Matere & another (Suing as the Legal Representatives of the Estate of Daniel Wafula Kundu (Deceased)) v Siro (Civil Case E499 of 2024) [2026] KEMC 706 (KLR)

4. The Plaintifis also pleaded in their plaint that the deceased was 41 years old at the time of his death earning a monthly income of Kshs. 40,000/= from masonry and farming, and that the deceased had been survived by his father, wife, and four children. 5. They added that the accident had occasioned the deceased’s estate loss and damage, thereby necessitating the filing of this suit for compensation. 6. The Defendant entered appearance and filed a Statement of Defence dated 12th February 2025 denying all the averments in the Plaintifis’ plaint save for the averment that this court had the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine this case. 7. In the alternative, the Defendant pleaded that if the accident occurred, then the same was substantially caused by the deceased’s negligent acts and omissions set out in paragraph 5 of the Statement of Defence. 8. The Defendant also averred that the Plaintifis’ case was tainted with fraud as pleaded in paragraph 10 of the Statement of Defence. 9. The foregoing set the stage for the hearing of this matter for the parties herein to prove the averments in their respective pleadings on a balance of probabilities. Evidence Plaintifi ’s Case 10. PW1 No. 76835 PC Isaac Kimani Njuguna produced this accident’s police abstract dated 22nd October 2024 showing that the accident herein occurred and that the same was reported at Bungoma Police Station vide OB. No. 07/16/08/2024. 11. He admitted in cross-examination that he did not visit the scene. 12. PW2 Juliet Nasimiyu Matere adopted her witness statement on record as her evidence in chief. She produced all the documents listed in the Plaintifis’ list of documents as exhibits, save for the receipts for funeral expenses and the post-mortem report, which she marked for identification. 13. She conceded in cross-examination that she did not have proof that the deceased was a mason earning a monthly income of Kshs. 40,000/=. She confirmed that she did not witness the accident. 14. PW3 Simon Sunguti Simiyu recalled that on the date of the accident, while riding his bike towards Bungoma general direction from Bukembe general direction, he saw a motor vehicle (a white matatu) coming from the opposite direction. He also saw the deceased standing beside a diversion joining the main road. 15. He added that he saw the motor vehicle divert towards where the deceased was standing in a manner to suggest that the matatu wanted to carry the deceased, only for the motor vehicle to knock down the deceased. 16. In cross-examination, he admitted that his name was not appearing in the police abstract as a witness. He stated in re-examination that he recorded his statement after the police abstract had been issued. 17. PW4 Solomon Njihia produced the receipts for tents and chairs reported hired to the Plaintifis’ during the deceased’s funeral. 18. PW5 Xavian Nyongole Nyongesa is the assistant chief Namirembe Sub-Location. He produced his letter dated 31st October 2025 listing the deceased’s dependents as an exhibit. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/706/eng@2026-04-30 2

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19. He stated in cross-examination that the contents of the said letter were informed by the deceased’s history. 20. PW6 Neville Mwenya produced the receipts for the deceased’s cofin and transport services rendered during the deceased’s funeral procession. 21. PW7 Dr. Eliud Kosgei of Bungoma County Referral Hospital produced the deceased’s post-mortem report dated and mortuary expenses receipt of Kshs. 10,500/= as exhibits. 22. He could not tell if the deceased was an alcoholic or was drunk at the time of the accident since he did not run any toxicology tests during the deceased’s post-mortem examination. Defendant’s Case 23. DW1 No. 76835 PC Isaac Kimani Njuguna also testified as the Defendant’s witness. He produced the accident’s police abstract and an OB extract setting out the Defendant’s (DW2) report to Bungoma Police Station after the accident. 24. He read out DW2’s report to the police station, alleging that while DW2 was driving along Bungoma – Webuye road towards Webuye general direction, he knocked down the deceased when the deceased. He blamed the deceased for the accident. 25. In cross-examination, he admitted that he did not investigate the circumstances under which the accident occurred. He also stated that the accident was still pending under investigations, and that it was prejudicial to blame the deceased for the accident, given that the accident was still under investigations. 26. He added that there was nothing to show that DW2 was to blame for the accident. 27. DW2 Richard Makori Siro adopted his undated witness statement on record as his evidence in chief. He produced his copy of the driving licence and the Defendant’s motor vehicle inspection report dated 19th August 2024 as exhibits. 28. He testified that after he had knocked down the deceased, a pedestrian helped him to carry the deceased when he felt alcohol fumes coming from the deceased’s breath. He added that he tried avoiding the accident by swerving a bit since he was carrying passengers, but the accident still occurred. 29. He admitted in cross-examination that the accident occurred. He also admitted that he was not an alcohol expert to tell that the deceased was drunk on the date of the accident. He denied speeding at the time of the accident. He also denied that the deceased was ofi-road at the time of the accident. He also stated that the impact was on his right-hand side. 30. He added in re-examination that the trafic case facing him arising from the accident was dismissed for lack of evidence. Analysis & Determination 31. This court has given due regard to the pleadings, evidence, written submissions, and the authorities placed before this court by the parties herein. 32. The parties herein are in agreement that the accident occurred. The fact that the Defendant was driving the motor vehicle herein at the time of the accident is also not disputed. Further, it is common ground that the deceased died as a result of the accident. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/706/eng@2026-04-30 3

