County Government of Nyeri & another v Cecilia Wangechi Ndungu

Reading sections 40 and 31(a) together as a whole, the court discerned two dismissal routes. Section 40 requires County Assembly-initiated process on specified grounds including investigation and representation rights; section 31(a) allows the Governor, on his own motion, to dismiss if he considers it appropriate or necessary. The Governor's initial letter under section 40(1) was corrected to invoke section 31(a), confirming only the latter permits dismissal on the Governor's own motion.

Drawing on B.P. Singhal, Wade & Forsyth and Dunsmuir, the court held that in a democracy under the rule of law, no authority has the right to do as it pleases. Section 31(a) must be interpreted in light of constitutional values, Article 10 national values and devolution principles. The Governor's discretion is impliedly limited: it must be exercised reasonably, for the public good and benefit of the county. While no disciplinary hearing is mandated, appropriateness or necessity requires reasons making the dismissal appropriate or necessary.

The burden lay on the respondent to establish arbitrariness. The dismissal letter gave no circumstances for termination, no evidence of reasons was tendered, and the appellants maintained the Governor need give no reasons at all. That posture itself demonstrated arbitrariness. The court affirmed the Industrial Court's finding that the respondent's right to fair administrative action was violated.

Article 260 defines State Offices to include a member of the executive committee of a county government. The Employment Act governs contract-of-employment relationships; State Officers' terms are instead regulated by the Constitution or relevant statute, principles of fair administrative action and rules of natural justice. The Industrial Court therefore erred insofar as it applied employment law due process, though its fair-administrative-action finding survived.

The appellants argued judicial review orders could not issue in a petition since judicial review has its own procedure under the Law Reform Act and Order 53. The court rejected this, holding that a petition under Article 22 attracts the full remedial power under Article 23, expressly including an order of judicial review.