Oscar Kioko Muema v Republic

a. That the trial court erred in both law and facts by convicting the appellant on evidence that did not meet the minimum threshold of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, hence erroneously convicting the appellant. b. That the trial court erred in both law and facts by relying on trumped up charges and fabricated stories where it is clearly demonstrated by the complainant the she lied to the caught (sic). c. That the trial court erred in both law and facts by not noting that the charge he relied upon by the prosecution was fatally defective and hence it did not disclose some vital information that ought to have been indicated in the charge sheet, the defect occasioned an incurable denial of justice to the appellant. d. That the trial court erred in both law and facts by holding that the offence of defilement was completed without the ingredient of penetration being proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the medical officer did not at any point showed ascertain any sign of penetration e. That the trial court erred in both law and facts by failing to factor the time the Appellant had spent in remand custody pursuant to Section 333 (2) of the Criminal Procedure code. f. That the trial court erred in both law and facts by not considering the clinical officer’s findings that were arrived at after the medical examination that showed that there was no penetration at that particular time. g. That the trial court erred in both law and facts by not considering that the prosecution case was marred with contradictions and inconsistencies that were notable across the witnesses testimonies. 6. PW 1, the complainant victim in this case told the court that she was born on 17th April 2004, she identified her birth certificate in court. Her evidence was that on 8th October 2021, at around 6 p.m when she was walking home from her others shop, which is approximately 2 km from her home. She had walked a distance of around 1 km, when she noticed the appellant, Oscar trailing her from behind. 7. The appellant then grabbed her T-shirt and fell her to the ground. Besides, he also took her wallet which contained Ksh 1,900, being the day’s sales that she had collected from her mother’s shop. She tried to rest, but the appellant overpowered her, and is said to have removed his belt and used it to tie around the victim’s neck. 8. The appellant then removed his trouser and defiled the complainant. When he was done, she dressed up and the appellant threatened her to leave and not look behind. That is when the victim picked up her wallet and ran home. When she got home, she noted a blood stain on her clothes. She immediately reported the incident to her father and the matter was reported to Kibwezi Police station. She was referred to the hospital, where she was examined, and treated, and P3 form later filled by the medical officer. The victim told the court that Oscar was a person well known to her as he used to work at Mwaniki’s homestead, and that she did not have any grudge with him 9. The victim positively identified the soiled white T-Shirt that she wore on the material day, as well as a sky blue coloured pair of bikers which bore blood stains, as a result of the defilement incident. 10. In cross examination by the appellant, the victim maintained that he was well known to her, and that they were not friends. That the incident took place at an isolated area, and that she had tried to run away, but the appellant grabbed, and they struggled but he overpowered her. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12182/eng@2026-07-30 2

