Skip to content
AI-generated case briefs sourced from Kenya Law · Not legal advice
AI-generated case brief
Case Brief · caselaw.co.ke
Court of AppealPartially AllowedCivil Appeal No. 342 of 2014

Equator Distributors v Joel Muriu & 3 others [2018] KECA 53 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
20 December 2018
5,420 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~22 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

#

Kenya's Court of Appeal ruled that a vehicle seller's company—not the buyer—bears liability for its driver's negligence, because vicarious liability follows employment, not ownership.

What this practically means

#

Executive summary

#
This first appeal concerned liability for a fatal road traffic accident of 10th April 1999 near Makindu between a lorry (KAL 970G) driven by the 2nd respondent, an employee of the 3rd respondent vendor, and a combi (KAK 902Z). Four people died, including Rachael Wangui Muriu, on whose estate the 1st respondent sued. The trial court (A. Aroni J) apportioned negligence at 70% against the lorry driver and 30% against the other driver, and held the appellant buyer vicariously liable for the 70% because property and risk in the vehicle had passed to it; the seller, acting as a gratuitous agent in delivering the vehicle to Voi, was absolved. The Court of Appeal, comprising Nambuye, Makhandia and Otieno-Odek JJA in a single judgment of the court, dismissed the challenges to the 1st respondent's locus standi under a limited grant ad colligenda bona and to the weight given the police sketch map, holding the map to be an item of evidence carrying probative value but not binding on the court. However, the Court found the trial judge had misapprehended the law by pegging liability on legal ownership. Reaffirming John Nderi Wamugi and Anyanzwa v. Luigi De Casper, it held vicarious liability depends not on ownership but on the delegation of tasks or duty; the 3rd respondent, as the driver's employer and bailee of the vehicle for delivery, was vicariously liable instead of the appellant. The appellant's claim for contractual indemnity failed, indemnity being founded on contract and the delivery arrangement not being contractual. The quantum of Ksh. 582,575/= was affirmed; the 70% liability and costs were borne by the appellant and the 2nd and 3rd respondents jointly and severally, with the 4th respondent bearing its own costs. The appeal was partially allowed.

Questions the Court framed

#

The issues the Court set itself to decide, in its own words.

  1. 1.Whether the 1st respondent had locus standi, under a limited grant ad colligenda bona, to institute and maintain the suit on behalf of the estate of the deceased
  2. 2.What probative value attaches to a police sketch map of a road traffic accident scene
  3. 3.Whether the trial judge erred in evaluating the evidence on causation and in finding contributory negligence against the drivers
  4. 4.Who, between the appellant (buyer) and the 3rd respondent (seller/vendor), bears the 70% liability for the negligence of the 2nd respondent driver, having regard to vicarious liability, gratuitous agency and the bailor-bailee relationship
  5. 5.Whether the appellant is entitled to indemnity from the 3rd respondent

Key legal issues

#
01

Locus standi under a limited grant ad colligenda bona

Holding

The 1st respondent, holding a limited grant of letters of administration ad colligenda bona issued for the purpose of instituting the proceedings, had legal capacity and locus to institute and maintain the suit.

Reasoning

The Court examined the limited grant dated 2nd July 1999 issued in High Court Succession Cause No. 1204 of 1999 in respect of the estate of Rachel Wangui Muriu. The grant expressly limited the purpose to instituting proceedings in the suit. On that basis the Court was satisfied the 1st respondent had capacity and locus, rejecting the appellant's contention that only a full grant conferred capacity to sue. The trial court's finding to the same effect was affirmed.

p. 4
02

Probative value of a police sketch map

Holding

A police sketch map prepared after the event is not an eye-witness account, but it carries probative value showing the relative positions of vehicles immediately after the accident; it is merely an item of evidence and not binding on the court.