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33. In the circumstances, this court takes the view that the issues for determination are liability and quantum. Liability 34. This court has given due regard to the parties’ submissions on liability. 35. The Plaintifis relied on PW2’s testimony on the circumstances under which the accident occurred to blame the Defendant for the occurrence of the accident. 36. On the Defendant’s part, he relied on DW1’s testimony and his testimony to prove on a balance of probabilities that the accident occurred when the deceased suddenly crossed the road while staggering. 37. It is imperative to note that DW1 admitted that he neither investigated the accident nor visited the scene and that it was prejudicial to blame the deceased for the occurrence of the accident, yet the accident was pending investigations. This means that DW1’s evidence on the circumstances under which the accident occurred was hearsay evidence, which is not of any evidential value in this case. 38. Further, this court notes that the OB. report/entry DW1 read out in this court and produced an extract of the same, which was a report made by DW2 after the accident. It is inconceivable that a person involved in an accident will make a report to the police regarding an accident, incriminating himself for causing the accident. 39. Therefore, this court cannot rely on DW2’s own report to the police on the circumstances under which the accident occurred to blame the deceased for the occurrence of the accident. 40. Turning to PW2’s testimony on the circumstances under which the accident occurred, PW2 remained forthright even after cross-examination that the motor vehicle knocked down the deceased as it appeared to stop to carry the deceased who was standing beside the road. 41. The Defendant took issue with PW2’s credibility on the ground that PW2 was not listed in the police abstract as an eyewitness. 42. It is this court’s considered view that not all eye witnesses are captured in a police abstract. To require all accident eyewitnesses to be captured in police abstracts will be stretching the rules of evidence and civil litigation too far. The mere fact that a person’s name does not appear in a police abstract does not mean that such a person did not witness the accident. 43. A reading of PW2 and DW2’s statements reveals that PW2 knew the circumstances under which the accident occurred since he correctly stated that the motor vehicle that knocked the deceased was a matatu which was being driven towards the Webuye general direction. PW2 must have witnessed the accident. 44. Notably, there is no evidence on record that PW2 had an interest in this matter; therefore, this court finds no reason to doubt PW2’s credibility. In any event, this court had the benefit of observing PW2’s demeanour when he testified before this court. He was a credible and trustworthy witness whose testimony remained unshaken even after cross-examination. 45. PW2’s independent and credible testimony on how the accident occurred is direct evidence. Direct evidence is the best evidence a court can rely on in determining a matter. Such evidence must be believed. 46. The fact that the Defendant was driving a motor vehicle which is a lethal machine shows that the Defendant the Defendant owed the deceased a higher duty of care, given that he was driving a motor https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/706/eng@2026-04-30 4

