ANN (Minor ) (Suing through her Father & Next Friend JNK) v Watu Credit Limited & 2 others (Civil Case E501 of 2024) [2025] KEMC 444 (KLR) (15 April 2025) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2025] KEMC 444 (KLR) REPUBLIC OF KENYA IN THE BUNGOMA LAW COURTS CIVIL CASE E501 OF 2024 TO OMONO, RM APRIL 15, 2025 BETWEEN ANN (MINOR ) (SUING THROUGH HER FATHER & NEXT FRIEND JNK) .............................................................................................................. PLAINTIFF AND WATU CREDIT LIMITED .............................................................. 1ST DEFENDANT WATU NOMINEES COMPANY LIMITED .................................. 2ND DEFENDANT BRIAN OTIENO .............................................................................. 3RD DEFENDANT RULING 1. Before this court is the 1st & 3rd Defendants/Applicants’ (in this ruling jointly referred to as ‘the Applicants) Application dated 26th February 2025 brought under Sections 3A & 3B of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 1 rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules (2010), and all other enabling provisions of the law seeking that the Applicants be struck out from this suit. 2. The Applicants’ application is based on the ground that the Applicant was only a financier to the purchase of motor cycle registration number KMFM 748 K and hence cannot be liable for damages arising from the use of the said motorcycle. 3. The Plaintifi/Respondent opposed the instant Application vide a Replying Afidavit sworn on 18th March 2025 by stating that the instant Application was fatally defective and destitute of merit hence the same should be struck out. 4. The Respondent added that the Applicants were the sole registered owners of the motorcycle in question hence cannot be struck out from this suit. He added that since the Applicants, despite being financiers, failed to register the subject motorcycle in their joint names and that of the 2nd Defendant, it would not be in the interest of justice to strike out the Applicants from this suit at this stage. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2025/444/eng@2025-04-15 1
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5. He also urged this court to find that given the circumstances of this case, the question of whether the Applicants were improperly joined to this suit could only be determined during the hearing of the main suit. Analysis & Determination 6. Parties’ pleadings and submissions filed herein as well as the authorities relied upon by each party have been duly considered by this court. The issues that commend to this court for determination are: a) Whether the firm of Wabomba Masinde & Associates is properly on record for the Applicants b) Whether the question of misjoinder of a party ought to be determined during the hearing of the main suit or at interlocutory stage c) Whether the instant Application is merited Whether the firm of Wabomba Masinde & Associates is properly on record for the Applicants 7. The Respondent averred at paragraph 11 of their Replying Afidavit herein that the firm of Wabomba & Masinde Advocates was not properly on record for the 1st and 3rd Defendant/Applicants, hence could not file the instant Application. 8. The Respondent further averred that the firm of Akwala & Company Advocates was the proper firm to act for all the Defendants, having been duly instructed by the suit motorcycle’s insurer. 9. This court has had the benefit of going through the Memorandums of Appearance filed herein by the firm of Wabomba & Masinde Advocates and Akwala & Company Advocates. 10. The firm of Wabomba & Masinde Advocates filed its Memorandum of Appearance for the 1st and 3rd Defendants/Applicants on 06th December 2024. 11. On 13th January 2025, the firm of Akwala & Company Advocates filed a Memorandum of Appearance for all the Defendants herein. 12. The foregoing shows that the firm of Akwala & Company Advocates purported to come on record for the 1st & 3rd Defendants/Applicants after the firm of Wabomba & Masinde Advocates had already done so. 13. That being the case, the firm of Akwala & Company Advocates needed to comply with the provisions of Order 9, Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Rules before being deemed to have appropriately come on record for the 1st and 3rd Defendants. 14. Order 9 Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 provides for change of Advocates as follows: “ A Party suing or defending by an Advocate shall be at liberty to change his Advocate in any cause or matter, without an order for that purpose, but unless and until notice of any change of Advocate is filed in Court in which such cause or matter is proceedings and served in accordance with Rule 5, the former Advocate shall, subject to rules 12 and 13 be considered the Advocate of the party until the final conclusion of the cause or matter, including any review or appeal.” https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2025/444/eng@2025-04-15 2
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15. In Stephen Mwangi Kimote v Murata Sacco Society [2018] eKLR Kemei J expressed himself on this issue: Unless and until a notice of change of Advocate is filed and duly served an Advocate on record for a party remains the Advocate for that party subject to removal from record at the instance of another party under Rule 12 of the same Order or withdrawal of the Advocate under Rule 13 of the same Order. 16. There is no evidence on record to show that the firm of Akwala & Company Advocates complied with the provisions of order 9 rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Rules before purporting to come on record for the 1st and 3rd Defendants/Applicants. 17. Guided by the authorities above, this court returns a finding that the firm of Wabomba & Masinde Advocates is properly on record for the 1st & 3rd Defendants/Applicants. Whether the question of misjoinder of a party ought to be determined during the hearing of the main suit or at interlocutory stage 18. The Applicants submitted that Order 1 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Rules permits a court to determine a question regarding a party’s misjoinder at any stage of the proceedings. The Applicants further submitted that a party improperly sued ought not to endure the rigour of a full trial and thereby incur expenses before it can vindicate itself. 