John Akhala v Inspector General of The National Police Services & 1 other

EVERLYN ACHUNGO AKHALA ................................................. 2ND PETITIONER CHARLES KIWENDO .................................................................... 3RD PETITIONER EDITH ADHIAMBO OORO .......................................................... 4TH PETITIONER JOSEPH ANYAMA ........................................................................... 5TH PETITIONER NERISHA JUMA OUMA ................................................................ 6TH PETITIONER BENSON ONYANGO OWAA ......................................................... 7TH PETITIONER ROBERT OUKO ODONGO ........................................................... 8TH PETITIONER LINDA AOL ...................................................................................... 9TH PETITIONER MAO (GUARDIAN TO MA) ........................................................ 10TH PETITIONER BOO ................................................................................................. 11TH PETITIONER CLINTON OTIENO AKA BILL CLINTON OTIENO .............. 12TH PETITIONER JOSEPH ODHIAMBO OYWER ................................................... 13TH PETITIONER DAVID OMONDI OKOTH ........................................................... 14TH PETITIONER HARBARTY MUYESHI ................................................................ 15TH PETITIONER SHALMON OTIENO ODOYO ..................................................... 16TH PETITIONER STEVE BIKO OBONGO ................................................................ 17TH PETITIONER EVANS OWINO AILA ................................................................... 18TH PETITIONER KENNETH OMONDI OWITI ..................................................... 19TH PETITIONER DANIEL OUMA OBARE .............................................................. 20TH PETITIONER AAO (GUARDIAN TO ROO) ....................................................... 21ST PETITIONER DANIEL OCHANDA OWITI ....................................................... 22ND PETITIONER KARILUS AKACH RAPHAEL .................................................... 23RD PETITIONER CHRISTOPHER OTOTO ODERO .............................................. 24TH PETITIONER DENNIS OCHIENG ...................................................................... 25TH PETITIONER BRIAN OBIERO ............................................................................ 26TH PETITIONER JOSEPH OBALA ONGILI ............................................................. 27TH PETITIONER AMOS ODUOR OTENGO ............................................................ 28TH PETITIONER DORCAS AKINYI OLUOCH ....................................................... 29TH PETITIONER AND INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICES ........................................................................................ 1ST RESPONDENT THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE ......................................... 2ND RESPONDENT https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 2

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ATTORNEY GENERAL ............................................................... 3RD RESPONDENT INDEPENDENT POLICING OVERSIGHTAUTHORITY ...... 4TH RESPONDENT AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE MISSION ......................... 1ST INTERESTED PARTY KENYA NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS .... 2ND INTERESTED PARTY KATIBA INSTITUTE ....................................................... 3RD INTERESTED PARTY AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ....................................... 4TH INTERESTED PARTY LAW SOCIETY OF KENYA ............................................. 5TH INTERESTED PARTY JUDGMENT 1. Brian Oniang’o and William Akhala Omulele, aged 22 and 24 years old respectively, were in their house on 20/7/2023 at Nyalenda Estate, Kisumu resting after having had their lunch, when police officers in riot gear stormed their house, dragged them out to the road, assaulted them with clubs and kicks and left them for dead. 2. The two were taken to Jaramogi Oginga Odinga Teaching and Referral Hospital (JOOTRH) where they succumbed to those injuries on 26th and 29th July, 2023, respectively. 3. On 19/7/2023 at about 6.30 pm, Charles Kiwendo (‘3rd petitioner’) sent his son JLK aged 17 years to buy provisions for supper. He never returned. The following morning, the 3rd petitioner traced him in Ward 5 at Kisumu County Referral Hospital. His son informed him that he had been shot in the left scrotum by a police officer. The young JLK would later on 26/11/2023 succumb to complications arising out of the gunshot. 4. Edith Adhiambo Ooro (‘4th petitioner’) was the wife of Benard Ochieng Otana. On 13/7/2023, she returned home to prepare lunch for her family but found that her husband had stepped out to buy food. He never returned. His body would later be traced at Nightngale Hospital in Kondele with a gunshot at the back. The post mortem report prepared on 14/7/2023 revealed that he died due to extensive haemorrhage due to gunshot. 5. On 21/7/2023 at about 4.30 pm, Joseph Anyama Midawe received a call from one Caleb Amimo that his son one George Odhiambo Anyama had been shot by police officers near Kisumu Medical Education Trust. He later traced the body of his son at JOOTRH. The death was confirmed to have resulted from excessive haemorrhage secondary to penetrating abdominal injury following gunshot wounds. 6. On 19/7/2023 at about 5.00 pm, Nerisha Juma Ouma (‘6th petitioner’) was at home when she received a call to the effect that her nephew, one David Ochieng Ouma had been shot near Nyando River Bridge in Ahero. She later confirmed his demise at JOOTRH on 20/7/2023. The post mortem report confirmed that he had died out of extensive haemorrhage secondary to gun wound. 7. Willian Onyango Otieno (‘deceased’) was a tuk tuk driver along Ahero-Kisumu route. On 19/7/2023, he left home for work but never returned. His father, Benson Onyango Owaa 7th petitioner would later, https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 3

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on 22/7/2023, trace his body at JOOTRH mortuary with a gunshot wound to the left side of his neck. A post mortem report dated 25/7/2023 revealed that he died of excessive bleeding due to gunshot. 8. On 12/7/2023, Peter Otieno Adoyo called one Wilson Omondi Aduke from Nightngale Hospital and informed him that he had been beaten unconscious by police officers. His brother, Robert Ouko Adongo (‘8th petitioner’) rushed there but found that Adoyo had been transferred to JOOTRH. Reaching there, he found him in excruciating pain. Adoyo narrated to him the terror that had been unleashed on him by police officers. He succumbed to the injuries the following morning. The cause of death was opined to be circulatory collapse secondary to extensive soft tissue injuries following assault. 9. Frank Opiyo Odhiambo (‘deceased’) was a carpenter in Kondele making coffins. On 19/7/2023 at around mid-day, he was with his co-workers around Nildeep area when police officers in uniform threw teargas at them. They hid at Lexo Petrol Station. Once the teargas smoke had subsided, they sought to leave but a police officer shot him dead. Lynda Akoth Aol (‘PW 2’ and the ‘9th Petitioner’) would later find his body at Port Florence Otonglo Mortuary. A post mortem report revealed that he died due to extensive haemorrhage due to gunshot wound. 10. On 20/7/2023, MAO, aged 16 years was sent by her elder sister to go and buy tomatoes from a grocery shop. A few meters from her home, she met police officers running towards her direction. She turned to run away but was shot and fell down. Her mother Mary Atieno Onyango (“10th petitioner”) later found her at Howic Nursing Home where a rubber bullet was extracted from her right clavicle area. Her disability index was assessed at 5% by Dr. Neema Mbaruku (‘PW 4’). 11. On 20/7/2023 at about 2.00 pm, BOO (“11th petitioner”) then 17 years old, was playing football with his friends on a murram road within Nyalenda ‘A’ Estate, Kisumu. Chaos erupted and each one scampered to safety. Unfortunately for him, he was shot at the back and forearm. He lost consciousness and was admitted at JOOTRH for 1 week. PW 4 assessed his disability at 10% for the lung and 15% for the hand and forearm. 12. Clinton Otieno aka Bill Clinton Otieno (“12th petitioner”) was a boda boda operator. On 7/7/2023 at about 3.00 pm, he dropped a customer in Kisumu town and was returning to Nyalenda ‘A’ where he was residing when he found a group of people on the road. Police officers charged at the crowd and he was shot in right forearm. He sustained a fracture and other injuries to the chest and right thigh. He was admitted at JOOTRH for 10 days before being discharged. 13. Joseph Odhiambo Oywer (“13th petitioner”) was a bicycle transport provider from Patel Estate. On 20/7/2023 at about 4.00 pm, he was cycling back home to Nyamasaria. On reaching Kachok roundabout, he met a crowd running away from police officers. He continued riding his bicycle past both the crowd and the police officers. After passing the said officers, he was shot on the right leg toes. He was treated at JOOTRH and had one of his toes amputated as a result of the gunshot wounds. The degree of his disability was assessed at 5%. 14. David Omondi Okoth, (“14th petitioner”) a holder of Diploma in Engineering and working as a freelance general worker in construction sites, travelled from Thika in mid-July, 2023 to Mowlem Kisumu to inspect a family property. On 20/7/2023, he stepped out to buy airtime from a shop located within the premises. Suddenly, a police vehicle appeared cruising at a high speed. It stopped and two police officers stepped out and shot at him. One bullet hit him on the lower chest wall tearing the diaphragm and perforated the colon. He was treated at Avenue Health Care where the bullet was extracted. His disability was assessed at 30%. 15. On 14/7/2023, Harbaty Mangala Muyeshi (“15th petitioner”) went to work at Mamboleo. However, since his work mates did not turn up, he decided to go back home to Polyview Estate at 10.30 am. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 4

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However, the motorbike rider carrying him refused to go past Somali Base along Kakamega Road because of the demonstrations ahead. He therefore alighted and decided to go through Kondele. He encountered police officers at Kondele flyover and started to run towards Kondele roundabout. The police shot him twice on both of his lower limbs. He was rushed to JOOTRH where he was admitted for two weeks while undergoing treatment. His disability index was estimated at 25%. 16. On 20/3/2023 at about 6:00 pm, Shalmon Otieno Odoyo, (16th petitioner”) an apprentice mechanic left his place of work at Jua Kali area, Kisumu Town and headed to Nyaori Centre, his home. On reaching Kachok roundabout, he saw a group of people running from behind with police officers in hot pursuit. He was shot a few metres from his home and fell down. He was later treated at JOOTRH where it was confirmed that he had suffered a gunshot wound on the left leg with the bullet exiting from the front. His disability index was assessed at 5%. 17. On 28/3/2023 at about 8.30 pm, Steve Biko Obongo (“17th petitioner”) had just left a construction site at Nyamasaria and was headed home. On reaching Nyalenda, Nyaori Centre, he decided to buy food when he saw people running towards him from the main road with two armed police officers in hot pursuit. He also started running away when he was shot on the right leg. He was admitted at JOOTRH for treatment for 2 weeks. His disability index was assessed at 20%. 18. Evans Owino Aila “(18th petitioner”) is a Billing Officer at Maxcure Hospital. On 6/7/2023, he reported for night duty at Mega City and signed out the following morning of 7/7/2023. He picked up his motorbike and headed home to Chulaimbo. On the way, he picked up his friend one Washington Ochieng Owino. On reaching Otonglo Bridge, he met a group of about 10 police officers who waived him down. The police assaulted him and ordered him to remove stones that were blocking the road. On starting to remove the stones, one of the officers shot him on the left thigh. He was rushed to Masaba Hospital for emergency attention. He was later treated at his workplace and his disability index was assessed at 5%. 19. Kenneth Omondi Owiti (‘PW1’ and “19th petitioner”) is a Clinical Officer at Saimex Medicare, Kuria West, Migori County. On 20/7/2023 at about 6.48 pm, he stepped out with his and a neighbour’s daughter to get provision for supper. While at the gate to his premises, he saw a contingent of armed police officers. One of them shouted at him and shot him on the left upper limb. He was rushed to Migori County Referral Hospital. A qualified surgeon had to be sourced from Kisii County to come and operate on him. A bullet was found to have lodged behind his spine. He was discharged on 26/7/2023 and his disability index was assessed at 30%. 20. On 17/7/2023 at about 4.00 pm, while at Nyamasaria near Butter Toast, Daniel Ouma Obare (“20th petitioner”) had purchased airtime from a shop and was walking home. Suddenly, a Land Cruiser stopped and police officers alighted. They lobbed tear gas on anyone on sight. One aimed and shot at him shuttering his left jaw. He was admitted at JOOTRH where the bullet was extracted from his mandible and handed over to IPOA. Due to financial constraints, he is yet to undergo surgical fixation and implants. 21. The 21st petitioner is AOO, the mother to ROO, a 17 year old boy. On 12/7/2023 at about 11.00 am, ROO left his sister’s house in Membe and was walking home to Obunga. On reaching Kondele flyover, he encountered police officers who shot him on the left upper limb. He was admitted to JOOTRH and discharged on 25/7/2023. Subsequently, he was admitted on various days to repair the severed vein. His disability index was assessed at 30%. 22. On 21/7/2023, Daniel Ochanda Owiti (“22nd petitioner”) was at home with his family. At about 2.30 pm, 4 police officers stormed his house, clobbered him and left him for dead. He visited Pandpieri Hospital on 24/7/2023 where he was treated. His disability index was estimated at 10%. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 5