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11. TMK, is the father to the complainant. He told the court that on the material day, he had gone to pick the daughter from the shop, but he found the same closed. When he got home, the daughter was not at home, but after a short while, she arrived. The white T-shirt that she wore was dirty. When he enquired why she was crying, she informed him that she had been defiled by one Oscar. He immediately escorted her to the police station where the matter was reported, and the victim later escorted to hospital for medical attention. At the time of the incident, the victim was a form two student, then aged 17 years. The witness also identified the soiled white T-shirt that the victim wore of the date of the alleged offence. 12. In cross examination, the witness stated that the accused was not known to him prior to the date of the alleged offence, and hence had no reason to frame him up. 13. No. 80927 P.C Francis Musyoka, a police officer based at Kibwezi police station produced the pair blood stained bikers and soiled T-Shirt. He stated that the two exhibits were handed over to him by the initial investigating officer, who had since been transferred from the police station. In cross examination, the police officer stated that the complainant stated that the accused was well known to the appellant, and that at time of recording her statement with the police, she gave the names of the appellant and stated that he was a person well known to her. 14. Dr. Kakungi Blastus is the Medical Officer based at Kibwezi hospital. He produced the P3 form filled at the hospital in respect of the victim. He testified that the victim had given a history of defilement. She attended hospital and upon examination, the evidence that presented was that she had bruises on her genitalia, and that hymen was broken. She was also slightly bleeding, and on a high vaginal swab, there was vaginal bleeding. The remarks by the medical officer who filled the P3 form indicated that there was evidence of partial penetration, with slight bleeding. 15. In cross examination, the doctor confirmed that the most probable cause of injuries was forced penetration. That the evidence of broken hymen is consistent with penal penetration 16. When placed on his defence, the appellants evidence was that on the 13th October 2021, he was at home when he was informed that there were people looking for him and that they had threatened that they would kill him. That he went to Machinery town, where he met a girl, a man and a woman. That the girl stated that she did not know his name. He asked that the man where he got his name from, and the man informed him that he got the name form a man to whom he had sold a phone to. He denied the charges and that that there was a secret agenda between the parties and the man to whom he had sold the phone to frame him up. 17. In cross examination, the appellant admitted in his defence that he had not accounted for, nor made a mention of his whereabouts on the 8th October 2021. He also stated that the father to the victim, and the victim were not known to him. He did not also give the identity of the man who to whom he had sold a mobile phone to. 18. In support of his defence, Catherine Katungwa Mutuku told the court that on the 8th October 2021, there was a burial that was taking place, and that the appellant had been left behind at home to take care of the children because he was not feeling well on that day. Later on 14th, the appellant was arrested on false allegations. DW 3, Josphine Nzisa corroborated the evidence of DW 2 to the extent that there was a burial on the 8th October 2021, and that when they returned from the burial, they found the appellant at home at around 2 p.m when she got home. She also stated that the appellant had ben falsely accused of the charges. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12182/eng@2026-07-30 3

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Submissions 19. The Appellant submitted that the prosecution evidence was riddled with contradictions and inconsistencies, and that the case was fabricated and fragmented in order to secure a conviction. In regard to the evidence tendered by the complainant, he submitted that there were two versions given, and that the prosecution did not reconcile the evidence between the complainant and pw3. The Appellant also argued that his rights under Article 50(2)(g) and (h) of the Constitution were violated. 20. The Respondent on the other hand submitted that the prosecution case had been proved to the required standards, and that the connections and sentence were sound and ought to be upheld. Analysis 21 . This being a first appeal, this court is under a duty to reevaluate and assess the evidence and make its own conclusions. It must, however, keep at the back of its mind that a trial court, unlike the appellate court, had the advantage of observing the demeanour of the witnesses and hearing their evidence firsthand. The Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa in Pandya vs Republic [1957] EA 336 held as follows:“ On a first appeal from a conviction by a Judge or magistrate sitting without a jury the appellant is entitled to have the appellate court’s own consideration and views of the evidence as a whole and its own decision thereon. It has the duty to rehear the case and reconsider the witnesses before the Judge or magistrate with such other material as it may have decided to admit. The appellate court must then make up its own mind not disregarding the judgment appealed from but carefully weighing and considering it. When the question arises which witness is to be believed rather than another and that question turns on manner and demeanor, the appellate court must be guided by the impression made on the judge or magistrate who saw the witness but there may be other circumstances, quite apart from manner and demeanor which may show whether a statement is credible or not which may warrant a court different.” 22. On a first appeal, the appellant is entitled to a fresh and exhaustive reevaluation of the evidence on record, with the appellate court drawing its own conclusions, while bearing in mind that it did not have the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. In the case of Okeno v Republic, the East Africa Court of Appeal stated on the duty of the court on a first appeal: An appellant on a first appeal is entitled to expect the evidence as a whole to be submitted to a fresh and exhaustive examination (Pandya v. R., [1957] E. A. 336) and to the appellate court's own decision on the evidence. The first appellate court must itself weigh conflicting evidence and draw its own conclusions. (Shantilal M. Ruwala v. R., [1957] E.A. 570). It is not the function of a first appellate court merely to scrutinize the evidence to see if there was some evidence to support the lower court's findings and conclusions; it must make its own findings and draw its own conclusions. Only then can it decide whether the magistrate's findings should be supported. In doing so, it should make allowance for the fact that the trial court has had the advantage of hearing and seeing the witnesses, see Peters v. Sunday Post, [1958] E. A. 424. 23. The legal burden is the burden of proof is on the prosecution and remains constant throughout. According to established principles, burden of proof rests upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of an accused person beyond reasonable doubt. This burden does not shift to the accused, save in a few https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12182/eng@2026-07-30 4

