Glasstech & Interior Solutions Limited v Bhupinder (Small Claims Appeal E322 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 9874 (KLR) (2 July 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 9874 (KLR) REPUBLIC OF KENYA IN THE HIGH COURT AT NAIROBI (MILIMANI LAW COURTS) SMALL CLAIMS APPEAL E322 OF 2025 WA OKWANY, J JULY 2, 2026 BETWEEN GLASSTECH & INTERIOR SOLUTIONS LIMITED ......................... APPLICANT AND SINGH BHUPINDER .......................................................................... RESPONDENT RULING 1. This ruling is in respect to the Applicant's Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2025 seeking leave to file an appeal against the judgment delivered by the Small Claims Court on 25th July 2025 out of time. 2. The application is supported by the grounds on its face, an affidavit sworn on behalf of the Applicant and written submissions dated 5th November 2025. 3. The Respondent opposed the application through a replying affidavit and written submissions dated 25th November 2025. 4. The Application was canvassed by way of written submissions which I have considered. Applicant's Case 5. The Applicant submitted that although it became aware of the judgment, through its advocates, shortly after delivery, it issued instructions to appeal late. Upon receiving instructions, counsel promptly requested certified proceedings and judgment on 15th October 2025 for purposes of preparing the record of appeal. 6. The Applicant argued that the delay was neither deliberate nor inordinate as certified proceedings are yet to be supplied by the trial court, and that it has already filed a Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal. It contended that the intended appeal raises arguable issues and that no prejudice will be occasioned to the Respondent if leave is granted. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/9874/eng@2026-07-02 1
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Respondent's Case 7. The Respondent submitted that judgment was delivered on 25th July 2025, which meant that the statutory period for filing an appeal expired on or about 25th August 2025. The Respondent noted that the Applicant only requested for the proceedings on 15th October 2025 and filed the present application on 16th October 2025, nearly three months after judgment. 8. The Respondent argued that no satisfactory explanation has been ofiered for the entire period of delay and that the application was only prompted by imminent execution after extraction of the decree. 9. It was further submitted that appeals from the Small Claims Court lie only on questions of law pursuant to Section 38(1) of the Small Claims Court Act, yet the intended appeal merely challenges factual findings. 10. The Respondent relied on Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat vs. IEBC & 7 Others [2014] eKLR and Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lillian S" vs. Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1, and urged the Court to dismiss the application. Analysis and Determination 11. I find that the main issues arising for determination are: a. Whether the Applicant has established sufficient cause for extension of time. b. Whether the intended appeal raises arguable questions of law. Suficient Cause 12. The applicable law is Section 79G of the Civil Procedure Act, which requires appeals from subordinate courts to be filed within thirty days, unless the appellant satisfies the court that there existed good and sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time. 13. In Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat vs. IEBC & 7 Others [2014] eKLR the Supreme Court held that extension of time is not a right but an equitable remedy available only to a deserving litigant. The applicant therefore bore the burden of explaining the delay satisfactorily. 14. In Leo Sila Mutiso vs. Rose Hellen Wangari Mwangi, the Court identified the relevant considerations as the length of delay, the reason for the delay the chances of the intended appeal succeeding and the degree of prejudice to the Respondent. 15. In the present case, it was not disputed that judgment was delivered on 25th July 2025 while this application was filed on 16th October 2025, approximately two months and three weeks after expiry of the statutory period. 16. The explanation advanced is that the Applicant issued instructions late and thereafter counsel requested proceedings. 17. This Court observes that the Applicant became aware of the judgment, through its advocates, immediately after delivery. No explanation has been ofiered as to why instructions could not be issued within the statutory period or shortly thereafter. 18. A litigant cannot simply attribute delay to internal consultations without demonstrating circumstances beyond its control. It is my view that the request for proceedings dated 15th October 2025 cannot explain the period between 25th July and 15th October 2025. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/9874/eng@2026-07-02 2
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19. As was held in Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat, (supra) every period of delay must be satisfactorily accounted for. 20. Accordingly, this Court is not persuaded that sufficient cause has been demonstrated. Arguable Questions of Law 21. Section 38(1) of the Small Claims Court Act limits appeals to the High Court to matters of law only. I have considered the Memorandum of Appeal referred to by the parties and I note that most of the proposed grounds challenge the trial court's findings on evidence, factual evaluation and conclusions reached after hearing witnesses. 22. It is trite that an appellate court exercising jurisdiction under Section 38(1) cannot reopen factual disputes. 23. This Court agrees with the reasoning in Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lillian S" vs. Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1 that jurisdiction is everything. Where jurisdiction is statutorily limited, the Court cannot expand it. 24. I find that the Applicant has not demonstrated any clear question involving interpretation of the law, application of legal principles, jurisdiction or procedural illegality capable of sustaining an appeal under Section 38(1). 25. Consequently, I find that the intended appeal appears to raise predominantly factual complaints outside this Court's appellate jurisdiction. Prejudice 26. The Respondent obtained judgment nearly three months before the present application. The decree requires installation of the windshield and payment of costs remains unsatisfied. 27. I find that granting extension of time in the absence of satisfactory explanation would further delay enjoyment of a valid judgment. 28. While prejudice alone may not defeat an application for extension of time, it remains a relevant consideration. 29. The Court finds that the balance of justice favours finality of litigation. 30. For the reasons that I have stated in this ruling, I find that the instant application is not merited and I hereby dismiss it with costs to the Respondent. It is so ordered. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT MILIMANI THIS 2ND DAY OF JULY, 2026. HON. W. A OKWANY JUDGE In the presence of; No appearance for Applicant Ngugi for Respondent Abdirzak – Court Assistant https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/9874/eng@2026-07-02 3
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