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Court of AppealPartially AllowedCivil Appeal No. 264 of 1996

Nairobi City Council v Thabiti Enterprises Ltd (Civil Appeal 264 of 1996) [1997] KECA 59 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
7 March 1997
10,412 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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·~42 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal voided a Kshs 80 million award because the judge decided a compensation claim no one had actually pleaded in the case.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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The Court of Appeal allowed, by a two-to-one majority, an appeal by Nairobi City Council against the ruling of Hayanga J refusing to review his own judgment of 27 September 1995, which awarded Thabiti Enterprises Limited Kshs 80,000,000 as the value of land L.R. 209/10466. Bosire J had earlier struck out the Council's defence and entered judgment for Thabiti on its plaint, which claimed only a permanent injunction, removal of erections and general damages for trespass, leaving damages for formal proof. At the formal proof, however, counsel for Thabiti prosecuted the claim as compensation for compulsory acquisition of the land, an issue never pleaded, and Hayanga J awarded the market value of the land. Akiwumi JA, with Tunoi JA concurring, held this was a glaring error apparent on the face of the record, inconsistent with Bosire J's ruling and with the decree itself, which should have compelled the judge to grant review. The majority further held, following Sande and Sheikh, that a judge has no jurisdiction to determine an unpleaded issue notwithstanding party acquiescence, and declined to follow Odd Jobs v Mubia. Lakha JA dissented: in his view the unpleaded issue, having been left to the court with the full participation and acquiescence of both parties, was properly before it; there was no error on the face of the record, no failure of justice, and the Council, having paid Kshs 1 million under the decree, had approbated the judgment. The appeal was allowed, the ruling refusing review and the judgment of 27 September 1995 were set aside, and each party was ordered to bear its own costs of the appeal, the Council having acquiesced in the trial.

Questions the Court framed

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The issues the Court set itself to decide, in its own words.

  1. 1.Whether the judgment of Hayanga J of 27 September 1995 contained an error apparent on the face of the record sufficient to warrant review under Order 44 rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
  2. 2.Whether the learned judge had jurisdiction to determine the compensation value of the suit land when that issue had not been pleaded and the pleadings were never amended, notwithstanding the acquiescence of the parties.
  3. 3.Whether the acquiescence and part-payment by the City Council barred it from seeking review of the judgment.
  4. 4.Whether 'any other sufficient reason' in Order 44 rule 1 is restricted to reasons analogous to the other enumerated grounds for review.

Key legal issues

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01

Error apparent on the face of the record as a ground of review

Holding

The majority held that Hayanga J's award of Kshs 80,000,000 as compensation for compulsory acquisition, when the only matter for formal proof was general damages for trespass under Bosire J's ruling, was a glaring error apparent on the face of the record which should have compelled him to grant review.

Reasoning

Bosire J had struck out the defence and entered judgment on the plaint, which claimed only injunction, removal of erections and general damages for trespass. The subsequent judgment awarding the value of the land was inconsistent with that ruling and with the decree itself, which recited the trespass-based prayers. The error was obvious and self-evident, and the trial judge himself had recognised the true issue before departing from it. Party acquiescence made no difference.

p. 9
02

Jurisdiction to determine unpleaded issues

Holding

The majority held that a judge has no jurisdiction to determine an issue not pleaded, even where the parties acquiesce in its determination; the only way to raise issues is through the pleadings.

Reasoning

Relying on Sande and Sheikh, the majority reaffirmed that pleadings define and delimit the matters in controversy and that relief not founded on the pleadings will not be given. Determination of compensation for acquisition of land did not flow naturally from a trespass claim and was a completely different issue. The trial judge's wrongful assumption of jurisdiction also amounted to 'any other sufficient reason' for review under Wangechi Kimita.

p. 6
03

Effect of acquiescence in an unpleaded issue (dissent)

Holding

Lakha JA dissented, holding that where parties acquiesce in an unpleaded issue and leave it to the court for decision, the court may properly determine it, and such determination discloses no error on the face of the record.

Reasoning

Following Odd Jobs v Mubia, Nkalubo v Kibirige and Railways Corporation v East African Road Services, Lakha JA held that an unpleaded issue left to the court with the full participation of both parties becomes an issue at the trial. It is not for the judge to refuse the case the parties choose to present. He also found the City Council, having paid Kshs 1 million under the decree, had approbated the judgment and could not attack it.

p. 15
04

Scope of review jurisdiction under section 80 and Order 44 rule 1

Holding

The court confirmed that 'any other sufficient reason' for review need not be analogous to the other enumerated grounds, following Wangechi Kimita v Mutahi Wakabiru, and that the court has an unfettered discretion to review its own decrees or orders for any sufficient reason.

Reasoning

Tracing the authorities from Sadar Mohamed v Charan Singh (unfettered discretion) through Yusuf v Nokrach (restrictive, analogous-grounds approach) to Wangechi Kimita, the court held the current position to be that a restriction to analogous grounds would clog the unfettered statutory right of review. The wrongful assumption of jurisdiction by the trial judge qualified as 'any other sufficient reason'.

p. 11

Legal principles established

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  • A judge has no power or jurisdiction to decide an issue not raised before him; the only way to raise issues before a judge is through the pleadings.
  • An error apparent on the face of the record is one that is obvious and self-evident and does not require elaborate argument to establish; a judgment that makes nonsense of a previous judgment in the same suit discloses such an error and constitutes a failure of justice.
  • 'Any other sufficient reason' in Order 44 rule 1 need not be analogous with the other enumerated grounds of review, since such a restriction would clog the unfettered right given to a court to review its decision under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act.
  • A judge is not permitted in a civil dispute to take it upon himself to introduce or determine issues; he must rest content with the case presented by the parties.

