Sai v Family

enunciated in the locus classicus case of Selle v Associated Motor Boat Co. EA 123. The Court must also pay heed to the guiding principles in Mbogo & Another v Shah EA 93, which dictate that an appellate court should not interfere with the exercise of discretion by a trial judge unless it is satisfied that the judge misdirected themselves in some matter, or acted on matters they should not have acted upon, resulting in a clearly wrong decision and an injustice. 4. In fulfilling this mandate, the Court has scrutinized the pleadings, the evidentiary record and the statutory frameworks governing child rights, the execution of decrees, and the jurisdiction of the Kadhi's Courts. Brief Background 5. The Appellant and the Respondent are former husband and wife who profess the Islamic faith. Their union was blessed with one minor child, currently aged 4 years. Following the irretrievable breakdown of their marriage, the parties submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Kadhi’s Court at Nairobi to formalize their separation. On 18 March 2021, a Consent Decree was entered before the Honourable Deputy Chief Kadhi, dissolving the marriage by one talaq. 6. The Consent Decree incorporated specific provisions regarding the welfare, custody, and maintenance of the minor child. The terms, as extracted from the official decree, were as follows: i. That the Petition be withdrawn entirely. ii. That the parties divorce with one talaq with effect from 18 March 2021. iii. That about the welfare of the minor: the mother shall have physical custody while the father shall have the right of access to the minor and especially the first and the last Saturday of every month. iv. That the father shall provide for the upkeep of the minor Kshs. 17,000/- per month and pay education expenses when the child starts education. v. That the court disregard this Petition and adopt this consent. vi. That the honourable court is pleased to register the divorce and issue a divorce certificate. 7. The documentary evidence on record, including M-Pesa statements and bank transfer receipts, indicates that the Appellant has consistently complied with the directive to remit the Kshs. 17,000/ = monthly upkeep since the decree was issued. The conflict catalysing the present appeal arose when the minor child reached school-going age. The Respondent unilaterally enrolled the minor at Riara Kindergarten and Primary School. 8. The fee structure for Riara Group of Schools, as annexed in the trial court record, demonstrates that it is a high-tier private institution. The fees are substantial, with the playgroup costing Kshs. 49,500/ =, reception class Kshs. 71,000/=, Pre-Primary One (PP1) Kshs. 76,000/=, and Pre-Primary Two (PP2) Kshs. 78,000/= per term. These figures are exclusive of a Kshs. 4,000/= registration fee, Kshs. 10,000 caution fee, Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) subscriptions, sports attire, mandatory student accident cover, and transportation charges which range from Kshs. 11,400/= to Kshs. 44,300/= per term depending on the residential zone. 9. Following the enrolment, the Respondent accrued school fees expenses which she quantified in her application for execution at Kshs. 224,000/=, plus court collection fees of Kshs. 1,500/=, bringing the total to Kshs. 225,500/=. When the Appellant failed to remit this specific sum, the Respondent approached the trial court via a Notice to Show Cause dated 18 September 2023, seeking the https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/5489/eng@2026-04-30 2

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attachment of the Appellant's salary for wilful disobedience of the Consent Decree. She averred that the Appellant had wilfully neglected to pay the minor's school fees, thereby acting in contempt of the court orders. 10. In response, the Appellant filed a Replying Affidavit accompanied by a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 7 October 2023. He vehemently contested the jurisdiction of the Kadhi's Court to entertain execution matters pertaining to child maintenance and custody, arguing that such matters are the exclusive preserve of the Children's Court under the Children Act. Substantively, he argued that the phrase "pay education expenses" in the consent order was vague and unquantified, and that the Respondent had enrolled the minor in an extravagantly expensive school without any prior consultation. 11. Furthermore, the Appellant provided evidence of his extensive financial obligations to a blended family. He demonstrated that he has three other minor children from different relationships. The school-going children among them are enrolled at Corner Brook Junior School in Juja, an institution with a significantly lower fee structure. Invoices attached to his Affidavit showed termly fees at Corner Brook ranging from Kshs. 8,000/= to Kshs. 30,000/=. The Appellant argued that forcing him to pay the exorbitant Riara School fees for one child would cripple him financially, leaving him unable to cater to his ailing father and his other dependents, thereby creating an undue and discriminatory advantage for the subject minor. 