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dismissed irregularly by the Respondents, this was an employee – employer dispute. 5. It is against this backdrop that this court reserved this matter for ruling on whether this cause was an employee – employer dispute within the meaning of section 12 (1) (a) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, which this court has the jurisdiction to hear and determine. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION 6. This court has given due regard to the pleadings on record as well as the Claimant’s oral submissions before this court. 7. The only issue for determination is whether this matter is an employee – employer dispute that this court has the jurisdiction to hear and determine under section 12 (1) (a) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act. 8. The jurisdiction of this court is well spelt out under Article 162 (2)(a) of the Constitution and section 12 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act. By dint of the said provisions of the law, this court only has the jurisdiction to hear and determine matters relating to employment and labour relations, including: a) disputes relating to or arising out of employment between an employer and an employee; b) disputes between an employer and a trade union; c) disputes between an employers' organisation and a trade unions organisation; d) disputes between trade unions; e) disputes between employer organizations; f) disputes between an employers' organisation and a trade union;

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g) disputes between a trade union and a member thereof; h) disputes between an employer's organisation or a federation and a member thereof; i) disputes concerning the registration and election of trade union officials; and j) disputes relating to the registration and enforcement of collective agreements. 9. It follows that any dispute outside the ambit of the above provisions of the law are disputes which this court cannot purport to hear and determine. This is in line with the often-cited phrase that jurisdiction is everything, and without it, a court must lay down its tools (see Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] eKLR cited with approval in West Kenya Sugar Company Limited v Keiza (Employment and Labour Relations Appeal E009 of 2021) [2023] KEELRC 322 (KLR)). 10. The question of whether this cause is an employee – employer dispute cannot be determined without defining who an employee and employer are. These definitions are found in Section 2 of the Employment Act, which expressly defines an “employee” as “a person employed for wages or a salary, and includes an apprentice and indentured learner”. Conversely, an “employer” is defined as “any person, public body, firm, corporation or company who or which has entered into a contract of service to employ any individual and includes the agent, foreman, manager or factor of such person, public body, firm, corporation or company”. 11. Guided by section 2 of the Employment Act, it follows that the Claimant can only be deemed to be the Respondents’ employee if the Respondents employed him for wages or salary, or where the Claimant was the Respondents' apprentice or an indentured learner. On the

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other hand, the Respondents can only be deemed to be the Claimant’s employers if they entered into a contract of service to employ the Claimant. 12. The Claimant averred that he was elected by Wamulali villagers to be their area manager. Area managers are generally national government administration officers. The recognized national government administration officers are set out in the National Government Coordination Act. This begs the question of whether area managers are employees within the meaning of the National Government Coordination Act. 13. Section 15 of the National Government Coordination Act lists the persons considered to be the Public Service Commission’s employees under that Act as follows: (a) a county commissioner in respect of every county; (b) a deputy county commissioner in respect of every subcounty; (c) an assistant county commissioner in respect of every ward; (d) a chief in respect of every location; (e) an assistant chief in respect of every sublocation; and (f) any other national government administrative officer in respect of a service delivery unit established under section 14. 14. It is evident from section 15 of the National Government Coordination Act reproduced above that an area manager is not an employee within the meaning of the said section 15. 15. This court is well aware that the National Government Coordination (Amendment) Bill 2023 (“the Bill”) seeks to amend sections 14 and 15 of the National Coordination Act for the recognition

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of area managers as Public Service Commission employees who will be drawing salaries from the government. 16. The Bill is yet to be passed by parliament. It is only upon the amendment of the National Government Coordination Act as contemplated under the Bill that area managers will become public officers per Article 260 of the Constitution and section 15 of the National Government and Coordination Act. 17. That will effectively mean that after the said amendment, any dispute on an alleged unfair dismissal of an area manager will become an employee – employer dispute within the meaning of section 12 (1) (a) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, which this court is clothed with the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine. 18. This legal position can be gleaned from Havi v Judicial Service Commission & another (Petition E039 of 2024) [2024] KEELRC 798 (KLR) cited with approval in Gikenye & 2 others v Mwaura & 9 others (Petition E001 of 2025) [2025] KEELRC 592 (KLR), where the court held and found as follows: “10. While making the finding, the Court has considered that in Narok County Government and Another v Richard Bwogo Birir and Another (2015) 5JELR 104466 (CA) the Court of Appeal has found that state and public officers are all servants of the people when the court upheld the trial court’s findings thus, “39. It is upon consideration of those and other provisions that the trial court reached the following compelling conclusion:“…all persons holding public or state office in Kenya in the executive, the legislature, the judiciary or any other public body and in national or county government are servants of the people of Kenya. The court holds that despite the level of rank of state or public office as may be held, no public or state officer is a servant of the other but all are servants of the people. Thus, the court holds that the