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23. Karilus Akacha Raphael (“23rd petitioner”) is a resident of Nyalenda Western Estate in Kisumu Town. On 21/7/2023 at about 10.00 am, he went to his friend’s house within the same estate for a friendly chat. At about 1.30 pm while his friend’s wife was preparing lunch, a group of 7 police officers broke down the gate, entered the compound dragged him outside and clobbered him. He was left with a fractured right lower limb which was casted twice at JOOTRH. 24. Christopher Ototo Odero of Nyalenda Estate Kisumu is the 24th petitioner. On 19/7/2023 at about 2.00 pm, he was walking along Nyalenda-Kachok road when he was shot by a police officer and suffered gunshots on both thighs of the lower limbs. He was treated of gunshots at JOOTRH. 25. Dennis Ochieng Obwao (“25th petitioner”) a tuk tuk driver, boarded a motorcycle to go home on 27/3/2023 at 3.00 pm. On reaching Kisumu Boys roundabout near Ahero Mowuok stage along Kisumu-Nairobi Highway, police officers appeared, threw teargas and opened indiscriminate gun shots. Obwao was shot on the chest, taken to Howic Nursing Home in Nyalenda and then transferred to JOOTRH. He underwent surgical operation to extract the bullet and was admitted thereat until 10/4/2023. 26. Brian Obiero Oliyo (“26th petitioner”) was a student at Kisumu National Polytechnic. On 20/7/2023, he was in his house revising for KNEC exams slated for the following day when at about 6.30 pm, police officers stormed the house and flashed him out. They clobbered him outside his house then asked him to go back. They left him nursing his wounds. Good Samaritans took him to Howic Hospital and thereafter JOOTRH for treatment. He suffered femoral fracture and traverse patella fracture. He ended up with the right knee deformity with 5% disability index. 27. Joseph Oballah Ongiri the 27th petitioner was a resident of Nyamasaria Estate within Manyatta ‘B’, Kisumu. On 21/7/2023, at about 2.00 pm, he stepped out to go and buy water for his family. He saw a motor bike with two pillion passengers riding towards him. When they neared him, one of the pillion passengers drew a gun and shot him. The rider turned back and the two pillion passengers hopped into a police Land Cruiser which sped off. Ongili was rushed to JOOTRH where he was operated on to remove the bullet. He remained in hospital until 24/7/2023. His disability index was assessed at 10% by PW 4 who examined him on 19/7/2024. 28. Amos Oduor Oteng’o (“28th petitioner”), a resident of Carwash Estate in Kisumu was at home on 19/7/2023. At about 4.30 pm he left home and headed to Kona Mbuta-Manyatta Road for Mpesa services. However, he found all shops closed. He headed to Kisumu-Kibos Road trying to get an Mpesa shop that was open but found none. While returning home, police officers pursued him and shot him in the abdomen. He was rushed to JOOTRH where the live bullet was removed from his abdomen. He remained in hospital until 25/7/2023. His disability index was assessed at 25%. 29. All that is narrated above is not from any blockbuster movie or any warfront. It is actual events that took place in Migori, Kisumu and Ahero, areas between the months of March and July, 2023 during public demonstrations against the high cost of living dubbed the “Azimio Maandamano”. 30. Amidst these chaos, one person with her colleagues never lost sight of their calling. Dorcas Akinyi Oluoch, (“29th petitioner”) the LSK Chair, Kisumu Chapter, in exercise of their mandate under section 4 of the Law Society of Kenya Act and in public interest, led her members in collecting data, monitoring the operations of the members of the 2nd respondent and offered pro-bono services where needed to the victims. 31. She coordinated in interviewing the victims of the police brutality, offered psycho-socio support to the victims, engaged Dr. Peter Machuri (PW5) and Dr. Neema Mbaruku (PW4) to interpret the medical https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 6

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records for the victims. She coordinated in obtaining consents from the petitioners for the lodgment of the present petition. She communicated with IPOA and other relevant bodies with a view to assisting the victims including the petitioners. She also appeared at the trial as PW6, having been given authority to appear and plead by and for all the petitioners, and testified. She adopted the contents of all their affidavits and was cross-examined on them. The firm of M M Omondi & Company Advocates was finally instructed to lodge the present petition. 32. By the petition dated 30/8/2024, all that is narrated above was pleaded in detail and supported by affidavits of all the petitioners. It was brought against the 1st respondent (Inspector General of Police), 2nd respondent (the National Police Service ‘NPS’), the Attorney General and the 4th respondent (IPOA), respectively. 33. It was alleged that the respondents had breached and violated the fundamental rights and freedoms of the petitioners. In particular, it was alleged that the 1st and 2nd respondent had contravened article 244 of the Constitution of Kenya and the National Police Service Act (‘NPS Act’) on the use of force. That their officers used excessive force against the petitioners and more so, the minors involved. 34. It was further alleged that the 4th respondent had abdicated its statutory role of giving effect to article 244. That although information was sought from it under article 35 of the Constitution of Kenya, on the level of its investigation, it failed to supply the same or even respond to the subsequent reminders. As a result, the petitioners right to institute appropriate action for appropriate remedies was compromised. 35. It was further contended that none of the petitioners were demonstrators. That they were either shot at or clobbered while going on with their daily chores. That the officers of the 2nd respondent breached the law as to the use of force as none of the petitioners was armed. That the 4th respondent had taken forever to carry any investigations while it is required to do so promptly, and in any event, within 90 days. 36. For the foregoing reasons, it was contended that, the petitioners right to life, right to the security of the person, right to information, right to fair administrative action, right to protection of children from all forms of violence had been infringed by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondent. That the law on the lawful use of force by police officers was violated. Various declarations were therefore sought against the respondents as well as damages for compensation. 37. The interested parties filed affidavits in support of the petition. Vincent Chahale, the Country Director of the 1st interested party swore an affidavit on 28/2/2025. He stated that the police had responded to peaceful demonstrations with excessive and disproportionate force against unarmed civilians including innocent bystanders. This led to loss of life and serious injuries and widespread violations of fundamental rights. That the 2nd respondent was obligated to respect human rights within constitutional and statutory limits and ensure public order without resorting to excessive force. 38. That on the directions of the 1st respondent, the officers of the 2nd respondent responded to the protests with the full force of the police leading to the death of the 1st to 9th petitioners and serious injuries to the 10th to 28th petitioners. That the 1st interested party facilitated medical treatment to the petitioners. He produced a victim impact statement which detailed the psychological impact assessment of the petitioners prepared by a professional counsellor. 39. Dr. Benard Mogesa, the Chief Executive Officer of the 2nd interested party swore an affidavit on 26/2/2025 in support of the petition. After setting out the mandate of the KNHRC, he stated how his Commission monitored the demonstrations. That it observed that the agents of the 1st and 2nd https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 7

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respondent were lobbying tear gas, using batons to assault members of the public and demonstrators and opened gun fire indiscriminately including forcefully pulling people from their homes and assaulting them. 40. He further deposed that the Commission documented human rights violations including, the right to life, right to freedom and security of the person, right to peaceably and unarmed assemble, freedom from torture and cruel inhuman and degrading treatment. It documented a total of 113 victims from Kisumu, Migori, Kisii and Siaya Counties. Of these, 16 were deaths and 91 were cases of injuries committed by agents of the 1st and 2nd respondent. He produced various exhibits to support his allegations. 41. Katiba Institute, the 3rd interested party, through Emily Kihama supported the Petition through an affidavit sworn on 9/2/2025. She averred that during the period in question, the 1st and 2nd respondent systematically targeted, maimed and killed inhabitants of Kisumu and its environs in a well -coordinated terror campaign in the name of Public Order Management, the end of which was tears, blood and death. 42. That the officers of the 1st and 2nd respondent acted in breach of the Constitution, the NPS Act and the Police Standing Orders in the use of force during public order management. It accused the 4th respondent of failing in its duty to investigate the complaints made against the agents of the 1st and 2nd respondent. 43. Amnesty International, the 4th interested party, supported the petition vide the replying affidavit of Irungu Hougton sworn on 29/1/2025. He averred that it is the hostile response of the 1st respondent to the protests that set the stage for what became an extremely intolerant and violent police response to the protests. 44. That the police violently suppressed the protests by shooting with lethal ammunition, excessive use of tear gas, assault by use of batons and pursuing the fleeing public to their homes, forcibly removing them therefrom and assaulting them. That between March and July, 2023, the police killed a total of 31 people through unnecessary use of excessive force in utter disregard of the principles of necessity and proportionality. That the police violated both the Constitution and international human rights standards. 45. Clement Nyaletsossie Voule and Thomas Probert appeared as amicus curiae. They supplied the court with a brief on international human rights law applicable to the use of force in the context of the policing of assemblies and the subsequent duty to investigate. The principles enunciated therein were novel and guided the court a great deal in the determination of this petition. 46. The 1st to 3rd respondent opposed the petition vide grounds of opposition dated 5/8/2025. They contended that the petition had failed to establish with precision the specific acts or omissions allegedly committed by the said respondents. That it failed to meet the threshold set out in the case of Anarita Karimi Njeru vs Republic (1979) KLR 154. That there was no evidence directly linking the alleged injuries or deaths to the 1st and 2nd respondent. 47. That the petition improperly attributed collective responsibility to the NPS and its command structure without proof of individual culpability of the 1st respondent. That the actions of the police, was lawful and in accordance with the NPS Act sections 24, 58, 61 and 62 and the Constitution of Kenya and the Public Order Act Cap 56 and the NPS (Use of Force and Fire Arms) Regulations 2014, respectively. That their actions were in public interest. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 8

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48. That any injuries or deaths were unfortunate results of violent unlawful and uncontrolled protests rather than out of deliberate or excessive police conduct. That the petitioners had failed to exhaust the available mechanisms for redress including the IPOA. That the allegations were generalized speculative and lacked evidentiary foundation. That it was an attempt to unduly interfere with the operational independence of the 1st respondent as guaranteed under article 245(2)(b) of the Constitution of Kenya. 49. That the reliefs are incapable of being granted in the absence of specific proof of wrongdoing by the 1st respondent. That there was no factual or evidential basis to make the declarations sought. That the petition offended the principle of separation of powers and institutional accountability as it sought the court to micromanage operational and security decisions constitutionally reserved for the Police Service. That the petition was contrary to public interest as it undermined the lawful authority of the NPS to maintain law and order. That the Petition should therefore be dismissed. 50. The 4th respondent opposed the petition vide the replying affidavit of Raphael Nyina, an Assistant Director Investigation with IPOA sworn on 29/1/2025. He stated that under the IPOA Act, the 4th respondent is mandated to conduct investigations into complaints related to disciplinary or criminal offences committed by members of the NPS. That on receipt of complaints, it commenced investigations relating to allegations of excessive use of force by police officers during the Azimio demonstrations in Kisumu and its environs between March and July, 2023. 51. As at the time of swearing the said affidavit, IPOA was conducting investigations with regard to all the petitioners save for the 10th, 16th and 18th petitioners. It was denied that any of the complainants were turned away as contended by the petitioners. That IPOA took up investigations upon the complaints lodged as well as on its own motion. Copies of statements by the victims were produced in support of those assertions. 52. It was further asserted that the public was kept abreast of the investigations through various media stations and that IPOA had engaged the Law Society of Kenya on the investigations on 10/8/2024. 53. On the assertion by the 29th petitioner on its conduct, it was averred that she did not identify the specific person she was acting for and that the information sought was confidential. That the investigations were complex having taken place during public disorder. There were large number of victims and there was difficulty in identifying the perpetrators. 54. That there was no statute of limitation on investigations as similar investigations during the postelection chaos of 2017 took time but were finally concluded and a file forwarded to the DPP in 2021 and prosecution in Nbi Criminal Case No. E074 of 2022 R vs Titus Yoma & 11 Others was ongoing. 55. It was averred that the investigations were still ongoing and once concluded, appropriate recommendations would be made. That IPOA should be left to conclude its investigations. That in conclusion, the reliefs sought against IPOA should not issue as it had already commenced investigations. 56. The petitioners paraded 5 witnesses whose testimonies are captured above as well as the testimony of the 4th respondent’s witness. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents and all the other parties did not call any witness. Submissions 57. The parties filed their respective submissions that are on record. Mr. M M Omondi learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petition met the constitutional test/threshold outlined in the cases of Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic [1979] eKLR, Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 9

