Maina v Laurel Investment Limited (Civil Suit 17 of 2015) [2016] KEMC 9 (KLR)

b. Failing to provide the Plaintifi with proper and or safe system of work. c. Permitting the Plaintifi to be injured. d. Failing to warn the Plaintifi of such eminent dangers involved in her work. e. Failing to provide the Plaintifi with protective devices. f. Failing to take precautions to avert danger from the Plaintifi. 3. The plaintifi is therefore praying for general and special damages, costs of the suit and interests. He is represented by the law firm of Munene Chege & Co. Advocates. 4. The defendant herein entered appearance on 31/03/2015 through the firm of Munene Wambugu & Kiplagat Advocates. In its Statement of Defence dated 31/03/2015, it denied the plaintifi's claim in its entirety and put him to strict proof thereof. In the alternative and without prejudice to the denial, it avers that the environment at its workplace is safe, with a safe system of work where all employees are provided with adequate training on the tasks to be undertaken, are well informed of the risks that might be involved and are well supervised, provided with protective clothing and safety gear and therefore if the plaintifi was its employee (which is denied) and/or if the plaintifi was injured as alleged, then the same was caused wholly or substantially by the plaintifi's own negligence which it particularised in paragraph 7 of the Statement of Defence as follows:- 5. a. Failing to maintain a proper lookout for his personal safety while undertaking the assigned tasks. b. Failing to take proper care whilst undertaking assigned duties. c. Failing or neglecting to wear the protective gear provided for his personal safety. d. Failing and neglecting to heed to instructions and training given on the precautionary measures to be taken so as to prevent an injury. e. Failing to adhere to and follow the laid down procedures on personal safety at the workplace. f. Failing to take extra precaution while working. g. Exceeding the scope of his duties by undertaking tasks that were not assigned to him. h. Disregarding warnings and cautions that had been given. i. Exposing himself to unnecessary risks thus causing the injuries. The defendant thus prayed that the Plaintifi's suit against it be dismissed with costs. Procedural facts of the case 6. As already stated hereinabove, the plaintifi filed this suit vide a Plaint dated 16.02.2015 on 03.03.2015. The Plaint was filed together with the Verifying Afidavit, List of Witnesses, Documents and the Statements, as required. The defendant entered appearance on 31.03.2015, when it filed its Memorandum of Appearance dated 31.03.2015, and Statement of Defence dated 29.07.2015.The plaintifi then filed his Reply and Pre-trial questionnaires on 04.05.2015, and Statement of Issues on 28.05.2015, all dated 04.03.2015. 7. The Pre-trial conferences which were to be held before me, could not proceed because of the absence of the defendant. On 18.06.2015, when the matter was mentioned before me for directions, the defendant https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2016/9/eng@2016-09-08 2

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and its representative were both absent. It was nevertheless agreed that the matter does proceed with the hearing, which was to commence before me on 23.07.2015. On 23.07.2015, both parties were represented. It was then further agreed that the defendant does subject the plaintifi herein to a second medical examination. 8. Hearing finally commenced before me with the plaintifi's case on 19.11.2015. The defence opened and closed its case on 11.02.2016 and 12.05.2016, respectively. Before the defence case was closed, parties herein entered into a consent to produce Dr. Malik's medical report as DEXH. No. 5, without calling the doctor. Parties then further agreed to file and exchange their written submissions, arguments and authorities before 9.00am on 09.06.2016 when the matter was to be mentioned to confirm the closure, or otherwise, of the submissions. 9. The submissions were however confirmed closed on 23.06.2016 and the matter fixed for the present judgment. All the other procedural issues, including adjournments, are well recorded in the proceedings herein which are self-explanatory. Substantive Facts of The Case 10. The plaintifi testified as PW2. He stated that he used to work with the defendant as from 2011. He produced a document informing him of his job description as a sprayer as PEXH. No. 3. That on 16.02.2013, he reported on duty while feeling unwell. His chest was aching him. He went to the Human Resources Oficer who gave him permission to visit Ol Kalou District Hospital for treatment. He was also granted leave on account of the sickness. He produced the Leave Application Form, with the approval, dated 16.02.2013, as PEXH. No. 4. At the hospital, he was treated, given some drugs, and then discharged. He was treated vide PEXH. No. 2, which was produced by DW3, Peter Wainaina, a records oficer at the hospital, while being cross-examined. Upon being treated, he resumed his duties but was not fully healed. He was therefore given more leave days to seek further treatment vide another Leave Application Form dated and approved on 20.12.2013 on account of sickness. The same was produced as PEXH. No. 5. He attributes the injuries to the defendant's negligence and or breach of duty for failing to provide him with proper protective apparels and devices such as gloves, masks and gumboots. That that made him to inhale the sprayed chemicals which caused him the injuries. That the defendant has refused to compensate him for the loss and injuries sufiered despite issuing a demand to them. He was then also examined by PW1, Dr. Obed Omuyoma, a medical practitioner from Nakuru. 