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idea of servants of the crown is substituted with the doctrine of servants of the people under the new Republic as nurtured in the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. The hierarchy of state and public officers can be complex, detailed and conceivably very long vertically and horizontally but despite the rank or position held, the court holds that they are each a servant of the people and not of each other as state or public officers. They are all servants of the people. The court holds that there are no masters and servants within the hierarchies of the ranks of state and public officers in our new Republic. The court further finds that the string that flows through the constitutional provisions is that removal from public or state office is constitutionally chained with due process of law. In the opinion of the court, at the heart of due process are the rules of natural justice. Thus, the court finds that the pleasure doctrine for removal from a state or public office has been replaced with the doctrine of due process of law. Article 236 is particularly clear on the demise of the pleasure doctrine in Kenya's public or state service… In the new Republic, the court holds that public service by public and state officers is guided by the doctrine of servants of the people and the doctrine of due process and not by the doctrines of the servants of the crown and the pleasure doctrine. In the opinion of the court, the demise of the pleasure doctrine and the demise of the doctrine of servants of the crown in the new Republic's constitutional framework constitute the very foundation of the Republic, namely, Kenya is a sovereign Republic and all sovereign power belongs to the people of Kenya and shall be exercised only in accordance with the Constitution.” 19. Therefore, until the National Government Coordination Act is amended as contemplated in the Bill, area managers are not Public

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Service Commission employees within the meaning of section 15 of the National Government Coordination Act whose employment disputes can be heard and determined by this court. 20. It is abundantly clear from the analysis above that the prevailing legal regime in this jurisdiction is that area managers are not Public Service Commission employees. It is also a matter of public notoriety that area managers are not paid any salary or wages. They are simply volunteers who help in day-to-day national government administration. Further, area managers do not work under any contract of service. They are also neither apprentices nor indentures of the Public Service Commission. 21. In addition to the above, there is no evidence that the Respondents entered into a contract of service with the Claimant. Even if the Claimant had executed a contract of service for employment as an area manager, that contract would have been between him and the Public Service Commission, not the Respondents. Further, there is nothing on record to suggest that the Claimant is the Respondents’ apprentice or indenture. Therefore, the Respondents cannot be said to be the Claimant’s employers. 22. The foregoing shows that the election of the Claimant by villagers did not confer upon him employment status within the meaning of section 2 of the Employment Act. 23. Having found that the Claimant was not employed by the Respondents for wages or salary, and that the Claimant was neither an apprentice nor an indenture of the Public Service Commission or the Respondents, the inevitable conclusion to be drawn is that there is no employee – employer relationship between the Claimant and the Respondent. This court finds support in Rift Valley Water Services Board & 3 others v Asanyo & 2 others (Civil Appeal 60 & 61 of 2015 (Consolidated)) [2022] KECA 778 (KLR), where the Court of Appeal held:

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“In our considered judgment, the 1st respondent was not employed by the 2nd respondent “… for wages or a salary.” Neither was he an apprentice or indentured learner. We find nothing on record to suggest that the 2nd respondent had entered into a contract of service to employ the 1st respondent as its employee within the meaning of the Act. Accordingly, the Employment Act did not apply to him…” 24. The absence of an employee – employer relationship between the parties herein or between the Claimant and the Public Service Commission means that there cannot be an employee – employer dispute between the parties herein or between the Claimant and the Public Service Commission. 25. The upshot of the foregoing is that this cause is not an employee – employer dispute within the meaning of section 12 (1) (a) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act. DETERMINATION 26. Accordingly, for the reasons above, this cause is struck out for want of jurisdiction with no order as to costs. 27. This file is closed. Ruling read, signed, and delivered in open Court at Bungoma this 07th day of April 2026 T.O. OMONO SENIOR RESIDENT MAGISTRATE In the presence of: Respondents C/A: Mr. Rioba

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