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Rights Alliance [2013] eKLR, Communications Commission of Kenya v Royal Media Services [2014] eKLR and more recently in Kanchory v Service & 3 others; Law Society of Kenya & another (Interested Parties) [2025] KEHC 13792 (KLR). That it set out the pleaded violations, clearly articulated how each of these standards was breached in the specific incidents presented. 58. That in resolving the issues presented, this court ought to be guided by the transformative nature of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, which requires courts to interpret and develop the law in a manner that most favours the enforcement of rights while article 24 strictly limits any permissible limitation of rights. 59. That a holistic and purposive constitutional interpretation is required as article 259(1) commands that the Constitution be construed in a manner that promotes its purposes, values and principles as affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Equity Bank Limited v West Link Mbo Limited [2013] eKLR. 60. That contrary to contention by the 1st – 3rd respondent that the petitioners had failed to exhaust the available statutory mechanisms for redress and that the reliefs sought in the petition were untenable and incapable of being granted, it was submitted that under article 22 of the Constitution, any person has the right to approach court to seek enforcement of fundamental rights and the existence of alternative remedies does not limit or exclude this constitutional right. 61. That the Court of Appeal had in Sharma v Attorney General & 3 Others (Civil Appeal E065 of 2023) [2025] KECA 1470 (12 September 2025) (KLR) emphasized that, constitutional remedies are independent of criminal investigations. 62. That the 1st respondent had command and control of all operation units nationwide during the subject protests and was bound by the general international law principle of command responsibility and ought to take responsibility for the actions of his subordinates who caused the deaths of the 1st – 9th petitioners. This was because he either ordered the perpetuation of excessive force, tolerated it or tacitly issued directions to officers within his command to shoot to kill and/or maim the peaceful demonstrators. 63. That the principle of command responsibility is part of the general principle under international law and it is therefore binding on the 1st and 2nd respondent by virtue of article 2 (5) of the Constitution of Kenya. The case of Republic v The University of Nairobi Ex Parte Michael Jacobs Odhiambo & 7 Others (2016) eKLR was relied on this proposition. 64. That there must have been an operation order prepared by the 1st respondent to guide the members of the 2nd respondent who were carrying out operations during the peaceful protests. That the 1st respondent failed and neglected to discharge his obligations under articles 244 and 245 of the Constitution and sections 8, 8A and 10 of the National Police Service Act in that he failed to uphold the highest possible standards of professionalism and discipline among the members of the 2nd respondent and to foster and promote good relations between them and the petitioners. 65. That the officers of the 2nd respondent used excessive, arbitrary, unreasonable, lethal force and unlawfully killed the 1st – 9th petitioners and maimed 19 petitioners thus violating article 26 of the Constitution. That the 1st and 2nd respondent acted heavy-handedly, disproportionately, unprofessionally, unlawfully and unconstitutionally in the handling of peaceful protesters and thereby violated the petitioners’ fundamental rights and freedoms. 66. That the members of the 2nd respondent used excessive force on the petitioners contrary to the National Police Service Act No. 11A of 2011 under section 61 (2) and the sixth schedule which provides instances https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 10

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when there can be use of force. That in the present case, the use of force was uncalled for especially as some of the petitioners were minors. 67. The petitioners relied on the case of Attorney-General & 2 Others v Ndii & 79 Others; Dixon & 7 Others (Amicus Curiae) (Petition 12, 11 & 13 of 2021 (Consolidated) (2022) KESC 8 (KLR) (31 March 2022) (Judgment) for the proposition that constitutional or statutory bodies must operate strictly within the four corners of their constitutional and statutory mandates. 68. The court was urged to issue an award of general damages against the 1st and 2nd respondents for the damage and pain caused to the Estates and dependants of the 1st – 9th petitioners who are deceased persons as well as the other petitioners and the damages be quantified accordingly pursuant to the provisions of article 23 (3) (c) of the Constitution of Kenya. That while life lost cannot be restored, an award of damages will provide acknowledgement, closure and a measure of solace to the families of the 1st – 9th petitioners. Reliance was placed on the case of Tobiko (Suing as the administrator of the Estate of Allan Amugune Tobiko) v Ministry of Interior & Co-ordination of National Government & 4 Others (2023) 904 (KLR). 69. It was submitted that the police, while carrying out operations in Nyalenda, Obunga, Manyata, Kondele, Ahero, Migori and other parts of Kisumu during the subject protests, used excessive force on both protestors and petitioners who were not protesting whereas none of them posed any risk or danger to the police officers. Titus Ngamau Musila Katitu vs Republic (2020) KECA 705 [KLR] & Law Society of Kenya vs Kithinji & 5 others; Katiba Institute & Another (Interested Parties) [2025] eKLR was relied on the use of excessive force. 70. That the conduct of the police violated article 26 of Constitution of Kenya on right to life and article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which states that every human being has the inherent right to life and that this right ought to be protected by the law and that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his right to life. Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) & Another v Inspector General of the National Police Service & 2 others [2024] KEHC 3233 (KLR) was relied on this. 71. That the 1st and 2nd respondents violated article 29 of the Constitution by assaulting the petitioners causing grievous harm to them and shooting others who sustained injuries and gunshot wounds that maimed their bodies and caused permanent disability. 72. That the police violated the petitioner’s right to equal protection and benefits of the law under article 27 of the Constitution as the evidence presented reveal that they undertook their operation in informal settlements and did not patronize areas such as Milimani or Riat that are inhabited by the opulent. 73. That a majority of the petitioners who went to report the incidents at the respondents did not receive justice and that this pattern of obstruction impeded independent investigations, violated statutory obligations of cooperation thereby hampered access to justice for the petitioners thereby violating their rights under article 47 of the Constitution on fair administrative action. The case of Orion East Africa Limited v Permanent Secretary Ministry of Agriculture and Attorney General (2012) eKLR was relied on in support of that submission. 74. That police officers went around in Nyalenda, Obunga and Manyatta breaking into people’s homes illegally, pulling men out and brutalizing them in violation of articles 31 and 50 of the Constitution of Kenya. That they also shot, maimed and killed children in violation of article 53. 75. That the 4th respondent had sole and exclusive oversight mandate over any actions of the 1st and 2nd respondent that result in any death and injury as were the circumstances of the 1st to 28th petitioners. Reliance was placed on the case of Legal Advice Centre t/a Kituo cha Sheria & 2 Others v Cabinet https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 11

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Secretary, Ministry of Interior and Co-ordination of National Government & 3 others (2025) KEHC 5718 (KLR). 76. That the facts and circumstances arising out of the petition invoked the mandate of the 4th respondent as was admitted by R4W1 at paragraph 7 of his replying affidavit. That however, he failed to adduce proof to show that active investigative processes were in motion. 77. That had the 4th respondent fully, expeditiously and properly executed its monitoring mandate, it would not have found the investigations to be complex or the challenge of complexity would have been greatly minimized and overcome. That it had failed to demonstrate why the investigation outcome and status was confidential and thus the court ought to find that they violated their statutory duty to inform the petitioners as held in the case of Independent Policing Oversight Authority v Siddique w/o Arshad & 3 Others [2025] KECA 1456 (KLR). 78. That having proved the clear unfulfilled statutory duty owed to them by the 4th respondent and that the circumstances of their deaths and injuries resulted from actions of the 2nd respondent under the command of the 1st respondent and further, there being no equitable bar to the mandamus order sought, the balance of convenience favors grant of this remedy. Reliance was placed on the case of Kenya National Examinations Council v Republic ex parte GNN & 9 others (1997) eKLR where the Court of Appeal defined the general test for issuance of mandamus. 79. Miss Imbosa appeared and submitted on behalf of the 1st interested party. She submitted that the petition was about the State’s ongoing failure to protect victims of police violence. The victims had been left exposed after being denied timely information and effective protection. That the delay in investigation had traumatized the victims who continue living in fear as the perpetrators remain in active service. 80. That the victims had suffered arbitrary use of lethal force by members of the 1st and 2nd respondent. The 4th respondent had proved inept and had completely failed to offer any support to the victims. That the court should step in and offer support to them at this stage. She urged that the petition be allowed. 81. For the 2nd interested party, Ms. Agina submitted that from its investigations, there were grave violations of human rights by the members of the 1st and 2nd respondent. There was unlawful and excessive use of firearms and force by the police. 82. That there had been violation of right to life, the right to freedom from torture, cruel and degrading treatment, as well as right to liberty. The cases of Ann Wairimu Njahira vs Nairobi City County Government & 4 Others (2017) eKLR and Muslim for Human Rights (MUHURI) & Another vs Inspector General of National Police Service & 2 Others (2024) KEHC 3233 KLR were relied on in support of those submissions. 83. That the use of force was never used as a last resort. That the 1st and 2nd respondent were liable for the violations of the petitioners’ rights. That under chapter 58 of the National Police Service Standing Orders, the police are mandated to discharge their functions by use of non-violent means. However, in the present case, they used force as a first result. She urged that the reliefs sought be granted. 84. Mr. Walumbe, learned counsel for the 3rd interested party submitted that the use of force by the officers of the NPS was excessive and it resulted in the deaths and severe injuries to the petitioners who were not directly involved in the protests. That consequently, the actions of the 1st and 2nd respondent fell short of the constitutional and statutory basis for the use of force. Further, they have not given a detailed response to each of the 28 petitioners showing any extenuating circumstances to justify the excessive use of force. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 12

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85. That the 4th respondent was required to proactively disclose information on the investigations, reports and decisions made with respect to the work that it did and that it failed to disclose information on any investigation or result of the investigation. 86. That the 1st and 2nd respondents’ attempt to limit the petitioners’ constitutional right to protest did not meet the article 24 muster, which provides that rights may only be limited by law and only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. 87. That the actions of the 1st and 2nd respondent did not meet the ‘anchored in law’ and ‘proportionality and reasonableness’ test, and their argument of ‘maintaining law and order’ did not hold water. This was because bystanders were shot at and a significant number of the petitioners were hounded out of the homes and grievously assaulted as a punishment for supposedly taking part in protests. 88. That the petitioners are thus entitled to fair and adequate compensation for the violations by the State, even though the majority of the perpetrators, police officers, have not been prosecuted and regardless of the status of the investigation by the 4th respondent. Reliance was placed on the Court of Appeal decision in Sharma v Attorney General & 3 others (Civil Appeal E065 of 2023) [2025] KECA 1470 (KLR) (12 September 2025). 89. That the acts of violence by police officers were indiscriminate and failed the international law test of ‘proportionality’ and ‘necessity’. This is so because a majority of those affected were not armed and were not taking part in protests and for this reason, the petitioners merited the grant of the orders sought. 90. Mr. Mbanya, learned counsel for the 4th interested party submitted that the States obligations under international law was clear. He referred to various international instruments and submitted that the State had fell far short in upholding the same. These included the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. He supported the issuance of the prayers sought by the petitioners. 91. Mr. Mwangi, learned counsel for the amicus curiae submitted that, the court had to apply a balanced prism in the circumstances of the case before it on the situation where force may be used. The type of arms used and whether it was appropriate. That in the present case, there had been no justification in the use of the force against the victims. That the police had failed to carry out investigation alleging that they were waiting for IPOA. He supported the prayers sought in the Petition. 92. On their part, the 1st – 3rd respondent were represented by Mr. Kujo. He submitted that the court should decline jurisdiction over matters where statutory and administrative mechanisms existed to provide redress as held by the Court of Appeal in Geoffrey Muthinja & Another v Samuel Henry & Others & 1756 Others [2015] eKLR. 93. That in the present case, the petitioners failed to exhaust statutory remedies under the Access to Information Act, the Fair Administrative Action Act and the complaint and review mechanisms set out under the IPOA Act. 94. That the petitioners were in breach of the doctrine of avoidance and judicial minimalism as the matters raised in the petition can and should be addressed via statutory mechanisms as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 Others v Royal Media Services Ltd & 5 Others [2014] eKLR. 95. That the doctrine of ripeness and mootness apply in the present case as the facts remain uncertain since investigations are on-going thus the factual matrix is incomplete and unsuitable for definitive https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 13