Reasoning

Drawing on comparative authority (People v. Benson; West v. Jaloff) and Kenyan authority on point-of-impact evidence, the Court held a police sketch depicts the layout of the scene and the relationship of vehicles to the surroundings, shedding light on speed and direction. The court, not the sketch, determines the facts from all the evidence. The appellant failed to show the trial court acted on wrong material in giving weight to the sketch.

p. 5
03

Vicarious liability as between buyer and seller after sale of a motor vehicle

Holding

The trial court misapprehended the law by pegging liability on legal ownership; vicarious liability rests on the employer/employee relationship, so the 3rd respondent, as employer of the driver, bears the 70% liability, not the appellant buyer.

Reasoning

The Court reaffirmed John Nderi Wamugi and Anyanzwa v. Luigi De Casper, holding that pegging vicarious liability on legal ownership to the exclusion of employer/employee relationship would amount to grave injustice. The 3rd respondent had supervisory power over its driver, not the appellant. The appellant's liability, if any, rested on putting its vehicle in the possession of the 3rd respondent, who engaged a negligent driver, and on the duty of care owed to other road users. The delivery arrangement, being outside the sale contract, was governed by negligence and bailor-bailee law.

p. 5
04

Liability of a gratuitous agent/bailee

Holding

The 3rd respondent, though a gratuitous agent delivering the vehicle as a good gesture, was a bailee owing a duty of care to the bailor, and as employer of the negligent driver was vicariously liable; a gratuitous agent's liability is founded in tort.

Reasoning

The arrangement to deliver the lorry from Nairobi to Voi was not part of the sale agreement. The relationship for delivery was one of bailor and bailee, and the bailee owes a duty of care to the bailor. There is no absolute rule that a gratuitous agent or bailee is not liable to the principal; the liability is founded in tort. The 3rd respondent owed a duty to instruct a driver who would exercise due care and skill. Shiells v. Blackburne and Wilson v. Brett, relied on by the respondents, did not avail them on these facts.

p. 5
05

Indemnity between appellant and 3rd respondent

Holding

The appellant was not entitled to indemnity from the 3rd respondent because indemnity is founded on contract and no contractual relationship existed for purposes of delivery; at most, a right to damages arises.

Reasoning

The Court adopted Bowen L.J.'s dictum in Birmingham and District Land Company v. London and North Western Railway Company distinguishing a right to indemnity as such, which flows from the original bargain, from a right to damages which attaches to breach of contract. Since the delivery arrangement was held not to be contractual, the appellant's Third Party Claim for indemnity failed.

p. 5
06

Contributory negligence and causation

Holding

The trial court did not err in finding both drivers negligent and apportioning liability at 70% against the driver of KAL 970G and 30% against the driver of KAK 902Z.

Reasoning

The Court found the loss of four lives indicative of imprudent behaviour by both drivers; a motorist must exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable speed to keep the vehicle under control. The police sketch showing the point of impact in the middle of the road supported the finding that the lorry driver bore the larger share of blame. The trial court's apportionment was upheld as between the negligent drivers, though the burden is now borne by the 3rd respondent vicariously with the 2nd respondent and shared by the appellant.

p. 5

Legal principles established

#
  • Vicarious liability depends not on ownership of a motor vehicle but on the delegation of tasks or duty, i.e. the employer/employee or agent/principal relationship with emphasis on who employed and controlled the tortfeasor.
  • There is no absolute rule that a gratuitous agent or gratuitous bailee is not liable to the principal; the liability of a gratuitous agent is founded in tort, not contract.
  • A police sketch map of a road traffic accident is not an eye-witness account but carries probative value as an item of evidence showing the relative positions of vehicles immediately after the accident; it is not binding on the court.
  • A limited grant of letters of administration ad colligenda bona, issued limited for the purpose of instituting proceedings, bestows locus standi on its holder to institute and maintain those proceedings.
  • A right to damages is not a right to indemnity as such; a right to indemnity as such is given by the original bargain between the parties, while the right to damages follows from breach of the original contract.
  • A bailee owes a duty of care to the bailor, is expected to return the bailed goods when the time for possession is over, and is presumed liable if the goods are not returned, though the bailee is not an insurer of the goods' safety.