11. In cross-examination, the plaintifi confirmed that he had for the 3 years while working with the defendant, spraying the chemicals, till he was sacked for bad health. That he used to complain to his supervisors about the worn out and inappropriate boots, gloves and masks without any remedy, or solution. That he used to attend the institution's clinics periodically where he used to be issued with pain killers. 12. PW1, Dr. Obed Omuyoma, a general medical practitioner based at Nakuru with a basic undergraduate degree in Medicine from the University of Nairobi, confirmed having examined the plaintifi herein on 16.01.2015 and prepared a medico-legal report of the same date which he produced as PEXH. No 1A. He stated that the plaintifi gave him a history of having been employed by the defendant herein as a chemical sprayer when he came into contact with the sprayed chemicals and developed allergic chemical bronchitis. That he examined him and noted wheezing at the chest. He therefore concluded that he was grievously harmed. He charged him Kshs. 5000/= for the report. He produced the receipt as PEXH. NO 1B. He further stated that he charged a fee of Kshs. 10,000/= on account of his court attendance. He produced the receipt as PExh. No. 1C. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2016/9/eng@2016-09-08 3

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13. In cross-examination, he confirmed that the plaintifi sustained the injury 2 years before the examination.. He relied on his own examination and an undated treatment card from Ol Kalou District ( J.M. Kariuki) Hospital ( PEXH. No.2). That the wheezing sound means that there was a problem at the chest. That X-ray was therefore not necessary to diagnose the problem. That his examination confirmed the disease pleaded. That the diagnosis and his history made him narrow down on the disease. 14. The defendant called the plaintifi's supervisor, DW1, George Kamau Gitau, who confirmed that the plaintifi was working under him as a sprayer. He testified on the general human resource policies including that the defendant supplies all its employees with water proof spray suit including water proof goggles, spray mask, gum boots and hands gloves. He produced a document dated 11.01.2013, which indicates that the plaintifi acknowledged receipt of, and confirmed that while on duty he will always use, impervious spray suit, gum boots, goggles, mask, rubber gloves and legging canvas, as DEXH. No. 1. That the devices are issued every 3 months and replaced in between, in case the worker complains. That the plaintifi herein did not complain as claimed by him. He further stated that in case of chemical contact, then the employee is normal assisted by his fellow employees. That in case it worsens, then the employee reports to the hospital where the doctor makes the entries of the list of incidents in a general register. That this accident was however not entered into the register. 15. In cross-examination, he confirmed that there is no proof that the supplied devices were new and further insisted that the plaintifi could have complained if the same were worn out. He confirmed that the plaintifi used to report to him that he was not feeling well, that he used to pray for sick-ofi and further that he used to refer him to the doctor who was unable to ascertain the ailment. 16. The Defendant's Human Resources (HR) Manager, DW2, Levison Ndirangu, also confirmed that the plaintifi was an employee of the defendant. He knew him having worked as such for the defendant for a period of 10 years. He stated that the plaintifi was issued with devices which were new at the time and as per their HR policy. That they keep the records of the injuries in an Accident Book where all the accidents are recorded. He fills in the entries. That the plaintifi herein reported no injury. He produced a copy of the book as DEXH. No. 2. 17. In cross-examination, he stated that no one was allowed to spray without protective equipments which are issued every 3 months. He however confirmed that he did not have any proof that the plaintifi was issued with brand new devices as claimed by him. 18. DW3, Peter Wainaina, is a records oficer at Ol Kalou District Hospital. He stated that the plaintifi's name did not appear in their manual register for 16.02.2013, but for 05.09.2013. That on 05.09.2013, he gave them a referral chit for a sick ofi. He produced a computer print out for the register for 05.09.2013, as DEXH. No. 3 showing that the plaintifi was attended to on that date. He also produced a validation report on the plaintifi herein that had been requested by an assessor, where they called for further medical documents from the plaintifi. The validation report was produced as DEXH. No. 4. His evidence is that the ailment or the condition that made the plaintifi be seen at the hospital are unclear from their records. 19. He however confirmed in cross-examination that at the time when the plaintifi was seen, in February 2013, the records for the hospital were manual. That he had not come to court with the manual register. That the entries are filled by the records oficer. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2016/9/eng@2016-09-08 4