19. It was the Respondent’s case that since the Applicants only registered the suit motorcycle in the name of the 1st Applicant, it would not be in the interest of justice to strike out the Applicants from this suit at this stage. 20. The Respondent added that the question of misjoinder of a party ought to be determined after both parties have been heard on merit 21. The instant Application is brought under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules. 22. Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules is in the following terms:“ The court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintifi or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintifi or defendant, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court efiectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit, be added.”(Emphasis added) 23. Order 1 Rule 14 of the Civil Procedure Rules further provides for the time and manner in which the application envisaged under Order 1 rule 10 (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules is to be brought. Order 1 Rule 14 of the Civil Procedure Rules states “ Any application to add or strike out or substitute a plaintifi or defendant may be made to the court at any time before trial by chamber summons or at the trial of the suit in a summary manner.”(Emphasis added) 24. The operative words in the provisions of law cited above are: ‘at any stage of the proceedings’ and ‘at any time before trial…or at the trial of the suit..’ https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2025/444/eng@2025-04-15 3
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25. The operative words in the provisions of the law cited above show that an Application for misjoinder of a party can be made at any stage of proceedings. 26. Further, the Civil Procedure Rules (see Order 1 Rules 10 and 14 and 25 of the Civil Procedure Rules) provide for the question of joinder to be tried by afidavit evidence, or even by oral application. Despite those express provisions of the law, it would appear that the Respondent was urging this court not to determine the question of misjoinder on the basis of Afidavit evidence but to defer such a determination to the full hearing of the main suit. 27. That invitation by the Respondent is not sound in law since evidence to prove or disprove a fact can be placed before a court through Afidavit evidence. The practice in this jurisdiction is that it is permissible for questions raised in an interlocutory application to be determined by way of Afidavit evidence. 28. It is this court’s considered view that the Afidavit evidence and the annextures placed before this court by the parties herein are suficient for this court to make a determination on the question of the misjoinder of the Applicants. What evidence on misjoinder or otherwise of the Applicants would the parties herein place before this court during the hearing of the suit that the Respondent can not place before this court at this stage? None at all. 29. If this court was to take the position taken by the Respondent on when to determine the question of misjoinder of the Applicants, that would constitute a waste of precious judicial time and dragging the Applicants in a costly venture of defending a non-existent civil claim against them if it ultimately turns out at the conclusion of this suit that the Applicants were improperly sued.. 30. This court takes the considered view that the question of misjoinder of a party ought to be determined at the earliest opportune time. 31. Therefore, given the above, the Respondent’s contention that a determination on whether the Applicants are liable in this matter should await the trial of the main suit, with respect, lacks any legal basis since liability can only attach to a party who has been properly sued. 32. For the reasons above, this court finds and holds that the instant Application is properly before this court at this stage of the proceedings. Whether the instant Application is merited 33. The Applicants urged this court to find that they were merely financiers of the suit motor cycle whose only interest in the suit motor cycle was their financial interest in the said motorcycle. That being the case, the Applicants submitted that they could not be held liable for the 2nd Defendant’s actions, hence they ought to be struck out from these proceedings. 34. The Respondent, on the other hand, took the view that since the 1st Applicant was the sole registered owner of the suit motor cycle, they were necessary parties to this suit. The Respondent also added that since the police abstract placed before this court identified the 3rd Defendant/Applicant as the motorcycle’s beneficial owner, the 3rd Defendant/Applicant was a proper party to this suit. 35. Paragraph 9 of the Respondent’s Replying Afidavit herein shows that the Respondent acknowledged the fact that the 3rd Defendant/Applicant held a security interest in the suit motorcycle until the financing agreement between it and the 2nd Defendant is fully settled. 36. Material placed before this court by the Applicant and the concession by the Respondent show without doubt that the Applicants are mere financiers to the purchase of the suit motorcycle. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2025/444/eng@2025-04-15 4
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37. The evidence led by the Applicants proving that they were only financiers to the purchase of the suit motorcycle was uncontroverted by the Respondent. 38. The Respondents just relied on the police abstract and copy of records, and added that if the Applicants were mere financiers then they ought to have had the motorcycle in question registered in both their names and that of the 2nd Defendant. 39. Having established that the Applicants’ interest in the suit motorcycle is to secure their financial interest, the next question is whether the Applicants were properly sued. 40. The question of a financier’s liability in road trafic accidents has been a subject of various judicial pronouncements in this jurisdiction. 