Terakate Properties Limited v Develco Investments Limited (in Liquidation) & 28 others (Environment and Land Case 3 of 2009) [2026] KEELC 1657 (KLR)
The bottom line
#The Environment and Land Court in Kisii dismissed a liquidated company's bid to overturn consent orders settling a long-running land dispute, with costs awarded against it.
What this practically means
#Executive summary
#Key legal issues
#Competence of the application: functus officio, insolvency leave, and validity of the liquidators' appointment
The preliminary objections failed as they were not confined to pure points of law. The court was not functus officio because it retains limited authority to entertain applications for setting aside its orders; leave under Section 432 of the Insolvency Act was not required because that provision restricts proceedings against a company in liquidation, not proceedings commenced by it; and the validity of the provisional liquidators' appointment is not justiciable in the Environment and Land Court.
The court first applied the Mukisa Biscuit test and found the objections required interrogation of contested facts and judicial discretion, so they could not stand as preliminary objections. On functus officio, it adopted the Supreme Court's Odinga decision on finality but held the doctrine does not divest a court of all jurisdiction — applications recognized in law, including to set aside orders, remain entertainable. On insolvency leave, it followed In re Resolution Insurance Company Limited, holding Section 432 targets proceedings against, not by, a company in liquidation. The validity of the liquidators' appointment was held to fall outside the ELC's jurisdiction.
Whether the consent orders of 7th March 2022 should be set aside
The court declined to set aside the consent orders. The 1st Defendant was not a party to either consent and, under the doctrine of privity, lacks locus standi to impeach them. Even assuming locus, no vitiating factor — fraud, collusion, misrepresentation, non-disclosure or mistake — was demonstrated. The mere assertion that material was 'not available' at the time of the consent, without explanation, was insufficient given the ten-year gap between the 2011 transfer and the 2022 consent.
The court applied the settled principle that a consent order has contractual effect and may be interfered with only on grounds justifying rescission of a contract, citing In re Estate of RBC and Brooke Bond Liebig v Mallya. It observed that the 1st Defendant's counsel was present when the consents were adopted and raised no objection. However, the court rejected the respondents' contention that the counterclaim was constructively withdrawn, holding a counterclaim is an independent cause of action surviving under Order 7 Rule 13 in the absence of express withdrawal or dismissal.
Whether leave should be granted to amend the Defence and Counterclaim to introduce a cross-claim against the 2nd Defendant
Leave to amend was declined. With the suit against the 1st Defendant withdrawn, no subsisting claim remains within which a defence may lie; the counterclaim survives only against the Plaintiff, and there is no procedural foundation for introducing a cross-claim against the 2nd Defendant absent a live suit between those parties.
The court reasoned that the amendment sought would in effect revive or reconfigure proceedings conclusively settled by the consent and would introduce an entirely new dispute between the 1st and 2nd Defendants under the guise of amendment. Such a claim, if it exists, should be pursued in a fresh suit rather than grafted onto concluded proceedings. Accordingly, the amendment in the manner sought was untenable and leave was declined, resulting in dismissal of the entire Motion with costs.
Legal principles established
#- Preliminary objections must raise pure points of law capable of disposing of the matter on the assumption that all pleaded facts are correct; objections requiring interrogation of contested facts and judicial discretion are not sustainable
- The functus officio doctrine does not completely divest a court of jurisdiction; a court retains limited authority to entertain applications for review, clarification, or setting aside of its orders where proper grounds are demonstrated
- The leave requirement under Section 432 of the Insolvency Act applies only to proceedings brought against a company in liquidation, not to proceedings commenced by or on behalf of the company by its liquidator
- A consent order has contractual effect and binds only the parties to it; a stranger to the consent lacks locus standi to challenge it
- A counterclaim constitutes a distinct and independent cause of action which survives withdrawal or discontinuance of the main suit under Order 7 Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Rules, absent express withdrawal or dismissal
Court orders
#- 1.The Notice of Motion dated 20th April 2022 is dismissed
- 2.Costs of the Motion awarded to the Plaintiffs/Respondents
- Jurisdiction invoked
- Original civil jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court over land matters; insolvency supervision pursuant to the Insolvency Act, 2015 considered but Section 432 leave held not applicable to proceedings by a company in liquidation
Key timeline
#Practical implications
#Frequently asked questions
#Cite this brief
#Cite this brief
Caselaw, "Terakate Properties Limited v Develco Investments Limited (in Liquidation) & 28 others (Environment and Land Case 3 of 2009) [2026] KEELC 1657 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2026). Not stated in the extract provided. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/1657/eng@2026-03-05
Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.