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Original judgment

Tumbo t/a Dominion Yard Auctioneers v Secretary BOM St Jude Muanda Secondary School & another (Criminal Case E012 of 2025) [2026] KEMC 633 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA IN THE CHIEF MAGISTRATES COURT AT BUNGOMA CRIMINAL CASE NO. E012 OF 2025 SAMSON ITONDE TUMBO T/A DOMINION YARD AUCTIONEERS………….PLAINTIFF VERSUS THE SECRETARY B.OM ST. JUDE MUANDA SECONDARY SCHOOL………………………………………………………………………..1ST DEFENDANT THE B.O.M ST. JUDE MUANDA SECONDARY SCHOOL……………….2ND DEFENDANT RULING 1. The 1st Defendant/Applicant moved this court vide a Notice of Motion Application dated 11th February 2025 brought under Order 1 rule 10 (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules praying for the following orders: a) That the 1st Defendant, improperly joined to this suit be struck out from the suit herein and the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant be dismissed b) That the Plaintiff to pay the 1st Defendant’s costs of defending this suit against him. 2. The instant Application was grounded on the grounds on the face of it and further grounds set out in the Supporting Affidavit sworn by Philip Muchika on 11th February 2025. 3. A perusal of the instant Application shows that the instant Application is largely grounded on the ground that under the 4th schedule, rule 1(a) made under section 56(8) of the Basic Education Act, a school has a

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corporate form and the Board of Management is a body corporate capable of suing and being sued and therefore the secretary of that entity has no personal liability. 4. The Plaintiff/Respondent opposed the instant Application through a Replying Affidavit dated 18th February 2025 sworn on the even date by Samson Itonde Tumbo. 5. It was the Respondent’s averment that the instant Application is unmerited, scandalous, and an abuse of the court process hence the same ought to be dismissed with costs. 6. To buttress his position on the instant Application, the Plaintiff/Respondent averred this suit was not an ordinary suit but a procedural suit arising from the Certificate of Costs issued in favour of the Plaintiff in Bungoma CMC CC. NO. 216 of 2019 (mother suit) where the Defendants herein were Defendants when judgment was entered against them jointly and severally. 7. The Plaintiff/Respondent added that the trial court did not find the 1 st Defendant/Applicant an unnecessary party in the mother suit hence the 1st Defendant/Applicant was a proper party to this suit. 8. It was also averred by the Plaintiff/Respondent that since the 1 st Defendant/Applicant having not sought to alter the Certificate of Costs and the decree in the primary suit, she can not be granted the prayers sought herein. The Plaintiff/Respondent also added that since the 1 st Defendant/Applicant was a signatory to the cheques and all payment instruments issued by St. Jude Muanda Secondary School she was a necessary party to this suit. 9. Parties herein submitted orally on the instant Application. 10. Mr. Wasilwa for the Applicant reiterated that the proper party to be sued per the Basic Education Act was the Board of Management and not the school principal hence the 1st Defendant/Applicant was improperly joined to this suit. He added that the existence of the Certificate of Costs and the decree in the primary suit did not supplant

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the mandatory provisions of the Basic Education Act, and that the earlier breach of the law did not excuse breach of express provisions of the Basic Education Act. 11. In response, Mr. Anwar for the Plaintiff/Respondent submitted that striking out the 1st Defendant will be akin to amending the decree in the primary suit. He added that had the 1 st Defendant been struck out in the primary suit then the instant Application would have had merit. ANALYSIS & DETERMINATION 12. This court has duly considered the pleadings, the submissions and the authorities relied upon by the parties herein. This court is of the considered view the following issues commend to this court for determination: a) Whether the 1st Defendant/Applicant can be struck out of this suit at this stage b) Whether the 1st Defendant/Applicant should be struck out of this suit Whether the 1st Defendant/Applicant can be struck out of this suit at this stage The Plaintiff/Respondent’s counsel averred that it was not possible to strike out the 1st Defendant/Respondent from this suit at this stage since this was merely a procedural suit that seeks to convert the certificate of costs in the primary suit into a decree for purposes of execution. Counsel for the Plaintiff/Respondent also submitted that striking out the 1 st Defendant/Respondent from this suit at this stage was akin to amending the certificate of costs and the decree in the primary suit. Simply put, counsel was urging this court to find that simply because the 1 st Defendant/Applicant was a party in the primary suit, she can not be struck out from this suit arising from the primary suit.