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Issues, Burden and Standard of Proof 20. There was no pre-trial conference conducted herein to frame or narrow down the issues herein. As already stated, the defendant failed to attend, and/or, co-operate with the plaintifi during the pre-trials. Such issues however fiow from the pleadings, then to the evidence adduced in proof of the claims, and then to the submissions. 21. Though from the pleadings herein, the defendant herein denied all the averments in the plaintifi's plaint herein, subsequent evidence adduced during the trial, especially from PW1, the plaintifi himself, DW1 and DW2, confirms that the plaintifi was indeed, at all material times herein, employed by the defendant herein as a chemical sprayer. He was therefore using some chemicals. It is also not in dispute 1 that the plaintifi's health was then not good . The cause of his ill health could then not be ascertained and still cannot be ascertained from the records of the hospital where he used to attend, whether the 2 defendant's clinic or Ol Kalou District Hospital where DW3 works as the records oficer . Neither could it be ascertained from the sick-ofis applications forms that used to be approved by DW2. He was however unwell and used to attend hospital. He is not an expert in medicine, neither is the court nor any of the other witnesses herein, except PW1. He is not therefore expected to know what has caused his ailment without a diagnosis by a medical practitioner. This was also a condition and not an accident, and could have gone unreported or undiagnosed for a very long time. He was eventually sacked because 3 of his poor health . In civil cases, however, the burden of proof is on each party to prove his claim. The standard of proof is lower: a preponderance of probabilities. The issues for determination herein is therefore whether there is medical evidence that the plaintifi sustained the injury pleaded, whether the same was linked to the defendant's negligence or breach of duty as pleaded, and whether the plaintifi is therefore entitled to the reliefs sought. Determination 22. On the first issue, learned counsel for the plaintifi submitted that the injuries were occasioned over a long period of time but that the apex was notable when the plaintifi sought for leave due to sickness. That the report by Dr. Obed Omuyoma, produced as PEXH. No. 1A, clearly indicated that the plaintifi sufiered the injuries alleged in the plaint. That the doctor clearly testified and justified his report in court by indicating how he came up with his conclusion. That his conclusion is that the injuries sufiered by the plaintifi were as a result of inhaling chemical sprays over a long period of time. 23. Learned counsel for the defendant however submitted that Dr. Omuyoma's report does not aid this court because the plaintifi has not proved that he was treated on the said date, and the source of the doctor's diagnosis is therefore unknown. That the chemicals that the plaintifi was allegedly exposed to were never listed or given so that a determination is made as to whether the plaintifi was allergic to them or not. That Dr. Malik's report was produced by consent as DEXH. No.5 and is clear that the plaintifi did not exhibit any symptom of Allergic Chemical Bronchitis. 1 Refer to DW1's evidence in cross-examination that: '...[D]aniel (Plaintifi) sometimes used to come and pray for ofi days because of illness. The doctor did not ascertain the same...The Plaintifi has not been compensated. He used to tell me that he was not feeling well and I used to refer him to the doctor'. 2 Refer to DW3's testimony: '...[D]aniel Gikonyo was treated for...No records of the illness. He gave us a treatment shit...for a sick ofi. The same is undated. Our records have no record of treatment of 05.09.2013...He should supply us with other documents.' 3 Whereas the plaintifi confirmed that he was sacked because of bad health, DW1, confirmed his sacking, but did not disclose the reason, or challenge the plaintifi's. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2016/9/eng@2016-09-08 5

