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Court of AppealDismissedCivil Appeal 109 of 2004· [2007] KECA 476 (KLR)

Abubakar Zain Ahmed v Premier Savings & Finance Limited & 4 others [2007] KECA 476 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
29 June 2007
3,929 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal dismissed a land-fraud claim because it was filed too late and relied on a Power of Attorney that third parties could validly trust.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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The appellant, administrator of the estate of Latifa Said Ahmed, sued several parties claiming that charges over two Mombasa properties had been unlawfully created and registered after Latifa's death, through the misuse of a General Power of Attorney by her father, the 2nd respondent, in conspiracy with the lender, its advocate and the land registrar. The High Court (Onyancha, J) on 4th March 2004 struck out and dismissed the suit as against the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents as disclosing no reasonable cause of action and being frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process, leaving the appellant free to proceed against the 2nd respondent only. The appellant appealed on twelve grounds; the 1st, 3rd and 4th respondents filed cross-appeals. The Court of Appeal (Tunoi, Githinji and Waki, JJA, in a single judgment of the court) affirmed. It restated the settled principles that striking out under Order 6 rule 13 is discretionary and drastic, to be exercised only in plain and obvious cases where the pleading is hopeless and incurable by amendment. The Court held that no valid conspiracy was pleaded because the respondents were never notified of Latifa's death as required under section 116(4) of the Registered Land Act, so the Power of Attorney subsisted under section 117(1) and they properly relied on it at face value. It further held the tort claims were hopelessly time barred under the Limitation of Actions Act and the suit was beyond redemption by amendment. The appeal was dismissed, the 1st, 3rd and 4th respondents' cross-appeal allowed, the 2nd respondent's cross-appeal dismissed, with costs to the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents against the appellant.

Key legal issues

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01

Principles governing striking out of pleadings under Order 6 rule 13

Holding

Striking out is discretionary, drastic and to be exercised only in plain and obvious cases in the clearest of cases; the principles from D.T. Dobie v Muchina and related authorities govern

Reasoning

The Court traced the settled jurisprudence from D.T. Dobie & Co v Muchina, Wenlock v Moloney, Nitin Properties, and other authorities, holding that parties are not lightly to be driven from the seat of judgment and that striking out is a drastic remedy to be used with extreme caution, only where the pleading is hopeless and beyond redemption by amendment. The Court applied these principles to the High Court's striking out of the amended plaint.

p. 5
02

Whether a valid cause of action in conspiracy was disclosed against the respondents

Holding

No valid allegation of conspiracy was made out on the pleadings; the respondents acted within their ordinary duties and could rely on the Power of Attorney absent notification of Latifa's death

Reasoning

The Court held that none of the respondents was ever notified of Latifa's death as required under section 116(4) of the Registered Land Act, so the Power of Attorney subsisted under section 117(1). The respondents relied on it properly at face value, their actions were not out of the ordinary, and thus no leg existed for the averment of conspiracy during the loan negotiations, registration of charges, or transfer of the 1st respondent's business.

p. 6
03

Limitation of actions in tort

Holding

The appellant's claims, being in tort for acts occurring between 1987 and 1998 and within his knowledge by 25th May 1998, were time barred under the Limitation of Actions Act

Reasoning

The Court agreed with the High Court that all the acts on which the appellant built his case were torts actionable only within three years of occurrence unless the period was enlarged under the Limitation of Actions Act. No evidence of enlargement was placed before the Court. The claim was therefore hopelessly time barred and hopeless, and sustaining it would serve no purpose.

p. 6
04

Whether the suit was curable by amendment

Holding

The suit was incurably bad and beyond cure by amendment; the High Court was right that allowing it to trial would waste the parties' resources on a claim bound to fail

Reasoning

While courts generally grant leave to amend defective pleadings, the facts here - principally hopeless time-bar - militated against further amendment. An amendment had already been made with leave. The Court adopted the High Court's observation that allowing the claim to trial would only waste money on a cause of action that must eventually fail, and allowed the respondents' cross-appeal on this ground.

p. 7

Legal principles established

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  • The power to strike out a pleading under Order 6 rule 13 is discretionary, permissive, and to be exercised only in plain and obvious cases with great care and circumspection
  • A suit may be summarily dismissed only where it is so hopeless that it plainly and obviously discloses no reasonable cause of action and is beyond redemption by amendment; a mere semblance of a cause of action curable by amendment should go to trial
  • In the absence of notification of the donor's death as required under the Registered Land Act, a general Power of Attorney subsists under section 117(1) and third parties may properly rely on it at its face value

Court orders

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  1. 1.The appellant's appeal is dismissed
  2. 2.The Notice of Cross-Appeal by the 1st, 3rd and 4th respondents is allowed on the ground that the proposed amendment could not breathe life into the appellant's claim against them
  3. 3.The Notice of Cross-Appeal filed by the 2nd respondent is dismissed with costs
  4. 4.The 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents shall have the costs of the appeal and of the Notices of Cross-Appeal against the appellant

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Registered Land Actsection 117(1)
  • Registered Land Actsection 116(4)
  • Registered Land ActCap 300
  • Limitation of Actions ActCap 22
  • Civil Procedure RulesOrder VI rules 13 and 16; Section 3A

Cases cited (6)

  • D.T. DOBIE & CO. (K) LTD V MUCHINA
    [1982] KLR page 1
  • WENLOCK V HALONEY & OTHERS
    [1965] I WLR 1238 at page 1242
  • NITIN PROPERTIES V. JAGIR SINGH KALSI
    Nairobi C.A. NO. 132/89 (unreported)
  • SAMUEL KANYI GITONGA V. PETER MUGWERU
    Nairobi HCCC No. 3356/89 (unreported)
  • TRADE BANK LTD. V. KERSAM
    Nairobi HCCC No. 6662/91 (unreported)
  • Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edn. Vol. 37, para 430
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Mombasa
H.C.C.C. No. 327 of 2001
Jurisdiction invoked
First appeal to the Court of Appeal under the Civil Procedure Act/Rules (provision not expressly stated in the judgment)

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Later judgments citing this (21)

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Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.

Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Abubakar Zain Ahmed v Premier Savings & Finance Limited & 4 others [2007] KECA 476 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2007). Civil Appeal 109 of 2004. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2007/476/eng@2007-06-29

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.