Court orders

#
  1. 1.Affirmation of the damages awarded to the 1st respondent, subject to the issue of liability
  2. 2.Setting aside of the trial court's finding that the appellant is vicariously liable for the negligence of the 2nd respondent
  3. 3.Substitution of a finding that the 3rd respondent is vicariously liable for the negligence of the 2nd respondent
  4. 4.A finding that the appellant and the 3rd respondent are jointly liable for the 70% contributory negligence, sharing it proportionately one third each with the 2nd respondent
  5. 5.Upholding of the total quantum of damages of Ksh. 582,575/= as awarded by the trial court
  6. 6.The decree to be executed against the appellant, the 2nd and 3rd respondents jointly and severally, to the exclusion of the 4th respondent
  7. 7.The appellant, 2nd and 3rd respondents to jointly and severally bear the 1st respondent's costs before the High Court and in this appeal
  8. 8.The 4th respondent to bear its own costs in the High Court and in this appeal

The bench

#

One judgment of the whole court — no separate or dissenting opinions.

majority
majority
majority
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Nairobi
HCCC No. 2116 of 1999
Jurisdiction invoked
First appeal to the Court of Appeal under the appellate jurisdiction conferred by Article 164 of the Constitution (as a first appeal from the High Court)

Relief refused

#

Indemnity by the appellant from the 3rd respondent

Indemnity is founded on contract and there was no contractual relationship between the parties for purposes of delivery of the motor vehicle to Voi; at most the appellant would have a right to damages, not indemnity as such

p. 5

Costs

The appellant, the 2nd and 3rd respondents to jointly and severally bear the cost of the 1st respondent before the High Court and in this appeal, and to proportionately bear one third of the costs and liability in the 70% contributory negligence; the 4th respondent shall bear its own costs at the High Court and in this appeal.

Quotable passages

#

Verbatim from the judgment, each located to the page it appears on in the official PDF — so these can be cited and checked directly.

Accordingly, we set aside the finding of the trial court that the appellant is vicariously liable for the negligence of the 2nd respondent. In its place, we make a finding that the 3rd respondent is vicariously liable for the negligence of the 2nd respondent.
p. 6Final orders - reversal of vicarious liability finding
For avoidance of doubt, the decree that flowed from the trial court shall be executed as against the appellant, the 2nd and 3rd respondents, jointly and severally, to the total exclusion of the 4th respondent.
p. 6Final orders - execution of decree
The appellant, the 2nd and 3rd respondents to proportionately bear one third of the costs and liability in the 70% contributory negligence. The 4th respondent shall bear its own costs at the High Court and in this appeal.
p. 6Final orders - costs and apportionment
vicarious liability depends not on ownership but on the delegation of tasks or duty.
p. 3Principle of vicarious liability
There is no absolute rule that a gratuitous agent or gratuitous bailee is not liable to the principal. Even a gratuitous agent can become liable to his principal. The liability of a gratuitous agent is not founded on contract but in tort.
p. 5Liability of gratuitous agent
Based on this limited grant, we are satisfied that the 1st respondent has legal capacity and locus to institute and maintain the instant proceedings.
p. 4Locus standi under limited grant
A police sketch map is just but an item of evidence to be considered.
p. 5Probative value of police sketch map

Issues in the judgment

#
minor

Internal inconsistency in registration numbers: the sale vehicle is referred to as KAL 970G but paragraph 14 ground (iv) refers to KAL 907 G, and paragraph 12 (trial court quote) refers to the purchased vehicle as KAK 902 Z where it clearly means KAL 970 G

minor

The delivery instruction is described inconsistently: paragraph 2 states delivery to Voi was 'gratuitously agreed', while the judgment later holds the 3rd respondent was an agent and bailee of the appellant, and paragraph 37 states the delivery arrangement 'was not part of the sale agreement'

Key timeline

#

Practical implications

#

Frequently asked questions

#

Later judgments citing this (5)

#

Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.

Cite this brief

#

Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Equator Distributors v Joel Muriu & 3 others [2018] KECA 53 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2018). Civil Appeal No. 342 of 2014. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2018/53/eng@2018-12-20

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.