41. In Ali Lali Khalifa And 8 Others Vs Pollman’s Tours And Safaris Ltd, & Diamond Trust Bank (K) Limited Vrs Salim Khalid Said[2003] eKLR, the court considered the nature and efiect of a financier and hirer status under a Hire Purchase Agreement and held as follows: “ The legal position is this: if it can be demonstrated that a registered owner of a motor vehicle hired out to a third party or the said vehicle was used in the circumstances which did not allow for the doctrine of vicarious liability on the part of the registered owner, to apply, then the latter is not liable.In Ormrod v. Crosville Motor Services Ltd. (1954) 2 All ER 752, at page 755 Lord Denning said: “The law puts a special responsibility on the owner of a vehicle who allows it to go on the road in charge of someone else, no matter whether it is his servant, his friend or anyone else. If it is being used wholly or partly by the owner’s business or for the owner’s purpose, the owner is liable for any negligence on the part of the driver. The owner only escapes liability when he lends it or hires it to a third person to be used for purposes in which the owner has no interest or concern.”In the circumstances of the present case the following facts have been proved to exist (a) The second defendant was a mere financier of the first defendant for the purposes of the acquisition of the motor vehicle Reg. No. KAE 520H by the first defendant, and the second defendant’s interest in said vehicle was merely recorded in the Registration Book or in the records held by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles for the purposes of securing its interests under the Hire Purchase Agreement. That interest is in the balance of the loan or advances to the first defendant…. interest is the balance of the loan or advances to the first Defendant. (b) At the time of the accident the said vehicle KAE 520H had been sold to the third Defendant by the first Defendant and the third defendant was thus operating matatu business (c) The second defendant had neither interest in the first defendant’s business nor in the third defendant’s matatu business. (d) The accident the subject matter of this suit, arose at the time when the said vehicle was being driven wholly for the purpose of the business of the Third defendant.” Emphasis added. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2025/444/eng@2025-04-15 5
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42. Similarly, in Justus Kavisi Kilonzo V Coast Broadway Company Limited & another [2008] eKLR , it was held that; “ Despite the registration of the 2nd defendant as co-owner of the said motor vehicle, as a financier of the 1st defendant, the 2nd defendant is not a necessary party to these proceedings. To use the language of Etyang J (now retired), in Mombasa HCC Number 106 of 2002: Ali Lali Khalifa & Others –vs- Pollman’s Tours & Safaris & 2 Others (UR), the 2nd defendant has demonstrated that it hired out the said motor vehicle to the 1st defendant and the said vehicle was used by the 1st defendant in circumstances which do not allow for the doctrine of vicarious liability to apply to the 2nd defendant.” 43. The foregoing shows that ownership of a motor vehicle does not, of itself, establish liability for an accident. The plaintifi must prove that the owner is vicariously liable for the acts of the driver of the motor vehicle by showing that the driver is an employee or agent (see Jane Wairimu Turanta v Githae John Vickery and Equity Bank Limited & Munene Don ML HCCC No. 483 of 2012 [2012] eKLR). 44. On whether the owner who has a financial interest in a motor vehicle has control over the driver, it is well settled in this jurisdiction that a financier’s only interest in the security is to secure the repayment from the owner and it is not in control of the motor vehicle for that reason (see Ali Abdi Dere v Hash Hauliers Limited & Another MKS HCCC No. 16 of 2014 [2018] eKLR). 45. The Court of Appeal in Mohammed Hassan Musa and Another v Peter Mailanyi and Another NYR CA Civil Appeal No. 243 of 1998 [2000] eKLR stated as follows: “ There is one other aspect of this appeal that we feel we must comment on. The plaintifi is an Advocate of the High Court of Kenya but in his attempt to realise the decree he resorted to what in efiect amounted to jungle law. The third defendant, Diamond Trust (K) Ltd, which had nothing to do with the accident but had merely only financed the purchase of the motor vehicle which caused the accident was wrongly sued and attached…” 46. In Sumer Singh Bachu v Nicholas Wainaina Kago Waweru [1976] eKLR, the Court of Appeal stated after setting out authorities placed before it by counsel for the Plaintifi challenging the dismissal of his case against one of the Co-Defendants: “ With respect to the learned counsel these authorities do not in my view assist the plaintifi’s case. On the contrary, they show clearly that where a person owns a vehicle which is driven by another person, even with the permission of the owner, that owner will not be vicariously liable in tort for the negligence of the driver unless it is established that the driver was acting as a servant or agent of the owner, or was using the vehicle for the benefit of the owner or of something in which the owner had an interest either alone or jointly with the driver.” (emphasis added) 47. The Respondent did not place before this court any evidence to show that at the time of the accident, the 2nd Defendant was riding the suit motorcycle for the benefit of the 1st & 3rd Defendants/Applicants. 48. The authorities cited above show that a proven financier in the purchase of a vehicle is a nominal owner having no custody or control of the vehicle, and as such the financier does not owe a duty of care to a claimant as would have given rise to (vicarious) liability against the financier. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2025/444/eng@2025-04-15 6
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49. This instant case is a case where the Applicants’ financial interest in the suit motorcycle is beyond dispute. In the circumstances, and guided by the authorities above, this court holds and finds that no purpose would be served by dragging the Applicants to a full trial. Determination 50. Accordingly, for the reasons set out above, the application dated 26th February 2025 is merited. 51. The suit against the 1st and 3rd Defendants/Applicants is dismissed with costs. 52. It is so ordered. READ, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT BUNGOMA THIS 15TH DAY OF APRIL 2025 T.O. OMONO RESIDENT MAGISTRATE In the presence of: Wabomba for the 1st & 3rd Defendant/Applicants Angode for the Plaintifi/Respondent C/A: Albert https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2025/444/eng@2025-04-15 7
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