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vehicle, which is a dangerous machine if not handled well. To this end, this court places reliance on Monda v Suji & another [Suing as the Legal Representatives of the Estate of Mathew Okello Ombonya Deceased] [2023] KEHC 2778 [KLR], where Aburili, J posited as follows: “ 35. Further, in the case of Mary Njeri Murigi v Peter Macharia & another [2016] eKLR, this court expressed itself thus;“A person who is driving a vehicle is under a duty of care to other road users. The vehicle is a lethal weapon and due care is expected of the driver who is in control thereof.” 47. The higher duty of care the Defendant owed the deceased was breached when the motor vehicle knocked the deceased. Therefore, the Defendant must bear the consequences of his negligent acts or omissions. 48. Given the reasons above, this court finds and holds the Defendant 100% liable for the occurrence of the accident. Quantum Under the Fatal Accidents Act Loss of Dependency 49. The Plaintifis pleaded for damages under the Fatal Accidents Act. The damages awarded under the Fatal Accidents Act are contingent on proof of loss of dependency. 50. The claim for damages for loss of dependency is grounded on section 4 of the Fatal Accidents Act. Section 4 of the Fatal Accidents Act provides as follows:Every action brought by virtue of the provisions of this act shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parents and the child if the person, whose death so caused and shall , subject to the provisions of section 7, be brought by and in the name of the executor or administrator of the person deceased, and in every such action the court may award such damages as it may think proportioned to the injury resulting from the death to the persons respectively for whom and for whose benefit the action is brought, and the amount so recovered, after deducting the cost not recovered from the defendant shall be divided amongst those persons in such shares as the court by its judgment shall find and direct. 51. The Plaintifis pleaded in their Plaint that the deceased was survived by his father, wife, and four children. 52. The Assistant Chief Ndengelwa Sub-location’s letter dated 31st October 2024, produced by PW5, confirms that the deceased was survived by his father, wife, and four children aged between 6 and 17 years old. 53. The Defendant submitted that in the absence of a marriage certificate and birth certificates, the Plaintifis had not proved on a balance of probabilities that the deceased was survived by dependents within the meaning of section 4 of the Fatal Accidents Act. 54. The question of whether only a marriage certificate and birth certificates prove the existence of dependents was addressed in Tipper Hauliers Limited v Gladys Nanjala Namulata & another (Suing https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/706/eng@2026-04-30 5

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as the Legal Representative of the Estate of the Late Peter Wafula Kisache) [2020] KEHC 245 (KLR), where Mulwa J rendered herself thus on this issue: I stated earlier in this judgment that the chief of the area where the respondent resides, by his letter stated the children and dependants of the deceased. It is trite and of common knowledge that it is not only a birth certificate that can authenticate fatherhood or motherhood of children. There are many persons in our society who do not have or possess birth certificates, but are known by their local administration, be it the area chief, village elder, school, or Church, that the children belong to their father/mother having been born and raised in the locality. In my very considered view, a chief’s letter is a document that, for all purposes and intent, can authenticate dependants of a resident in the area. It is common knowledge that it is only recently in Kenya that it has become mandatory for all school going children to obtain birth certificates to enable them register in the schools. It was never a mandatory requirement. I therefore find and hold that the chief’s letter - PExhibit 3, suficiently proved the deceased’s dependents. I decline to accept the appellant’s submission to the contrary efiect. 55. It is evident from the authority above that a chief’s letter, unless controverted by credible evidence, is suficient proof of a deceased’s dependents. The Defendant did not controvert the contents of the assistant chief’s letter herein on the deceased’s dependents. 56. It is for the reasons above that this court finds and holds that the evidence on record proved on a balance of probabilities that the deceased was survived by the dependents pleaded in the Plaint. The persons pleaded in the Plaint are dependents within the meaning of section 4 of the Fatal Accidents Act. 57. The fact that the deceased was survived by children under the age of eighteen shows that the said children lost dependency at a very needy age; therefore, the claim for damages for loss of dependency is properly before this court. 58. The claim for loss of dependency constitutes the multiplicand, the dependency ratio, and the multiplier. This is applicable where the court adopts the multiplier approach of making awards. In other instances, where the circumstances of a case permit, the court may adopt the global award approach in making an award under this head. 59. The Plaintifis pleaded in their Plaint that the deceased died aged 41 years old while earning a monthly income of Kshs. 40,000/= from farming and masonry. PW2 stated as much in her testimony. 60. However, PW2 conceded in cross-examination that there was no proof that the deceased was a mason earning a monthly income of Kshs. 40,000/=. 61. A reading of the deceased’s Certificate of Death on record shows that the registrar of deaths did not make an entry on the deceased’s occupation. Ordinarily, a Certificate of Death aids in proving a deceased’s occupation. 62. There is also no evidence of the kind of farming the deceased used to engage in before his death. 63. In the absence of evidence that the deceased was a mason and a farmer at the time of his death, and given that the deceased’s Certificate of Death is silent on the deceased’s occupation, this court agrees with the Defendant’s submission that the deceased’s occupation at the time of his death is unknown. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/706/eng@2026-04-30 6

