Kingbros Kenya Limited & 1 other v Nairobi City County Government & 2 others

2. The Petition is vehemently opposed by the Respondents through a series of Replying Affidavits and Written Submissions, which posit that the impounding was a lawful enforcement action for nonpayment of county charges and that the Respondents are not liable for the damage caused by thirdparty rioters. 3. The factual matrix from which this dispute arises is largely uncontested, though the legal characterization and consequences are hotly disputed. The 1st Petitioner, Kingbros Kenya Limited, is a company in the business of transport and was contracted to supply and transport raw soapstone from Nyamira County to KEDA (K) Ceramics Co. Ltd in Kajiado County. The 2nd Petitioner, Paleah Stores Limited, is the registered owner of the subject motor vehicle KDJ 014Q and trailer ZF 4748, which was assigned to this task. 4. On 26th July 2024, while the vehicle was transiting through Nairobi County via the Eastern Bypass en route to Kajiado, it was stopped by officers of the Nairobi City County Government. The Petitioners' case is that the county officers made verbal demands for an unascertainable payment without providing any written basis, justification, or official demand. The driver, unable to comprehend the demand, declined to pay, following which the vehicle was impounded and towed to the County Government's yard near Wakulima House. 5. The Respondents' account, as deponed by Dr. John Ntoiti, the Interim CEO of the Nairobi Revenue Authority (3rd Respondent), is that the driver was evading payment of "approved charges" amounting to Kshs. 3,000 per trip as required under Section 8 of the Nairobi City County Finance Act, 2023, and its Schedule 3.6 for "Transport of quarry materials in and out of Nairobi." An invoice, No. BL-TP 36486, was allegedly generated but ignored by the driver, leading to the vehicle's impoundment. 6. The vehicle remained impounded for a period of 48 days. Crucially, on 12th September 2024, following the filing of this Petition, the Respondents contacted the Petitioners to collect the vehicle. Upon arrival at the yard, the Petitioners discovered that the vehicle and trailer had been extensively damaged by fire. The Respondents attribute this damage to a riot by traders of Wakulima Market, an event they claim was reported at Kamukunji Police Station. The Petitioners, however, hold the Respondents liable for this damage, citing negligence and a breach of the duty of care owed to them as the bailee of the vehicle. The Petitioner’s Case 7. The Petitioners, through the Amended Petition and the Supplementary Affidavit of their Director, Patrick Njiru Kuria, contend that the impoundment of their vehicle was unlawful, arbitrary, and unconstitutional. They anchor their case on several pillars. 8. First, they assert that the Respondents acted without any legal basis. They argue that Section 8 of the Nairobi City County Finance Act, 2023, and Schedule 3.6, upon which the Respondents rely, are inapplicable. They state that the schedule specifically concerns the "transport of quarry materials in and out of Nairobi," whereas their vehicle was merely transiting through Nairobi, with its journey originating in Nyamira and terminating in Kajiado. Furthermore, they contend that the material being transported, soapstone, is an industrial raw material, not a building material as contemplated by the Schedule. 9. The Petitioners allege a blatant violation of their right to fair administrative action under Article 47 of the Constitution and Section 4 of the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015. They state that at no point were they given written reasons for the impoundment or a formal demand for payment. The invoice (BL-TP 36486) presented by the Respondents in their affidavits is dismissed as an afterthought, https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19211/eng@2025-12-04 2

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conjured up for the purposes of litigation, and notably, it was never served upon the driver or the Petitioners at the material time. 10. The Petitioners posit that the impoundment constituted an unlawful deprivation of property contrary to Article 40 of the Constitution. They argue that even if there was a legitimate fee payable, which they deny, the act of impounding a multi-million-shilling asset over an alleged Kshs.3,000 debt is manifestly disproportionate and fails the proportionality test under Article 24 of the Constitution. 11. Further, the Petitioners claim that the unconditional release of the vehicle on 12th September 2024, without any demand for the purported arrears, is a tacit admission by the Respondents that the initial impoundment was unlawful. 12. Regarding the damage to the vehicle, the Petitioners contend that the Respondents, having taken custody of the vehicle, owed them a strict duty of care to ensure its safety. The fact that the vehicle was set ablaze while under the County's control is, in their view, prima facie evidence of negligence for which the Respondents must be held liable. 13. Consequently, the Petitioners seek several reliefs, including declarations that their constitutional rights were violated, compensation for loss of use at Kshs.120,000 per day from 26th July 2024 until when the motor vehicle is repaired and ready to resume work, and compensation for the damage to the vehicle assessed at Kshs. 1,114,424.81. The Respondents’ Case The 1st Respondent’s case 14. The 1st Respondent’s case is primarily advanced through the affidavits of Dr. John Ntoiti of the Nairobi Revenue Authority. On the legality of the impoundment, the 1st Respondent maintains that the action was a lawful enforcement of the Nairobi City County Finance Act, 2023. It depones that the driver of the vehicle was obligated to pay "approved charges" and was presented with an invoice which he ignored. It further alleges that the vehicle was listed as a defaulter for multiple previous trips, thus justifying the enforcement action. It characterizes the Petitioners' refusal to pay as an evasion of lawful county revenue. 15. Further, it is deponed that since the vehicle was impounded, it was taken to the County yard where it continued to attract more charges on impounding fees, storage fees and towing charges. Additionally, it is averred that after the vehicle was impounded, there was no communication from the said motor vehicle owners nor did they visit the Nairobi County offices to make payments as required by the County Law which resulted the vehicle to remain at the yard. 16. It is the 1st Respondent’s case that on 12th September, 2024 traders of Wakulima Market staged a riot against their relocation by the 1st Respondent which resulted in vandalizing of both County Government assets and private properties among them being the subject motor vehicle KDJ O14Q and Trailer ZF 4748 stored in the County’s yard. It is averred that as a result of the damage, the Petitioner’s Director engaged the County on urgent mitigating measures which resulted to the release of the motor vehicle and trailer to the Petitioners for safe custody. 17. It is also averred that the 1st Respondent cannot be blamed for the damages caused to the subject motor vehicle as the same was not done by its officers or agents. Moreover, it is argued that the amount claimed by the Petitioners is exaggerated. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19211/eng@2025-12-04 3

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The 2nd Respondent’s Case 18. The 2nd Respondent, through Dr. Machel Waikenda, filed a separate Replying Affidavit whose central purpose is to disassociate himself and his department from the entire dispute. His case is one of mistaken identity and lack of jurisdiction. 19. He avers that his department, the Department of Mobility, is not responsible for the oversight or management of the impound yard where the vehicle was detained. He states that this function falls squarely under the jurisdiction of the Department of Revenue, which is managed by the Nairobi Revenue Authority. 20. Consequently, he depones that he is "a stranger to the facts in this petition" and considers himself a wrongfully enjoined party. His singular prayer is for this Honourable Court to dismiss the case as against him, or in the alternative, to have his name struck out from the proceedings as his inclusion is "misconceived, mischievous and bad in law.” The 3rd Respondent’s Case 21. The case for the 3rd Respondent is intrinsically tied to and presented through the same evidence as the 1st Respondent, given that Dr. John Ntoiti is its CEO. However, its distinct position can be discerned from the affidavits sworn by Dr. John Ntoiti in his official capacity. 22. The 3rd Respondent anchors its defence on its statutory mandate to monitor and administer the county revenue streams. 23. In a Supplementary Affidavit, the 3rd Respondent sought to make a technical correction, clarifying that the payment demanded was "Approved Charges" and not "cess," in an attempt to align its actions more precisely with the county legislation. Petitioners’ Submissions 24. The Petitioners, in their written submissions, crystallized their arguments around three key issues. They relied heavily on the case of Patrick Kamotho King’ori v Inspector General of Police & 4 others [2019] eKLR to emphasize the duty of state agencies to notify an owner of the reasons for impounding a vehicle and to follow due process. 25. It was submitted that the Respondents never gave the Petitioners the reason for impounding the vehicle which is contrary to the provisions of Section 4 (2) of the Fair Administrative Actions Act. Additionally, it was argued that there is no connection between the decision to impound the motor vehicle, the fees claimed and the actual fees payable under the law relied upon by the County. Moreover, it submitted that the Respondent has not pointed to the law empowering them impound motor vehicles thus making their decision to be irrational and arbitrary. They relied on the case of Moses Kipkoech Rotich v Kenya National Highways Authority & 7 others [2018] eKLR, where the court found that impounding a vehicle without justification violates the rights to property and fair administrative action. 26. On proportionality, they invoked the decision in Jacqueline Okuta & another v Attorney General & 2 others [2017] eKLR, arguing that impounding a vehicle over a Kshs. 3,000 claim is a grossly disproportionate measure that fails the constitutional limitation test under Article 24. 27. For the claim of loss of use, Counsel referenced the decision in Musembi v County Government of Kitui & 4 others [2024] eKLR, which affirmed that compensation is awardable for loss of business https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19211/eng@2025-12-04 4

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due to wrongful impoundment. They urged the court to award Kshs.5,760,000 based on their uncontroverted evidence of earning Kshs. 120,000 daily for the period of 48 days between 26th July, 2024 and 12th September 2024 when the vehicle was unconditionally released. 28. On the liability for the fire damage, Counsel reiterated the principle from the Musembi v County Government of Kitui & 4 Others (supra) that the detaining authority has an obligation to secure vehicles in its yard and cannot escape liability for vandalism. Respondents’ Submissions 29. The Respondents, in their joint submissions, focused on the failure of the Petitioners to discharge their legal burden of proof. They analogized from criminal law principles in Pius Arap Maina v Republic (2013) eKLR and Benard Odongo Ogutu v Republic (2018) eKLR, arguing that the Petitioners have not provided evidence to prove the alleged constitutional violations beyond any doubt. They placed particular reliance on Mbuvi Kasina v Attorney General & another, Petition E369 of 2021, where this court held that a petitioner must prove that their fundamental rights and freedoms were violated and must also demonstrate malice and improper motive and that mere confinement is not, in itself, a constitutional violation. 30. On the issue of damages, Counsel cited the decision in David Bagine v Martin Bundi Civil Appeal 283 of 1998, emphasizing that special damages must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved, and that "throwing figures at a judge" without proof is insufficient. 31. It was also submitted that the Petitioners have failed to disclose all material facts on the day the vehicle was impounded. It is argued that the driver hid some facts as they refused to pay county revenue as expected when they were asked to pay and instead opted to run away until he was stopped by the county officials after a chase. 32. They maintained that the fire was caused by rioters, an event outside their control, and that the Petitioners' recourse, if any, lies with their insurers. Analysis And Issues For Determination 33. Having carefully considered the pleadings, affidavits, and submissions of the parties, the following issues fall for this court's determination: SUBPARA i. Whether the impounding and detention of Motor Vehicle KDJ 014Q and Trailer ZF 4748 by the Respondents was lawful and constitutional. SUBPARA ii. Whether the Respondents are liable for the damage caused to the vehicle by fire while it was in their custody. SUBPARA iii. Whether the Petitioners are entitled to the reliefs sought. Whether the impounding and detention of Motor Vehicle KDJ 014Q and Trailer ZF 4748 by the Respondents was lawful and constitutional 34. The starting point is Article 40 of the Constitution, which guarantees every person the right to acquire and own property and that no person shall be deprived of property of any description unless the deprivation is for a public purpose or in the public interest and is carried out in accordance with https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19211/eng@2025-12-04 5

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the Constitution and an Act of Parliament. The act of impounding a vehicle is a clear deprivation of property, albeit temporary. Therefore, the Respondents, as state agencies, bore the burden of demonstrating that this deprivation was justified under a clear written law and was executed in a manner consistent with constitutional norms. 35. The Respondents have pinned their justification entirely on Section 8 of the Nairobi City County Finance Act, 2023, and specifically Schedule 3.6, which imposes charges for the "Transport of quarry materials in and out of Nairobi." Upon a thorough scrutiny of the facts and the law, this justification is fundamentally flawed and cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. 36. First, there is a profound disconnect between the law cited and its application to the Petitioners. The vehicle was transporting soapstone from Nyamira to Kajiado. It was not transporting materials into or out of Nairobi for use within Nairobi; it was merely in transit. The Respondents have not pointed to any legal provision that empowers them to levy a charge on goods that are merely passing through the county without their origin, destination, or point of consumption being within Nairobi. To impose such a levy would, in fact, risk contravening Article 209(5) of the Constitution, which prohibits county taxation that prejudices the national mobility of goods. The attempt to force the Petitioners' circumstances into the narrow confines of Schedule 3.6 is, with respect, a legal mischaracterization. 37. Second, and more fatally, is the complete absence of due process. Article 47 of the Constitution and Section 4 of the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015, mandate that every person has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair. Where an administrative action is likely to adversely affect a person's rights, that person must be given prior and adequate notice, a right to be heard, and written reasons for the decision. 38. Article 47(1) provides: “ 1. Every person has the right to administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. 2. If a right or fundamental freedom of a person has been or is likely to be adversely affected by administrative action, the person has the right to be given written reasons for the action” 39. The right to fair administrative action forms part of the Bill of Rights in the constitution, which is a set of values and principles aimed at protecting everyone. These rights must be respected and protected and may not be violated by any individual, institution, or government. The right to fair administrative action is now anchored in the Constitution, the Constitution having clearly declared it a right and everyone has to enjoy it just like any of the many fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights. This basic right aims to ensure that government or institutional administrators make decisions in a fair way. Any contemplated administrative action must therefore be subject to the constitutional standard set in Article 47(1). The right to fair hearing which had its foundation in common law, has attained constitutional basis. It is now a constitutional requirement that anybody who takes administrative action, must do so expeditiously, act reasonably and be procedurally fair. 40. Under Article 47 (2) of the Constitution as read with the provisions of the Fair Administrative Actions Act of 2015, the common law position that there is no duty to give reasons for administrative decision is no longer a general principle of law in Kenya. A shift has taken place and there is requirement to give reasons for administrative decisions. In Judicial Service Commission v Hon. Justice Mutava Mbalu, Civil Appeal No. 52 of 2014, Githinji JA in considering the duty to give reasons for administrative action in light of Article 47 (2) of the Constitution expressed that reasons for decision should be given as a matter of right where a right under the Bill of Rights has been or is likely to be adversely affected by https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19211/eng@2025-12-04 6

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the administrative action and not otherwise; that the right to be given written reasons for the decision can be limited by law for a reasonable and justifiable cause. 41. Article 47 (2) of the Constitution as read with Sections 4 (3) (d) and 5 (d) (i) and 6 (2) (a) and 6 (4) of the Fair Administrative Action Act require written reasons for administrative decision. Section 6 (1) as read with Section 6 (2) (a) of the Act stipulates that every person materially or adversely affected by any administrative action has a right to be supplied with such information as may be necessary and such information shall include reasons for which the action was taken and any relevant documents relating to the matter. Sections 3(d), 5 (d) (i) and 6 (2) (a) and 6 (4) of the Fair Administrative Act encompass a statutory obligation upon decision-makers to give written reasons for their decisions. This contrasts with common law that had stopped short of requiring reasons for all administrative decisions. 42. Article 47 has raised the bar in administrative action to make it responsive to constitutional requirement that administrative actions to be taken, meet the constitutional threshold of procedural fairness thus protecting the fundamental rights of person(s) against whom administrative action is taken or contemplated. 43. The fact that fair administrative action is a constitutional right was emphasized in the South African case of President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others (CCT 16/98)2000(1) SAI thus“ The right to a just administrative action is now entrenched as a constitutional control over the exercise of power. Principles previously established by the common law will be important though not necessarily decisive, in determining not only the scope of section 33, but also its content. The principal function of section 33 is to regulate conduct of the public administration, and, in particular, to ensure that where action taken by the administration affects or threatens individuals, the procedures followed comply with constitutional standards of administrative justice…” (emphasis) 44. In the instant case, the evidence before this court is that the driver was confronted with a verbal demand. There is no credible evidence that the invoice (BL-TP 36486) was ever issued to or served upon the driver at the scene. Its production for the first time in these proceedings renders it a selfserving document, an afterthought crafted to legitimize an otherwise arbitrary action. As held in Patrick Kamotho King’ori v Inspector General of Police & 4 others (supra), the police (and by analogy, other state enforcement agencies) have a duty to serve the affected person with papers demonstrating the reason for impounding. In arriving at the position, the court stated as follows; “ Be that as it may, it is not denied by the respondents that as at the time the motor vehicle was impounded it was in the possession of the petitioner. There is no evidence that the police made any effort to investigate the manner in which he came to be in possession of the said motor vehicle, neither did they serve him with any papers to demonstrate the reason for the impounding and detention. We live in a country governed by the rule of law. If the petitioner was in violation of any law by being in possession of the said motor vehicle, then it was beholden on the police to inform him and to follow the proper procedures to take the motor vehicle away from him.” https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19211/eng@2025-12-04 7

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45. The Respondents' failure to do so was a gross violation of the Petitioners' right to fair administrative action and right to property as rightly observed further by the court in the case of Paris Mutwiri John v Base Commander Maua Traffic Base and another [2021] eKLR. In holding so, the court stated thus; “ This Court thus finds that there was indeed infringement of the Petitioner’s right to property by the very act of impounding the Petitioner’s motor vehicle without any lawful justification. This Court adds that the impoundment was arbitrary, and a direct contravention of the provisions of Article 40 (2) (a) of the Constitution.” 46. Furthermore, the Respondents' power to impound a vehicle for the non-payment of such a charge is not apparent from the cited law. Even if such a power were implied, its exercise in this manner, without a written demand, without a notice of violation, and without affording the owner an opportunity to contest or pay the charge, renders the administrative action procedurally ultra vires and substantively unfair. 47. The Respondents' reliance on criminal law principles is misplaced. This is a constitutional matter where the Petitioners allege that the State's actions have violated their fundamental rights. The standard is not "proof beyond reasonable doubt" but on a balance of probabilities. The Petitioners have provided a prima facie case of arbitrary action. The evidentiary burden then shifted to the Respondents to justify their conduct, which they have failed to do. The case of Mbuvi Kasina v Attorney General & another (supra) is distinguishable as it involved an arrest, where different considerations apply. In cases of property deprivation, the state must positively demonstrate the legal basis and procedural regularity of its actions. 48. The subsequent unconditional release of the vehicle, without any demand for the purported Kshs. 3,000 or the accumulated impounding fees, is conduct that speaks volumes. It is a compelling indicator that the Respondents themselves recognized the legal infirmity of their position. A lawful impoundment for a debt would logically culminate in the payment of that debt or a court order for its recovery, not a silent, unconditional release. 49. Consequently, I find and hold that the impounding and subsequent detention of the Petitioners' motor vehicle from 26th July 2024 to 12th September 2024 was unlawful, arbitrary, and in violation of the Petitioners' right to property under Article 40 and their right to fair administrative action under Article 47 of the Constitution. Whether the Respondents are liable for the damage caused to the vehicle by fire while it was in their custody 50. The principle of bailment is central to this issue. When the Respondents took possession of the Petitioners' vehicle, a bailment relationship was created. The Respondents, as the bailee, owed a duty of care to the Petitioners, as the bailor, to take reasonable measures to protect the vehicle from loss or damage. The standard of care expected is high, given that the bailment was involuntary and for the bailee's own purposes of enforcement. 51. The vehicle was in the Respondents' secure yard. It was set ablaze and extensively damaged. The Respondents' defence is that this was an act of rioters, a vis major, for which they are not liable. However, the legal doctrine of res ipsa loquitur ("the thing speaks for itself") is applicable here. A vehicle securely stored in a county government yard does not ordinarily get set ablaze in the absence of some negligence on the part of the custodian. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19211/eng@2025-12-04 8

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52. The Respondents had a non-delegable duty to provide adequate security for the property they had seized. The mere assertion that rioters were responsible, is insufficient to discharge their evidential burden. They have not demonstrated what security measures were in place, how the rioters gained access, or what steps were taken to prevent or mitigate the damage. As eloquently stated in the Musembi v County Government of Kitui & 4 others (supra), which this court finds highly persuasive, the detaining authority cannot escape liability otherwise how else would someone organize security of his detained vehicles at a Police Station yard? The court in the above matter stated thus in making its decision; “ This court also finds that the 4th Defendant cannot escape liability, because it is quite apparent from the evidence tendered that the lorry was later driven from the county yard to the Police Station without notifying the owner. There is no way the Police can claim that they were not aware of who took the lorry there. The lorry was not a small vehicle not to be noticed. It is a huge lorry as per D exhibit 1 and was reported to be carrying thirty (30) tons of sand. It was obviously quite conspicuous at the Police Station and there is no way any Police Officer at Kitui Police Station can claim ignorance of the same being parked at that station.” By detaining the lorry in their yard or allowing the County to detain the lorry at the Police Station, the 4th Defendant assumed responsibility for the security of the lorry. The 4th Defendant is under an obligation to ensure that there is security to the vehicles detained in their yard. The owners of such vehicles have legitimate expectation that their detained vehicles are secured and if the owner suffers loss due to vandalism of the detained vehicle then the Police should be held liable. They cannot escape liability otherwise how else would someone organize security of his detained vehicles at a Police Station yard? If such was to happen, there would be chaos and insecurity at Police Station with each owner organizing for his/her own security of their detained vehicles. The Kenya Police Service must therefore style up and live up to their mandate under the Constitution & National Police Service Act by securing the properties of the people and particularly those they have detained for whatever reason..” 53. The Respondents' attempt to frame this as a mutual agreement for release to mitigate damage does not absolve them; it implicitly admits that their yard was no longer secure. The Petitioners' director has denied any such agreement, and even if it existed, it would only underscore the Respondents' failure in their primary duty of care. 54. Therefore, I find the Respondents liable for the damage caused to the Petitioners' vehicle and trailer by fire while under their custody. Their negligence and breach of duty of care are established on a balance of probabilities. Whether the Petitioners are entitled to the reliefs sought 55. Having found violations of constitutional rights and liability in negligence, the court must fashion an appropriate remedy under Article 23(3) of the Constitution. 56. The Petitioners seek compensation for loss of use at Kshs. 120,000 per day. This is a claim for special damages. The Respondents are correct that such damages must be strictly proved. The Petitioners have provided an invoice and proof of payment (Annex PN8) demonstrating a transaction worth Kshs. 120,000. While this is not conclusive proof of daily loss, it provides a credible basis for the claimed rate, and the Respondents did not challenge this evidence with any contrary data. In comparable cases, https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19211/eng@2025-12-04 9

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courts have awarded global sums for loss of use. Guided by Musembi v County Government of Kitui & 4 others (supra), Patrick Kamotho King’ori v Inspector General of Police & 4 others (supra), Moses Kipkoech Rotich v Kenya National Highways Authority & 7 others (supra), and Paris Mutwiri John v Base Commander Maua Traffic Base & another (supra) and considering the period of 48 days, an award of Kshs. 1,500,000 for the unlawful deprivation of property and loss of use is fair and just compensation in the circumstances. 57. For the physical damage to the vehicle, the Petitioners have provided an assessment report from Mobikey Trucks and Bus Limited quantifying the cost of repair at Kshs. 1,114,424.81. The Respondents dismissed this as a "quotation," but it is a detailed assessment from a relevant industry player. In the absence of any contrary assessment from the Respondents, this court accepts it as a reasonable and credible quantification of the loss. This amount, being special damages, is specifically pleaded and proved to the required standard. The Petitioners are entitled to Kshs. 1,114,424.81. 58. The Petitioners are also entitled to a declaration that their rights under Articles 40 and 47 were violated. A permanent injunction restraining the Respondents from impounding their vehicles without a formal, written, and lawful reason is also warranted to prevent a recurrence of such arbitrary conduct. 59. From the foregoing, the Petition is meritorious. The Respondents acted high-handedly, without a clear legal mandate, and in blatant disregard of the Petitioners' constitutional rights. Their subsequent negligence led to the destruction of the Petitioners' property. The rule of law demands accountability for such actions. 60. Consequently, I enter judgment for the Petitioners against the Respondents jointly and severally, and hereby issue the following final orders: a. A declaration be and is hereby issued that the impounding and detention of Motor Vehicle Registration Number KDJ 014Q and Trailer ZF 4748 by the Respondents on 26th July 2024 was unlawful and violated the Petitioners' rights under Article 40 and Article 47 of the Constitution of Kenya. b. A permanent injunction be and is hereby issued restraining the Respondents, their agents, or anyone acting under their authority from impounding, towing, withholding, or detaining the Petitioners' Motor Vehicle KDJ 014Q and Trailer ZF 4748, or any other vehicles belonging to the Petitioners, without providing a formal, written demand and reason that is explicitly justified under a specific written law. c. The 1st and 3rd Respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay the Petitioners compensation for the unlawful impoundment and loss of use in the sum of Kshs.1,500,000/=. d. The 1st and 3rd Respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay the Petitioners the sum of Kshs.1,114,424.81 as damages for the repair of the vehicle and trailer. e. The sums awarded in (c) and (d) above shall attract interest at court rates from the date of this judgment until payment in full. f. The Respondents shall bear the costs of this Petition. It is so ordered. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY THIS 4TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2025. ............................................ BAHATI MWAMUYE MBS https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19211/eng@2025-12-04 10

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JUDGE https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/19211/eng@2025-12-04 11

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