; that leave of the court was not obtained under Section 432 of the Insolvency Act; that the proposed cross-claim introduces a new and time-barred cause of action. 54. Further, it is alleged that a new party is sought to be enjoined without leave under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Rules; and that the alleged appointment of the co-provisional liquidators is invalid under Section 437 of the Insolvency Act. 55. The law governing preliminary objections is well settled. In Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors (1969) EA 696, the court held that a preliminary objection must raise a pure point of law capable of disposing of the matter on the assumption that all pleaded facts are correct. The same principles were reafirmed by the Supreme Court in Hassan Ali Joho & Another v Suleiman Said Shahbal & 2 Others [2014] eKLR. 56. Applying those principles to the objections raised, it is evident that they are not confined to pure points of law. The issues raised such as the authority of the alleged provisional liquidators, the nature of the proposed cross-claim, and the surrounding circumstances of the Application inevitably require interrogation of contested facts and the exercise of judicial discretion. They are therefore not sustainable as preliminary objections. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/1657/eng@2026-03-05 6
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57. Nonetheless, the same contentions have also been raised in the replying afidavits by the Plaintifi, the 2nd Defendant and the Interested Parties. These arguments therefore remain part of the substantive opposition to the Motion and must be addressed on their merits. 58. For clarity, the court will at this stage confine itself to the question of competence only in so far as it relates to whether it is functus, whether leave was required under the Insolvency Act before the present proceedings could be instituted and legitimacy of the 1st Defendants deponents. 59. The remaining objections including those touching the efiect and finality of the consent orders, and the 1st Defendant’s locus, as well as the propriety of the proposed cross-claim will be addressed under the subsequent issues for determination. 60. The doctrine of functus oficio embodies the principle of finality in litigation, signifying that once a court has rendered its decision, it has exhausted its mandate over the matter. This position was afirmed by the Supreme Court in Odinga v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 3 others (Petition 5 of 2013) [2013] KESC 2 (KLR). 61. However, the doctrine does not operate to completely divest a court of jurisdiction. A court retains limited authority to entertain applications recognized in law, including applications for review, clarification, or setting aside of its orders where proper grounds are demonstrated. Consequently, the mere adoption of a consent order determining a suit does not render the court incapable of considering an application seeking its variation or setting aside. 62. It is not in dispute that the 1st Defendant is under liquidation and that the present Motion has been brought through its joint provisional liquidators. The 2nd Defendant contends that, pursuant to Section 432 of the Insolvency Act, 2015, leave of the court ought to have been obtained before instituting the present proceedings. 63. Section 432 of the Insolvency Act addresses the consequences of a liquidation order and restricts the commencement or continuation of proceedings against a company in liquidation without leave of the court. 64. The position of the law was clarified in In re Resolution Insurance Company Limited (Insolvency Petition E077 of 2023) [2025] KEHC 1949 (KLR), where the court held that while the jurisdiction to supervise liquidation fiows from Section 423 of the Insolvency Act, the requirement for leave under Section 432 applies only to proceedings brought against a company in liquidation. 65. The court in that decision rejected the contention that a liquidator must obtain leave under Section 432 to initiate or continue proceedings on behalf of the company. The statutory restriction is therefore directed at proceedings against the company, not proceedings commenced by it. Consequently, this objection is untenable. 66. As regards the alleged irregularity in the appointment of the provisional liquidators, that is not a matter that can be determined by the environment and land court. II. Whether the court should revoke and set aside the consent orders adopted on the 7th March, 2022? 67. The 1st Defendant asks this court to revoke and set aside the consent orders adopted on 7th March 2022, particularly the consent entered into between the Plaintifi and the Interested Parties. It is contended that the declaration within the consent recognizing the 2nd Defendant as proprietor of the suit property prejudicially afiects the 1st Defendant’s interest in the property despite its claim thereto. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/1657/eng@2026-03-05 7