12. The trial court dismissed the Preliminary Objection on jurisdiction. Proceeding to the substantive Notice to Show Cause, the Kadhi delivered a Ruling on 23 February 2024. Relying on Article 53 of the Constitution, section 32 of the Children Act, and Islamic jurisprudential texts including Surah AlBaqarah 2:233 and Surah At-Talaq 65:6–7, the trial court found that the Appellant had neglected his educational obligations towards the minor. The trial court consequently ordered the attachment of one-seventh (1/7) of the Appellant’s gross monthly salary until the sum of Kshs. 225,500/= was fully recovered. The court further directed that moving forward, the Appellant should pay school fees for the subject minor in parity with what he pays for his other children. 13. Aggrieved by this decision, the Appellant filed a Memorandum of Appeal dated 21 March 2024, raising five primary grounds of appeal: a. That the learned Kadhi erred in law and fact by failing to find that pursuant to the Consent entered between the parties on 18 March 2021, the Respondent had a duty to consult the Appellant before enrolling the minor in school; b. That the learned Kadhi erred in law and fact in failing to find that the wording of the consent, to wit "payment of school fees," was vague and thus could not place any particular figure as recoverable from the Appellant; c. That the learned Kadhi erred in law and fact by failing to consider that the Appellant owed a duty to provide for other minors before the attachment of his salary, hence giving an undue advantage to the subject minor over the others; d. That the learned Kadhi erred in both law and fact in relying on extraneous issues not relevant to the facts in issue in coming to his conclusions; e. That the Learned Kadhi erred in law and in fact in coming to a conclusion contrary to the evidence, the law, and the submissions urged before him. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/5489/eng@2026-04-30 3

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The Appellant's Submissions 14. The Appellant submits that a court's jurisdiction flows exclusively from the Constitution or legislation, citing the Supreme Court in Samuel Kamau Macharia v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 Others eKLR, which asserts that a court cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction it does not possess, and that jurisdiction goes to the very heart of the matter. Relying on the High Court decision in IK v RMS eKLR, the Appellant contends that parties cannot confer jurisdiction by consent. The Appellant posits that since the dispute related to the enforcement of custody and child maintenance, the Kadhi's Court should have downed its tools, as these matters are the exclusive preserve of the Children's Court under section 73 of the Children Act. The Appellant further relied on Mombasa Civil Appeal No. 15 of 2013 H.M.M v K.J.D and Republic v Kadhi's Court Nairobi Ex-parte T.L eKLR to support the proposition that Kadhi's Courts lack jurisdiction over children's welfare matters. 15. Substantively, the Appellant asserts that while he does not disown his parental responsibility, the unilateral choice of Riara School was unreasonable and financially unsustainable. He emphasizes that the original decree did not specify a school or a fee amount, rendering the order vague. He invokes the inherent powers of the Court under section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act to prevent the abuse of the court process, citing Kenya Power and Lighting Company Limited v Benzene Holdings Limited t/a Wyco Paints eKLR. 16. The Appellant heavily relies on the persuasive decision of this Court in NK v AL eKLR (Family Appeal No. 29 of 2019), where it was held that a parent cannot be compelled to meet school fees in a high-cost school without a specific court order or mutual agreement, especially when carrying extensive financial obligations for the entire family alone. He argues that attaching his salary to recover an unquantified and unilaterally incurred debt is oppressive and punitive. The Respondent's Submissions 17. The Respondent vehemently opposes the appeal. She argues that the Consent Decree of 18 March 2021 is a sacrosanct contract that cannot be varied or set aside in the absence of fraud, mistake, or misrepresentation. The Respondent relies on the Court of Appeal decision in Board of Trustees National Social Security Fund v Micheal Mwalo eKLR and the High Court holding in Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd v Specialized Engineering Co. Ltd KLR 485 to emphasize the binding nature of consent orders entered into by legally competent parties. She further cites Anura Perera v Nation Media Group Limited eKLR to argue that a consent order is an impermissible fetter on the discretion of the court to tamper with the agreement without both parties' consent. 18. On the question of jurisdiction, the Respondent argues that the Appellant voluntarily submitted to the Kadhi's Court in 2021 and cannot approbate and reprobate. Furthermore, she submits that child maintenance is an issue appurtenant to divorce and personal status under Muslim law, thus falling squarely within the purview of Article 170(5) of the Constitution. The Respondent relies on decisions such as ZUDG v SJKUR eKLR, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdi & Another v Adan Yusuf eKLR, and Najma Ali Ahmed v Swaleh Rubea eKLR to demonstrate that the Children Act did not oust the jurisdiction of the Kadhi's Court over the children of Muslim parents when the issues arise incidentally to divorce proceedings. 19. The Respondent further avers that the Appellant is a Business Development Manager with significant financial ability, and that his failure to pay the school fees is a deliberate evasion of his parental responsibilities under both Kenyan law and Islamic Sharia. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/5489/eng@2026-04-30 4