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24. On Dr. Malik's report, learned counsel for the plaintifi, relying on the case of David Ndung'u Macharia Vrs Samuel K. Muhiu & Another NRB HCCC 125/89, cited in George Morara Masitsa Vrs Texplast Industries Limited [2015]eKLR, attacked Dr. Malik's report because the author did not explain to the court how he arrived at the finding unlike Dr. Omuyoma who personally appeared in court. That this should be the case because the report is inconsistent with Dr. Omuyoma's findings. In the David Ndungu Macharia case, supra, Ringera, J. ( as he then was) stated inter alia: The second issue is that only an agreed report can properly be admitted in evidence without calling the maker. The mere exchange of medical reports does not render such report or reports admissible without calling the makers unless one or both of them have been agreed... 25. Learned counsel submitted on the point that Dr. S. M. Malik's report cannot be admitted in light of the fact that neither of the reports was agreed upon by both counsel as the correct one. 26. I do agree with the arguments by the learned counsel for the plaintifi as far as the reliability, and not the admissibility, of Dr. Malik's report vis-a-vis Dr. Omuyoma's in making a determination in the first and the main issue in this trial. Whereas the document was admitted by consent as an exhibit herein, it was still admitted as an exhibit for the defence case. The plaintifi had already produced his report as exhibit. It cannot be said that the plaintifi, by allowing the admission of Dr. Malik's report as an exhibit, was aiding the defence case, while knowing very well that the report was inconsistent with Dr. Omuyoma's report who had come and produced his while on oath. Clearly, can this court disregard the evidence of a report given on oath, and instead rely on a report whose evidence has not been given and tested on oath? That can only happen when there is no inconsistency in the evidence therein. Where there is inconsistency, then it becomes an issue of reliability. Which of the inconsistent reports to be believed. It will be an absurd practice to believe evidence not given on oath to discredit one that was given and tested while on oath. That is why there was a trial whose main aim is to find out the truth. There will be no need for a trial as envisaged in our laws, if parties are allowed to admit inconsistent evidence of documents not produced or tested on oath, and then proceed to make findings from the evidence, while dismissing some as unreliable. 27. The procedure under Order 11 Rule 3, Civil Procedure Rules,2010, that provides for such short cut admissions of statements, documents or afidavit evidence without calling the makers or deponents are only useful when the evidence therein is uncontested, more or less like in a case stated. Odunga J. in Hon. Musikari Kombo VRS Royal Media Services NBI HCCC 89/2011 held that statements filed by parties together with the pleadings are not required to be on oath. Consequently, they are not evidence in the case and can only acquire the status of evidence when adopted by the witness after being sworn. On the efiect of such evidence, Makhandia J. (as he then was) in Consolata Hospital Mathari VRS Bianka Matens (Nyeri HCCA 17/2004) stated as follows:The efiect of the evidence not given on oath is that it amounts to no more than a mere statement of no probative value to the case...The law has stated that evidence must be taken on oath unless for children of tender years as well as those who shoes to be afirmed 28. I do therefore find no probative value in the report by Dr. Malik. This therefore leaves me with the expert evidence of Dr. Omuyoma, which was given on oath and tested in cross-examination. It confirmed that the ailment and injury that could not be ascertained, and that caused much sufiering to the plaintifi herein was allergic chemical bronchitis which he developed over a period of time. He examined him and used his expertise to diagnose the same. He then linked the same to the history provided by the plaintifi, which was also confirmed herein, that he worked for long with the defendant while spraying chemicals. The plaintifi did testify that he was exposed to the chemicals while working https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2016/9/eng@2016-09-08 6

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for the defendant. Dr. Omuyoma's expert opinion, which now remains unchallenged, is that the exposure to the chemicals for a period of 3 years led him to develop allergic chemical bronchitis which caused him grievous harm. There is no better evidence to challenge this expert opinion. Such an expert opinion could only be challenged by another reliable expert opinion evidence. The defendant conducted its case casually by not having its expert opinion evidence admitted and tested on oath and they cannot say that they were misled by the plaintifi who only consented to the admission of the evidence. That kind of evidence not given on oath fails the reliability test, when considered against a contrary evidence that has been given on oath. 29. I do not therefore see any firm ground to reject Dr. Omuyoma's report given that no better evidence has been brought to challenge the same. To require the plaintifi, a lay casual, to specifically know the names of the chemicals that he inhaled would be, as held in George Morara Masitsa VRS Texplast Industries Limited [2015] eKLR, raising the burden of proof in civil cases to that of beyond reasonable doubt. It is not contested that the plaintifi was working in an environment where he could be exposed to chemicals. It was then conformed that during that period, he developed some sickness which he states afiected his chest. He states that he used to inhale the chemicals because he was not provided with proper system of work, and he was later examined and found to have developed the allergic condition pleaded herein which an expert linked to the exposure to the chemicals. It has also been proved that during that period of his employment when he was so exposed, he used to be seen at the hospital for being sick. It was not his duty to diagnose the sickness at the time, or to indicate the same and make the entries in the medical documents and other documents produced herein. 