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exceptional statutory instances where the law expressly provides otherwise. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition, Volume 17, paras 13 and 14: The legal burden is the burden of proof which remains constant throughout a trial; it is the burden of establishing the facts and contentions which will support a party’s case. If at the conclusion of the trial he has failed to establish these to the appropriate standard, he will lose. The legal burden of proof normally rests upon the party desiring the court to take action; thus a claimant must satisfy the court or tribunal that the conditions which entitle him to an award have been satisfied. In respect of a particular allegation, the burden lies upon the party for whom substantiation of that particular allegation is an essential of his case. There may therefore be separate burdens in a case of with separate issues. 24 . Brennan J, addressed the standard of proof required in Criminal cases the case of Re Winship 397 US 358 {1970}, at page 36164 that: The accused, during a criminal prosecution, has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction…Moreover use of the reasonable doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. 25. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. Lord Denning in Miller vs. Ministry of Pensions, [1947] 2 ALL ER 372 had this to say: “ That degree is well settled. It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence of course it is possible, but not in the least probable, the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice”. 26. The Court is obliged to conduct a fresh and thorough examination of the evidence, reassess the credibility of witnesses, and evaluate any conflicting testimony to reach its own independent conclusions. Throughout this exercise, the legal burden of proof remains unchanged, resting entirely on the prosecution to establish the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Only by meticulously scrutinizing all the evidence, while adhering strictly to the statutory framework, can the Court ensure that the appellant is afforded a full and fair reevaluation of the case. 27. Courts dealing with criminal matters must always remain mindful of the high standard of proof required and the serious consequences that a conviction imposes on an accused. The caution has regard to the nature of criminal offences, whose consequences extend beyond the individual to society at large. A conviction and sentence as a sexual offender carries a lifelong stigma for the accused. It also leaves indelible scars on the victim. Conviction must thus be justified based on indisputable evidence given to the required standards. This is what the former Chief Justice Mohamed of Namibia had in mind in addressing sexual offences in S v Chapman 1997 (2) SA CR 3 (A) at 55: ‘Rape is a serious offence, constituting as it does a humiliating, degrading and brutal invasion of the privacy, the dignity and the person of the victim. The rights to dignity, to privacy and https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12182/eng@2026-07-30 5

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the integrity of every person are basic to the ethos of the constitution and to any defensible civilization.’ 28. 29. It is with this background that the court must first analyse the evidence and the proceedings. Then it must address the issues and make findings on each of the issues. The appeal raises only two issues, that is: i) .Whether the offence was proved to the required standards. ii) Whether the trial court failed to comply with the provision of Article 50(2) (g) and (h) of the Kenyan Constitution 2010. The first issue is the question of proof of the offence of defilement. The law under which the appellant was charged is provided under Section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act as follows: 8. 30. (1) A person who commits an act which causes penetration with a child is guilty of an offence termed defilement. (2) A person who commits an offence of defilement with a child aged eleven years or less shall upon conviction be sentenced to imprisonment for life. (3) A person who commits an offence of defilement with a child between the age of twelve and fifteen years is liable upon conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less than twenty years. (4) A person who commits an offence of defilement with a child between the age of sixteen and eighteen years is liable upon conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less than fifteen years. (5) … (8) The provisions of subsection (5) shall not apply if the accused person is related to such child within the prohibited degrees of blood or affinity. On the other hand, the appellant was charged with an alternative count under Section 11 of the Sexual Offences Act, which provides as follows: (1) Any person who commits an indecent act with a child is guilty of the offence of committing an indecent act with a child and is liable upon conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years. (2) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) if it is proved that such child deceived the accused person into believing that such child was over the age of eighteen years at the time of the alleged commission of the offence, and the accused person reasonably believed that the child was over the age of eighteen years. (3) The belief referred to in subsection (2) is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances, including the steps the accused person took to ascertain the age of the complainant. (4) Where the person charged with an offence under this Act is below the age of eighteen years, the court may upon conviction, sentence the accused person in accordance with the provisions of the Borstal Institutions Act (Cap. 92) and the Children's Act (Cap. 141) https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12182/eng@2026-07-30 6

