High Court 13187 of 2026

Joseph Mahuro Maina, to this Court for hearing and determination. (b) The transmission of the entire original lower court record. (c) An order that the cause proceed de-novo before this Court. (d) The typing and certification of the proceedings undertaken both in High Court Succession Cause No. 7 of 2020 and in the Magistrate’s Court. (e) And leave for the parties to file fresh bundles, inventories, affidavits of protest and witness statements. The Applicants’ Case 2. The Applicants state that they originally instituted the succession proceedings before this Court through a Petition for Letters of Administration Intestate dated 17 th July, 2020. The Petition was gazetted and the cause was subsequently transferred to the Magistrate’s Court at Murang’a by an order made on 22nd October, 2020. Page 2 of 14

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3. Following that transfer, a Grant of Letters of Administration Intestate dated 8th July, 2021 was issued appointing the 1st Applicant and the 1st Respondent as administrators. A further grant dated 8th June, 2022 is said to have appointed the 2nd Respondent as an Administrator alongside the 1st Applicant and the 1st Respondent. 4. The Applicants contend that they were represented by different advocates and were not adequately informed of the transfer or of the subsequent proceedings. They maintain that the issuance of grants appointing different combinations of administrators created uncertainty regarding the lawful administration of the estate. 5. They further contend that the inventories filed before the Magistrate’s Court disclose an estate whose gross value exceeds Kshs. 20,000,000 and is therefore outside the pecuniary jurisdiction of the subordinate court. The supporting affidavit states that the issue was raised before the Principal Magistrate on 27th January, 2026, whereupon the parties were granted leave to approach this Court for transfer of the cause. Page 3 of 14

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The Response 6. The application is opposed through the Replying Affidavit sworn by the 2nd Respondent on 17th March, 2026 wherein she contends that the cause has remained pending for more than six (6) years because of delays attributable to the Applicants. intermeddling She with the further accuses them estate, disposing of of estate property and attempting to frustrate proceedings pending before the Environment and Land Court. 7. Significantly, the 2nd Respondent does not oppose the transfer of the cause in principle. Her objection is directed at any interference with the grant said to have been issued by consent to the three joint administrators. DETERMINATION 8. Having considered the application, the affidavits and the material placed before the Court, the issues arising for determination are: a) Whether the succession cause should be transferred to this Court; b) Whether the cause should proceed de-novo and the grants already issued be displaced; and Page 4 of 14

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c) Who should bear the costs of the application. Whether the Cause Should Be Transferred 9. It is this Court’s finding that although the application invokes Section 18 of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 51 of the Civil Procedure Rules, succession proceedings are principally governed by the Law of Succession Act and the Probate and Administration Rules. However, the citation of an inapplicable or unnecessary procedural provision is not, by itself, fatal where the substance of the relief sought is clear. In the Re-Estate of Esha Mohamed Adam (Deceased) [2021] KEHC 3967 (KLR), the Court held that reliance on Civil Procedure provisions not having been imported by Rule 63 was a defect of form and proceeded to consider the substantive relief under Section 47 of the Law of Succession Act and Rule 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules. 10. Section 47 of the Law of Succession Act gives the High Court jurisdiction to entertain applications and determine disputes arising under the Act and to make such orders as may be expedient. Rule 73 preserves the Page 5 of 14

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Court’s inherent power to make orders necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of its process. Therefore, the substance of the present application is therefore properly before this Court. 11. Section 48(1) of the Law of Succession Act limits a Magistrate’s jurisdiction in succession matters to estates whose gross value does not exceed the applicable pecuniary limit prescribed under Section 7(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act. The applicable limit also depends on the rank of the Magistrate presiding over the cause. 12. In the instant case, I find that no formal valuation report has been placed before this Court to confirm the value of the deceased’s estate. I also find that the Applicants have not produced title documents, official searches, bank statements, share certificates or other records to establish that all the assets appearing in the inventories were owned by the deceased and presently form part of his estate. 13. In view of this, the Court is therefore not in a position to make a conclusive finding that every asset appearing in Page 6 of 14

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the inventory belongs to the deceased’s estate or that the estate’s gross value exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of the subordinate court. The inventory, standing alone, is not conclusive proof of either ownership or value. Ordinarily, it is trite that a party alleging that an estate exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court seized of the cause bears the burden of placing sufficient evidence before the Court. 14. In Re-Estate of Kilonzo Nzioka (Deceased) [2022] KEHC 10373 (KLR), the Court declined to transfer a succession cause where the alleged additional assets had not been sufficiently disclosed and no valuation reports had been produced to establish that the estate exceeded the subordinate court’s jurisdiction. 15. Nevertheless, the absence of a formal valuation report is not invariably fatal. In the case of Felista Ninga Ndimi v James Ndimi Thuku & Another [2016] KEHC 7039 (KLR), the Court found that although no valuation had been undertaken, the nature and size of the disclosed property, which included a parcel measuring 26.5 acres, Page 7 of 14