30. As held by Justice Aburili in the George Morara Masitsa case, supra, there is, on a balance of probability, no doubt, a causal link between the unsafe working environment under which the plaintifi worked and his ailment, and eventual diagnosis herein. Dr. Omuyoma gave his opinion on the status of the plaintifi at the time of the examination, which opinion cannot be challenged by any other evidence, apart from another better expert evidence given on oath in the same field. 31. The plaintifi insisted that he was not provided with proper protective devices, other than worn out ones, during the period of his employment with the defendant, which exposed him to the chemicals. The defendant produced DEXH. No.1, which only proves that the equipments to protect him were issued to him on 11.01.2013. There is however no proof of the conditions of the equipments. The defence witnesses confirmed the same. There is also no proof that he was provided with any such protective equipment since 2011 when he started using the chemicals. His condition started afiecting him by February 2013, just one month after he was issued with the equipments listed in DEXH. No.1, whose state and condition have not been ascertained by the defendant to rebut the plaintifi assertion and evidence that the equipment were worn out and therefore unsafe. He must have been exposed to the chemicals over a long period of time as indicated in Dr. Omuyoma's report and the equipment that were given to him, if any, were therefore not protective enough. On a balance of probabilities, I do find that the plaintifi has proved his case on a balance of probability against the defendant and deserves to be compensated. 32. The defendant was negligence as it did not take precaution to provide the plaintifi with a safe place to work and or facilities. This exposed the plaintifi to a risk of danger of the injury which has been proved herein, and which the defendant ought to know, namely, exposure to chemicals that were harmful to his health over a long period of time. In Statpack Industries VRS James Mbithi Munyao [2005]eKLR, and Evans Makokha Barasa VRS Silverstone Masters LTD [2012]eKLR it was expressly stated that the plaintifi must prove a causal link between the defendant's negligence and his injury, such a plaintifi must adduce evidence from which, on a balance of probability, a connection between the two may be drawn, and that an injury per se is not suficient to hold someone liable for the same. To quote from https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2016/9/eng@2016-09-08 7

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the authority in Statpack Inditries VRS James Mbithi Munyao ( Supra) at page 4, the judge stated as follows:[C]oming now to the more important issue of "causation", it is trite law that the burden of proof of any fact or allegation is on the plaintifi. He must prove a causal link between someone's negligence and his injury. The Plaintifi must adduce evidence from which, on a balance of probability, a connection between the two may be drawn. Not every injury is necessarily a result of someone's negligence, An injury per se is not suficient to hold someone liable for the same. Here, in this case, the Respondent did not lead any evidence to connect his injuries or accident to an act or omission on the part of the Appellant. The real cause of the accident was not established. The learned Magistrate ought to have asked herself, as I have repeatedly tried to ask myself, "so what exactly did the employer do or did not do that caused this accident?" And I cannot find the answer in the testimony adduced before the lower court. In Wilsher vs Essex Area Health Authority (1988) 2W. L. R. 557 the House of Lords held that where the defendant's negligence was only one, the onus was on the Plaintifi to establish "causation", and that, in that case he had failed to establish that the defendant's negligence was the cause of the accident. It is instructive to note that in the Wilsher case, the House of Lords noted that at least one of the factors of negligence could be attributed to the defendant. Here in this case before me, not a single element of negligence has been pleaded or proved against the Appellant... Similarly, in Cummings (or McWilliams) vs Sir Willian Arrol (1962) 1 AER 623 the House of Lords held that even assuming the defendants were in breach of their duty in not providing a safety belt to their deceased employee, nevertheless they were not liable in damages because their breach of duty was not the cause of the damage