Raghbir Singh Chatte v National Bank of Kenya Limited [1996] KECA 99 (KLR)
The bottom line
#Kenya's Court of Appeal confirmed that simply denying a debt is not a defence — defendants must give specific reasons why they owe nothing, or lose by default.
What this practically means
#Executive summary
#Questions the Court framed
#The issues the Court set itself to decide, in its own words.
- 1.Whether the application below clearly specified the order sought and the grounds under Order 6 rule 13(1) on which it was brought
- 2.Whether a general denial or mere traverse in a defence to a liquidated demand constitutes a valid and effective defence
- 3.Whether inconsistent alternative pleadings were permissible in the appellant's defence
- 4.Whether the learned judge exercised the requisite extreme caution in striking out the defence
- 5.Whether the learned judge erred in relying on section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act
Key legal issues
#Whether a general denial is a valid and effective defence to a liquidated demand
No. In a suit for a debt or liquidated demand where the facts are clearly pleaded, a general denial is of no use, shows a lack of candidness, and discloses no reasonable defence under Order 6 rule 13(1)(a).
The court relied on its own decision in Magunga General Stores, where Platt JA held that a mere denial is not a sufficient defence in an action for a debt because the defendant must give some reason why the money is not owed. It also drew on the Supreme Court Practice commentary on the corresponding English rule, Order 18 rule 13, enforcing the cardinal principle that every allegation of fact must be specifically traversed or is deemed admitted. The appellant's defence contained only empty general traverses of the primary facts plus an evasive alternative plea of payment without particulars.
Whether Shah v Patel and Lancaster Radiators support the validity of general denials
They are distinguishable. In both cases the defence contained substantial specific denials raising issues of substance, with the general denial being a mere appendage, unlike the present defence which consisted only of a general denial.
Akiwumi JA analysed Sir Kenneth O'Connor's remarks in Shah, noting they were obiter, and Morton LJ's judgment in Lancaster Radiators, which expressly reserved the question of a defence consisting simply of one paragraph. Adkins was also distinguishable because there was no application to strike out on the ground of no reasonable defence. Halsbury's statement that general traverses have become common practice rests on those same distinguishable authorities.
Whether inconsistent alternative pleadings were permissible
Alternative pleadings may be allowed, but not where the alternative defence is plainly evasive and contradictory, particularly where no particulars of payment are given.
Counsel cited Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure for the proposition that inconsistent pleadings are not prohibited. The court accepted that inconsistent pleadings are generally permissible but adopted Mulla's qualification that what is prohibited are pleadings setting up inconsistent and embarrassing claims or defences. The appellant's alternative plea that any overdraft extended (which was denied) had been fully paid, without stating how or when, was spurious and embarrassing.
Whether the learned judge erred in relying on section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act
No error. The judge did not rely on section 3A for striking out the defence for disclosing no reasonable defence; his reference to section 3A related only to the invalid grounds of frivolity and abuse of process.
The appellant argued the judge wrongly invoked the inherent jurisdiction under section 3A. The court examined the ruling and found the judge decided the striking-out on the pleadings alone, excluding affidavit evidence, and that the reference to section 3A concerned only the separate, invalid grounds under rule 13(1)(b) and (c). The appeal ground therefore failed.
Whether the judge exercised the requisite extreme caution
Yes. Having regard to the pleadings and the law in Magunga General Stores, the judge acted with the necessary caution and in a clear and obvious case.
The court acknowledged the principle, drawn from D. T. Dobie, that striking out requires extreme caution and clear and obvious cases. It then measured the defence against that standard: it was a spurious and evasive general traverse of clearly pleaded primary facts with an evasive alternative plea of payment without particulars. On that material the judge neither took extraneous matters into account nor applied wrong principles, so his discretion was properly exercised.
Legal principles established
#- In an action for a debt or liquidated demand, a mere denial or general traverse is not a sufficient defence and discloses no reasonable defence for the purposes of Order 6 rule 13(1)(a).
- An evasive, inconsistent and contradictory alternative general traverse cannot give merit to a defence and renders it one disclosing no reasonable defence.
- In an application to strike out a defence, the particular order sought must be clearly set out in the application, and the judge must exercise extreme caution and act only in clear and obvious cases.
Court orders
#- 1.Appeal dismissed
- 2.Appellant to pay costs of the appeal
The bench
#One judgment of the whole court — no separate or dissenting opinions.
Wrote the judgment
- On appeal from
- High Court of Kenya at Kisumu
- H.C.C.C. No. 315 of 1993
- Jurisdiction invoked
- First appeal to the Court of Appeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court (Civil Appeal 50 of 1996)
Relief refused
#Setting aside the order striking out the defence and entering judgment for the respondent
The defence was a spurious, evasive and contradictory general traverse disclosing no reasonable defence, and the judge exercised his discretion properly
Costs
Appeal dismissed with costs to the respondent.
Quotable passages
#Verbatim from the judgment, each located to the page it appears on in the official PDF — so these can be cited and checked directly.
Thus is Maguga General Stores this court authoritatively enunciated the principle that in an action for a debt or liquidated demand a mere denial or general traverse will not do for all purposes.
in an action for a debt or liquidated demand in money, a mere denial of the debt is wholly inadmissible
Such a spurious pleading in the alternative cannot give any merit to the defence and so also makes it one which discloses no reasonable defence for all purposes including that of 0 6 r 13(1)(a).
I have already pronounce that in an application for the strong summary order for striking out, the particular order sought, should be clearly set out in the application, otherwise it would be wrong to entertain it.
I would in the result dismiss the appeal with costs.
Issues in the judgment
#The judgment records that the application heading cited Order 6 rule 13(1)(a), (b) and (c), but the body of the judgment elsewhere refers to grounds (a) and (d), an internal inconsistency in the rule references.
The coram shows only one Judge of Appeal (Akiwumi, JA) delivering and signing the judgment, which is unusual for a Court of Appeal bench; no other judges are named.
Key timeline
#Practical implications
#Frequently asked questions
#Later judgments citing this (3)
#Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.
- Shelly Engineering Works Ltd v Maruru & 4 others (Civil Appeal E163 of 2023) [2026] KECA 1573 (KLR)[2026] KECA 1573 (KLR)31 Jul 2026applied
- Njoroge v Moi University (Cause E091 of 2022) [2024] KEELRC 2806 (KLR)[2024] KEELRC 2806 (KLR)14 Nov 2024
- Njoroge v Moi University (Cause E091 of 2022) [2024] KEELRC 2806 (KLR)[2024] KEELRC 2806 (KLR)14 Nov 2024applied
Cite this brief
#Cite this brief
Caselaw, "Raghbir Singh Chatte v National Bank of Kenya Limited [1996] KECA 99 (KLR)", Case Analysis (1996). Civil Appeal 50 of 1996. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/1996/99/eng@1996-04-26
Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.