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constitutional adjudication. Reliance was placed in the case of Agoro & 2 Others v Ethics & AntiCorruption Commission & Others [2024] KEHC 7955 (KLR). 96. That the evidence relied on by the petitioners was plagued with hearsay, second-hand accounts, delayed medical assessments, derivative autopsy reports and a total absence of ballistic or forensic proof and no eye-witness was called in support of the petitioners’ case. That in the premises, it would be improper and unsafe for the court to make definitive findings of constitutional violation or to impose liability on the 1st and 2nd respondent. 97. That the petitioners never tendered any evidence to suggest that there was any widespread policy or directive on use of lethal force issued by the 1st respondent and the hierarchical position of the 1st respondent alone is not enough to attach constitutional liability for command and institutional liability. 98. That the petitioners failed to satisfy the jurisdictional, procedural and evidentiary burdens required for constitutional litigation and thus the petition ought to be dismissed for being legally untenable, premature and unsubstantiated. He urged that the petition be dismissed. 99. Ms. Awino appeared for the 4th respondent. She submitted that the investigations documents sought by the petitioner were confidential and exempted from disclosure pursuant to Access to Information Act and the Independent Policing Oversight Act. 100. That the petitioners were seeking to interfere with the Statutory and administrative powers of the 4th respondent without having advanced any legitimate reasons why they required the documents sought. Reliance was placed on the case of Katiba Institute v Judicial Service Commission & 2 Others; Kenya Magistrates and Judges Association & 2 Others (Interested Parties) (Constitutional Petition E128 of 2022) [2022] KEHC 438 (KLR). 101. That the delay in finalizing investigations does not mean that there was no investigations being conducted but rather that the investigations were complex and large in capacity. That consequently, the 4th respondent sought time to finalize its thorough investigations and make appropriate recommendations to the DPP. 102. That whereas investigations are still on-going, the 4th respondent had established the culpability of the 2nd respondent acting under the command and control of the 1st respondent with regard to the fatal shootings and serious injuries. That the 4th respondent did not perpetrate the fatal shootings and serious injuries and thus the court ought not to find it vicariously culpable for the actions of the 2nd respondent under the command of the 1st respondent. 103. That consequently, the petitioners had no basis seeking a blanket relief of compensation and/or damages as against the 4th respondent. This is because only a master can be held vicariously liable for the conduct of the servant in the course of employment as was held in the case of Teachers Service Commission v WJ & 5 Others [2020] eKLR. That the aspect of torture does not suffice in this case as the elements were lacking. She prayed that no orders be made against her client. Analysis 104. Having considered the pleadings, the evidence on record and the parties’ submissions, the following issues fall for consideration: a. Does the petition meet the constitutional threshold? b. Is the Petition premature for failure to exhaust the available alternative remedies? https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 14

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c. Is the 1st respondent a proper party or was he wrongly joined in the petition? d. Was the 4th respondent (IPOA) properly joined in the petition? If so, what reliefs should be made against it? e. Did the petitioners prove their case? If so, were any of their rights violated? f. Are the petitioners entitled to the reliefs sought? 105. Before delving into the above issues, there is one issue that the court has first to consider. During the trial, when R4W1 was testifying, Ms. Owino applied for an adjournment to enable the 4th respondent file a further affidavit and produce additional material. The same was objected to and the court upheld the objection. In upholding the objection, the court indicated that it will give its reasons in this judgment. The following then are the reasons for upholding the objection. 106. Firstly, there is no room in any litigation, even in constitutional matters, for litigation by instalments. A party is supposed to put forth the entire of his case including all the evidence he is to rely on at the earliest before the case is set down for hearing. The application was being made at the middle of the trial. 107. Secondly, fair trial demands that each party be given reasonable opportunity to meet the case of his/her opponent. One cannot be allowed to call fresh evidence once the other party has concluded his case. In this case, the petitioners, as well as the interested parties, had already closed their respective cases. 108. Thirdly, had the court allowed the application, it would have re-opened the case afresh since, the petitioners should have been allowed to recall their witnesses to either rebut or challenge the to be introduced new evidence. That would have violated article 159 of the Constitution which commands that justice must not be delayed. The petition was filed in August, 2024. The same was served twice, in September, 2024 and in February, 2025. The parties had been given ample opportunity to lodge all and any materials they had before the hearing. Yet the application was being made in November, 2025. That was too late in the day! Allowing the application would have not only prejudiced the other parties, but it would have also led to unnecessary delay and amount to an abuse of court process. Those then were the reasons for declining the application by the 4th respondent. a. Does the petition meet the constitutional threshold? 109. It was the 1st and 2nd respondent’s contention that the petition did not meet the threshold of pleading in constitutional matters in terms of the case of Anarita Karimi vs Republic (supra) and as re-affirmed in the Mumo Matemu case (supra). The petitioners contended otherwise. 110. In Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (supra), it was held that: “ If a person is seeking a redress from the High Court on a matter which involves a reference to the Constitution, it is important (if only to ensure that justice is done to his case) that he should set out with a reasonable degree of precision that of which he complains, the provisions said to be infringed and the manner in which they are alleged to be infringed.” 111. Simply put, precision pleading is a mandatory requirement in constitutional petitions. A petitioner should clearly specify the right or fundamental freedom that has been violated or infringed or threatened with infringement. He must state how the violation or infringement occurred, the specific articles of the Constitution that are alleged to have been infringed or violated and the jurisdictional basis for the court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. This will not only enable a respondent to know the case he is https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 15

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facing, to be able to make an appropriate response, but will also assist the court to understand the case before it in order to be able to give the appropriate remedy or relief. 112. In the present case, the court has considered the petition carefully. Not only did the petitioners plead the specific provisions of the Constitution and statutes that were allegedly violated by the respondents, but they also specified the facts that they relied on for those allegations. The rights or fundamental freedoms allegedly violated were specified with particularity as well as the jurisdictional basis for the same. Clearly, the respondents knew very well the nature of the case they were facing. That challenge fails. b. Is the petition premature for failure to exhaust the available alternative remedies? 113. The respondents contended that the petition was premature since the petitioners sidestepped the other alternative remedies available under statutes. That they should have first exhausted the remedies set out in the Fair Administrative Action Act, Access to Information Act and the IPOA Act before approaching this court. That they should not have pursued constitutional remedies yet there were effective statutory remedies available. The petitioners contended otherwise. 114. In Geoffrey Muthinja & Another v Samuel Henry & Others & 1756 Others [2015] eKLR, the Court of Appeal was emphatic that a court should decline jurisdiction over matters where statutory and administrative mechanisms existed to provide redress. Further, on the doctrine of avoidance and judicial minimalism, the Supreme Court of Kenya clarified in the case of Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 Others v Royal Media Services Ltd & 5 Others [2014] eKLR that matters that can be effectively addressed via statutory mechanisms should not be couched or pursued as constitutional. The aggrieved parties should pursue those matters under the statutory mechanisms established. 115. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the petitioners’ complaints were that; the members of the 2nd respondent had brutally assaulted them; that any complaints to the various police stations bore no results; that the information they had sought from the respondents regarding investigations, if any, to their complaints fell on deep deaf ears. That as a result, they were unable to pursue any remedies for the wrongs they had suffered. 116. It is not in dispute that all the complaints the petitioners had against the 1st and 2nd respondent could be addressed by making requisite reports to the 4th respondent under the IPOA Act. That the attempt to draw information from the 4th respondent which was ignored could also be pursued through the Access to Information Act and the Fair Administrative Actions Act but would that have been effective? 117. The first point of call for any complaint one has on the misconduct of police officers is IPOA. The IPOA Act has provisions on the mechanisms on how the wrongs committed by police officers are to be dealt with. The brutal assaults by police officers could have been reported to IPOA. Further, the Fair Administrative Actions Act provides that where any person seeks information from a state agency and the same is not released, he/she should report to the Commission on Administration of Justice for redress. 118. In the present case, all the actions complained of by the Petitioners against the members of NPS were reported to IPOA. The evidence on record shows that either IPOA turned a deaf ear to them or took its sweet time to act on the reports. It alleged that its system were down and where it took the reports, it took forever to act. Indeed, even as at the time of the trial, the “investigations were still ongoing”. 119. Apart from taking forever to act, any action on part of IPOA would not have been adequate. It refused to release any information sought from itself that was meant to assist the victims pursue appropriate remedies against the police. This court does not think the Commission on the Administration of https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 16

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Justice would have faired better. It would have only sought the same information and the answer would have been ‘pending investigations’. 120. It is this court’s finding that, the alternative remedies would not have been adequate in the circumstances of this case. Victims had lost their lives. Others had lost their limbs. The alternative statutory remedies were far inadequate to right the wrongs that had been committed to the victims. The fundamental rights and freedoms of the petitioners had been breached, violated, and there was a threat of continued violation and infringement. Pursuing those alternatives would not have resulted in any positive ending for the petitioners. It would have only meant more misery than finding a remedy. 121. In any event, what remedies were there under IPOA Act? It would be investigations with a view to identify the culprits of the violence for criminal prosecution. It would not lead to closure for the petitioners who had suffered serious trauma, infringement of rights and personal violence. 122. In Sharma vs Attorney General & 3 Others (2025) KECA 1470 (KLR), the Court of Appeal held: “ The trial court erred in law in equating the function of a criminal trial, which is to determine individual criminal liability, with that of a constitutional petition, which is to determine whether there has been violation of constitutional rights, and if so, to grant appropriate reliefs. In doing so, the court failed to discharge its constitutional mandate under article 163(3) (b) to determine alleged violations of rights as well as its duty under article 21(1) to protect and promote those rights. By deeming the petition as premature, the trial court effectively required the appellant to wait indefinitely for investigative authorities to act. In light of the fact that four years had passed without any meaningful progress, this position resulted in a denial of justice.” 123. And in Nicholus vs Attorney General & 7 Others National Environmental Complaints Committee & 5 Others (2023) KESC 113 (KLR), the Supreme Court of Kenya held: “ Flowing from the above findings and in that context, it is our view that, where the reliefs under the alternative mechanism are not adequate or effective, then there is nothing that precludes the adoption of a nuanced approach, as we have stated. What must matter at the end is that a path is chosen that safeguards a litigant’s right to access justice while also recognizing the efficiency and specificity that established alternative dispute resolution mechanisms can offer. This is because, to achieve a harmonious and effective legal framework, it is imperative to strike a judicious balance between the emphasis on providing the initial opportunity for resolution to entities established by law and the assertion of litigant’s right to access the court. However, such convergence requires a caseby-case assessment by considering issues such as the nature of the dispute and the adequacy of the alternative dispute mechanism. See also our decision in Bia Tosha Distribution Ltd vs Kenya Breweries Ltd & 6 Others (Pet No 15 of 2020) (2023) KESC 14 (KLR) (Const and JR) (17 February 2023) (Judgment).” 124. In view of the foregoing, this court finds that the alternative remedies available to the petitioners in this case were generally inadequate and that the only route available to them was to seek the determination of whether their rights had been infringed through this petition and for appropriate reliefs. That challenge also fails. 125. It was further contended by the 1st and 2nd respondent that the court should apply the doctrine of judicial minimalism, as well as the doctrines of ripeness and mootness. That the petition presented complex factual issues involving forensic causation, ballistics medical causation amongst others. That https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 17

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investigations should be left to IPOA to conclude before any constitutional pronouncements can be made. Further, that since investigations were still pending, the doctrine of ripeness and mootness was applicable. The cases of CCK & 50 Others vs Royal Media Services Ltd & 5 Others (2014) eKLR and Agoro & 2 Others vs Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission & Others (2024) KEHC 7955 (KLR) were relied on in support of those contestations. 126. I appreciated the dictas contained in the cited cases. Where the issue for consideration is devoid of pure constitutional issues such as criminal liability amongst others, the doctrine of judicial minimalism will apply. Further, when the issue for determination has not yet matured or ripened of where several steps have to be undertaken in order to make proper and substantive determination, the doctrines advanced will apply. 127. In the present case however, there is overwhelming evidence of what happened. There is evidence of when, where, who and what happened. The actions complained of are gun shots and assault. The victims are known, there are medical reports to affirm the averments of the violence meted out on the victims. It is alleged that the said actions resulted in the infringement and violation of the petitioners’ fundamental rights and freedoms. In my view, no more investigations are required for the court to determine whether or not the rights of the petitioners were or were not violated. The pending investigations are for criminal culpability and for appropriate action under IPOA Act. they will not help in the determination of whether or not the rights and freedoms of the petitioners were violated. Accordingly, those contentions are rejected. c) Is the 1st respondent a proper party or was he wrongly joined in the petition? 128. The 1st respondent protested his innocence. He contended that there was no specific wrong that could be associated with him. That he had committed no wrong and he should therefore not have been joined in the Petition. The petitioners and the interested parties submitted otherwise. 129. For one to be liable in any circumstances, the court has to consider one’s obligations and how he/she discharged or failed to discharge those obligations under the Constitution or statute. The 1st respondent submitted that for liability to attach on him, there must be evidence of policies, directives, or specific orders authorizing unlawful use of force. 130. Article 244 and 245 of the Constitution provide for the objects functions and command of the National Police Service. Under article 245(2)(b), the 1st respondent exercises independent and overall command over the National Police Service. In that regard, he is not under any obligation to be directed by anyone in matters of investigation, enforcement of the law and employment and running of the Service. 131. The foregoing constitutional mandate is buttressed or operationalized by sections 8 and 10 of the National Police Service Act. Section 8 provides: “ The Service shall be under the overall and independent command of the Inspector-General appointed in accordance with article 245 of the Constitution and the provisions of this Act.” 132. From the foregoing, it is clear that the overall operational command of the National Police Service is on the Inspector General. His total hold and control of the service is re-inforced by the provisions of section 10 of the National Police Service Act which sets out a plethora of the functions and powers of that office. They are so detailed as to leave no room whatsoever for speculation as to who is in charge and control of the Service. 133. The foregoing being the case, what is the position in the present case? The petition is about the events that took place between the months of March, 2023 and July, 2023. During that period, there were https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 18