sufiered. ( Emphasis, supplied) 33. I have already found that the defendant exposed the plaintifi to the chemicals herein by exposing him to danger and the resultant injury which it knew or ought to have known in the circumstances by failing to provide him with proper and same system of work such as protective devices and exposing to the chemical for a period of 3 years. The defendant on its part have failed to prove any contribution from the plaintifi. I however find the defendant to be 75% liable as the plaintifi confirmed that he did complain to the defendant but still nevertheless continued to work for the defendant even when he started to experience the efiects of the chemicals. This could have worsened the harm. He waited till he was dismissed by the defendant. It therefore means that had he not been dismissed, he could have continued with the work even much longer and that would have aggravated his injuries. 34. On general damages, the relevant authority herein is that in George Morara Masitsa case, supra. An award of Kshs. 100,000.00 was upheld therein for recurrent chest pain and coughs as a result of allergic rhinitis, headaches and nasal congestion sustained in 2008, in similar circumstances as the present case. The injuries therein are however much more serious than the present one, and I shall therefore adopt the same award herein, but enhance the award to Kshs. 110,000/= because of the time lapse since then. In arriving at the award, I am mindful of the principle of general damages that such awards are not intended to punish the defendant, but rather to compensate the plaintifi, an injured party, so far as money can be said to compensate for pain and sufiering arising out of the Defendant's negligence. 35. On special damages, it is trite law that claims must not only be particularly pleaded, but must be specifically proved. There are several and countless judicial authorities on the same including the Court of Appeal decisions in Savannah Development CO. LTD VRS Posts And Relecommunicatons https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2016/9/eng@2016-09-08 8

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Employees Housing Co-op Society LTD { Civil Appeal No. 160 of 91 (UR)}, Jivanji VRS Sanyo Electrical Company Limited (2003) 1 EA 98 and Kenya Shell LTD VRS Benjamin K. Kibiru (Civil application no. NAI 97 of 1986) and the oftenly cited/ quoted famous Lord Goddard CJ's in Bohhamcarter VRS Hyde Park Hotel LTD (1948) 64 times Law Report, 117. 36. This requirement is not merely a procedural necessity but is a mandatory requirement as held in a recent appeal decision by Korir-Lagat, J, sitting at the High Court at Kisii in KPLC LTD VRS Diana Achieng Ogunyo ( supra); where she quoted Savannah Development CO. LTD VRS Posts And Telecommunicatons Employees Housing Co-op Society LTD, supra, where the learned judges of appeal held as follows on this requirement: Having considered judicial pronouncements on the subject of special damages including the decision of this court, we can confidently state that the requirement that special damages must be explicitly pleaded and proved is not merely a procedural necessity but is a mandatory legal requirement going to the jurisdiction on the specific issue and an objection by the defendant that a plaintifi haw violated this rule may be taken at any time and even on appeal. 37. Of the two categories of special damages pleaded, the plaintifi was only able to prove Kshs. 5,000/= being the medical report ( PEXH. No.1A) which I have extensively relied on herein. The prove was vide a receipt for the amount which was produced as PEXH. No.1B. The court attendance fees were not pleaded and the same may therefore be recoverable, not as special damages, but as costs. The treatment charges of Ksh. 890/= that were pleaded were, on the other hand, not proved. Only Kshs. 5,000/= shall therefore be awardable as special damages herein. 38. The awards herein are subject to the 75% finding on liability herein. 39. On costs the plaintifi did confirm that he issued a demand notice to the defendant herein which it ignored. There was no evidence by the defendant to deny the same. The demand notice dated 27.1.2015 was duly filed alongside the plaint herein as required. The defendant was therefore duly informed and notified of the claim herein. He shall therefore pay the costs of the suit herein. Final Disposal Order 40. In light of the above findings, I do hereby order that judgment be and is hereby entered against the defendants herein for the sum of Kshs. 82,500/=, being general damages for pain and sufiering, and 3750/= being special damages; totalling to KSH. 86,250/= ; costs of the suit and interests on all the sums at court rates. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NYAHURURU IN OPEN COURT THIS 08th DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2016 ALOYCE-PETER-NDEGE SENIOR RESIDENT MAGISTRATE In the presence of; Counsel for the plaintifi: Chege Counsel for the defendant: Naminda h/b Munene Wambugu Plaintifi: Absent Defendant's representative: Absent https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2016/9/eng@2016-09-08 9

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