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68. It is not in dispute that two consents were executed on 21st February 2022 and subsequently adopted as orders of the court on 7th March 2022. The first, between the Plaintifi and the 2nd Defendant, discharged the injunction issued on 10th December 2015 and marked the suit against the 1st and 3rd Defendants as withdrawn. 69. The second, between the Plaintifi and the 6th–26th Interested Parties, provided a framework for settling claims arising from the Interested Parties’ purchase of parcels within the suit land from the Plaintifi, including verification of purchase documents and refund of the purchase price with interest upon agreed terms. 70. The law governing the setting aside of a consent judgment is well settled. In In re Estate of RBC (Civil Appeal 117 of 2019) [2023] KECA 1553 (KLR), the Court of Appeal, citing Board of Trustees National Social Security Fund v Michael Mwalo [2015] eKLR, reiterated that a consent order has contractual efiect and may only be interfered with on grounds that would justify rescission of a contract, such as fraud, collusion, misrepresentation, mistake or an agreement contrary to public policy. 71. Before considering whether that threshold has been met, the issue of locus standi arises. It is admitted that the 1st Defendant was not a party to either of the consents, which expressly identify the Plaintifi, the 2nd Defendant and the Interested Parties as the consenting parties. Guided by the doctrine of privity, as afirmed in Flora N. Wasike v Destimo Wamboko [1988] eKLR, a consent binds only the parties to it. In those circumstances, the 1st Defendant lacks locus standi to impeach the impugned consents. 72. Even assuming, arguendo, that the 1st Defendant could surmount the hurdle of locus, no evidence has been placed before this court demonstrating fraud, collusion, misrepresentation, non-disclosure of material facts or any other vitiating factor that would justify rescinding the consent. 73. The 1st Defendant merely asserts in its afidavit that it has “since established” that the transfer of L.R. No. 11329 Kasarani from the 1st Defendant to the 2nd Defendant on or about 3rd June 2011 was fraudulent, null and void, and that this information was not available at the time the consent was recorded. The Applicant does not explain why this material was dificult to find, considering that the date between the transaction and the impugned consent is ten (10) years apart. It is my opinion and I so hold that it is not suficient just to say the material was not available to a party without stating reasons. 74. Moreover, the record shows that the 1st Defendant’s counsel was present in court when the consents were adopted, and he indeed raised no objection at that time. 75. In the premises, the 1st Defendant, not being a party to the impugned consents, lacks locus to challenge them, and in any event no vitiating factor has been demonstrated that would warrant the court’s intervention. Accordingly, the threshold for setting aside a consent judgment has not been met. 76. However, the court does not agree with the contention by the Plaintifi and the other Respondents that the 1st Defendant’s counterclaim was constructively withdrawn upon adoption of the consent and withdrawal of the suit against it. In law, a counterclaim constitutes a distinct and independent cause of action. Accordingly, under Order 7 Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the withdrawal or discontinuance of the main suit does not automatically extinguish a counterclaim. In the absence of an express withdrawal or dismissal, the 1st Defendant’s counterclaim dated 1st June 2009 remains on record. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/1657/eng@2026-03-05 8
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III. Whether leave should be granted to the 1st Defendant to amend its amend its Defence and Counterclaim as per the annexed Draft? 77. The 1st Defendant also asks for leave to amend its Defence and Counterclaim so as to introduce a crossclaim against the 2nd Defendant, premised on the alleged discovery of new information relating to the 2011 transfer of the suit property. It contends that such amendment is necessary to enable the court to efiectually and completely determine the real questions in controversy between the parties. 78. In response, it is asserted that the proposed amendment is legally untenable as it seeks to introduce an entirely new cause of action against the 2nd Defendant long after the suit was settled by consent and the claim against the 1st Defendant withdrawn. 79. It is further argued that the counterclaim on record is directed solely against the Plaintifi, contains no claim against the 2nd Defendant, and that any intended claim ought properly to be pursued in a fresh suit rather than grafted onto concluded proceedings. 80. As aforesaid, the suit against the 1st Defendant was withdrawn pursuant to the consent adopted on 7th March 2022. What this means is that there is presently no subsisting claim against the 1st Defendant within which a defence may lie. 81. While the counterclaim remains on record as an independent cause of action against the Plaintifi, there is no procedural foundation for the introduction of a cross-claim against the 2nd Defendant in the absence of a live suit between those parties. 82. The amendment sought would, in efiect, revive or reconfigure proceedings that were conclusively settled and would introduce a new dispute between the 1st and 2nd Defendants under the guise of amendment. In the circumstances, the amendment, in the manner sought, is untenable and leave is declined. 83. In conclusion, for the reasons outlined herein, the Motion dated 20th April 2022, is deemed unmerited and is hereby dismissed with costs. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT KISII VIA VIRTUAL PLATFORM THIS 5TH OF MARCH, 2026. A. OMOLLO JUDGE https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/1657/eng@2026-03-05 9
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