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demonstrations throughout the Republic of Kenya. The petition is on what happened in Migori and Kisumu Counties. From the evidence on record, in those areas, police officers who are members of the 2nd respondent opened fire indiscriminately, clobbered people and left them for dead. It is those actions which the petitioners accused the 1st respondent of. 134. The petitioners relied on the international law principle of command responsibility to charge the 1st respondent. In the article by Judge Bakone Justice Moloto Command Responsibility in International Criminal Tribunals, 3 Barkeley J. International Law 1 (2009) 12 at page 15, the writer observes: “ To hold a person criminally responsible under the doctrine of command responsibility for an international crime, the prosecution must prove three legal elements. 1. The existence of superior subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrators of the crime as his subordinate; 2. That the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed, and 3. That the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof. … The doctrine of command responsibility is ultimately predicated upon the power of the superior to control the acts of his or her subordinates. … What matters is whether the superior has actual powers to control the actions of his or her subordinates…” 135. I am persuaded by this international law principle. It is a good and sound principle to be applied in a democracy such as Kenya and in the field of human rights litigation. It is not only sound but apt in circumstances where human rights issues are raised and for purposes of transparency and accountability in exercise of public power. While the principle is applicable for criminal responsibility in international criminal jurisprudence, it is highly persuasive in the circumstances of this case. Here, the subordinates of the 1st respondent run amok. They were under his control and direction. They perpetrated heinous acts. Someone has to take responsibility. 136. In the present case, not only is there constitutional but also statutory underpinning of overall command and control by the 1st respondent over the National Police Service and its members. Further, there was evidence by R4W1 that there existed an operation order on how the Service was dealing with the chaos that were the demonstrations. 137. In this regard, the operation order was within the knowledge, possession and control of the 1st respondent. He did not produce it. There is no way this court can know what directives the police in Migori and Kisumu had. Were they directed to indiscriminately shoot, clobber everyone on sight, pursue and flush out people from their houses in Nyalenda, Nyamasaria and Kondele? This cannot be established unless the 1st and 2nd respondent produce the operation orders applicable. These they did not produce. They withheld the same from court for their reasons. The overall command responsibility over the NPS lay with the 1st respondent. He was properly joined in the petition to answer for the wrongs committed by his juniors/subordinates. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 19

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d) Was the 4th respondent (IPOA) properly joined? If so what reliefs should be made against it? 138. The petitioners complaint against the 4th respondent was that, it failed to undertake its constitutional and statutory oversight mandate over the members of the 2nd respondent. That it is the only body constitutionally and statutorily mandated to oversight the Police Service. That despite as such, the petitioners reported to IPOA the infractions complained of but IPOA failed to act. It failed to disclose the investigations it had undertaken. That when contacted by the 29th petitioner (PW6) for information, it turned a blind eye and ear and failed to disclose the same. 139. On its part, IPOA contended that it took up investigations both suo motto and on report by the majority of the petitioners. That the investigations were both complex and sensitive. That it could not divulge the information sought by the 29th petitioner because of its sensitivity and due to data protection issues. 140. There is no doubt that IPOA has the exclusive role of oversighting the members of the National Police Service. See Legal Advice Centre vs Interior Minister (2025) KEHC 5718 (KLR). That is a role that it can share with no other body. Indeed, in Attorney General & 2 Others vs Independent Policing Oversight Authority & Another (2015) eKLR, it was held: “ IPOA is nonetheless mandated by the statute that creates it to keep the 3rd respondent on its toes. It is charged with the duty to hold the 3rd appellant accountable to the public in the performance of its functions. It is equivalent to an ombudsman who is supposed to receive complaints related to the 3rd respondent, from members of the public, investigate them, and then make recommendations to the relevant authorities for necessary action.” 141. Has IPOA lived to its said calling in the present case? The events complained of occurred in March – July, 2023. By the time the petition was being lodged, over twenty-five (25) months had passed by. All that it had done was to record statements from many of the petitioners. R4W1 who appeared and testified on its behalf told the court the effort that it had made. He told the court how sensitive it was to investigate the perpetrators of the complaints. They are police officers who are still in active service and how the investigations were complex. 142. That may have been the case. There are no investigations that are a walk in the park. If IPOA claims that the investigations are complex, who does it expect to undertake them? Is it owning up to its inability to undertake its constitutional mandate? That won’t do. IPOA cannot run away from its responsibility. There is no investigation that can be too complex as to take forever to be undertaken. It is an attitude problem. This must not be encouraged! There was no plausible explanation why IPOA had taken forever to conclude the investigations. There was no even an attempt to explain the extent the investigations had been undertaken. 143. IPOA submitted that there was no statute of limitation to investigations. That is where the problem lies. Just because there were no timelines fixed for undertaking investigations, IPOA took unto itself the opportunity to take forever in carrying out the investigations! That is an extremely negative attitude that cannot be encouraged of public bodies. Having in mind that it is only IPOA that has the exclusive mandate of oversighting the 1st and 2nd respondent, it cannot be allowed the luxury of taking forever in investigations. That will leave the 1st and 2nd respondent with no accountability and may run amok. 144. In my view, notwithstanding the alleged complexity of the investigations, the same had taken unreasonably long to be of any help to anyone. Evidence is being eroded while IPOA takes its sweet time. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 20

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145. The other complaint was that IPOA failed to give information to the petitioners to enable them take appropriate action in furtherance of their rights. PW6 requested certain information from IPOA but IPOA neither supplied nor responded to either the request or the reminder. The answer given in these proceedings is not satisfactory. IPOA contended that PW6 did not disclose the names of the victim she was acting for and that in any event, it held a meeting with the LSK Council, Nairobi. 146. The answer to that contention is simple, IPOA never responded to PW6. Had it sought further and better particulars from her, she would have willingly supplied the same. It never raised issues of data protection then. By raising those issues in answer to the petition, that is but an afterthought. And in deciding to meet LSK Council, Nairobi, that did not address the issues raised by PW6 for and on behalf of the victims in Migori and Kisumu! 147. For investigations to be acceptable, they must be prompt, independent, impartial, professional, transparent, and must be concluded within a reasonable time. They must be undertaken when the evidence is still fresh and available. The victims must be updated of the same within the acceptable parameters that do not jeopardize either the investigations or the safety of the victims. 148. I am alive to the fact that, IPOA as an independent body, should be left to operate independently and should not be unnecessarily be fettered in its operations. Indeed, in Katiba Institute vs Judicial Service Commission & 2 Others (2022) KEHC 438 (KLR), the court observed: “ …the court remains alive to the position that entities created under the Constitution and the law ought to be accorded the latitude to discharge their functions and that any judicial interventions must be in the clearest of cases…” 149. However, in the circumstances of this case, a period of over 25 months is too long for any meaningful outcome to be achieved in the investigations. The failure to act with dispatch, in my view, compromised the petitioners’ ability to promptly seek remedies to the violation of their rights. Further, the failure to give the information sought violated the petitioners right to information. The seeking of that information did not amount to interference of IPOA’s mandate under the law. 150. In the circumstances of this case therefore, I think the 4th respondent cannot be let scot free. While it is not liable for the brutal acts of the NPS officers, it delayed investigations and its recalcitrant behavior cannot be left to go unchecked. It must be made to account for its existence. 151. Accordingly, the 4th respondent was properly joined in these proceedings for appropriate reliefs. An order of mandamus against it with structural interdicts will do. e) Did the petitioners prove their case? Were any of their rights violated? 152. It was contended by the 1st and 2nd respondent that the petitioners had not proved their case as they had failed to tender cogent, admissible and credible evidence. That the testimonies of PW1 to PW6 was not credible or reliable. That the shooters were not identified. That original documents were never produced. That no ballistic or forensic analysis was tendered. That most of the acceptable evidence is with IPOA. 153. From the onset, it should be noted that the Petition was supported by affidavits sworn by each of the 29 petitioners. The relevant documents were sworn to and produced in those affidavits in accordance with the law. PW1 to PW6 appeared and were extensively cross-examined on those documents. At no one time, after the bundles were served upon the respondents, did any of them dispute any of the documents and/or request for the production of the original thereof. The testimonies of PW1 to https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 21

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PW6 remained unshaken. They explained everything that needed explanation. It was never displaced in cross-examination. 154. A constitutional standard of proof petition is a normal suit. The proof is on a balance of probability. The level is that of a normal civil suit. 155. In the present case, the evidence was offered by way of sworn affidavits whereby facts were stated on oath. The 1st and 2nd respondent decided not to respond to any of the said allegations. All these facts remained unrebutted. They remained the truth of the matters stated. They were later buttressed by the witnesses who appeared and re-stated them from the dock. 156. The undisputed evidence was that the petitioners were victims of police brutality. That on the various days sworn to, the 1st to 9th petitioners’ relatives were shot dead by police officers. Others were removed from the comfort of their homes, brought outside brutalized to death by police officers. Others died on the spot while others later succumbed to the injuries inflicted by the police officers. 157. There was also testimonies of the 10th to 28th petitioners that on the specified days, they were going on with their usual daily chores when police officers accosted them, assaulted and them for dead. That they were not involved in the demonstrations but were nevertheless viciously attacked by the police officers. The perpetrators of the violence used lethal weapons, guns and buttons against the victims. Further, the organs that were targeted left a lot to be desired. They were delicate and could lead to fatalities. 158. The totality of the foregoing is that, even if the police officers were dealing with the demonstrators themselves, of which the petitioners were not, they used excessive force. From the gunshots, the victims were either fleeing or were caught unawares. The use of guns is limited by both national and international law to instances where it is unavoidable to protect self (officer) or another individual from imminent threat of death or serious injury. That was not the case in any of the cases concerned in this petition. 159. The conclusion arrived at is that; the members of the 2nd respondent used excessive force in dealing with the demonstrators in Migori and Kisumu. They used lethal weapons against the petitioners that resulted in the violation of the petitioners’ rights as follows: a. The right to life (article 26). As a result of gun shots, petitioner Nos. 1 to 9 lost their lives. The officers of the 2nd respondent are enjoined under article 244(a) and (c) of the Constitution to adhere to constitutional standards that safeguard human rights and freedoms. Their actions led to the loss of the lives of the 1st to 9th Petitioners. b. Right to equal protection and benefit of the law (article 27). Every individual is entitled not to be discriminated upon for any ground. The testimonies of the petitioners was that the officers of the 2nd respondent unfairly targeted the residents of Nyalenda, Kondele and Obunga. The majority of the petitioners came from these areas. The other areas of Kisumu such as Milimani and Riat were left out of scourge. c. Right to security (article 29). Every person is entitled to the freedom and security of the person. The evidence on record is that all the victims were in good health prior to their encounter with the police officers. Petitioner Nos. 10 to 28th were subjected to various injuries which led to various degrees of disability. The use of excessive force by the members of the 2nd respondent led to the grievous injuries suffered by the petitioners thereby infringing on their right to the security of the person. d. Right to human dignity (article 28). Every person, including the Petitioners, is entitled to protection from torture and cruel treatment. The testimonies on record are that the police https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 22

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officers moved into the homes of the petitioners as well as in the highways and clobbered the petitioners. The brutal assault not only demeaned the petitioners. The treatment of the 10th to 28th petitioners was bereft of common decency and dignity. e. Right to privacy (article 31). The evidence on record is that police officers broke into the houses of the Petitioners, flushed them therefrom and clobbered them senseless. The petitioners were entitled to the privacy of their homes but this was shattered when police officers broke down gates and doors to flush them out. f. Right to fair hearing (article 50). Every individual suspected of any offence is entitled to a fair hearing. He is entitled to be told his wrong, be brought before an impartial tribunal and be given a fair hearing. None of the petitioners was told of any wrong doing. None was charged in a court of law. They were viciously punished and had grave injuries inflicted on them g. Right to fair administrative action (article 47). After the petitioners were injured as narrated in their affidavits they went to various police stations and IPOA to make reports. However, they were never attended to. At IPOA, most were informed that its systems were down. At police stations, they were turned away. As a result, the petitioners were denied the right to have their reports being acted on and investigated promptly. h. Right to protection of the child (article 53). The Constitution recognizes that the children are entitled to special protection being a vulnerable class. In the present case, minor petitioners were exposed to violence by the police officers. This was in utter violation of the said right. 160. The totality of the foregoing is that, the respondents violated the rights of the petitioners as set out above. The petitioners were able to prove their case against the respondents accordingly. 161. There was one thing that came out very clearly during the trial, the use of excessive force. The members of the 2nd respondent seem not to have known their responsibility under article 244 of the Constitution. That article requires the NPS, of course through its members, to uphold high standards of professionalism and discipline, prevent corruption, promote transparency and accountability and most important of all, comply with human rights standards. It directs the service to train its staff to achieve these values. 162. From the evidence on record, there seem to be a complete disconnect between the NPS and the mandate and the dictates of article 244 of the Constitution. The amount and level of violence meted out to the unarmed public, the petitioners, the events of March-July, 2023 testifies to the fact that the NPS is oblivious to the requirement of upholding the Bill of Rights. 163. Article 37 of the Constitution provides: “ Every person has the right, peaceably and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket, and to present petitions to public authorities.” 164. It is clear from the foregoing that, that article guarantees Kenyans, the right, peaceably and unarmed, to assemble, demonstrate, picket and present petitions to public authorities. This fundamental right, which I believe was the underlying issue during the Azimio demonstrations that led to the cause of action herein, enables citizens to voice their grievances and hold leaders accountable. This is so but the same must be exercised within the bounds of peace. 165. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondent failed and/or refused to file any evidence in answer to the allegations of fact made in the petition. This robbed the court the opportunity of understanding what happened and why it happened. Why was there so much violence meted out by the NPS against the unarmed public? https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 23

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Why was brutal force the first point of call by the NPS? Why was there no other means applied before resorting to brutal force? Were there no other peaceful means to employ in confronting the public rather than shooting on first sight? This court will fail in its duty under article 165 of the Constitution, if it does not address this issue. 166. The only irresistible conclusion that could be inferred, in the absence of a replying affidavit from the 1st to 3rd respondent, is that there was a disconnect between the 2nd respondent on its obligations under article 244 and the Bill of Rights, and in particular, to uphold the right under article 37 of the Constitution. In its endeavor to maintain public order, the NPS must have in mind and respect the Bill of Rights. That is the dictate of article 244 of the Constitution. There is nothing on record to show that the members of the NPS are aware of the right under article 37 of the Constitution. There is no evidence to show that its members have been trained on or that there are regulations in place on how to deal with demonstrations and picketing under that article. 167. It is not lost to this court that most of our public institutions were a colonial heritage. That those institutions were modelled against public interest. In the post 2010 Constitution, the curriculum, policies and spirit of those institutions that were created immediately after 1963, would run foul of the Constitution. This court did not have the benefit of knowing what the NPS has done to comply with the constitution 2010. The court does not know what the training curriculum and the nature thereof for NPS is as far as maintenance of public order is concerned vis a vis article 37 of the Constitution. 168. The level of violence meted out to the petitioners in this case gives credence to doubts as to the existence of a set of rules and regulations to govern public order in light of article 37 of the Constitution. Probably, it may be the absence of such guiding principles, guidelines or regulations that may have led to the violence and brutal force on first instance by the members of the NPS when confronted with the citizens’ attempted exercise of the right under article 37 of the Constitution. 169. In the absence of any evidence of the existence of any such guidelines or regulations or training manual by the NPS, on the exercise of the right under article 37 of the Constitution as mandated by article 244 thereof, the court would declare itself on the same. 170. A structural interdict will issue for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondent, to develop and publish regulations on public order management to regulate the handling of public demonstrations, picketing and the use of force in the event of necessity. This will bring certainty on how the citizenry will exercise and realize its rights under article 37 and give clear guidelines to the NPS under article 244. This has to be done at the auspices of the 2nd interested party which is the one constitutionally mandated to promote and protect the Bill of Rights under the Constitution, and the 4th respondent who exercises oversight over the 1st and 2nd respondent. The latter is also mandated with the obligation of ensuring the training of the NPS officers in order to achieve the constitutional threshold. A structural interdict to issue in respect thereof to confirm compliance. The Bill of Rights are not an inspiration, they are a vested right that is to be exercised and enjoyed by the citizens of this County within the parameters of the law. f ) Are the petitioners entitled to the reliefs sought? 171. The petitioners craved for various declaratory reliefs as well as for compensation. Article 23(1) of the Constitution gives this Court jurisdiction to hear and give redress where there is denial of infringement of a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights. The court is empowered to issue declaration, an injunction, order judicial review or order compensation in appropriate cases. 172. I have already found that the respondents infringed and violated the petitioners’ various constitutional rights and freedoms. Appropriate declarations shall issue. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 24

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173. As regards compensation, having found that the 1st and 2nd respondent were liable for the injuries sustained by the petitioners, the question is whether the petitioners merit compensation. It goes without say that having suffered death and various injuries in the deprivement of their rights and freedoms, the petitioners are entitled to compensation. 174. Majanja, J (as he then was) in Zeitun Juma Hassan Petitioning on Behalf of the Estate of Abdul Ramadhan Biringe (deceased) v Attorney General & 4 others [2014] eKLR observed that it was within the court’s powers to grant a remedy for violation of a fundamental right and freedom under the Bill of Rights. He observed: “ The petitioner’s plea to the court is to award damages that would compensate the deceased’s estate and dependants as a result of the respondents’ unconstitutional actions. It is beyond doubt that compensatory damages are one of the reliefs the Court is empowered to grant under section 84 of the former Constitution (See Wachira Weheire v Attorney General Nairobi HC Misc Appl No 1184 of 2003 [2010] eKLR and Harun Thungu Wakaba v Attorney General Nairobi HC Misc Appl No 1411 of 2004 [2010] eKLR). The petitioner’s case is that the death of the deceased has robbed her and her family of their breadwinner. At the material time the deceased was a lorry driver who supported his family wholly. While the principles applicable to the ordinary civil law may be relevant in guiding the court is (sic) awarding damages, under section 84 of the former Constitution, the court has wide discretion in awarding relief subject to the overall duty of the court to ensure that the deceased’s rights are vindicated...” 175. This position was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in the case of Tobiko (Suing as the administrator of the Estate of Allan Amugune Tobiko) v Ministry of Interior & Co-ordination of National Government & 4 others (supra). 176. While infringement of rights may attract damages, in the present case, the infringement led to either loss of life or limb. In the circumstances, in addition to compensation on the said infringement, damages may be calculated in the normal civil manner. 177. It is judicial practice that the general approach in awarding damages for injuries is that comparable injuries should as far as possible be compensated by comparable awards. In Stanley Maore vs Geoffrey Mwenda (2004) eKLR, the Court of Appeal observed that: “ ...we must consider the award of damages in the light of the injuries sustained. It has been stated now and again that in assessment of damages, the general approach should be that comparable injuries should, as far as possible, be compensated by comparable awards keeping in mind the correct level of awards in similar cases.” 178. In the case of Charles Oriwo Odeyo v Appollo Justus Andabwa & another [2017] eKLR, the Court of Appeal set out the principles to be considered in awarding damages as follows: “ The assessment of damages in personal injury case by a court is guided by the following principles: 1) An award of damages is not meant to enrich the victim but to compensate such victim for the injuries sustained. 2) The award should be commensurable with the injuries sustained. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 25

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3) Previous awards in similar injuries sustained are a mere guide but each case be treated on its own facts. 4) Previous awards to be taken into account to maintain the stability of awards but factors such as inflation should be taken into account. 5) The awards should not be inordinately low or high” 179. The petitioners submitted that the 1st - 9th petitioners lost their lives thus the court ought to award compensatory damages while the 10th - 28th petitioners who suffered injuries as a result of the violations from the respondents are entitled to general damages as compensation. 180. Consequently, the court will proceed to determine compensation as follows:- 181. The 1st petitioner testified as PW3 in regard to two individuals, his son Brian Oniang’o who was aged 22 years old and his nephew William Akhala Amulele aged 24 years old. PW5 Dr. Peter Maturi Mwamba produced reports based on their postmortem reports as evidence in support of their case. From the record, William Akhala Amulele was represented by the 2nd petitioner. 182. As regards the 1st petitioner, Brian was aged 22 years old at the time of death. He died on the 26/7/2023, four days after the assault. The evidence on record was that he was working in a supermarket whilst waiting to join university. 183. On pain and suffering, it is now a well settled principle that the degree of pain a deceased person endured will be the determining factor in making an award on pain and suffering. If the deceased died instantly, the pain would be less and therefore, the award would be nominal. If the deceased died after a considerable amount of time, the damages for pain and suffering would not be nominal in the circumstances. See West Kenya Sugar Co. Limited vs Philip Sumba Julaya (Suing as the administrator and personal representative of the estate of James Julaya Sumba) (2019) eKLR. 184. In Joseph Kivati Wambua v SMM & Another (Suing as the Legal Representatives of the Estate of EMMDeceased) (2021) eKLR, Odunga J (as he was then) held: “ …a distinction ought to be made between a case where the deceased passes away instantly and where the death takes place sometimes after the accident. In the former, the award ought to be minimal as the legal presumption is that the deceased did not undergo pain before he died. However, where the deceased dies several hours after the accident during which time he was conscious and was in pain, an award for pain and suffering would not be nominal.” 185. The evidence on record is that the assault happened on 22/7/2023. The deceased died on 26/7/2023. This is approximately 4 days after the date of the assault. After the examination, the doctor who performed the post mortem report opined the death was caused by severe head injury due to blunt force trauma following assault. The deceased must have endured a lot of pain in the 4 days’ period leading up to his death. I award Kshs. 150,000/- for pain and suffering. 186. On damages for loss of expectation to life, the general acceptable convectional award is Kshs. 100,000/-. See the case of Hyder Nthenya Musili & Another vs China Wu Yi Limited & Another (2017) eKLR. Again, this is dependent on the time the deceased took before he died. 187. As regards the award for loss of dependency, the uncontroverted evidence is that the deceased was 22 years at the time of his death and that he was working at a supermarket while waiting to join university. I find that a global sum award of Kshs. 1,000,000/- is sufficient in this case. The decision in Stanwel Holdings Limited & another v Racheal Haluku Emanuel & another [2020] eKLR is apt wherein https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 26

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the court reduced an award of Kshs. 2,000,000.00/- for loss of dependency (a global sum) to Kshs 1,000,000/- for the Estate of a 23-year-old deceased. In Maingi Celina v John Mithika M’itabari suing as the administrator of the estate of Erastus Kirimi Mithika (Deceased) [2018] KEHC 6555 (KLR) where the deceased was aged 18 years at the time of his death and was just about to be admitted into University, the High Court set aside the amount awarded for lost years and substituted with a global sum of Kshs. 1,000,000/- for loss of dependency. 188. Accordingly, the total award to the estate of Brian Oniang’o (1st petitioner), is Kshs. 1,250,000/-. 189. Turning to the estate of William Akhala Amulele, he was aged 24 years old and died on the 29/7/2023, 7 days after the assault. An award of Kshs. 150,000/- for pain and suffering will be adequate as the deceased must have endured a lot of pain in the 7 days’ period leading up to his death. On damages for loss of expectation to life, I find that the sum of Kshs. 100,000/- to be reasonable. 190. As regards loss of dependency, the deceased was 24 years at the time of his death. He was a casual labourer and that he took care of his grandparents. I find that a global sum award of Kshs. 800,000/to be sufficient. Accordingly, the total award to the estate of William Akhala Amulele (2nd petitioner) is Kshs. 1,050,000/-. 191. As regards the 3rd petitioner (JLK) he was aged 17 years of old. He died 9 days after being shot. I award his estate Kshs. 1,050,000/-, being Kshs. 150,000/- pain and suffering Kshs. 100,000/- loss of expectation of life and general damages of Kshs. 800,000/-. 192. The Estate of one Benard Ochieng Otana was represented by the 4th petitioner. The evidence on record is that the deceased was shot and died on the 13/7/2023 in Kondele. That he was 42 years old at the time of his death. 193. As regards pain and suffering and loss of expectation of life, In the case of Mercy Muriuki & Another v Samuel Mwangi Nduati & Another (Suing as the legal administrator of the Estate of the late Robert Mwangi) (2019) eKLR the court observed that: “ The generally accepted principle therefore is that very nominal damages will be awarded on these two heads of damages if the death followed immediately after the accident. The conventional award for loss of expectation of life is Kshs. 100,000/- while pain and suffering the awards range from Kshs. 10,000/- with higher damages being awarded if the pain and suffering was prolonged before death.” 194. In the circumstances, I award Kshs. 10,000/- for pain and suffering and Kshs. 100,000/- for loss of expectation of life. As regards loss of dependency, the deceased died aged 42 years’ old. In Okiro & another v Mandere & another (Suing as the personal representatives and legal representatives of the Estate of Samwel Mandere Matonga – Deceased) [2025] KEHC 8622 (KLR), the court set aside the trial court’s award of Kshs. 1,500,000/- and replaced it with a global sum of Kshs. 800,000/- where the deceased was aged 42 years old. In Gilbert Kimatare Nairi & another (suing as personal representatives of the Estate of Lemayian Richard Kimatare (Deceased) v Civiscope Limited [2021] eKLR, the court upheld the trial court’s award of Kshs. 600,000/- for loss of dependency for the Estate of a farmer who died at 42 years of age. In the premise, I award general damages of Kshs. 800,000/-. The total of Kshs. 910,000/- is awarded to the 4th petitioner. 195. The estate of George Odhiambo Anyama was represented by the 5th petitioner. The evidence on record was that he was aged 27 years old and that he was shot and died on the 21/7/2023. As regards pain and suffering and loss of expectation of life based on the case of Mercy Muriuki & Another (supra), https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 27

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I award Kshs. 10,000/- for pain and suffering and Kshs. 100,000/- for loss of expectation of life. For dependency, I award Kshs. 1,000,000/-. Total award Kshs. 1,110,000/-. 196. The estate of David Ochieng Ouma was represented by the 6th petitioner. The evidence on record is that he was aged 28 years old and that he was shot and died on the 19/7/2023. As regards pain and suffering, I award Kshs. 10,000/- and Kshs. 100,000/- for loss of expectation of life. For loss of dependency, I award Kshs. 1,000,000/-. Total award is Kshs. 1.110,000/-. 197. The Estate of William Otieno Onyango was represented by the 7th petitioner. The evidence on record is that he was aged 27 years old and that he was shot and died on the 18/7/2023. As regards pain and suffering and loss of expectation of life, I award Kshs. 10,000/- and Kshs. 100,000/-, respectively. I award Kshs. 1,000,000/- for loss of dependency. Total award Kshs. 1,110,000/-. 198. The 8th petitioner, Robert Ouko Odongo represented the estate of Peter Otieno Adongo who was assaulted by the police on the night of 12/7/2023. The evidence on record showed that the deceased was beaten unconscious and subsequently died on the 13/7/2023 at 5pm. The cause of death was termed as circulatory collapse secondary to extreme soft tissue injuries following assault. The 8th petitioner presented evidence that prior to his death the deceased had sustained fractures to both arms and the left leg and that he was in a lot of pain that he could not lie on a bed so he died while sitting on a wheelchair. The assault happened on 12/7/2023 and the deceased died on 13/7/2023. The deceased must have endured a lot of pain in in the period leading up to his death. It is this court’s finding that an award of Kshs. 150,000/- for pain and suffering will be sufficient. On damages for loss of expectation to life, I award Kshs. 100,000/-. 199. As regards the award for loss of dependency, the uncontroverted evidence is that the deceased was 35 years at the time of his death and that he worked for various companies including Tuishi Companies and International Green World as an agent delivering goods to customers on demand. In Pamigo Limited v Phelestus Hoka Libulele (Suing as legal representative of the estate of Alex Olindi Opande (Deceased) [2019] eKLR, the court awarded Kshs. 1,048,704/- for loss of dependency for a deceased who died at 39 years. In Sinohydro Tianjin Engineering Co Ltd v Okumu (Suing as the administratix of the Estate of Joel Odhiambo Kimbage) & another (Civil Appeal E287 of 2020) [2023] KEHC 23911 (KLR), the court awarded Kshs. 1,500,000/- for loss of dependency for a deceased who died at 39 years. 200. In the circumstances, an award of Kshs. 1,000,000/- would be sufficient as general damages for loss of dependency. The 8th petitioner also sought special damages of Kshs. 15,050/- which was not challenged. The same was proven through receipts that were produced. I award the same. Accordingly, the total award to the estate of Peter Otieno Adongo (8th petitioner), is Kshs. 1,400,050/-. 201. The estate of Frank Opiyo Odhiambo was represented by the 9th Petitioner. The evidence on record is that he was aged 29 years old and that he was shot and died on the 19/7/2023. As regards pain and suffering and loss of expectation of life, I award Kshs. 10,000/- and Kshs. 100,000/- respectively. For loss of dependency, I award Kshs. 1,000,000/-. Total award Kshs. 1,110,000/-. 202. As regards the petitioners who sustained injuries following the protests, PW4, Dr. Mbaruku testified on their injuries. This is the basis upon which I will award damages. 203. On the 10th petitioner, MAO, a minor aged 17 years old. The evidence produced showed that she sustained soft tissue injuries from the rubber bullet that hit her right clavicular area and that she was expected to have residual weakness of her upper right limb with a disability index 5%. In Ogembo & Ano v Maisa (2023) KEHC 436 (KLR), the injuries consisted of soft tissue injuries and two degloving injuries. The court awarded Kshs. 300,000/-. In Khetia Draper Ltd v Chesoli [2025] KEHC 3718 (KLR) the plaintiff sustained minor to moderate soft tissue injuries and the High Court upheld an https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 28

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award of Kshs. 250,000/- as general damages. I award the 10th petitioner, MAO Kshs. 300,000/- as general damages. 204. The 11th petitioner, BOO was shot in the back. He sustained a fracture of the right hand and collapsed lung. Dr. Mbaruku testified that he would need a nerve conduct study for his upper right arm at Kshs. 12,000/- to assess the nerves, nerve costs of Kshs. 300,000/-, Kshs. 59,000/- for grafting. 205. While considering similar injuries, in Stejes Agencies Limited v Paul (Civil Appeal E067 of 2021) [2023] KEHC 19523 (KLR) (30 June 2023) (Judgment), the court reduced an award from 800,000/- to 600,000/- for fractured distal radius bone, fractures distal ulna bone, cut wound on the right knee, deep cut wound on the left leg. Segmented fractures left tibia bone among others. 206. Further, in the case of Kamaliki v Paul (Civil Appeal E004 of 2021) [2023] KEHC 2540 (KLR) (29 March 2023) (Judgment), the plaintiff was awarded Kshs. 650,000/- for left radius fracture, left ulna fracture and deep cut wound on the chin. Having looked at the authorities, I find that an award of Kshs. 650,000/- will suffice as general damages. 207. In regard to future medical expenses, the Court of Appeal in Tracom Limited & another v Hassan Mohamed Adan [2016] KECA 150 (KLR) held: “… We understand that to mean that once the plaintiff pleads that there would be need for further medication and hence future medical expenses will be necessary, the plaintiff may not need to specially state what amount it will be as indeed the exact amount of that future expenses will depend on several other matters such as the place where the treatment will be undertaken, and if overseas, the strength of the currency particularly Kenya currency at the time treatment is undertaken and of course the turn that the injury will have taken at the time of the treatment. We think all that will be necessary to plead (if it has to be pleaded at all) is the approximate sum of money that the future medical expenses will require…” 208. I also award future medical expenses as testified on by Dr. Mbaruku to the tune of Kshs. 371,000/-. Total award to the 11th petitioner, BOO Onyango is Kshs. 1,021,000/-. 209. The 12th petitioner, Clinton Otieno sustained gunshot wound to the forearm and chest. Dr. Mbaruku testified that the forearm would heal but with reduced muscular function and that he would need follow up on respiratory clinic. Guided by the awards in Stejes Agencies Limited (supra) and Kamaliki (supra), I award the 12th petitioner, Clinton Otieno Kshs. 650,000/- in damages. 210. The 13th petitioner, Joseph Odhiambo Oywer was shot on the foot and had 4 toes in his right foot dismembered. Dr. Mbaruku testified that he would require occupational therapy and rehabilitation of the foot at Kshs. 15,000/-. In National Cereals and Produce Board v Protas Wafula Wanyama Eld HCCA No. 89 of 2016 [2018] eKLR, the plaintiff sustained a swollen and tender right foot, cut wound on the right middle toe which was tender, traumatic amputation of the right 4th toe which was tender and a cut wound on the right 5th toe which was tender. The court reduced an award of Kshs. 400,000/to Kshs. 200,000/- in 2018. 211. In Ontiri v Mulwa (Civil Appeal 175 of 2020) [2024] KEHC 5162 (KLR) (Civ) (17 May 2024) (Judgment), the court set aside the award on general damages of Kshs. 1,000,000/- and substituted with an award of Kshs. 400,000/- where the plaintiff had sustained soft tissue injuries and amputation of the 4th and 5th toes. Having looked at the authorities, I find that an award of Kshs. 600,000/- will suffice as general damages plus Kshs. 60,000/- occupational therapy. Total award Kshs. 660,000/-. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 29

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212. The 14th petitioner, David Ongudi Okoth sustained a gunshot wound to the left lower chest wall that perforated his gut. Dr. Mbaruku testified that he suffers long-term stasis (cooling of the fluids as he cannot expire) and is prone to chest infections and will require antibiotics, physiotherapy and drainage of fluids. 213. In Alex Muthinji Njeke & Another v Attorney General [2017] KEHC 1498 (KLR), the 1st plaintiff similarly was shot and the bullet perforated his gut. The High Court awarded him Kshs. 3,500,000/as damages. Accordingly, I hereby award the 14th petitioner, Kshs. 3,500,000/- as compensation. 214. The 15th petitioner, Khabati Muyeshi sustained a gunshot wound on each of his legs as a result of which he is unable to move his right foot up and down. That he will require a nerve healing procedure as well as occupational and physiotherapy, a foot brace to be replaced annually at Kshs. 3,000/- each and a minimum 10 sessions of occupational therapy at Kshs. 30,000/-. Permanent disability was accessed at 25%. 215. In Eliud Rimui Kiarie v Attorney General & 3 others [2020] eKLR where the plaintiff was mistakenly shot several times, the court awarded Kshs. 5,000,000/- in general damages. In Alex Muthini Njeke & Another v Attorney General [2017] eKLR, where an award of Kshs. 3,500,000/- was awarded for pain and suffering where the plaintiff was shot by police in a mistaken identity. I award the 15th petitioner Kshs. 4,000,000/- as general damages for the injuries. 216. As regards future medical expenses, I award Kshs. 30,000/- for occupational therapy, Kshs. (3,000 x 30) = 90,000/- for the annual brace this is till the victim gets to 60 years old currently being 30 years old. Taking into consideration the nature of the injuries sustained by the 15th petitioner as well as the future expenses testified to by Dr. Mbaruku, I hereby award the 15th petitioner compensation to the tune of Kshs. 4,120,000/-. 217. The 16th petitioner, Shalmon Odoyo was shot on the right thigh from the back but retained the full range of motion on the leg. In essence, he sustained soft tissue injuries as a result of the gun shot. In Jyoti Structures Limited & another v Truphena Chepkoech Too & another [2020] eKLR, the High Court awarded Kshs. 125,000/- to a person who had sustained blunt injuries to the head, neck, chest, back and both thighs. In Ochola v Owuor (Civil Appeal E039 of 2022) [2024] KEHC 7689 (KLR), the High Court awarded Kshs. 150,000/- to a party who had sustained soft tissue injuries of the right shoulder joint and both knee joints and blunt injuries to the anterior chest wall, the neck, and the back leading to soft tissue injuries. Guided by the comparable cases above, I award the 16th petitioner Kshs. 450,000/as compensation. 218. The 17th petitioner Steve Biko Obongo was shot on the right leg and ended up sustaining a fracture of the right tibia as a result of which he will require physiotherapy twice a week for 6 months (12 sessions) at the cost of Kshs. 3,000/- per session. 219. In Godfrey Wamalwa Wamba & another vs. Kyalo Wambua [2018] eKLR, the appellant sustained a compound fracture of the right distal tibia/fibula, cut wounds on the scalp and chest and a cut on the lower lip, he was in hospital for three weeks, he underwent surgery for repair of the fibula. The doctor testified that his leg had shortened and needed corrective surgery. The trial court awarded him general damages at Kshs. 700,000/-, which the appellate court upheld. 220. In Wakim Sodas Limited v Sammy Aritos [2017] eKLR, the respondent sustained a fracture of the fourth rib and a compound fracture of the left tibia/fibula. The trial court awarded Kshs. 400,000/-, which was upheld on appeal. In Vincent Mbogholi v Harrison Tunje Chilyalya [2017] eKLR, the appellate court declined to disturb an award of Kshs. 500,000/- for a fracture of the left tibia leg bone https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 30

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(medial malleolus), blunt injury to the chest and left lower limb and bruises on the left forearm, right foot and right big toe. In the case of David Mutembei v Maurice Ochieng Odoyo [2019] eKLR, the respondent suffered injuries of a fracture of the right femur and a proximal fracture of the left tibia and was awarded general damages of Kshs. 1,600,000/- had the same reduced on appeal to Kshs. 800,000/-. 221. Taking into consideration the more recent decisions, I find that an award of Kshs. 800,000/- would suffice as general damages for the 17th petitioner. Total award Kshs. 836,000/-. 222. The 18th petitioner, Evans Owino Aira was assaulted by police officers while riding his motorcycle and had the motorcycle fall on him and trap him. Further, the officers shot him on the thigh. He healed and returned to work after 6 months. Dr. Mbaruku testified that he sustained soft tissue injuries to the thigh. 223. Guided by the comparable cases of Jyoti Structures Limited (supra) and Ochola v Owuor (supra), I award the 18th petitioner Kshs. 350,000/- as compensation. 224. The 19th petitioner Kennedy Omondi Owiti who testified as PW1 was shot on the chest as a result of which he sustained chest pain with difficulty in breathing. That he suffered occasional pneumonia due to the penetrating lung injury and has a long term healing complication as a result of lung fibrosis. That as a result of the injury, he has limited lung function causing restriction in his movement. Dr. Mbaruku recommended regular chest physiotherapy for 6 -12 months as well as physical and occupational therapy of the left upper limb. 225. Taking into consideration the nature of the injuries sustained by the 19th petitioner, his own testimony as well as that of Dr. Mbaruku and having regard for the decisions in Eliud Rimui Kiarie (supra) and Alex Muthini Njeke & Another (supra) I award the 19th petitioner damages of Kshs. 4,000,000/-. 226. The 20th petitioner Daniel Ouma Obare was shot on the face and sustained a fractured mandible with pain on the left jaw. That his face was disfigured on the left side. Dr. Mbaruku testified that he would require surgical fixation at the cost of between Kshs. 220,000/- to 250,000/-. I award Kshs. 250,000/as future medical expense. 227. In Mary Muthoni Ndichu v Heshima Distributors, Nairobi HCCC No 4983 of 1989, decided on March 22, 1994 the claimant who sustained a fracture of the jaw right mandible, dislocation of the jaw left temporally mandible joint, broken and chipped left premolar tooth and loss of upper canine tooth was awarded Kshs 350,000/- general damages. 228. In Alphonse Mwatsuma Mwagamchi v Joseph Mwanza Mwanzu & another [2005] eKLR, an award of general damages of Kshs. 1,200,000/- was made in the year 2005 for injuries to the mandible with loss of six (6) teeth and seven (7) others broken, fracture of mandible, contusion chest and severe back injury which involved the spinal cord. In Sancha v Oeri & another [2023] KEHC 4145 (KLR), the appellate court replaced the award of Kshs. 300,000/- with one of Kshs. 800,000/- where the plaintiff sustained fracture of maxillae, broken front teeth, laceration of the gums, loss of upper incisor tooth, laceration of the lower lip, fractures of the lower jaw and blunt laceration on the scalp. I hereby find that an award of Kshs. 1,000,000/- is sufficient as general damages. 229. Taking into consideration the recommendation by Dr. Mbaruku on surgical fixation, I hereby award the 20th petitioner Kshs. 1,250,000/- as compensation. 230. The 21st petitioner ROO sustained a gunshot wound in the forearm with the tissues expected to repair themselves. Dr. Mbaruku recommended occupational therapy for 5 years twice weekly at a cost of Kshs. 1,500/- to Kshs. 2,000/- and annual review for 5 years at a cost of Kshs. 3,000/- per visit. For https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 31

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future medical expenses I hereby award Kshs. 15,000/- for the annual visits and Kshs. 1,040,000/- for occupational therapy calculated at Kshs. 2,000/- per visit for 5 years. 231. As regards general damages, the 21st petitioner sustained soft tissue injuries. Guided by the comparable cases of Jyoti Structures Limited (supra) and Ochola v Owuor (supra), I award the 21st petitioner Kshs. 250,000/- as general damages. Consequently, I award the 21st petitioner a total award of Kshs. 1,305,000/- as compensation. 232. The 22nd petitioner, Daniel Ochanda Owiti was assaulted whilst in his house and sustained multiple soft tissue injuries on the upper part of the back as well as to the knee. Guided by the comparable cases of Jyoti Structures Limited (supra) and Ochola v Owuor (supra), I award the 22nd petitioner Kshs. 300,000/- as compensation. 233. On the 23rd petitioner, Karilus Akacha Raphael, the evidence produced showed that on the 21/7/2023 he was dragged out of the house by the police and beaten till he sustained a broken right leg. In Godfrey Wamalwa Wamba & another vs. Kyalo Wambua [2018] eKLR, the appellant sustained a compound fracture of the right distal tibia/fibula, cut wounds on the scalp and chest and a cut on the lower lip, he was in hospital for three weeks, he underwent surgery for repair of the fibula. The doctor testified that his leg had shortened and needed corrective surgery. The trial court awarded him general damages at Kshs. 700,000/-, which the appellate court upheld. In Wakim Sodas Limited v Sammy Aritos [2017] eKLR, the respondent sustained a fracture of the fourth rib and a compound fracture of the left tibia/ fibula. The trial court awarded Kshs. 400, 000/-, which was upheld on appeal. In David Mutembei v Maurice Ochieng Odoyo [2019] eKLR, the respondent suffered injuries of a fracture of the right femur and a proximal fracture of the left tibia and was awarded general damages of Kshs. 1,600,000/- which was reduced on appeal to Kshs. 800, 000/-. 234. Taking into consideration the more recent decisions on similar injuries, I find that an award of Kshs. 800,000/- would suffice as general damages which I award. 235. The 24th petitioner, Christopher Ototo Odero was shot in the thigh. He deposed that he sustained trauma due to the shooting and subsequently sought counselling. However, there is no evidence on record that he sustained any lifelong injuries. Guided by the awards in Stejes Agencies Limited (supra) and Kamaliki (supra), I award the 24th petitioner, Christopher Ototo Odero Kshs. 650,000/as compensation. 236. The 25th petitioner, Denis Ochieng sustained gunshot wounds to the chest and was admitted in hospital from the 27/3/2023 to 10/4/2023. He subsequently received psychosocial therapy and counselling following the incident however there was no evidence of any lifelong injuries. I award him in damages of Kshs. 500,000/-. 237. The 26th petitioner, Brian Obiero was assaulted by the police and ended up sustaining injury to the knee joint and a fractured patella. He was given a recommendation to buy crutches but could not afford the same thus developed a deformity in the right leg. 238. In Mochama v Ogoti [2025] KEHC 1468 (KLR), the plaintiff sustained injuries in the nature of scalp contusion, facial abrasion, chest contusion with resultant rib fractures, back contusion, fractures of the right radius and ulna, dislocation of the left patella and bruising of the right leg, the court on appeal set aside a trial court’s award of Kshs. 1,000,000/- as general damages and substituted it with one of Kshs. 600,000/-. 239. In the circumstances I award the 26th Petitioner Kshs. 600,000/- as damages. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 32

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240. The 27th petitioner, Joseph Obala Ongili aged 29 years old sustained a gunshot wound to the left thigh as a result of which he will require physiotherapy for 10 sessions at a cost of Kshs. 30,000/- as well as nerve medication for life at a cost of Kshs. 1,500/- per month. 241. Guided by the case of Alex Muthini Njeke & Another (supra) I hereby award the 27th petitioner Kshs. 2,500,000/- as general damages. As regards future medical expenses, I grant the 27th petitioner nerve medication for 30 years totalling up to Kshs. 2,340,000/- and Kshs. 30,000/- for physiotherapy. In total I award the 27th petitioner Kshs. 4,870,000/- as compensation. 242. The 28th petitioner, Amos Oduor Otengo aged 37 years, sustained gunshot wounds to the abdomen as a result of which he is expected to have lifelong complications of abdominal pain, will have to adjust diet whilst his lower limbs will require physiotherapy. That he will require nerve review of Kshs. 15,000/-, lifelong physiotherapy for 10 days in a month at Kshs. 3,000/- per session and Kshs. 5,000/- annual review. 243. Guided by the case of Alex Muthini Njeke & Another (supra) I hereby award the 27th petitioner Kshs. 2,500,000/- as general damages. As regards future medical expenses, I award him Kshs. 15,000/- for nerve review. 244. Consequently, I hereby award the 28th petitioner Kshs. 2,515,000/- as compensation. 245. For the 29th petitioner, she should be applauded for her effort and those of her colleagues who withstood the frustrations of fighting for the voiceless. Her and her colleagues firm standing for the public interest is worthy emulating. It is such brave Kenyans who protect the Constitution and public interest that National Awards should be considered for. 246. Accordingly, the petition hereby succeeds. I grant the following orders: a. A declaration hereby issues that the 1st to 9th petitioners’ rights to life as enshrined under article 26 of the Constitution; the petitioners right to equal benefit and protection of the law under article 27; their right to dignity under article 28; and their right to security of the person under article 29 of the Constitution were violated by the actions of the 1st and 2nd respondent subordinates who either shot or fatally injured the said petitioners. b. A declaration hereby issues that the 1st and 2nd respondent violated the petitioners’ rights by subjecting them to torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment by either shooting them and/or assaulting them, causing them severe and/or fatal injuries, contrary to article 28 and 29 of the Constitution. c. A declaration hereby issues that by failing to furnish the petitioners with information concerning the status of investigations on the protests material to this petition and further by failing to publish and/or publicize any report or updates material to this petition, the 4th respondent has violated the petitioners’ rights under article 35(3) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. d. A declaration hereby issues that the 1st respondent as well as officers of the 2nd respondent directly under his command failed to uphold their mandate and obligations under article 244 (a) and (c) of the Constitution and Chapter 47 of the National Police Service Orders when they carried out the violations complained of and established in this petition by the petitioners. e. A declaration hereby issues that the failure by the 1st, 2nd and 4th respondent to promptly, transparently, effectively and thoroughly investigate instances where the use of force led to death or injury of the petitioners violates the positive obligation to investigate and prosecute https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 33

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violations of the right to life, torture, inhuman, and degrading treatment under article 21(1) of the Constitution, article 6 and 7 of CAT; article 2 and 7 of the ICCPR. f. An order of mandamus hereby issues directing the 4th respondent to initiate prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations into the circumstances under which the petitioners and or their kin died or were injured at the hands of the officers of the 2nd respondent under the overall command of the 1st respondent during the period material to this petition, and to further supply the petitioners with the status of the investigations and recommendations they have arrived at in regard to the appropriate action to be taken as the conclusion of the investigations within 90 days of the date hereof. In default, further proceedings for compensation to the petitioners to issue against the 4th respondent. g. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondent are hereby directed to prepare, develop and publish regulations on public order management to regulate and manage public demonstrations and picketing under article 37 of the Constitution and on the use of force, where necessary. The publication to be made within 90 days and the 2nd interested party together with 4th respondent to ensure compliance therewith. h. An order for compensation by the 1st to 3rd respondents, jointly and severally, to the petitioners hereby issues as follows: i. 1st petitioner – Kshs. 1,250,000/-. ii. 2nd petitioner – Kshs. 1,050,000/-. iii. 3rd petitioner – Kshs. 1,050,000/-. iv. 4th petitioner – Kshs. 910,000/-. v. 5th petitioner – Kshs. 1,110,000/-. vi. 6th petitioner – Kshs. 1.110.000/- vii. 7th petitioner – Kshs. 1,110.000/-. viii. 8th petitioner – Kshs. 1,400,050/-. ix. 9th petitioner – Kshs. 1,110,000/-. x. 10th petitioner – Kshs. 300,000/-. xi. 11th petitioner – Kshs. 1,021,000/-. xii. 12th petitioner – Kshs. 650,000/-. xiii. 13th petitioner – Kshs. 660,000/-. xiv. 14th petitioner – Kshs. 3,500,000/-. xv. 15th petitioner – Kshs. 4,120,000/-. xvi. 16th petitioner – Kshs. 450,000/-. xvii. 17th petitioner – Kshs. 836,000/-. xviii. 18th petitioner – Kshs. 350,000/-. xix. 19th petitioner – Kshs. 4,000,000/-. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 34

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xx. 20th petitioner – Kshs. 1,250,000/-. xxi. 21st petitioner – Kshs. 1,305,000/-. xxii. 22nd petitioner – Kshs. 300,000/-. xxiii. 23rd petitioner – Kshs. 800,000/-. xxiv. 24th petitioner – Kshs. 500,000/-. xxv. 25th petitioner – Kshs. 500,000. xxvi. 26th petitioner – Kshs. 600,000/-. xxvii. 27th petitioner – Kshs. 4,870,000/-. xxviii. 28th petitioner – Kshs. 2,515,000/-. 247. Mention on 7/7/2026 to confirm compliance with the structural interdicts issued herein. 248. This being a public interest litigation, I make no order as to costs. 249. In the meantime, it’s with gratitude that I appreciate the immense industry, research and able submissions of the learned counsels who appeared in this matter. It is so decreed. DATED AND DELIVERED AT KISUMU THIS 25TH DAY OF MARCH, 2026. A. MABEYA, FCI Arb JUDGE Mr. M M Omondi (M M Omondi & Company Advocates), for the petitioners. Mr. Mbanya for the 4th interested party. Mr. Mwangi for the amicus curiae. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/3967/eng@2026-03-25 35

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