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64. The finding above inevitably leads to the conclusion that there is no evidence on record to prove on a balance of probabilities that the deceased used to earn a monthly income of Kshs. 40,000/= from farming and masonry. 65. The Plaintifis urged this court to adopt a multiplier approach in making an award under this head. The Defendant, on his part, submitted that in the absence of proof of the deceased’s occupation and monthly income, the global award approach was the appropriate mode of awarding damages under this head. 66. This court is in agreement with the Defendant’s submission that the circumstances of this case call for the adoption of a global award approach in awarding damages under this head, since applying the multiplier approach in making an award under this head will be akin to this court descending into the arena of speculation and groping in the dark. That is a path a court of law should not heed an invitation to take. 67. The position taken by this court is buttressed by the holding in Mwanzia Ngalali Mutua v Kenya Bus Services (Msa) Ltd & Another, which was cited with approval in Albert Odawa v Gichimu Gichenji (2007) eKLR as follows: “ The multiplier approach is just a method of assessing damages. It is not a principle of law or a dogma. It can, and must be abandoned, where the facts do not facilitate its application. It is plain that it is a useful and practical method where factors such as the age of the deceased, the amount of annual or monthly ependency, and the expected length of the ependency are known or are knowable without undue speculation where that is not possible, to insist on the multiplier approach would be to sacrifice justice on the altar of methodology, something a Court of Justice should never do.” 68. Similarly, the court in Moses Mairua Muchiri v Cyrus Maina Macharia (Suing as the personal representative of the estate of Mercy Nzula Maina (deceased) [2016] KEHC 5958 (KLR); stated thus: “ …where it is not possible to ascertain the multiplicand accurately, as appears to have been the case here, courts should not be overly obsessed with mathematical calculations in order to make an award under the head of lost years or loss of dependency. If the multiplicand cannot be ascertained with any precision, courts can make a global award, which by no means is a standard or conventional figure but is an award that will always be subject to the circumstances of each particular case.” (Emphasis added) 69. This court now proceeds to analyze comparable cases where global awards were made to the deceased’s persons within the deceased’s age bracket who were survived by a widow and young children. 70. In Kibe & another (Suing as Administrators of the Estate of David Wainaina Kibinge) v Macharia (Civil Appeal E184 of 2024) [2025] KEHC 11118 (KLR), the court made a global award of Kshs. 1,300,000/= for a 42-year-old man who was survived by a wife and children aged three children aged between 4 and 13 years. 71. Guided by the authority above, considering the passage of time since the case above was determined, and the fact that the dependents under this head will also benefit under the Law Reform Act, this court makes a global award of Kshs. 1,500,000/= under this head. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/706/eng@2026-04-30 7

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Under the Law Reform Act (a)Loss of Expectation of Life 72. The claim under this head was aptly expressed in Flint v Lovell {1935} 1KB354 where Lord Wright said: “ A man has, a legal interest entailing him to complain if the integrity of his life is impaired by tortious acts, not only in regard to pain, sufiering and disability, but in regard to the continuance of life for its normal expectancy. A man has a legal right, that his life shall not be shortened by the tortious act of another. His normal expectancy of life is a thing of temporal value, so that its impairment is something for which damages should be given…” 73. The deceased died aged 41 years old. There is no evidence on record that the deceased was working in a risky environment at the time of his death. Further, there is no evidence before this court of the deceased’s ill health before his death. Given the foregoing, the only logical conclusion to be drawn is that the deceased’s life was cut short by the accident herein. 74. In Mercy Muriuki & Another v Samuel Mwangi Nduati & Another (Suing as the Legal Administrator of the Estate of the late Robert Mwangi) (2019) eKLR, the court observed as follows regarding the award under this head: “ The generally accepted principle therefore is that very nominal damages will be awarded on these two heads of damages if the death followed immediately after the accident. The conventional award for loss of expectation of life is Kshs. 100,000/- while pain and sufiering the awards range from Kshs. 10,000/- with higher damages being awarded if the pain and sufiering was prolonged before death.” 75. Guided by the authority above, this court finds no reason to depart from the conventional award of Kshs. 100,000/= under this head; therefore, this court makes an award of Kshs. 100,000/= under this head. (b) Pain and Sufiering 76. The award under this head depends on the duration between the time the accident occurred and the time the deceased died. 77. General damages for pain and sufiering range from Kshs. 10,000/= where death is instantaneous to Kshs. 100,000/= where death occurs later. (See Hyder Nthenya Musili & Another -vs- China Wu Yi Limited & Another [2017] eKLR). 78. The deceased’s post-mortem report herein shows that the deceased died on the date of the accident. The deceased must have experienced pain before meeting his maker. 79. In Abdulaziz v Odhiambo & another (Suing as legal representative of the Estate of Phili Ondago) [2026] KEHC 4349 (KLR), the High Court upheld an award of Kshs. 50,000/= for a deceased who died on the date of the accident. 80. It is for the reasons above that this court awards Kshs. 50,000/= under this head for the fieeting pain and sufiering the deceased must have experienced before departing this world. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/706/eng@2026-04-30 8

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Loss of Consortium 81. The Plaintifis pleaded for an award of general damages for loss of consortium. In Kungl v. Schiefer (1960) 25 D.L.R. (2d) 344, Schroeder J.A. defined consortium as follows: “ The term 'consortium' is not susceptible of precise or complete definition but, broadly speaking, companionship, love, afiection, comfort, mutual services, sexual intercourse – all belonging to the marriage state – taken together make up what we refer to as consortium.” 82. Going by the definition of consortium above, one can conclude that an award for loss of consortium and servitium is usually made to a surviving spouse as compensation for loss of services rendered by the deceased spouse. 83. The Court of Appeal in Salvadore De Luca v. Abdullahi Hemedi Khalil & Anor [1994] eKLR, stated as follows regarding a claim for general damages for loss of consortium: “ So far as consortium is concerned, there is evidence that the appellant loved his wife and so did their children. The appellant has not re-married. No doubt, he had lost his wife’s companionship. There is, moreover, an impairment in the social life of the appellant and his young children who, too, have lost love, care and devotion of their mother. The learned judge clearly erred, in our view, in failing to award any damages for loss of consortium and servitium. Bearing in mind the fact that each case should be judged on its own facts, we would think that an award of KShs. 40,000/= is a fair measure for this head of damages and we award the appellant this sum with interest from the date of judgment in the superior court until payment in full.” 84. In Ruth Chepngeno Mutai Vs. Patrick Wajero Oloo and Anor (2016) eKLR, Visram, J. (as he then was) rendered himself thus on an award for loss of consortium: “ As a result of the death of the Deceased, the Plaintifi lost a husband. She told this court that she had no intention to remarry. Taking into account the cited authorities and the circumstances of the Plaintifi in particular, I award her Kshs. 100,000/= for loss of consortium.” 85. A reading of the authorities above shows that for a spouse to succeed for an award under this head, they must lead cogent evidence to show that they loved their spouse preceding the departed spouse’s death, and that their departed spouse rendered some spousal duties to them which services cannot be rendered as a result of the departed spouse’s death. Further, the question of whether a surviving spouse remarried or intends to remarry is also an important consideration before making an award under this head. 86. In a bid to lead evidence in support of the claim under this head, PW2 stated in her witness statement dated 29th October 2024, which she adopted as her evidence in chief, that the deceased was a loving, caring, and compassionate husband who took care of his children’s spiritual, mental, and financial well-being. 87. There is no evidence on record, at least for now, that PW2 plans to remarry. Therefore, taking the totality of the evidence on record into consideration, this court finds no hesitation in holding that the deceased’s death deprived PW2 of consortium. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/706/eng@2026-04-30 9

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88. Guided by the Ruth Chepngeno Mutai case (supra), this court makes an award of Kshs. 100,000/= for loss of consortium. Special Damages 89. The Plaintifis pleaded for special damages of Kshs. 228,050/= set out in paragraph 7 of the Plaint. The receipts for specials produced by the Plaintifi before this court proved the pleaded special damages. 90. The Defendant submitted that this court should not award any amount under this head claimed through a receipt lacking stamp duty. 91. The question of whether a receipt for specials is inadmissible for want of payment of stamp duty has been settled in this jurisdiction. 92. The Court of Appeal in Paul N. Njoroge Vs. Abdul Sabuni Sabonyo [2015] eKLR held as follows regarding this issue: “ 21. The finding is often made by lower courts that documents which do not comply with the Stamp Duty Act, Cap 480, Laws of Kenya were invalid and inadmissible in evidence. But this Court has held that to be erroneous and accepts the view it took in the case of Stallion Insurance Company Limited v. Ignazzio Messina & Co S.P.A [2007] eKLR where it stated thus: “ Mr. Mbigi submitted that the guarantee document relied on by the respondents to enforce their claim was inadmissible in evidence as it was not stamped contrary to the Stamp Duty Act. It is a submission which has been raised in other cases before but this Court has approved the procedure that ought to be followed in such matters. A case in point is Diamond Trust Bank Kenya Ltd vs. Jaswinder Singh Enterprises CA No. 285/98 (ur) where Owuor JA, with whom Gicheru JA (as he then was) and Tunoi JA, agreed, stated: “ The learned Judge also found that the agreements could not be enforced because they contravened section 31 of the Stamp Duty Act (cap 480). In view of my above finding, it sufices to state that sections 19(3) 20, 21, and 22 of the same Act provided relief in a situation where a document or instrument had not been stamped when it ought to have been stamped. The course open to the learned Judge was as in the case of Suderji Nanji Ltd. -vs- Bhaloo (1958) EA 762 at page 763 where Law J., (as he then was) quoted with approval the holding in Bagahat Ram -vs- Raven Chond (2) 1930) A.I.R Lah 854 that: “ before holding a document inadmissible in evidence on the sole ground of its not being properly stamped, the court ought to give an opportunity to the party producing it to pay the stamp duty and penalty…The appellant has never been given the opportunity to pay the requisite stamp duty and the prescribed penalty on the unstamped letter of guarantee on which he sought to rely in support of his claim against the 2nd defendant/respondent and he must be given the opportunity”. 93. The authority above shows that a receipt for specials cannot be disregarded by a court solely on the ground of non-compliance with the Stamp Duty Act. The Plaintifis who find themselves in such situations need to be allowed to comply with the Stamp Duty Act. This court, having not granted the Plaintifis an opportunity to comply with the Stamp Duty Act, cannot at this stage punish the Plaintifis for its own omission. In any event, it is the duty of the receiver of the money to pay Stamp Duty, not the Plaintifis. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/706/eng@2026-04-30 10

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94. The reasons above incline this court to find and hold that the Plaintifi pleaded and proved Special Damages of Kshs. 228,050/=. Consequently, this court awards the Plaintifis Special Damages of Kshs. 228,050/=. Determination 95. Given the foregoing, judgment is entered against the Defendants jointly and severally in the following terms:i. Liability………………………………………….100% ii. General damages under the Fatal Accident Act Loss of dependency……………Kshs. 1,500,000/= iii. Damages under the Law Reform Act Loss of expectation of life………Kshs. 100,000/= Pain and Sufiering……………….Kshs. 50,000/= iv. Loss of consortium…………………………..Kshs. 100,000/= v. Special Damages…………………………….Kshs. 228,050/= Total Award………………………..Kshs. 1,978,050/= 96. The general damages will accrue interest at court rate from the date of this judgment till payment in full. 97. The special damages awarded will accrue interest at court rate from the date of filing this suit till payment in full. 98. The Plaintifi will have the costs of this suit. 99. Judgment accordingly. READ, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED IN OPEN COURT AT BUNGOMA, THIS 30TH DAY OF APRIL 2026 T.O. OMONO SENIOR RESIDENT MAGISTRATE In the presence of: Ms. Wesonga for the Plaintifi Ms. Kinyanjui for the Defendant C/A: Mr. Rioba https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/706/eng@2026-04-30 11

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