Benson Limo v Directorate of Criminal Investigations & 2 others

2. The Petitioner contends that the Respondents have been conducting investigations against him in a manner that is unconstitutional and unlawful. He alleges that the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) and the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC), acting jointly and severally, have subjected him to intimidation, intrusive searches of his property and private affairs, and unwarranted threats of arrest without proper justification. The Petitioner maintains that the contemplated prosecution arising from these investigations is bereft of any factual or legal foundation and is, in his view, actuated by bad faith. 3. He further avers that the investigative measures complained of have infringed his right to privacy, contrary to Article 31 of the Constitution, by subjecting him to unreasonable search and seizure. He contends that the threatened arrest, if effected, would violate his rights to liberty, dignity, and fair process as guaranteed under Articles 29, 28, 49, and 50 of the Constitution. The Petitioner expresses apprehension that the criminal process is being invoked not for the advancement of any legitimate public interest in law enforcement, but rather as an instrument of victimisation, harassment, or the pursuit of ulterior motives. 4. Consequently, the Petitioner prays for declarations that the intended arrest and prosecution violate his constitutional rights and are therefore null and void. He seeks conservatory orders to restrain the Respondents from arresting or charging him in respect of the matters under investigation, and a permanent injunction to bar any continued harassment or infringement of his rights by the Respondents. The Petitioner also urges the Court to find that the Respondents’ conduct has amounted to an abuse of legal process, and to grant any other appropriate relief including, if applicable, damages or such orders as would vindicate his rights. 5. The Respondents oppose the petition and deny any wrongful conduct. In their replying affidavits and submissions, the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) and the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) assert that they have been lawfully exercising their investigatory mandates upon receiving credible complaints implicating the Petitioner in wrongdoing. They aver that all investigative steps undertaken have been lawful, and, in particular, that any searches or seizures of the Petitioner’s property were executed pursuant to valid search warrants or in exercise of statutory authority. In their view, these circumstances negate any suggestion of unlawful intrusion into the Petitioner’s privacy. The Respondents contend that there is prima facie evidence of wrongdoing, and probable cause to justify the Petitioner’s apprehension and possible prosecution. They maintain that, should the Petitioner ultimately be charged, his rights under Article 49 and Article 50 of the Constitution will be fully safeguarded, and he will be afforded a fair opportunity to challenge the evidence presented against him in accordance with due process. 6. The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), for his part, underscores his constitutional independence and mandate under Article 157 of the Constitution to institute and undertake criminal proceedings. He submits that no charges have, to date, been preferred against the Petitioner; however, should a decision to prosecute ultimately be taken, such a decision will be informed exclusively by the evidence and the applicable law, and not by any extraneous or improper considerations. The Director of Public Prosecutions contends that the Petitioner is, in effect, inviting this Court to second-guess or pre-empt the constitutionally ordained prosecutorial discretion in the absence of any concrete or demonstrable violation of rights. 7. The Respondents collectively argue that the petition is premature and devoid of merit, characterising it as an attempt by the Petitioner to forestall or derail lawfully conducted investigations and to insulate himself from due process. They urge this Court not to interfere with ongoing investigations or any https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/17811/eng@2025-05-22 2

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prospective prosecution except upon a clear showing of a constitutional infraction, which, in their view, the Petitioner has failed to establish. 8. It is noteworthy that at the outset of this petition, the Petitioner sought interim conservatory orders to bar his arrest and any further investigatory actions pending the determination of the petition. After inter-partes hearing of the application, the Court declined to grant orders halting the investigation or possible arrest, instead directing the Respondents to act within the confines of the law and to ensure the Petitioner’s rights are upheld should any arrest occur. The matter then proceeded to full hearing on the merits of the petition, leading to this judgment. 9. Having considered the pleadings, evidence and submissions, the Court has identified these issues for determination: a. Whether the intended arrest and/or prosecution of the Petitioner violates the Constitution or any statutory law. b. Whether the conduct of the Respondents; specifically, the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI), Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC), and Director of Public Prosecutions DPP amounts to victimisation, harassment, or a breach of the Petitioner’s privacy rights. Whether the intended arrest and/or prosecution of the Petitioner violates the Constitution or statutory law. 10. The Petitioner contends that the involvement of the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) in probing what he describes as a corruption-related matter rendered the investigative process unlawful. This argument, however, finds no support in the governing legal framework. On the contrary, the Court is satisfied that both the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) and the Ethics and AntiCorruption Commission (EACC) acted within the ambit of their lawful mandates in conducting the investigations in question. No evidence has been tendered to demonstrate that either agency acted ultra vires or exceeded the authority conferred upon them by statute. 11. It is not disputed that a complaint was lodged, or information received, implicating the Petitioner in conduct amounting to a criminal offence. Under Kenyan law, the police, through the Directorate of Criminal Investigations, bear a statutory duty to investigate reported crimes, while the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission is similarly mandated to inquire into allegations of corruption. Upon consideration of the material placed before the Court including the formal complaint, inquiry reports, and relevant correspondence the Court is persuaded that both agencies had a reasonable and lawful basis upon which to commence and pursue the investigations. 12. The legal threshold for the commencement of an investigation or the effecting of an arrest is the existence of a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that an offence has been, or is about to be, committed. This standard while appreciably lower than that required for conviction must nevertheless be anchored in ascertainable facts. In the present matter, the Respondents have demonstrated that there existed specific allegations, including the alleged irregular award of a tender to a company associated with the Petitioner and the presence of substantial, unexplained funds in the Petitioner’s bank account, which reasonably warranted investigative scrutiny. The presence of these allegations, coupled with the initial evidentiary material placed before the investigating agencies, sufficiently rebuts the Petitioner’s assertion that the investigative process is unfounded or devoid of basis. The Court is persuaded that the Respondents have established probable cause adequate to justify the investigative steps taken in respect of the Petitioner. It follows, therefore, that any arrest or charge that may arise from these investigations would rest upon a factual and lawful foundation, rather than upon any improper or illegal motive. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/17811/eng@2025-05-22 3

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13. The Petitioner’s case is principally anchored on hypothetical assertions namely, that should he be arrested, his constitutional rights would inevitably be violated because, in his estimation, any prosecution against him would be unjustified. This Court must, however, underscore that constitutional adjudication is grounded in evidence, not conjecture or speculation. The proper inquiry is whether the Petitioner has demonstrated, to the requisite standard, that the decision or the anticipated decision to arrest and charge him amounts, in itself, to a violation of the Constitution. The Petitioner has not established that any prospective decision by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to charge him would be actuated by an improper purpose or reached in disregard of the legal and constitutional standards governing prosecutorial discretion. Indeed, at the time of the hearing of this petition, the Director of Public Prosecutions had not rendered a conclusive decision on the matter, which fact in itself suggests that the Director of Public Prosecutions was still actively and independently evaluating the evidence, as mandated by Article 157(11) of the Constitution. The Petitioner’s apprehension that the Director of Public Prosecutions “will rubber-stamp the Directorate of Criminal Investigations’ recommendations” remains unsupported by any concrete or persuasive proof. 14. There is no indication that the Director of Public Prosecutions has been pressured or directed by any external entity; to the contrary, the Director of Public Prosecutions avowed his independence and adherence to the law, which this Court has no reason to doubt on the record before it. It is a wellestablished principle that courts must proceed on the presumption that constitutional office holders, such as the Director of Public Prosecutions, will discharge their duties in a manner consistent with the Constitution and the law, unless cogent and credible evidence is adduced to demonstrate otherwise. In Asha v DPP [2023] KEHC, the High Court observed that while the Director of Public Prosecution’s actions are open to challenge, any such challenge “can only succeed if he or she demonstrates that the decision of the Director of Public Prosecutions is not in the public interest or in the interests of justice but is an abuse of the court process.” No such demonstration has been made here. 15. The Petitioner cites prayers of rights Articles 27 (equality), 28 (dignity), 47 (fair administrative action), 49 (rights of arrested persons), 50 (fair trial) but failed to substantiate how exactly these rights have been or will be violated by a lawful arrest and prosecution. The act of being arrested or prosecuted, per se, is not a violation of fundamental rights if done in accordance with the law. Indeed, the Bill of Rights does not confer immunity from criminal process; rather it ensures that the process, if triggered, is conducted fairly and with respect for individual rights. The Petitioner’s rights under Article 49 and 50 are well-catered for within the criminal justice system. 16. For example, upon arrest he must be informed of the reason and brought to court within 24 hours. There is nothing on the record to suggest that the Respondents intend to act contrary to these constitutional safeguards. At trial, he would enjoy the presumption of innocence and all due process guarantees. It would be speculative at this stage to conclude that a trial court would not uphold these rights. The constitutional structure is that trial courts are the first defenders of an accused’s fair trial rights, and any lapses can be corrected on appeal. Thus, unless there is clear evidence that a trial would be a sham which is not alleged here, the Court should allow the ordinary mechanisms to operate. The Supreme Court of Kenya in the Supreme Court Petition No. 15 of 2022, has reiterated that constitutional petitions should not be misused to micro-manage or pre-empt the use of powers granted by law to other entities, unless a very clear case of abuse is made out. 17. One of the Petitioner’s grievances is that the evidence gathered (financial records, etc.) was obtained in violation of his privacy rights, implying that using such evidence would render the prosecution unconstitutional. The proper forum to challenge the admissibility or legality of evidence is the trial court. Article 50(4) provides that any evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right or https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/17811/eng@2025-05-22 4

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fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall be excluded if its admission would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. This means the Petitioner already has a guaranteed remedy in law if indeed evidence was procured through unconstitutional means: he can apply to have it excluded from the trial. It is not necessary nor appropriate for this Court at this stage to impugn the entire prosecution on the basis of an evidence-gathering complaint. 18. The Petitioner did not demonstrate that the investigators acted outside the legal processes provided for obtaining bank records or search warrants. The Respondents produced copies of the warrants and court orders they obtained. Even if, arguendo, some procedural lapse occurred which is not evident here, that alone would not justify stopping the prosecution; the trial judge could address it by excluding evidence or even terminating the case if a fair trial is impossible. The High Court in Mwangi v DPP [2024] KEHC cautioned that a constitutional court should not usurp the function of the trial court by evaluating the sufficiency of evidence or the propriety of evidence gathering, as doing so would entail prematurely deciding issues reserved for the trial. The role here is to ensure the process is lawful, not to scrutinize every piece of evidence as would be done in the trial. 19. While the law does not bar one from approaching a constitutional court to prevent an apprehended violation of rights, the timing and context matter. The criminal process has many built-in safeguards and opportunities for redress. For instance, if the Petitioner is charged and believes the charge is groundless or abusive, he can make an application before the trial magistrate for the case to be struck out as an abuse of process, or even move the High Court for revision or judicial review at that point with a more concrete foundation. In Kuria & 3 Others v Attorney General, it was held that the High Court ought not interfere with prosecutorial powers unless it is shown that the prosecution is instituted for reasons other than the honest enforcement of the law, or that it is oppressive. 20. This principle has been consistently upheld and was expressly reiterated in Kipngeno arap Ngeny, High Court Civil Application No. 406 of 2001, wherein it was recognized that an oppressive or vexatious prosecution may be restrained by the Court. It is, however, critical to note that mere inconvenience to the accused, or anxiety arising from the prospect of prosecution, does not meet this threshold, as such experiences are inherent in being subject to the law. In the present petition, the Petitioner’s allegations of oppression or abuse of power remain unsubstantiated. The evidence on record demonstrates that the Respondents are engaged in the lawful pursuit of a legitimate investigation into potential criminal conduct. Accordingly, the exercise of the Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction to quash a prosecution that has not yet been instituted would amount to overreach and would be manifestly premature. 21. Article 157(11) of the Constitution obliges the Director of Public Prosecutions to have regard to both the public interest and the interests of the administration of justice when determining whether to institute criminal proceedings. In parallel, the Court must also take into account the public interest in considering whether to grant the reliefs sought by the Petitioner. There exists a compelling public interest in the investigation and prosecution of corruption and economic crimes, given their corrosive impact on society and governance. The public rightly expects that alleged offenders, particularly public officers accused of abuse of office, be subjected to due process and, if found guilty, be held accountable. Equally, the public interest entails the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights and the rule of law; no person may lawfully be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful treatment, even in the pursuit of legitimate law enforcement objectives. 22. In the present case, the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any instance of unlawful treatment; all available indications suggest that the Respondents have acted, and will continue to act, within the bounds of the law. In these circumstances, the public interest favours allowing the investigative and prosecutorial processes to take their course, thereby providing a forum in which the veracity of the allegations against the Petitioner can be duly tested. To halt the prosecution absent clear and https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/17811/eng@2025-05-22 5

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compelling cause would risk conveying the regrettable impression that public officers may evade accountability through premature judicial intervention an outcome plainly contrary to the public interest. The Court finds resonance with the position articulated in Environment & Land Case 16 of 2019 (Nakuru), wherein it was emphasised that courts must exercise caution so as not to stifle lawful investigations, as doing so may occasion an injustice to the public by shielding potential offenders from due accountability. 23. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Petitioner has not established that the initiation of criminal proceedings against him would constitute a violation of the Constitution or any statute. Any intended arrest, if effected in accordance with the assurances provided by the Respondents and with full respect for the Petitioner’s rights under Article 49 of the Constitution, would be lawful. Similarly, any prosecution contemplated, subject to the Director of Public Prosecutions satisfying the requisite evidentiary and public interest thresholds, would likewise be lawful. The Petitioner continues to enjoy the presumption of innocence, together with the full complement of fair trial rights, all of which remain inviolate. Nothing placed before this Court suggests that the conduct of a trial would, in and of itself, result in a breach of his constitutional rights. It bears emphasis that an accused person’s rights are not suspended during the trial process; rather, they are actively safeguarded and enforced by the trial court. Consequently, the mere act of prosecuting the Petitioner cannot, in law or in fact, be characterised as a constitutional violation. This Court finds that the intended arrest or prosecution of the Petitioner, in the circumstances as presented, does not contravene the Constitution or any written law. The Petitioner’s prayers seeking a declaration to the effect that such processes are unconstitutional, or an order restraining the criminal proceedings, are therefore unwarranted and cannot be granted. Whether the Respondents’ conduct amounts to victimisation, harassment, or a breach of the Petitioner’s privacy rights. 24. The Petitioner suggests that he is being personally persecuted, possibly at the behest of individuals within his workplace or due to whistleblowing he engaged in. However, scant evidence was put forward to substantiate a theory of vendetta. The fact that the Petitioner is the subject of an investigation is not itself proof of victimisation; there must be some indication that he was unfairly singled out. 25. The Petitioner did not demonstrate that others similarly situated (if any) were treated differently, nor did he show any malice on part of investigators beyond his own perception of their attitude. The Respondents, for their part, have provided a reasonable and rational explanation for the Petitioner’s involvement in the investigation. It is undisputed that the Petitioner was the officer responsible for the tender under scrutiny and that funds in question were traced to accounts associated with him. This establishes a clear and legitimate nexus between the Petitioner and the subject matter of the investigation, demonstrating that the enforcement actions are based on objective considerations rather than on any capricious, personal, or vindictive motive. