Isaiah Gichu Ndirangu v The Registrar of Political Parties & 1 other

CHRISTOPHER KILONZO ........................................................ 3RD RESPONDENT TAABU O.W DANIEL ................................................................... 4TH RESPONDENT SELLAH ATIENO OPIYO ............................................................ 5TH RESPONDENT GERRY OLANG OWITI ............................................................... 6TH RESPONDENT CINDERELLA NEKESA ............................................................... 7TH RESPONDENT ANDREW NJOROGE ................................................................... 8TH RESPONDENT MARGARET NDANYI ................................................................. 9TH RESPONDENT MARERE MWARAPAYO WAMWACHAI ............................... 10TH RESPONDENT SADJAH PHILIPPE ..................................................................... 11TH RESPONDENT SHEM OCHARO ......................................................................... 12TH RESPONDENT MOSES GACHUGI ...................................................................... 13TH RESPONDENT JUSTUS WAMBUTURA ............................................................. 14TH RESPONDENT ZAHRA RASHID HILLOW ....................................................... 15TH RESPONDENT RUTH WANJIRU GICHOVI ..................................................... 16TH RESPONDENT INTERIM JUDGMENT Introduction 1. This Judgment pertains to a Constitutional Petition dated 7th August 2023, instituted by Isaiah Gichu Ndirangu (the Petitioner) against the Registrar of Political Parties (the 1st Respondent) and fifteen (15) other individuals who are members of the Steering Committee of the Political Parties Liaison Committee (the 2nd to 16th Respondents). The Petition challenges the purported removal of the Petitioner from his elected position as the Deputy Organizing Secretary of the PPLC. The gravamen of the Petition is that the process leading to his removal was procedurally flawed, violated his constitutional rights to fair administrative action, fair hearing, access to information, equality, and was contrary to national values and principles of governance. Background 2. The Political Parties Liaison Committee (PPLC) is a statutory body established under Section 38 of the Political Parties Act, 2011. It serves as a dialogue platform between the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP), the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), and all fully registered political parties in Kenya. The PPLC operates through various organs, including a Plenary (the supreme decision-making body) and a Steering Committee. 3. The Petitioner is the Chairman of the Party of Democracy Unity (PDU). Following elections conducted on 8th November 2022, the Petitioner was declared and gazetted as the Deputy Organizing Secretary of the PPLC Steering Committee. The 1st Respondent issued a Certificate of Election to that effect. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19345/eng@2025-12-17 2

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4. The dispute giving rise to this Petition stems from events in May and June 2023. It is alleged that the Petitioner was tasked with collecting funeral contributions following the death of the daughter of a PPLC member, Mr. Dick Kamau. Serious allegations subsequently arose concerning the Petitioner's handling of the funds, including accusations of failure to remit the full amount collected, issuing of inaccurate contribution lists, and the unilateral refund of contributions without authority. Further allegations were made that the Petitioner had, on a prior occasion, facilitated the fraudulent representation of a female acquaintance, said to be his party's official, as either a member of the Steering Committee or an official of the ORPP during a meeting at Lake Elementaita Mountain Lodge. 5. On 20th June 2023, during a PPLC Plenary meeting held at Lake Naivasha Resort, the conduct of the Petitioner was introduced as a matter for discussion. The Petitioner was not present but was represented by an alternate member from his party. The sequence of events in Naivasha is heavily contested. The Petitioner claims he was summarily removed from office. The 2nd to 16th Respondents, through their Chairman Mr. Evans Misati, contend that while members of the plenary were vociferously demanding the Petitioner's removal, the Chairman ruled that the matter should follow due process and be referred to the PPLC's Legal and Disputes Resolution Sub-Committee for a hearing. 6. The procedural aftermath is murky. Minutes from the Naivasha meeting were not signed. In a subsequent plenary held in Machakos in December 2023, unsigned minutes from Naivasha were tabled for adoption. A specific clause, Min/NPPLC/23/06/7, was introduced stating: "That Plenary impeached Mr. Isaiah Gichu Ndirangu as the Deputy Organizing Secretary of the Steering Committee of PPLC." The Petitioner avers these minutes were rejected by the plenary as inaccurate, while the Respondents suggest this clause was an amendment to correctly capture the Naivasha resolution. The Petitioner was also removed from the PPLC Steering Committee WhatsApp group, which he claims was to deny him access to information. 7. Aggrieved, the Petitioner filed the instant Petition and a Notice of Motion Application seeking conservatory orders. The conservatory orders were granted in part, staying his removal pending the hearing and determination of the Petition. The Petitioner thus seeks the following reliefs from this court: a. A declaration that the actions by the Respondents of failing to recognize the Petitioner’s right to a fair administrative action, fair trial and access to information are in gross violation of the Petitioner’s rights under Articles 27, 35, 38 and 50 of the Constitution. b. A declaration that the action of the respondents to remove the Petitioner as the Deputy organizing secretary PPLC are in violation of article 3(1),10,21,22,27(1),28,38(2),47,48 and therefore null and void ab initio. c. A declaration that the actions of the respondents to remove the petitioner from the PPLC steering WhatsApp group in the aim of preventing him to access information is in violation of article 36(1) of the Constitution and therefore null and void ab initio. d. Such any other order that the Honourable Court may deem fit to order in the interest of justice. e. Costs of this Petition. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19345/eng@2025-12-17 3

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The Petitioner's Case 8. The Petitioner’s case is presented through his Petition, Further Affidavit, Supplementary Affidavits, and Further Supplementary Affidavit and his written submissions. The factual narrative he presents is as follows: 9. He was duly elected and gazetted as Deputy Organizing Secretary on 8th November 2022. His removal was never contemplated until a plenary meeting held at Lake Naivasha Resort from 19th to 22nd June 2023. He was notified of this meeting but could not attend due to work commitments and sent an alternate representative from his party. 10. Crucially, the agenda for the Naivasha meeting, as circulated by the 1st Respondent, did not include any item concerning his conduct or removal. During the meeting on 20th June 2023, the agenda was allegedly amended from the floor to include a discussion on the "Conduct of PPLC Members," specifically targeting him. He was neither given prior notice of this amendment nor of the specific allegations to be levelled against him. 11. In his absence, and without any opportunity for him to defend himself, the plenary purportedly passed a resolution to remove him from the office of Deputy Organizing Secretary. He categorically denies the substantive allegations of misappropriating funeral funds and impersonation, terming them fabricated and politically motivated, orchestrated by individuals who were his opponents in the PPLC elections. 12. Following this, he was removed from the PPLC Steering Committee WhatsApp group, severing his access to official communications and information. Requests to the 1st Respondent for the official minutes of the Naivasha meeting and a written decision on his removal were ignored or denied. 13. In the subsequent plenary in Machakos in December 2023, minutes from Naivasha were tabled. These minutes were unsigned and contained a clause (Min/NPPLC/23/06/7) stating he had been "impeached." He avers that these minutes were rejected by the plenary as inaccurate. He further deposes that in a later plenary in March 2024, the same disputed clause was inserted into the Machakos minutes, which he views as a desperate, retrospective attempt to legitimize an unlawful act. 14. The Petitioner’s case is therefore that he was condemned unheard, following a process that was opaque, arbitrary, and devoid of any procedural safeguards. 15. The Petitioner, in his Written Submissions and Rejoinder Submissions, advances the following legal arguments: 16. First, he submits that the process violated Article 47 on Fair Administrative Action. He argues that administrative action must be lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair. The action taken against him, discussing his removal and making a decision (whether to remove or refer) was procedurally unfair. He was given no prior notice of the charges, the issue was not on the agenda, he was not afforded a hearing, and no written reasons were provided. Reliance was placed on the decisions in Dry Associates Ltd v Capital Markets Authority & Another [2012] eKLR and Kenya Human Rights Commission & Another v Non-Governmental Organizations Co-ordination Board & Another [2018] eKLR to underline that the right to a hearing is now a constitutional imperative, the breach of which renders an action null and void. 17. Second, he links this to the violation of Article 50 on Fair Hearing, incorporating the rules of natural justice (audi alteram partem). He relied on the Supreme Court decision in Evans Odhiambo Kidero & 4 others v Ferdinand Ndungu Waititu & 4 others SC Petition No 18 of 2014 as consolidated with https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19345/eng@2025-12-17 4

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Petition No 20 of 2014 [2014] eKLR to emphasize that a fair hearing requires both an opportunity to be heard and that the opportunity be reasonable. He was given none. 18. Third, he submitted that his right of access to information under Article 35 was violated. He was denied the official minutes of the Naivasha meeting, and his removal from the WhatsApp group hindered his access to operational information. He relied on the decision in Okoiti v Communications Authority of Kenya (Constitutional Petition No. 53 of 2017) to buttress the fundamental nature of this right. 19. Fourth, he argues the arbitrary and discriminatory nature of the process breached Article 27 on Equality and Freedom from Discrimination by stating that the unique, flawed process applied to him amounted to unfair treatment. 20. Fifth, he contends that the actions of the Respondents undermined Article 10 on National Values and Principles of Governance, particularly the rule of law, good governance, transparency, and accountability. 21. On the defence of exhaustion of internal remedies, he submitted that the exception applies by arguing that where the internal mechanism is inadequate or futile, and where the complaint raises a pure point of law, the court can intervene. He asserts that the internal committee cannot remedy a process that was unconstitutional from the start and therefore urged this Honourable Court to allow the Petition in its entirety with costs. The 1st Respondent's Case 22. The 1st Respondent’s case is presented in its Grounds of Opposition dated 19th September, 2023 and written submissions dated 17th October, 2023. The factual position advanced is largely defensive and focused on legal technicalities rather than a detailed recounting of the events. 23. It is averred that the Petition and the Application offend Section 5 (1) (a) of the Access to Information Act, 2016 as the information sought was not held by the 1st Respondent. 24. It was submitted that the Petition is partially anchored on the Draft Political Parties (Political Parties Liaison Committee) Regulations, 2016. Relying on Section 23(1) of the Statutory Instruments Act, it argues that these draft regulations have no legal force as they were never gazetted or enacted. Therefore, any claims based on their breach must fail. 25. On the alleged violation of Article 35 (Access to Information), it submits that the duty to disclose under Section 5(1)(a) of the Access to Information Act, 2016, is limited to information "held by" the public entity. It argues the Petitioner has not demonstrated that the minutes and decisions he seeks are held by the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties, as distinct from the PPLC. Thus, no obligation arises, and no violation occurred. Reliance was placed on the decision in Orange Democratic Movement Party (ODM) v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission [2019] eKLR in support of its arguments. 26. It further submits that the Petitioner failed to meet the threshold for conservatory orders (now moot) as his case relied on non-existent laws and disclosed no prima facie case. It prays for the dismissal of the Petition with costs. The 2nd to 16th Respondents’ Case 27. The 2nd to 16th Respondents’ case is presented in the Replying Affidavit of Evans James Misati sworn on 14th August 2023, his Further Affidavit sworn on 15th August 2023, and the supporting annexures. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19345/eng@2025-12-17 5

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28. They confirm that the Petitioner’s conduct was discussed at the Naivasha plenary on 20th June 2023. However, they vehemently deny the Petitioner’s core assertion. They depose that the Petitioner was not removed from office at that meeting. Their account is that members of the plenary, angered by the allegations of financial misconduct and impersonation, demanded his immediate removal. 29. The deponent, Mr. Misati, in his capacity as Chairman of the PPLC Steering Committee who was moderating the session, states that he intervened. He ruled that the matter was too serious to be decided in such a heated atmosphere and in the Petitioner’s absence. He directed that the issue follow due process and be referred to the PPLC’s Legal and Disputes Resolution Sub-Committee for a formal hearing. The matter, they state, remains pending before that sub-committee. 30. They justify the discussion by detailing the allegations: screenshots of WhatsApp conversations showing discrepancies in the funds collected and refunded; a formal petition from a member, Alfayo Alfonse Agufana, calling for his removal; and evidence that the Petitioner facilitated a person to falsely sign an attendance list as a Steering Committee member and as an ORPP official at a previous retreat. 31. They admit that the Petitioner was removed from the Steering Committee WhatsApp group but state this was a temporary measure to curb his alleged harassment and intimidation of other members on the platform following the Naivasha incident. 32. Their case is that the Petitioner has jumped the gun by rushing to court. They assert that a functional internal mechanism exists, has been used successfully before and should have been exhausted first. They view the Petition as premature and an attempt to bypass the PPLC’s own dispute resolution structures. 33. The 2nd to 16th Respondents, in their Written Submissions and Supplementary Submissions, argue as follows: 34. First, they submit that the Petition fails to meet the threshold of a constitutional petition as was underscored in Timothy njoya v Attorney General & another [2017] eKLR. They argue it lacks specificity by not stating with precision which right was violated by which specific respondent and how. They characterize it as a "fishing expedition." 35. Second, they submitted that the Petitioner failed to exhaust internal remedies. They elaborate on the existence of a robust Legal and Disputes Resolution Sub-Committee within the PPLC, comprising three practicing advocates, which has previously determined disputes. They argue that the Petitioner’s rush to court is premature and that the court should, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, direct him to exhaust this internal mechanism first. 36. Third, they submit that they are not necessary parties. They argue that the PPLC, as a statutory body, can sue and be sued in its own name. Suing them individually is vexatious and an attempt to intimidate, as any decision was to be made by the plenary, not by them as individuals. 37. Fourth, on the merits, they reiterate that no removal occurred. They argue that the Chairman’s ruling to refer the matter to a sub-committee was the correct invocation of due process. Therefore, the Petitioner’s claim that he was removed is unfounded, and his constitutional rights were not infringed because no adverse decision was taken against him. 38. They pray for the Petition to be dismissed with costs, or alternatively, for the court to direct the Petitioner to exhaust PPLC’s internal mechanisms. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19345/eng@2025-12-17 6

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Analysis and Determination 39. From the pleadings, affidavits, and submissions of the parties, the following issues fall for this Court’s determination: i. Whether the Petitioner’s Petition meets the threshold of specificity required for a constitutional petition. ii. Whether the Petitioner was required to exhaust the PPLC’s internal dispute resolution mechanisms before invoking this Court’s jurisdiction. iii. Whether the 1st Respondent and the 2nd to 16th Respondents are properly sued as parties to these proceedings. iv. Whether the process leading to the purported removal of the Petitioner from the position of Deputy Organizing Secretary of the PPLC violated his constitutional rights under Articles 47, 50, 35, 27, and 10 of the Constitution. v. What reliefs, if any, are the parties entitled to? Whether the Petitioner’s Petition meets the threshold of specificity required for a constitutional petition. 40. The principle is well settled. In the landmark case of Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic [1979] KLR 154, the court laid down the foundational rule that a constitutional petition must be precise. It stated: “ We would, however, again stress that if a person is seeking redress from the High Court on a matter which involves a reference to the Constitution, it is important (if only to ensure that justice is done to his case) that he should set out with a reasonable degree of precision that of which he complains, the provisions said to be infringed, and the manner in which they are alleged to be infringed.” 41. This principle was recently reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in Timothy Njoya v Attorney General & another (supra) which the Respondents heavily rely upon. The court reiterated that it is incumbent upon a petitioner to demonstrate with reasonable precision the provision of the Constitution violated and the manner of such violation. This requirement is not a mere technicality; it is essential for defining the scope of the dispute, informing the respondents of the case they must meet, and guiding the court in its adjudication. 42. Upon a holistic reading of the Petition dated 7th August 2023, the Supporting Affidavit, and the subsequent affidavits and submissions, I find that the Petitioner has, perhaps not with elegant drafting but with sufficient clarity, met this threshold. The Petition and the accompanying documents, read together, articulate a coherent narrative. The Petitioner alleges that a decision was made to remove him from an elected office. He specifies that this was done without prior notice of the charges, without an agenda item to that effect, in his absence, and without affording him an opportunity to be heard or to present a defense. He further alleges being denied access to the official record (minutes) of that process and being removed from a communication platform. 43. He then maps these factual allegations onto specific constitutional provisions: the lack of notice and hearing is linked to Articles 47 (fair administrative action) and 50 (fair hearing); the denial of minutes and removal from the WhatsApp group is linked to Article 35 (access to information); the arbitrary nature of the process is linked to Article 27 (equality and freedom from discrimination); and the https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19345/eng@2025-12-17 7

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overall unlawfulness is linked to Article 10 (national values and principles). This is further elaborated in his written submissions. While the initial Petition could have been more meticulously drafted, the subsequent pleadings and submissions have cured any initial ambiguity. The Respondents, particularly the 2nd to 16th, have demonstrated a full understanding of the case against them, as evidenced by their detailed affidavits rebutting each allegation. The objection on specificity thus fails. Whether the Petitioner was required to exhaust the PPLC’s internal dispute resolution mechanisms before invoking this Court’s jurisdiction. 44. The doctrine of exhaustion of internal or alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is a sound principle of law that promotes subsidiarity, allows for specialized bodies to handle technical matters, and preserves judicial resources for matters that truly require judicial intervention. It is not, however, an absolute rule. The courts have consistently carved out exceptions where its application would lead to injustice or be impractical. In the case of Krystalline Salt Limited v Kenya Revenue Authority (2019) eKLR, the court discussed these exceptions as follows; “ What constitutes exceptional circumstances depends on the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the administrative action at issue. Thus, where an internal remedy would not be effective and/ or where its pursuit would be futile, a court may permit a litigant to approach the court directly. So too where an internal appellate tribunal has developed a rigid policy which renders exhaustion futile… The Fair Administrative Action Act does not define ‘exceptional circumstances’. However, this court interprets exceptional circumstances to mean circumstances that are out of the ordinary and that render it inappropriate for the court to require an applicant first to pursue the available internal remedies. The circumstances must in other words be such as to require the immediate intervention of the court rather than to resort to the applicable internal remedy.” 45. The Respondents urge this Court to follow the path of deference, citing the existence of a Legal and Disputes Resolution Sub-Committee within the PPLC. They present it as a competent, impartial forum capable of delivering justice. The Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that approaching this internal mechanism would be an exercise in futility and that the core of his complaint is a direct infringement of constitutional rights by the very structure he is being asked to appeal to. 46. The jurisprudence on this point provides clear guidance. In Republic v Kenya Revenue Authority Ex Parte Style Industries Limited (2019) KEHC 11965 (KLR), the Court of outlined the exceptions to the exhaustion rule, including: where the internal remedy is ineffective; where the complaint is a pure question of law; where the complaint raises a constitutional issue; and where there are allegations of bias or where the applicant stands to suffer irreparable harm. 47. The circumstances of this case fall squarely within these exceptions. First, the Petitioner’s case is fundamentally a constitutional one. He is not merely challenging the outcome of a disciplinary process on substantive grounds; he is challenging the very legality and constitutionality of the process ab initio. He alleges that the foundational steps; notice, hearing, agenda-setting, were so fundamentally flawed as to render the entire proceeding a nullity. A constitutional court is the primary guardian of constitutional rights and is best placed to determine whether the process met the constitutional standard under Article 47. 48. Second, there is a real question regarding the impartiality and adequacy of the internal mechanism in this specific context. The allegations involve the conduct of the Steering Committee Chairman and https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19345/eng@2025-12-17 8

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members. The body that initiated the discussion and presided over the allegedly flawed plenary session is the same body, or is intricately linked to the body, that would oversee the internal dispute mechanism. The perception of bias, if not the reality, is palpable. 49. In the case of Law Society of Kenya v Centre for Human Rights and Democracy and 13 others [2013] KECA 172 (KLR) in which the court cited with approval the case of Anisminic Limited vs the Foreign Compensation Commission and Another [1969] 2 A.C 147; [1969] 2 WLR 163; 113 S.J. 55; [1969] 1ALL ER 208, for the holding inter alia that: “ …Court would not hesitate to invoke their jurisdiction and intervene where the decision of a tribunal is shown to have been made in contravention of the principle on natural justice and good faith; has acted ultra vires its power; failed to do something in the course of the inquiry which is of such a nature that its decision was a nullity; made its decision in bad faith; made a decision which it had no power to make; misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted to it; refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account; or based its decision on some matter which under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account…” 50. Third, and critically, the Respondents’ own account of the events creates a jurisdictional paradox for the internal mechanism. They swear repeatedly that the Petitioner was not removed in Naivasha; rather, the matter was referred to the Legal Sub-Committee for a hearing. If that is their true position, then the Petitioner has no "removal" decision to appeal internally. His grievance is that a process was commenced against him in a manner that violated his rights. An internal committee constituted to hear a disciplinary case against him cannot provide a remedy for the constitutional violations that preceded its own convening. Its mandate would be to hear the merits of the allegations, not to nullify the process that brought him before it on constitutional grounds. The internal mechanism is therefore not an adequate or appropriate forum for the grievances raised in this Petition. 51. For these reasons, the plea for exhaustion of internal remedies is rejected. This Court has both the jurisdiction and the duty to entertain this constitutional petition. Whether the 1st Respondent and the 2nd to 16th Respondents are properly sued as parties to these proceedings. 52. Regarding the 1st Respondent, the argument that it does not "hold" the minutes and therefore has no obligation under the Access to Information Act is a narrow and technical reading of its role. Section 38 of the Political Parties Act establishes the PPLC and places it under the auspices of the Registrar. The 1st Respondent convenes PPLC meetings, as evidenced by the invitation letters annexed by the Petitioner. The 1st Respondent’s office provides the secretariat, and critically, it funds the PPLC’s activities using public funds. The Registrar also gazetted the Petitioner’s election. In the context of a constitutional petition alleging systemic procedural failures in a statutory body it oversees, the 1st Respondent is a proper and necessary party. Its inclusion allows for comprehensive orders that may touch on its regulatory and facilitative functions concerning the PPLC. 53. Regarding the 2nd to 16th Respondents, their argument that the PPLC should be sued as a body corporate has some legal merit. However, their dismissal as unnecessary parties is not sustainable. Constitutional litigation often seeks remedies against individuals whose actions or decisions are alleged to have caused the violation. The Petitioner alleges that these specific individuals, as members of the Steering Committee and participants in the plenary, acted collectively to violate his rights. He seeks declaratory orders against them. In cases of alleged infringement of constitutional rights, persons https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19345/eng@2025-12-17 9

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whose conduct is integral to the complaint can be properly joined. Their presence ensures that any orders made by the Court, such as orders prohibiting them from participating in or upholding an unlawful process, can be effectively enforced. Their joinder is therefore proper. Whether the process violated the Petitioner’s constitutional rights. 54. This is the heart of the dispute. The Court must evaluate the facts against the constitutional standard. The starting point is the supreme law itself. Article 47(1) provides: “Every person has the right to administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.” Article 50(1) guarantees every person the right to a fair hearing. These provisions have transformed administrative law in Kenya. 55. In Dry Associates Ltd v Capital Markets Authority & Another; Crown Berger (K) Ltd (Interested Party) [2012] eKLR Majanja J. observed as follows: “ Article 47 is intended to subject administrative processes to constitutional discipline hence relief for administrative grievances is no longer left to the realm of common law or judicial review under the Law Reform Act (Cap 26 of the Laws of Kenya) but is to be measured against the standards established by the Constitution.” 56. The principles of procedural fairness, or natural justice, are ingrained in these articles. They encompass the twin pillars of audi alteram partem (the right to be heard) and nemo judex in causa sua (the rule against bias). The right to be heard, as articulated by the Supreme Court in Kidero & 4 others v Waititu & 4 others [2014] KESC 11 (KLR) includes two elements: “(i) an opportunity of hearing must be given; and (ii) that opportunity must be reasonable.” Reasonableness entails adequate notice of the case to be met and a genuine chance to respond. 57. Applying this standard to the contested events of 20th June 2023, I make the following factual findings based on the evidence presented: a. It is not disputed that the Petitioner was absent from the Naivasha plenary. b. It is not disputed that his conduct was discussed, and serious allegations were presented against him, including financial misconduct and impersonation. c. The Petitioner alleges, and it is not conclusively rebutted, that “his removal” was not a precirculated agenda item. The Respondents’ affidavit suggests the topic was introduced as a fresh item from the floor, which was adopted. d. Most critically, there is no evidence whatsoever that before this discussion and the alleged decision (whether to remove or to refer), the Petitioner was formally notified of the specific allegations, provided with any evidence (such as the petition from Mr. Agufana or the WhatsApp screenshots), and invited to present a written or oral defense. 58. The Respondents’ defense is two-fold and, in my view, contradictory. In one breath, they swear that no removal decision was made; only a referral. In another, they present minutes from a later meeting stating the plenary "impeached" him. This contradiction itself points to a process in disarray. However, even accepting their primary narrative that the outcome was a “referral,” the process leading to that referral was fundamentally flawed. 59. Discussing a member’s conduct, with a view to initiating formal disciplinary proceedings, based on serious and reputation-damaging allegations, is itself an administrative action likely to adversely affect his rights and legitimate expectation to hold office. Such a discussion, which sets in motion a formal https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19345/eng@2025-12-17 10

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process, must be preceded by basic procedural safeguards. The member must know what he is accused of and have a chance to give his side of the story before the committee deliberates and makes a decision, even if that decision is to refer. To hold otherwise would allow a committee to be poisoned by one-sided allegations before any formal hearing, compromising the fairness of the entire subsequent process. This is precisely what the Constitution seeks to prevent. 60. The failure to afford the Petitioner any prior notice or opportunity to be heard before the Naivasha plenary deliberated on his conduct constitutes a clear breach of Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution. The action was procedurally unfair and unlawful. This finding aligns with the holding in Naado & 6 others (All Applicants Suing as Officials of Supreme Council 0f Kenya Muslism (SUPKEM)- Ex Parte Applicants) v Registrar of Societies; Nzibo & another (Interested Parties) [2024] KEHC 1819 (KLR), where the court emphasized that according a hearing before taking adverse action is no longer discretionary. It is firmly entrenched in our Constitution as an inviolable right, failure of which renders their actions unconstitutional, null and void. In arriving at this decision, the court stated thus; “ Thus, a person whose interests and rights are likely to be affected by an administrative action has a reasonable expectation that they will be given a hearing before any adverse action is taken as well as reasons for the adverse administrative action as provided under Article 47 (2) of the Constitution. Generally, one expects that all the precepts of natural justices are to be observed before a decision affecting his substantive rights or interest is reached. It is however also clear that in exercising its powers to superintend bodies and tribunals with a view to ensuring that Article 47 is promoted the court is not limited to the traditional judicial review grounds. The Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015 must be viewed in that light.” 61. On the alleged violation of Article 35 (access to information), the Petitioner’s removal from the Steering Committee WhatsApp group, ostensibly to curb harassment but which had the effect of limiting his access to operational communications, was a disproportionate measure, especially in the context of an ongoing dispute about his status. More pertinent is the confusion and opacity surrounding the official record of the Naivasha meeting. The production of conflicting, unsigned minutes, and the subsequent debate and insertion of an “impeachment” clause months later, create a cloud over what precisely was decided. This lack of a clear, accessible, and official record impedes the Petitioner’s ability to know the precise case against him, which is ancillary to his right to a fair hearing. While the primary breach is under Articles 47 and 50, the chaotic record-keeping contributes to the overall procedural unfairness. 62. Given the foundational finding of a breach of fair administrative action and fair hearing, it is unnecessary to make definitive findings on the alleged breaches of Articles 27 and 10 in this instance. The unlawfulness of the process is sufficient to dispose of the matter. However, it is trite that any administrative action that is arbitrary and devoid of lawful procedure offends the principles of the rule of law and good governance under Article 10. 63. I must also address the substantive allegations against the Petitioner. This Court’s role in this constitutional petition is not to determine whether the Petitioner misappropriated funds or facilitated impersonation. That would require a trial with viva voce evidence and cross-examination, which has not taken place. The Court’s finding is strictly on the process. The Respondents are not precluded from initiating a fresh, lawful disciplinary process based on these allegations, provided it complies fully with the constitutional dictates of fairness enshrined in Articles 47 and 50. 64. From the foregoing, I find and hold that the process undertaken by the Respondents, culminating in the discussions and decisions regarding the Petitioner’s conduct at the PPLC Plenary on 20th June 2023 and related subsequent actions, violated the Petitioner’s constitutional rights to fair administrative https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19345/eng@2025-12-17 11

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action and a fair hearing under Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution. The process was initiated and progressed without affording the Petitioner the basic tenets of natural justice: prior notice of the allegations and a reasonable opportunity to be heard. 65. A process that is constitutionally infirm from its inception cannot produce a valid outcome. Consequently, any decision, resolution, or step taken towards the removal or impeachment of the Petitioner as Deputy Organizing Secretary of the PPLC, arising from or connected to the proceedings of 20th June 2023, is hereby declared unconstitutional, unlawful, null and void ab initio. 66. The Petitioner remains the lawful holder of the office of Deputy Organizing Secretary of the PPLC Steering Committee, entitled to all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto until lawfully removed in accordance with a procedure that comports with the Constitution. 67. For the avoidance of doubt, this Judgment does not preclude the PPLC, through its appropriate organs, from instituting a fresh disciplinary process against the Petitioner based on the substantive allegations, provided that such a process is conducted in strict compliance with the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015, and the constitutional principles of fairness, including adequate notice, disclosure of evidence, and a full right to be heard before any adverse decision is made. 68. Consequently, this Honourable Court makes the following orders: a. A declaration be and is hereby issued that the process leading to the purported removal/ impeachment of the Petitioner, Isaiah Gichu Ndirangu, from the office of Deputy Organizing Secretary of the Political Parties Liaison Committee (PPLC) violated his rights under Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. b. A declaration be and is hereby issued that any resolution, decision, or step purporting to remove or impeach the Petitioner from the said office, made during or arising from the PPLC Plenary held on 20th June 2023 at Lake Naivasha Resort or any subsequent meeting (including the insertion of Clause Min/NPPLC/23/06/7), is unconstitutional, unlawful, null and void ab initio. c. An order of certiorari be and is hereby issued quashing the said unconstitutional and unlawful decision/resolution for the removal/impeachment of the Petitioner. d. An order of prohibition is hereby issued prohibiting the 1st to 16th Respondents, their agents, or any person acting under their authority from implementing, acting upon, or giving effect to the said unlawful decision. e. A mandatory order be and is hereby issued ordering that the Petitioner be and is hereby reinstated to the office of Deputy Organizing Secretary of the PPLC Steering Committee with immediate effect and the 1st Respondent shall take all necessary administrative steps, including but not limited to restoring the Petitioner’s access to all official PPLC communication forums (including the relevant WhatsApp groups) and recognizing him as the holder of that office in all official records and correspondence. f. No orders as to costs. Orders accordingly. File closed accordingly. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY THIS 17TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2025. BAHATI MWAMUYE MBS JUDGE https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19345/eng@2025-12-17 12

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In the presence of: The Petitioner in person- Mr. Isaiah Gichu Ndirangu Counsel for the 1st Respondent – Ms. Ndwiga h/b Mr. Wakoko Counsel for the 2nd to 16th Respondents – Ms. Nyakeriga Court Assistant – Ms. Lwambia HCCHRPETE285/2023 JDT Page 8 of 8 https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19345/eng@2025-12-17 13

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