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(5) 31. 32. The provisions of subsection (2) shall not apply if the accused person is related to such child within the prohibited degrees of blood or affinity. In the case of Charles Wamukoya Karani v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 72 of 2013, it was held that the essential elements constituting the offence of defilement are the age of the complainant, proof of penetration, and positive identification of the assailant. These key ingredients of the offence of defilement, were similarly elucidated in the case of George Opondo Olunga v Republic [2016] eKLR are; a. Proof of the age of the complainant, b. Proof of penetration and c. Proof that the appellant was the perpetrator of the offence. The Court of Appeal in Edwin Nyambogo Onsongo vs. Republic (2016)eKLR stated as follows in respect of proving the age of a victim in cases of defilement: ... The question of proof of age has finally been settled by recent decisions of this court to the effect that it can be proved by documents, evidence such as a birth certificate, baptism card or by oral evidence of the child if the child is sufficiently intelligent or the evidence of the parents or guardian or medical evidence, among other credible forms of proof. We think that what ought to be stressed is that whatever the nature of evidence preferred in proof of the victim’s age, it has to be credible and reliable. 33 . While addressing the question of age of the victims in the Sexual Offenses Act, the court in Kaingu Elias Kasomo vs. Republic, Malindi, the Court of Appeal in Criminal Appeal No. 504 of 2010 stated as follows: “ Age of the victim of the sexual assault under the Sexual Offences Act is a critical component. It forms part of the charge which must be proved the same way as penetration in the cases of rape and defilement. It is therefore essential that the same be proved by credible evidence for the sentence to be imposed will be dependent on the age of the victim”. 34. It is only when there is evidence of doubtful origin that a doctor can determine the age scientifically. In the case of Francis Omuroni Vs Uganda Court of Appeal No. 2/2000, the court held that: “ In defilement cases, medical evidence is paramount in determining the age of the victim. The doctor is the only person who could professionally determine the age of the victim in the absence of any other evidence. Apart from Medical evidence age may also be proved by birth certificate, the victim’s parents or guardian and by observation and common sense.” 35. In this case, the minor testified and gave unshakeable evidence on how the offence occurred. She went on to identify her Certificate of birth Entry No. 1021319259, issued on 21 June 2013, which showed that her date of birth as 17th April 2004. This evidence was corroborated by her father, who told the court that as at the time of the alleged offence, the victim was aged 17, and was then a form two student. To this extent, I find that this element has been proved to the required standards. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12182/eng@2026-07-30 7