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made it apparent that the estate exceeded the applicable pecuniary limit. 16. However, the inventory discloses, prima facie, an extensive estate comprising several assets. Although their ownership and precise value remain to be proved, the question on whether their cumulative gross value falls within the subordinate court’s pecuniary jurisdiction is not altogether fanciful. 17. The cause was initially instituted before this Court and subsequently transferred to the Magistrate’s Court. Since then, more than one grant has been issued, different combinations of administrators have been appointed and several proceedings have been undertaken. In principle, the 2nd Respondent does not oppose the transfer, but objects to the displacement of the existing grant and the commencement of the cause afresh. 18. In those circumstances, I find that the Court has not been called upon to declare the proceedings before the Magistrate’s Court a nullity. What the Court is being is being asked to determine is the appropriate forum in Page 8 of 14

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which the outstanding administration of an apparently extensive estate should continue. 19. Having regard to the prima facie extent of the estate, the unresolved question of its gross value, the fact that the cause originated in this Court and the need to avoid the risk of further proceedings being undertaken before a court whose pecuniary jurisdiction may ultimately be called into question, I am satisfied that the prudent course is to transfer the cause to this Court. 20. On Whether the Cause Should Proceed De Novo, the Applicants have sought that the entire cause proceeds afresh after its transfer. Their explanation is that their previous advocates did not adequately inform them of the transfer or of the subsequent steps taken in the matter. In response, the 2nd respondent and 3rd Administrator, the matter has been in court for more than six (6) years, the same having been filed before this Court and then transferred to the lower court at the instance of the same Applicants. According to her, the applicants have been keen on delaying and frustrating the conclusion of the matter as they have been benefitting from intermeddling Page 9 of 14

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with the state by disposing off the property items of the estate, a result of which there is a pending matter against them in the Environment and Land Court. 21. In consideration of either parties case, I find the explanation by the Applicants inadequate. A reading of the proceedings confirms that the Applicants were themselves the petitioners who instituted High Court Succession Cause No. 7 of 2020 and were aware that succession proceedings concerning the estate were pending before the courts. 22. Moreover, 1st the Applicant was named as an administrator in the grant dated 8th July, 2021 and again in the subsequent grant dated 8th June, 2022. Therefore, in those circumstances, the Applicants cannot simply state that they were wholly unaware of the progress of the cause. 23. Further, I find correspondence to that there their former is no evidence advocates, of registry inquiries, formal complaints or other material which has been exhibited to demonstrate the steps taken by the Page 10 of 14

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Applicants to follow up the cause between 2020 and the filing of the present application in March, 2026. 24. In the case of Habo Agencies Limited v Wilfred Odhiambo Musingo [2015] KECA 987 (KLR), the Court of Appeal held that “it is not sufficient for a litigant merely to blame an advocate for every omission in the conduct of litigation. A party remains under an obligation to show interest in and follow up the progress of his or her case, notwithstanding representation by counsel.” 25. Further, it is worth noting that the present application is also not a summons for revocation or Annulment of grant. None of the substantive prayers expressly seeks the revocation of the grant dated 8th July, 2021 or the subsequent grant dated 8th June, 2022. 26. Revocation or Annulment of a grant is governed by Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act which provides that: “A grant may be revoked on grounds including substantive defects in the proceedings through which it was obtained, fraud, concealment of material facts, an untrue allegation essential to the grant, failure to Page 11 of 14

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administer the estate diligently or circumstances rendering the grant useless or inoperative.” 27. It is true that Section 76 permits the Court to act either upon an application by an interested party or on its own motion. That power must nevertheless be exercised upon an identifiable statutory ground and after the persons whose appointment and interests are affected have been afforded a fair opportunity to respond. 28. Thus, an order that the proceedings commence de-novo would, in substance, erase the previous proceedings and displace the grants already issued. That would indirectly achieve what the Applicants have not expressly sought or properly established under Section 76. 29. Under the demonstrated circumstances, the prayer that the cause proceeds de-novo is declined and the cause shall proceed from the stage it has reached before the Magistrate’s Court, subject to appropriate case- management directions after the complete original record has been received and considered. Page 12 of 14

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30. Further, any party wishing to challenge the grant, or pursue any other relief concerning the administration of the estate may be at liberty to move this Court through an appropriate application in the transferred succession cause. Such application shall be considered on its merits and upon the evidence that shall be that shall be placed before the Court. Disposition 31. In the ultimate, the Notice of Motion application dated 16th March, 2026 is allowed in the following terms: a. Murang’a Magistrate’s Court Succession Cause No. MCSUCC/519/2020 is hereby transferred to the High Court at Murang’a for further proceedings. b. The prayer that the cause proceeds de-novo is declined, and no order is made affecting the grants already issued. c. Each party shall bear their own costs of the application. It is so ordered. Page 13 of 14

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RULING DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT MURANG’A THIS 28TH DAY OF JULY, 2026. HON. DORAH CHEPKWONY JUDGE Page 14 of 14

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