Court orders

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  1. 1.The appeal is allowed.
  2. 2.The ruling of Hayanga J dated 26 November 1996 refusing review is set aside.
  3. 3.The City Council's application for review is allowed.
  4. 4.The judgment of Hayanga J of 27 September 1995 is set aside together with such consequential acts derived therefrom.
  5. 5.Each party will bear its own costs of the appeal.

The bench

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Judges wrote separately. A dissent does not bind; a concurrence may narrow the ratio.

majority

Wrote the judgment

Wrote the leading judgment. Held there was a glaring error apparent on the face of the record in Hayanga J's judgment awarding compensation for compulsory acquisition when the only issue for formal proof was general damages for trespass under Bosire J's earlier ruling; the trial judge should have granted the review. Also held a judge has no jurisdiction to determine an unpleaded issue notwithstanding party acquiescence, following Sande and Sheikh and declining to follow Odd Jobs.

For this reason alone, I would allow the appeal.p. 6
concurring

Wrote the judgment

Wrote a separate concurring judgment agreeing the appeal should be allowed. Held the trial judge misapprehended the matter, that errors apparent on the record warranted review, and that in awarding compensation the judge acted in excess of jurisdiction since compensation was never pleaded.

In the circumstances, the learned judge acted wrongly and in excess of jurisdiction in proceeding with the determination of compensation without ascertaining that he had jurisdiction so to do.p. 12
dissenting

Wrote the judgment

Dissented. Held that where parties acquiesce in an unpleaded issue being tried and leave it to the court, the issue becomes properly before the court (following Odd Jobs v Mubia and Nkalubo v Kibirige); there was no error on the face of the record and no failure of justice; further, the appellant, having paid Kshs 1 million under the decree, had approbated the judgment and could not attack it. Would have dismissed the appeal with costs.

I would on my part dismiss the appeal with costs and remit the case to the superior court for amendment of the decree to accord with this decision.p. 16
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Nairobi
H.C.C.C. No. 4626 of 1992
Jurisdiction invoked
First appellate jurisdiction under the Court of Appeal's statutory appellate powers (the judgment does not cite a specific constitutional provision); the appeal lay from the High Court's ruling refusing review under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 44 rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

Relief refused

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Lakha JA's proposed disposition dismissing the appeal with costs and remitting the case for amendment of the decree

Outvoted by the majority of the bench

p. 16

Costs

Each party will bear its own costs of this appeal.

Quotable passages

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Verbatim from the judgment, each located to the page it appears on in the official PDF — so these can be cited and checked directly.

the order of the Court is that the appeal is allowed, the ruling of Hayanga, J., which is appealed against is hereby set aside, the City Council's application for review is hereby allowed and the judgment of Hayanga, J. of 27th September, 1995, is set aside together with such consequential acts derived therefrom. Each party will bear its own costs of this appeal.
p. 9Final orders and disposition
In our view, the only way to raise issues before a Judge is through the pleadings 'and as far as we are aware, that has always been the legal position.
p. 7Pleadings as the exclusive means of raising issues
It can be' said of an error that it is apparent on the face of the record when it is obvious and selfevident and does not require an elaborate argument to be established
p. 5Definition of error apparent on the face of the record
Moreover strange results would follow if a judge were free to determine issues not properly before him.
p. 5Judicial restraint in determining unpleaded issues (Hancox Ag JA, adopted)
In the circumstances, the learned judge acted wrongly and in excess of jurisdiction in proceeding with the determination of compensation without ascertaining that he had jurisdiction so to do.
p. 12Excess of jurisdiction in awarding unpleaded compensation (Tunoi JA)
Determination of an issue even if unpleaded does not disclose an error on the face of the record if the parties acquiesced in such a determination and they left such an issue for the decision of the court.
p. 15Dissenting view on acquiescence in unpleaded issues (Lakha JA)
the court has unfettered discretion to review its own decrees of orders for any sufficient reason.
p. 11Scope of review power under section 80 Civil Procedure Act

Issues in the judgment

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minor

The judgment contains an internal inconsistency in the record of the High Court proceedings: the valuer is referred to as 'Mr. Aritho' in the narrative but as 'Mr. Gitonga Ritho' in the quoted judgment of Hayanga J.

minor

Tunoi JA's judgment states 'Against that decision the respondent has now appealed to this Court' where the appellant (Nairobi City Council) is the party appealing; this appears to be a drafting slip in the judgment.

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Later judgments citing this (6)

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Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.

Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Nairobi City Council v Thabiti Enterprises Ltd (Civil Appeal 264 of 1996) [1997] KECA 59 (KLR)", Case Analysis (1997). Civil Appeal No. 264 of 1996. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/1997/59/eng@1997-03-07

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.