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Original judgment

Nariki & another (Suing as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Christopher Musoga Sagana - Deceased) v Onyango & another (Civil Case E501 of 2024) [2025] KEMC 456 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA IN THE CHIEF MAGISTRATES COURT AT BUNGOMA CIVIL CASE NO. E501 OF 2024 ANDREW SAGANA NARIKI & MIRIAM M. MBOGA SAGANA (Suing as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Christopher Musoga Sagana (Deceased) ………………………………………………………..PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT VERSUS STEPHEN M. ONYANGO……………………………………………………..1ST DEFENDANT MOIZ MOTORS LIMITED..…………………………………...2ND DEFENDANT/APPLICANT RULING Before this court for determination is the 2nd Defendant/Applicant’s Application dated 10th June 2025 under Certificate of Urgency and expressed to be brought under Sections 1A and of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 1 rule 3 and 9, Order 51 Rule 1 and 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules, and all other enabling provisions of the law seeking the following orders: (a) Spent (b)That this Honourable Court be pleased to order that the 2nd Defendant be removed from the suit for misjoinder Bungoma CMC CC. No. E501 of 2024 Page 1 of 11 Ruling

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(c) That costs of this Application be provided for The instant Application was premised on the grounds on the face of it and further grounds set out in the Supporting Affidavit sworn on 12 th June 2025 by Nicholus Ngoli Inyangala. The gist of the instant Application is that at the time of the accident herein, the Applicant had already sold motor vehicle registration number KDQ 983 P to the 1st Defendant vide a Sale of Motor Vehicle Agreement dated 17 th July 2024. It was also averred by Ngoli that at the time of the accident, the 1 st Defendant was in possession of motor vehicle registration number KDQ 983 P and its beneficial owner, and that he had insured the same. He added that the Applicant was only the registered owner of the subject motor vehicle to secure its interest in the balance of the purchase price. The Plaintiff/Respondent opposed the instant Application vide a Replying Affidavit sworn on 25th August 2025 by her counsel, one Soita Nekesa Sylvia. Ms. Soita averred that the Applicant was properly sued since it was the subject motor vehicle’s registered owner at the time of the accident. She also averred that the veracity of the Applicant’s position that it had sold the subject motor vehicle to the 1 st Defendant could only be tested through evidence during the hearing of the main suit. Flowing from the averments in the Respondent’s Replying Affidavit on record, the Respondent urged this court to dismiss the instant Application with costs. Bungoma CMC CC. No. E501 of 2024 Page 2 of 11 Ruling

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On 04th September 2025, this court directed that the instant Application be canvassed by way of written submissions. At the time of writing this ruling on 30th September 2025, only the Applicant had filed their written submissions. ANALYSIS & DETERMINATION The pleadings, written submissions, as well as the authorities placed on record by the respective parties have been duly considered by this court. This court takes the view that the only issues that commend to this court for determination are: (a) Whether the instant Application is merited (b)Who should bear the costs of the instant Application Whether the instant Application is merited The Applicant urged this court to find that they were improperly sued since they were only registered owners of the subject motor vehicle at the time of the accident herein to protect their financial interest. On the other hand, the Respondent averred that the Applicant was properly sued since they were the subject motor vehicle’s registered owner at the time of the accident. The Respondent added that the question of whether the Applicant was properly sued could not be determined at this interlocutory stage but only after a full hearing upon hearing all the parties herein on merit. Bungoma CMC CC. No. E501 of 2024 Page 3 of 11 Ruling

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Turning to the issue of whether the question of misjoinder should only be determined after hearing all the parties on merit, this court places reliance on the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules to answer this question. Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules is in the following terms:“The court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit, be added.”(Emphasis added) Order 1 Rule 14 of the Civil Procedure Rules further provides for the time and manner in which the application envisaged under Order 1 rule 10 (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules is to be brought. Order 1 Rule 14 of the Civil Procedure Rules states “Any application to add or strike out or substitute a plaintiff or defendant may be made to the court at any time before trial by chamber summons or at the trial of the suit in a summary manner.”(Emphasis added) Bungoma CMC CC. No. E501 of 2024 Page 4 of 11 Ruling

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The operative words in the provisions of law cited above are: ‘at any stage of the proceedings’ and ‘at any time before trial…or at the trial of the suit..’ The operative words in the provisions of the law cited above show that an Application for misjoinder of a party can be made at any stage of proceedings. Further, the Civil Procedure Rules (see Order 1 Rules 10 and 14 and 25 of the Civil Procedure Rules) provide for the question of joinder to be tried by affidavit evidence, or even by oral application. Despite those express provisions of the law, it would appear that the Respondent was urging this court not to determine the question of misjoinder on the basis of Affidavit evidence but to defer such a determination to the full hearing of the main suit. That invitation by the Respondent is not sound in law since evidence to prove or disprove a fact can be placed before a court through Affidavit evidence. The practice in this jurisdiction is that it is permissible for questions raised in an interlocutory application to be determined by way of Affidavit evidence. It is this court’s considered view that the Affidavit evidence and the annextures placed before this court by the parties herein are sufficient for this court to make a determination on the question of the misjoinder of the Applicant. What evidence on misjoinder or otherwise of the Applicant would the parties herein place before this court during the hearing of the suit that the Respondent cannot place before this court at this stage? None at all. In the event this court heeds to the Respondent’s invitation to determine the question of the Applicant’s misjoinder after hearing the parties herein on merit, that will amount to dragging the Applicant in a costly venture of defending a non-existent civil claim against them if it ultimately turns out that the Applicant was improperly sued. Therefore, it follows that the question of misjoinder of a party ought to be determined at the earliest opportune time. A reading of the Sale of Motor Vehicle Agreement dated 17 th July 2024 shows that the Applicant sold the subject motor vehicle to the 1 st Defendant and Bungoma CMC CC. No. E501 of 2024 Page 5 of 11 Ruling

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Mercy Pharcy Oduor on hire purchase terms. That hire purchase agreement was to run from 17th August 2024 to 17th July 2027. The Respondent did not lead any evidence to prove on a balance of probabilities that the said Sale of Motor Vehicle Agreement dated 17 th July 2024. That being the case, this court holds and finds that the Applicant proved on a balance of probabilities that it sold the subject motor vehicle on hire purchase terms to the 1 st Defendant and Mercy Pharcy Oduor on 17 th August 2024. The Respondent took the view that since the Applicant was the subject motor vehicle’s registered owner as at 04 th August 2024 when the accident herein occurred, the Applicant was properly sued. The position taken by the Respondent, on the face of it, is sound in law since the copy of records for the subject motor vehicle placed before this court shows that as of 15th July 2024, the Applicant was the subject motor vehicle’s registered owner. However, the contents of the register of motor vehicles and motor vehicle logbook must be read together with section 8 of the Traffic Act. Section 8 of the Traffic Act provides thus: 8. Owner of vehicle The person in whose name a vehicle is registered shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to be the owner of the vehicleThe evidence led by the Applicants proving that they were only financiers Bungoma CMC CC. No. E501 of 2024 Page 6 of 11 Ruling

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to the purchase of the suit motorcycle was uncontroverted by the Respondent. The foregoing shows that an entry in a log book or the register of motor vehicles only creates a rebutable presumption that the person appearing in that register or logbook is the registered owner of a particular motor vehicle. That means that evidence to the contrary can rebut the presumption on ownership of the particular motor vehicle. This court has already held earlier on in this ruling that the Sale of Motor Vehicle Agreement dated 17th July 2024 on record is valid. In the circumstances, the only logical conclusion to be drawn is that at the time of the accident herein, the Applicant had sold the subject motor vehicle to the 1st Defendant and Mercy Pharcy Oduor on hire purchase terms. It is against this backdrop that this court holds and finds that the Applicant’s interest in the subject motor vehicle at the time of the accident was to protect his financial interest in recovering his hire purchase price in full. The question of a financier’s liability in road traffic accidents has been a subject of various judicial pronouncements in this jurisdiction. In Ali Lali Khalifa And 8 Others Vs Pollman’s Tours And Safaris Ltd, & Diamond Trust Bank (K) Limited Vrs Salim Khalid Said[2003] eKLR, the court considered the nature and effect of a financier and hirer status under a Hire Purchase Agreement and held as follows: Bungoma CMC CC. No. E501 of 2024 Page 7 of 11 Ruling

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“The legal position is this: if it can be demonstrated that a registered owner of a motor vehicle hired out to a third party or the said vehicle was used in the circumstances which did not allow for the doctrine of vicarious liability on the part of the registered owner, to apply, then the latter is not liable.In Ormrod v. Crosville Motor Services Ltd. (1954) 2 All ER 752, at page 755 Lord Denning said:“The law puts a special responsibility on the owner of a vehicle who allows it to go on the road in charge of someone else, no matter whether it is his servant, his friend or anyone else. If it is being used wholly or partly by the owner’s business or for the owner’s purpose, the owner is liable for any negligence on the part of the driver. The owner only escapes liability when he lends it or hires it to a third person to be used for purposes in which the owner has no interest or concern.”In the circumstances of the present case the following facts have been proved to exist (a) The second defendant was a mere financier of the first defendant for the purposes of the acquisition of the motor vehicle Reg. No. KAE 520H by the first defendant, and the second defendant’s interest in said vehicle was merely recorded in the Registration Book or in the records held by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles for the purposes of securing its interests under the Hire Purchase Agreement. That interest is in the balance of the loan or advances to the first defendant…. interest is the balance of the loan or advances to the first Defendant. (b) At the time of the accident the said vehicle KAE 520H had been sold to the third Defendant by the first Defendant and the third defendant was thus operating matatu business (c) The second defendant Bungoma CMC CC. No. E501 of 2024 Page 8 of 11 Ruling

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had neither interest in the first defendant’s business nor in the third defendant’s matatu business. (d) The accident the subject matter of this suit, arose at the time when the said vehicle was being driven wholly for the purpose of the business of the Third defendant.” Emphasis added. Similarly, in Justus Kavisi Kilonzo V Coast Broadway Company Limited & another [2008] eKLR , it was held that; “Despite the registration of the 2 nd defendant as co-owner of the said motor vehicle, as a financier of the 1 st defendant, the 2nd defendant is not a necessary party to these proceedings. To use the language of Etyang J (now retired), in Mombasa HCC Number 106 of 2002: Ali Lali Khalifa & Others –vs- Pollman’s Tours & Safaris & 2 Others (UR), the 2 nd defendant has demonstrated that it hired out the said motor vehicle to the 1st defendant and the said vehicle was used by the 1 st defendant in circumstances which do not allow for the doctrine of vicarious liability to apply to the 2nd defendant.” The foregoing shows that a hirer of a motor vehicle under a Higher Purchase Agreement cannot be held to be vicariously liable for the actions of a person who was driving a motor vehicle, which is the subject of a hire purchase agreement, for their own benefit. A hirer of a motor vehicle is a nominal owner having no custody or control of the vehicle, and as such the hirer does not owe a duty of care to a claimant as would have given rise to (vicarious) liability against the hirer. Who should bear the costs of this Application Bungoma CMC CC. No. E501 of 2024 Page 9 of 11 Ruling

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The general rule under section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act is that costs follow the event. Taking the totality of the circumstances of this case into consideration, this court is of the considered view that this is a proper case of departing from the general rule on costs, given that the Respondent sued the Applicant under an honest belief that the Applicant was the subject motor vehicle’s registered owner. DETERMINATION Accordingly, for the reasons set out above, the Applicant’s Application dated 10th June 2025 is allowed in the following terms: a) The suit against the 2nd Defendant/Applicant is dismissed b) There shall be no order as to costs. It is so ordered. Read, signed, and delivered virtually at Bungoma this 02 nd October 2025 T.O. OMONO SENIOR RESIDENT MAGISTRATE In the presence of: for the 1st Defendant/Applicant for the Plaintiff/Respondent Bungoma CMC CC. No. E501 of 2024 Page 10 of 11 Ruling

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C/A: Mr. Rioba Bungoma CMC CC. No. E501 of 2024 Page 11 of 11 Ruling

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