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Analysis & Determination 20. Having comprehensively analysed the pleadings, the record of the trial court, the grounds of appeal, and the written submissions of both parties alongside the relevant jurisprudence, the Court isolates the following central issues for determination: i. Whether the Kadhi's Court possessed the requisite jurisdiction to hear, determine, and execute matters relating to the custody and educational maintenance of the minor child; ii. Whether a Consent Decree that imposes an unquantified obligation (to "pay education expenses") can be executed via a Notice to Show Cause and subsequent salary attachment without prior mutual quantification or judicial assessment. iii. Whether the Respondent's unilateral enrolment of the minor in a high-cost private school violates the principles of equal parental responsibility and the "best interests of the child" when assessed against the Appellant's financial capacity and corresponding obligations to his other dependents. iv. Whether the trial court's execution order attaching one-seventh (1/7) of the Appellant's salary for the recovery of Kshs. 225,500/= was justified in law and in fact. The Jurisdiction of the Kadhi's Court 21. The question of jurisdiction is the most critical threshold issue in any judicial proceeding. As correctly cited by the Appellant, the Court of Appeal in Owners of Motor Vessel "Lillian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd KLR 1 definitively settled that jurisdiction is everything; without it, a court has no power to take even one more step, and a court of law must down its tools the moment it holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction. This was fortified by the Supreme Court in Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 Others eKLR, wherein it was held that jurisdiction flows from either the Constitution or legislation, and a court cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that which is conferred upon it by law. 22. The Appellant's jurisdictional challenge is premised on the argument that the Children Act confers exclusive jurisdiction over matters of child custody, maintenance, and welfare to the Children's Court. Section 73 of the repealed Act and the corresponding provisions in the 2022 Act stipulate the establishment of Children's Courts to conduct civil proceedings relating to parental responsibility, custody, and maintenance. The Appellant relies heavily on the decision in IK v RMS eKLR, where the Court held that the Kadhi's Court had no jurisdiction to hear and determine a children's dispute because the Magistrate must be specifically designated as a Children's Court by the Chief Justice in the Gazette. 23. Conversely, the Respondent argues that Article 170(5) of the Constitution limits the Kadhi's Court jurisdiction to the determination of questions of Muslim law relating to personal status, marriage, divorce or inheritance in proceedings where all parties profess the Muslim religion and submit to the jurisdiction of that court. Since custody and maintenance are natural incidents of marriage and divorce, they fall within personal status. 24. The jurisprudence on this issue has historically been divergent, representing two distinct schools of thought. In IK v RMS [2020] eKLR, H.M.M v K.J.D [2014] eKLR, and Republic v Kadhi's Court Nairobi Ex-parte T.L [2018] eKLR, the Court held the Children Act applies to all children regardless of religion. Section 73 requires specific gazettement of Magistrates to handle children https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/5489/eng@2026-04-30 5

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matters. The Kadhi's Court lacks specific statutory mandate over children under the Act, rendering such proceedings a nullity. 25. The cases of ZUDG v SJKUR [2020] eKLR, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdi v Adan Yussuf [2013] eKLR, and Najma Ali Ahmed v Swaleh Rubea [2010] eKLR gave a more purposive constitutional interpretation of the matter. In those instances, the Court held that the Children Act did not expressly oust the constitutional jurisdiction of Kadhi Courts. Custody and maintenance are inextricably intertwined with marriage and divorce under Islamic personal status. Kadhis, functioning as judicial officers, should hear incidental matters applying the "best interest" principle. 26. This Court aligns itself unequivocally with the purposive constitutional interpretation. Article 170(5) of the Constitution vests the Kadhi's Courts with the jurisdiction to determine questions of Muslim law relating to personal status, marriage, divorce, or inheritance. 