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36. On identification, in Anjoroni v Republic 1980 KLR 59 the court thus: “ Recognition of an assailant is mere satisfactory, mere assenting, and mere variable than identification of a stranger because it depends upon the personal knowledge of the assailant in some form or other” 37. The minor testified and identified the appellant as the perpetrator. Her evidence was that as she walked home, she noticed that the appellant was trailing her from a distance of 5 metres. She tried to run away but he caught up with her. She went on to tell the court that the appellant was someone well known to her, and that she knew where he had been working. Her evidence was corroborated by the police officer who told the court that at the time of recording her statement with the police, the victim state that the appellant was well known to her, and gave his names to the police. The minor did not just do identification but recognition. The court is satisfied that the appellant was recognized by the minor. 38. The last issue is penetration. The medical evidence showed there was penetration. The minor herself testified on what happened to her. Even without medical evidence, it will be safe to convict the appellant. The minor categorically told the court that the appellant grabbed her by the neck, fell her to the ground and removed her clothes and proceeded to defile her. She also noticed blood stains on her pair of bikers that she wore on that day, and which was produced as evidence in court. This evidence was corroborated by the evidence of the medical officer, who filled the P3 form. 39. The medical officer gave evidence on the injuries the minor suffered. These were very consistent with the oral evidence given by the victim. He noted that there was bleeding on the genital, and there were fresh bruises. The opinion of the medical officer was that threw was penetration. 40. Section 2(1) of the Sexual Offences Act defines penetration as: “ The partial or complete insertion of the genital organs of a person into the genital organ of another person.” 41. In the case of Mark Oiruri Mose v Republic [2013] KECA 67 (KLR), the Court of Appeal [Onyango Otieno, Azangalala & Kantai JJ.A ] held as follows: “ Many times, the attacker does not fully complete the sexual act during commission of the offence. That is the main reason why the law does not require that evidence of spermatozoa be availed. So long as there is penetration whether only on the surface, the ingredient of the offence is demonstrated, and penetration need not be deep inside the girl’s organ.” 42 . It is thus not a defence that the injuries were not serious or the penetration was not complete. The medical opinion is that there was evidence of partial penetration. The penetration was thus proved. 43. The second issue is that there was a mistrial due to non-compliance with article 50(2) (g) and (h) of the Constitution. The said article provides as follows: (g) to choose, and be represented by, an advocate, and to be informed of this right promptly; (h) to have an advocate assigned to the accused person by the State and at State expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly; https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12182/eng@2026-07-30 8

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44. The Court of Appeal in Manyeso v Republic [2023] KECA 827 (KLR) held thus: “ The appellant did not raise the issue of legal representation either in the trial court and the High Court. The appellant participated in the trial and cross-examined the witnesses, and it was not evident that he suffered any or any substantial injustice. The appellant’s rights to a fair trial on under articles 50(2)(g) and 50(2)(h) of the Constitution were not violated.” 45. The question of legal representation was not raised at all in the lower court. The appellant dealt with the matter effectively. It is only that the case was overwhelming. There is no demonstration of the appellant suffering any substantial injustice. Looking at cross examination, the appellant was able to effectively raise all questions and there was no evidence that the situation could change. 46. The appellant further in his submissions stated that then court erred by failing to have him taken to hospital to verify if he was the perpetrator of the offence. I have led perused the record of the court, and the record shows that the accused was arrested several days after the alleged offence. His application was considered by the trial court, and the learned magistrate rightly ruled that medical examination on the appellant would serve no useful purpose, because of the time factor. It was noted that the application was made a month after the date of the alleged offence. This failure imp my view did not occasion miscarriage of justice on the part of the appellant. 47. On the issue of contradictions and inconsistencies raised, I find that the prosecution witnesses were credible and their evidence was unshaken. 48. Now turning to the appellant’s defence, the appellant in his evidence only gave evidence in respect to the date of his arrest. He did not tell the court about his whereabouts on the date of the offence. Then it follows that DW 2 and DW 3 cannot seek to corroborate the evidence of the appellant, who did not dispute his evidence at the scene. The witnesses could not account for the whereabouts of the appellant at the time of the alleged offence. The trial magistrate was thus right in dismissing the appellant’s defence, and I uphold the conviction. 49. Regarding sentence, I note that the court meted out a sentence of 12 years and 9 months. The minimum mandatory sentence provided under section 8(4) of the sexual offences act is not less than fifteen years imprisonment. There is no other sentence provided. The court notes that the appellant mitigated that he ought to be given a second chance, and raised the fact that he has been in custody for a period of 2 years and 9 months, which period the trial magistrate considered, while sentencing him to twelve years and 9 months. 50. The question of such sentences was addressed in the case of Republic v Mwangi; Initiative for Strategic Litigation in Africa (ISLA) & 3 others (Amicus Curiae) [2024] KESC 34 (KLR), where the Supreme Court, [MK Koome, CJ, MK Ibrahim, SC Wanjala, N Ndungu & I Lenaola, SCJJ] posited as follows: 11. Mandatory sentences and minimum sentences as punishment in law have been commonly prescribed by legislatures worldwide but recently, various apex courts of several countries such as Canada, the USA, Australia, and South Africa as well as the European Court of Human Rights have struck down both mandatory life imprisonment as well as minimum sentences in an effort to move towards the approach of proportionality in punishment based on the actual crime committed. 12. Before Kenyan courts could determine whether or not the prevailing trends and decisions were persuasive, there ought to be a proper case filed, presented and fully argued before the High Court and escalated through the appropriate channels on the constitutional validity or otherwise of minimum sentences or mandatory sentences other than for the offence of murder. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12182/eng@2026-07-30 9

