Skip to content
AI-generated case briefs sourced from Kenya Law · Not legal advice
AI-generated case brief
Case Brief · caselaw.co.ke
Court of AppealPartially AllowedCivil Appeal No. 314 of 2000· [2005] KECA 16 (KLR)

Johnson Evan Gicheru v Andrew Morton & 1 other

Court of Appeal of Kenya
14 October 2005
3,824 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~15 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

#

Kenya's Court of Appeal tripled a libel award to Kshs.6 million, ruling that a defendant's refusal to apologise worsens damages.

What this practically means

#

Executive summary

#
This was an appeal by Johnson Evan Gicheru, then Chief Justice of Kenya, against the quantum of damages awarded by Aluoch, J of the High Court at Nairobi in a libel action against author Andrew Morton and publisher Michael O'Mara Books Limited over passages in the book 'Moi the Making of an African Statesman'. The passages, published in 1998 and serialized locally, suggested that Gicheru, as chairman of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the death of Dr Robert Ouko, had been compromised by a suspect and was out to whitewash the perpetrators. The defence was struck out and the libel proved at formal proof; the trial judge awarded Kshs.2,000,000 general and Kshs.250,000 exemplary damages. Tunoi, JA, writing the leading judgment, restated the classic restraint on appellate interference with damages but found the trial judge had acted on incorrect principle by overlooking the respondents' iniquity, the appellant's absolute blamelessness, the refusal to apologise or expunge the passages, and their obstructive conduct before and during trial. The Court also surveyed recent High Court libel awards and deprecated them as lacking juridical basis and manifestly excessive, declining to follow the Kshs.30 million Biwott award as a compromised deal. Applying the Jones v Pollard checklist, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the awards, and substituted a composite award of Kshs.6,000,000 with interest at court rates, making no separate exemplary award and awarding the appellant the costs of the appeal. Omolo, JA concurred fully in a separate short judgment.

Key legal issues

#
01

Test for interference by an appellate court with a trial judge's award of damages

Holding

The Court adopted the Rook v Rairrie principle as echoed in Butt v Khan: interference is justified only where the judge acted on a wrong principle of law or the award is so extremely high or so very small as to be an entirely erroneous estimate.

Reasoning

The Court restated the classic restraint principle: it would be disinclined to disturb a trial judge's award merely because it would have given a larger sum. Reversal requires proof of a wrong principle of law or an award so extreme as to be an entirely erroneous estimate of the damage. The Court nevertheless found both limbs satisfied here because the trial judge overlooked fundamental aggravating aspects of the libel and the victim.

p. 4
02

Whether the awards of Kshs.2,000,000 general and Kshs.250,000 exemplary damages were inadequate

Holding

Yes. The trial judge based the awards on incorrect principle by overlooking fundamental aspects of the libel and the victim, including the respondents' iniquity, the absolute blamelessness of the appellant, and the permanence of the libel in print.

Reasoning

The trial judge failed to express her sense of the iniquity of the respondents or consider the absolute blamelessness of the victim. The respondents refused any retraction or apology, asserted the passages were not defamatory, and behaved obstructively at trial. Because the offending passages remained in the book, the libel lives on permanently. Taking aggravation into account, the awards were inadequate and based on incorrect principle.

p. 6
03

The proper measure of the substituted award

Holding

A composite award of Kshs.6,000,000 was a fair and reasonable solatium, with no separate award of exemplary damages, bearing interest at court rates.

Reasoning

Drawing on the Jones v Pollard checklist of compensable factors and the restitution principle in Broom v Cassel, the Court weighed the gravity of the libel, the appellant's position, the respondents' refusal to apologise, and their conduct before and during trial. Aggregating these aggravating elements, the Court fixed a single composite sum rather than separate general and exemplary awards.

p. 6
04

Weight to be attached to recent High Court libel comparables

Holding

The High Court comparables surveyed lacked juridical basis, were potentially manifestly excessive, and should not be treated as persuasive guidelines by trial courts.

Reasoning

The Court reviewed awards ranging from Kshs.1.5 million to Kshs.30 million and identified common features: they mostly concerned prominent political figures or high-ranking officials, the publications were largely 'gutter press', the defendants almost never defended the suits, and none had been tested on appeal. The trial judges appeared to have ignored basic fundamental principles for awarding libel damages, so the comparables carried no persuasive weight.

p. 6
05

Whether the refusal of an injunction was erroneous

Holding

The appellant's third ground attacked the refusal of an injunction, but the Court did not dispose of it expressly, dealing with the appeal through the quantum substitution.

Reasoning

The trial judge had refused an injunction on the basis that the book had been in circulation since 1998 and there was no evidence sales of the offending edition continued. Although the appellant argued that admitted publication with unexpunged passages made the refusal wrong, the Court's operative orders addressed only quantum, interest and costs, leaving the injunction issue effectively overtaken by the substitution of a higher award.

p. 7

Legal principles established

#
  • An appellate court will not disturb an award of damages unless it is so inordinately high or low as to represent an entirely erroneous estimate, or the judge proceeded on wrong principles or misapprehended the evidence in some material respect.
  • In libel actions the trial court may, in assessing damages, look at the whole conduct of the defendant from publication down to the verdict, including conduct before action, after action, and at trial.
  • Damages in a libel case are at large and the latitude in awarding them is very wide; a court of appeal must not simply substitute its own opinion for that of the trial judge.
  • The recent High Court libel awards catalogued in the judgment lack juridical basis, may be manifestly excessive, and should not be taken by trial courts as persuasive or as guidelines.

Court orders

#
  1. 1.Appeal allowed
  2. 2.Awards of Kshs.2,000,000 general damages and Kshs.250,000 exemplary damages made by the High Court set aside
  3. 3.Substituted composite award of Kshs.6,000,000 as general damages against the respondents
  4. 4.No separate award of exemplary damages
  5. 5.Award to bear interest at court rates
  6. 6.Appellant to have the costs of the appeal
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Nairobi
H.C.C.C. No. 214 of 1999
Jurisdiction invoked
First appeal to the Court of Appeal against the judgment and decree of the High Court in a civil libel suit

Key timeline

#

Practical implications

#

Frequently asked questions

#

Later judgments citing this (15)

#

Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.

Cite this brief

#

Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Johnson Evan Gicheru v Andrew Morton & 1 other", Case Analysis (2005). Civil Appeal No. 314 of 2000. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2005/16/eng@2005-10-14

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.