27. Under Islamic jurisprudence (Sharia), the dissolution of a marriage inevitably triggers consequential obligations regarding the welfare, H###ana (custody), and Nafaqah (maintenance) of the children born of the union. It is a legal and practical absurdity to bifurcate family disputes by requiring Muslim litigants to dissolve their marriage in the Kadhi's Court and subsequently file a fresh, separate suit in the Children's Court to determine the maintenance of the children arising from the exact same dissolved marriage. The fragmentation of justice offends the overriding objective of civil litigation under sections 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act, which mandate the just, expeditious, proportionate, and affordable resolution of disputes. 28. Furthermore, the Supreme Court recently provided profound guidance on the intersection of religious pluralism and constitutional rights in Fatuma Athman Abud Faraj v Ruth Faith Mwawasi eKLR (SC Petition No. E035 of 2023). The Court recognized the specialized application of Muslim law in personal status matters under Article 24(4) and 170(5) of the Constitution, emphasizing that such provisions must be read harmoniously with the broader rights contained in the Bill of Rights. 29. The Children Act must be read in conformity with The Constitution. While the Act establishes Children's Courts, it does not explicitly repeal or oust the constitutional mandate of the Kadhi's Courts to adjudicate personal status matters. Matters of child custody and maintenance are deeply embedded in the personal status of the parties. Therefore, where Muslim parties submit to the Kadhi's Court for divorce, the Kadhi possesses the requisite jurisdiction to determine the incidental issues of child custody and maintenance, provided the Kadhi consistently applies the paramount constitutional standard: the best interests of the child as enshrined in Article 53(2) of the Constitution. 30. Additionally, the evidentiary record is clear that the Appellant voluntarily submitted to the Kadhi's Court in 2021, actively participated in the framing of the Consent Decree, and subsequently complied with the Kshs. 17,000/= monthly upkeep order for years. It is a well-established principle in our adversarial system that while parties cannot confer jurisdiction where none exists in law, a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a competent court, benefit from its decrees, and subsequently challenge the court's jurisdiction only when enforcement proceedings become financially inconvenient. 31. Therefore, this Court finds and holds that the Kadhi's Court was properly clothed with the requisite jurisdiction to record the Consent Decree of 18 March 2021 and to entertain the enforcement application regarding the minor's educational maintenance. The Appellant's Preliminary Objection on this specific ground must fail. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/5489/eng@2026-04-30 6

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The Vagueness of the Consent Decree and the Mechanics of Execution 32. The core of this appellate dispute lies in the specific wording of Order 4 of the Consent Decree dated 18 March 2021, which states: "THAT the father shall provide for the upkeep of the minor Kshs. 17,000/per month and pay education expenses when the child starts education." 33. The Respondent correctly posits that a consent judgment is a contractual agreement between parties, adopted by the court, and is generally sacrosanct. The Court of Appeal in Board of Trustees National Social Security Fund v Micheal Mwalo [2015] eKLR reiterated that a court of law will not interfere with a consent judgment except on grounds that would justify the rescission of a contract, such as fraud, collusion, or mistake. This was further affirmed in Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd v Specialized Engineering Co. Ltd [1980] KLR 485, where Harris J held that a consent order entered into by counsel is binding and cannot be varied unless obtained by fraud or contrary to public policy. The Respondent argues that because the Appellant consented to pay education expenses, he is irrevocably bound to pay the Kshs. 225,500/= incurred at Riara School. 34. However, the Respondent fundamentally conflates the validity of the consent order with its executability. The Appellant is not seeking to rescind or impeach the consent order; he acknowledges his overarching parental obligation to pay education expenses. His contention is that the phrase "pay education expenses" is vague, unquantified, and open-ended, and, therefore, incapable of summary execution. 35. For a decree to be executed through coercive civil mechanisms—such as the attachment of a salary, garnishee proceedings, or committal to civil jail—the decree must be for a liquidated, specified sum, or provide a clear, unambiguous mathematical formula for ascertaining that sum. An order to "pay education expenses" without specifying the school, the fee cap, the proportion of liability, or the mechanism for selecting the institution, is an unquantified obligation. 36. In Republic v Attorney General & Another Ex parte Mike Maina Kamau eKLR, it was held that for a party to be punished for disobedience of a court order, the terms of the order must be clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous, and the disobedience must be deliberate. Contempt of court and execution proceedings are quasi-criminal in their coercive effect; they cannot be founded upon an ambiguous directive. 37. When the minor reached school-going age, the Respondent was required by law, logic, and the principles of co-parenting to either seek mutual agreement with the Appellant on the choice of school and the quantification of the fees, or return to the Kadhi's Court to have the education expenses assessed and crystallized into a specific monetary decree before pursuing execution. Instead, the Respondent unilaterally enrolled the child in an expensive private institution, accumulated a bill of Kshs. 225,500/=, and immediately sought a Notice to Show Cause for salary attachment. 38. The trial Kadhi erred in treating the unquantified, open-ended clause as a blank cheque authorizing the Respondent to unilaterally incur unlimited expenses and subsequently utilize the coercive power of the state to attach the Appellant's salary. A vague consent order regarding future, unspecified expenses cannot be executed summarily without a prior judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of those expenses and the financial capacity of the debtor parent. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/5489/eng@2026-04-30 7

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Equal Parental Responsibility, Choice of School, and the Best Interests of the Child 39. Having established that the unquantified education expenses clause required mutual agreement or judicial quantification, the Court must evaluate the Respondent's unilateral choice of Riara Kindergarten against the statutory framework of parental responsibility. 40. The enactment of the Children Act, 2022 fundamentally overhauled the landscape of parental rights in Kenya, shifting away from the unequal provisions of the 2001 Act. Section 31 of the 2022 Act defines parental responsibility, while section 32 introduces the mandatory principle of equal parental responsibility, providing that: The parents of a child shall have parental responsibility over the child on an equal basis, and neither the father nor the mother of the child shall have a superior right or claim against the other in exercise of such parental responsibility whether or not the child is born within or outside wedlock. 41. Equal parental responsibility implies that major decisions affecting the life of the child—including healthcare, religious instruction, and importantly, the choice of educational institution—must be made jointly by both parents through consultation. The Respondent's unilateral decision to enrol the minor at Riara School without the consent of the Appellant directly violates the statutory dictate of joint parental responsibility. 42. The Respondent argues that her choice of school was in the best interests of the child, a principle enshrined in Article 53(2) of the Constitution. However, the best interests principle must be applied pragmatically, taking into account the financial realities of the family unit. The right to basic education does not automatically translate to a right to elite, high-cost private education if the parents cannot jointly afford it. 43. In NK v AL eKLR (Family Appeal No. 29 of 2019), the Court held: “ Whereas children are entitled to their rights, the same should be enjoyed within the means of their parents otherwise parents may end up with blood pressure and other related ailments at the altar of the right of a child... In the circumstances, one cannot demand for the adverse party to meet school fees and other related expenses in a high-cost school even without a specific court order... Since the Respondent is carrying the entire family financial obligations alone, he cannot be pushed too hard to educate all his children at a high-cost school beyond his means." 44. Similarly, in SAD v EOO [2021] eKLR and PKM v ANM [2020] eKLR, the Court emphasized that financial capability and parity among siblings are crucial determinants in assessing child maintenance orders. 45. This rationale is squarely applicable to the present appeal. The evidentiary record demonstrates that the Appellant is legally and financially responsible for a blended family comprising four minor children. Documentary evidence, including fee invoices and receipts, shows that the Appellant's other schoolgoing children are enrolled at Corner Brook Junior School, Juja. 46. A comparative analysis of the fee structures reveals a stark disparity. The law abhors discrimination among children of the same parent. Section 9 of the Children Act explicitly prohibits discrimination on various grounds, including social and economic status. To compel the Appellant to finance the education of the subject minor at an elite, high-cost institution while his other children attend a mid- https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/5489/eng@2026-04-30 8

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tier school creates an inequitable financial disparity within the family unit. It forces the Appellant to disproportionately allocate his finite resources to one child, inevitably prejudicing the welfare, nutrition, and educational prospects of his other dependents. 47. The Respondent averred that the Appellant is a Business Development Manager of great standing. However, the Respondent herself is employed as an Assistant Manager, Trade Finance at a commercial bank, indicating she possesses significant independent financial capacity. Where one parent unilaterally selects a premium, high-cost educational institution for a child without the concurrence of the other parent, and the cost of such an institution exceeds the proportionate standard of living maintained for the rest of the family, the parent making the unilateral choice must be prepared to shoulder the financial differential. 48. The trial court, paradoxically, recognized this principle of equity in part. In its impugned Ruling, the Kadhi directed that moving forward, the Appellant should pay school fees for the minor in parity with what he pays for his other children. However, the trial court erred fundamentally in failing to apply this same logic retrospectively to the Kshs. 225,500/= arrears. By ordering the attachment of the Appellant's salary to recover arrears accrued at a high-cost school chosen unilaterally, the Kadhi essentially validated the Respondent's breach of joint parental responsibility and penalized the Appellant for an obligation he neither consented to nor could reasonably afford. Execution via Salary Attachment 49. The final issue concerns the mechanics of the execution order. The trial Kadhi ordered the attachment of one-seventh (1/7) of the Appellant’s gross monthly salary until the sum of Kshs. 225,500/= is fully recovered. 50. The enforcement of child maintenance orders is governed by section 121 of the Children Act. Section 121(4)(c) permits the court to order the attachment of a respondent's earnings if satisfied that the failure to make a payment was due to wilful refusal or neglect, provided that the attachment does not exceed forty-five per cent (45%) of the respondent's annual income. Furthermore, this must be read in tandem with section 19(3) of the Employment Act, 2007, which enforces the strict one-third rule, prohibiting employers from making deductions that leave an employee with less than one-third of their basic salary. 51. While the mathematical fraction ordered by the Kadhi is facially within the statutory limits of both the Children Act and the Employment Act, the foundational basis for the attachment is fatally flawed. 52. As analysed above, the sum of Kshs. 225,500/= was not a liquidated debt arising from a specific, quantified court order, nor was it a mutually agreed expense. It was a highly contested figure arising from the Respondent's unilateral interpretation of a vague consent clause. Imposing a salary attachment—a severe and coercive mechanism of execution that carries the threat of disciplinary action or job loss for the employee—upon a party who has consistently demonstrated good faith by paying the quantified portion of the decree (the Kshs. 17,000 monthly upkeep and various medical bills), for a disputed, unilaterally incurred debt, constitutes a severe abuse of the judicial process. 53. The Appellant cannot be deemed in law to have wilfully neglected an order to pay Kshs. 225,500/= when no such specific order existed prior to the NTSC proceedings, and when the original consent decree merely ordered the payment of education expenses broadly. A finding of contempt or wilful disobedience requires the deliberate flouting of a clear, unequivocal directive. The Appellant's failure to pay the exorbitant Riara School fees was a product of a genuine dispute over the interpretation of the consent order, lack of consultation, and his genuine financial incapacity, not an act of contumacious defiance. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/5489/eng@2026-04-30 9

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54. Therefore, the order for the attachment of the Appellant's salary to recover the sum of Kshs. 225,500/ = is wholly unjustified in law, lacks a proper factual foundation, and must be vacated in its entirety. Disposition 55. In view of the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that the appeal has merit and succeeds. The Court makes the following orders: i. The appeal is allowed. ii. The Ruling and Order of the Honourable Deputy Chief Kadhi Suqyan Hassan Omar, delivered on 23 February 2024 in Nairobi Kadhi's Court KCDC Cause No. E035 of 2021, specifically the order attaching one-seventh (1/7) of the Appellant's gross monthly salary for the recovery of Kshs. 225,500/=, is hereby set aside. iii. The Appellant shall be liable for the arrears of the minor's education expenses from the date of enrolment, recalculated strictly based on the fee structure of Corner Brook Junior School. iv. If the Respondent elects to maintain the minor child at Riara Kindergarten and Primary School, she shall bear the exclusive financial responsibility for the differential between the Riara School fees and the Appellant's capped contribution as defined in Order (iii) above. v. The Appellant shall continue to remit the sum of Kshs. 17,000/= per month for the general upkeep of the minor without fail. vi. Each party shall bear their own costs for this appeal and the proceedings in the court below. DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 30 DAY OF APRIL 2026 HELENE R. NAMISI JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT Delivered on virtual platform in the presence of: For Appellant: Ms Muthama h/b Kamau For Respondent: Mr Masaviru Court Assistant Lucy Mwangi https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/5489/eng@2026-04-30 10

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