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That was the Supreme Court’s approach and direction in Muruatetu which had to remain binding to all courts below. 13. 51. The Court of Appeal failed to identify with precision the provisions of the Sexual Offences Act it was declaring unconstitutional, left its declaration of unconstitutionality ambiguous, vague and bereft of specificity. That approach was problematic in the realm of criminal law because such a declaration would have grave effect on other convicted and sentenced persons who were charged with the same offence. Inconsistency in sentences for the same offences would also create mistrust and unfairness in the criminal justice system. Yet the fundamental issue of the constitutionality of the minimum sentence may not have been properly filed and fully argued before the superior courts below. Further, the same court delivered its decision in Republic v Manyeso [2025] KESC 16 (KLR), where is stated as follows: Paragraph 11 to 14 of the Muruatetu directions are very clear that the decision in the Muruatetu case did not invalidate mandatory sentences or minimum sentences in the Penal Code, Sexual Offences Act or any other statute. Further, that the Muruatetu case cannot be said to be the authority for stating that all provisions of the law prescribing minimum sentences are inconsistent with the Constitution. Paragraphs 93 to 97 of the Muruatetu decision are also explicit that it is not for the court to define what constitutes a life sentence. While we appreciated that a life sentence could mean a certain minimum or maximum time to be set by a judicial officer, this court made the following recommendations to the Attorney General to develop legislation on what constitutes a life sentence: “ 94. We recognize that although the Judiciary released elaborate and comprehensive Sentencing Policy Guidelines in 2016, there are no specific provisions for the sentence of life imprisonment, because it is an indeterminate sentence. Nevertheless, we are in agreement with the High Court decision in Jackson Wangui, supra, which found that it is not for the court to define what constitutes a life sentence or what number of years must first be served by a prisoner on life sentence before they are considered on parole. This is a function within the realm of the Legislature. 95. We also acknowledge that in Kenya and internationally, sentencing should not only be used for the purpose of retribution, it is also for the rehabilitation of the prisoner as well as for the protection of civilians who may be harmed by some prisoners. We find the comparative jurisprudence with regard to the indeterminate life sentence is compelling. We find that a life sentence should not necessarily mean the natural life of the prisoner; it could also mean a certain minimum or maximum time to be set by the relevant judicial officer along established parameters of criminal responsibility, retribution, rehabilitation and recidivism. 96. We therefore recommend that the Attorney General and Parliament commence an enquiry and develop legislation on the definition of ‘what constitutes a life sentence’; this may include a minimum number of years to be served before a prisoner is considered for parole or remission, or provision for prisoners under specific https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12182/eng@2026-07-30 10

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circumstances to serve whole life sentences. This will be in tandem with the objectives of sentencing.65. From the above paragraphs of the Muruatetu case any reading of that decision ought to lead to the conclusion that it is upon the Legislature to enact legislation on what constitutes a life sentence and not the courts. 52. The sentence meted out is the mandatory minimum sentence. Therefore, I find that the sentence is was proper. 53. I have said enough to demonstrate that the impugned judgment is for upholding the conviction. However, the sentence meted out is lawful. Determination 54. In the circumstances, I make the following orders: a. The Appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. b. The sentence meted out is lawful. c. Right of appeal 14 days. d. The file is closed. DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED ON THIS 30TH DAY OF JULY, 2026. JUDGEMENT DELIVERED THROUGH MICROSOFT TEAMS ONLINE PLATFORM. MARTHA MUTUKU. JUDGE In the presence of: Miss for the State. Appellant in person. Court Assistant – Mr. Kibet https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12182/eng@2026-07-30 11

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