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Further, it was the Plaintiff/Respondent’s averment that striking out the 1 st Defendant/Applicant from this suit would defeat the execution process since she is responsible for signing the cheques for defraying the decretal sum in the primary suit. The submissions above by the counsel for the Plaintiff/Applicant that the 1 st Defendant/Applicant cannot be struck out from this suit at this stage begs the question of whether there is a time limit on when to strike out a party from a suit. This question is well answered in order 1 Rule 10 (1), (2) that provides thus: “(1) Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong persons as plaintiff, or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute to do so, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the court thinks fit. 2) The court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit, be added….(Emphasis added) Guided by the authority above, it should be noted that the operative word in order 1 rule 10(2) is ‘at any stage of the proceedings’ hence the Plaintiff/Respondent’s submission that the 1st Defendant/Applicant cannot be struck out from this suit at this stage lacks the limbs to stand on in law. On whether the 1st Defendant/Applicant cannot be struck out from these proceedings given that she remains a party to the proceedings in the primary suit, this court answers this issue in the affirmative since the mere fact that the 1 st Defendant/Applicant was improperly joined in the primary suit does not preclude this court from striking out the 1 st Defendant/Applicant from subsequent proceedings arising from the primary suit if this court finds that the 1 st Defendant/Applicant was improperly joined in the primary suit. This court also disagrees with the Plaintiff/Respondent’s counsel’s submission that if this court finds that the 1 st Defendant/Applicant was improperly joined to this suit, that will be akin to this court amending the decree and the certificate of costs in the primary suit. In the event this court finds that the 1 st Defendant/Applicant was improperly joined to this suit, it will be incumbent upon the Plaintiff/Respondent to move the trial court in the primary suit for review of the judgment rendered in the primary suit. The consequence of that review will have the net effect of amending the decree and the certificate of costs in the primary suit. In the words of the 1 st Defendant/Applicant’s counsel, the mere existence of the Certificate of Costs and the decree in the primary in the 1st Defendant/Applicant’s name does not supplant the express provisions of the Basic Education Act,2013. It should also be borne in mind that striking out the 1 st Defendant/Applicant from this suit will not prevent the Plaintiff/Respondent in realizing the fruits of their judgment in the primary suit since the decree arising from the primary suit is enforceable against the 2nd Defendant.

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Given the foregoing, this court holds and finds that the 1st Defendant/Applicant can be struck out of this suit at this stage. Whether the 1st Defendant/Applicant was properly joined to this suit The question of whether a school principal of a public school being the secretary to a public school’s Board of Management or a member of a public school’s Board of Management can be sued in their personal and official capacity for their lawful acts in execution of their official duties is well answered by the express provisions of the Basic Education Act, 2013. Paragraph 1 to the fourth Schedule of The Basic Education Act,2013 provides that the Board of Management of a school shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal, and shall in their corporate names, be capable of suing and being sued. Therefore, that simply means that by law, the Board of Management is the only body that can sue and be sued in matters affecting a public school. Courts in this jurisdiction have also had to grapple with the question above on several occasions before and after the enactment of the Basic Education Act, 2013 as demonstrated hereunder. In Menengai Primary School Another -versus- Jamila Anyona (2006) eKLR, Kimaru J. held as follows: The issue for determination by this court is whether the respondent properly sued the appellants…… In any event, the respondent would not have sued the headmistress of Menengai Primary School because she had no capacity in law to be sued. Under Section 9 of the Education Act and the Education (School committees) Regulations made thereunder, it is only a school committee of a primary school which is mandated with authority of managing the said primary school. It is the school committee of the primary school which can sue and be sued. The headmistress of a primary school cannot therefore be sued in respect of any action that she undertakes in the school on behalf of the school…… In the circumstances of this case therefore, it is clear that the respondent sued the appellants wrongfully. The appellants lacked capacity to be sued on behalf of Menengai Primary School. In Republic vs The Secretary to the Board of Governors, Musingu High School-Kakamega (2011)eKLR Lenaola J (as he then was) at paragraph 5 stated that “from the above it is obvious that the body lawfully capable of being sued on behalf of a school is the Board of Governors as a corporate entity and not one of its officials such as the secretary to the board. I also note specifically that the (Board of Governors) order. That order provides in Rule 10 as follows: “No governor shall be subject to any personal liability in respect of any matter or thing done or omitted or any contract entered into by or on behalf of the board which he is a governor or by or on behalf of any school or group of school administered by that board.” After the enactment of the Basic Education Act, 2013, the courts also addressed the question above in numerous authorities as demonstrated below. In Kisumu ELC case no,225 of 2014, Evans Otiende Omollo vs School Committee Union Primary School and Another (2015)eKLR Kibunja J. stated that: “the parties described as defendants herein do not exist as they are not legal entities under the Basic Education Act capable of being sued or to defend this suit. He further stated at paragraph 5 that “having found that the four named defendants are nonexistent as entities capable of being sued, the court finds that to allow the suit as filed to continue to further hearing would be an abuse of the courts’ process”

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Mativo J (as he then was) when confronted with the question above in J.N. and 5 others vs. Board of Management, St. G School Nairobi and Another(2017) eKLR rendered himself thus: “my understanding of the law and the above provision is that the Board of management is a legal entity, capable of suing and being sued and the school Principal cannot be sued in her name or personal capacity for decisions made by the Board. There is nothing to show that she made the impugned decisions made by the board. There is nothing to show that she made the impugned decision in her capacity or acted outside her mandate to warrant personal liability:. the petition does not disclose a case against her in her personal capacity and it would be improper, unfair and unjust to drag her through these proceedings when the decision being challenged was arrived at by a legal entity.”(Emphasis added) A reading of the authorities set out above, in the absence of evidence on record that the 1 st Defendant/Applicant acted outside the scope of her authority leading to the primary suit, this court returns a finding that the 1 st Defendant/Applicant was improperly joined to this suit. DETERMINATION 13. For the reasons above, this court holds and finds that the 1 st Defendant/Applicant’s Application dated 11 th February 2025 is merited hence the same is allowed as prayed. Judgment read, signed and delivered in open Court at Kitale this 26th day of February 2025. T.O. OMONO RESIDENT MAGISTRATE In the presence of: C/A: Albert

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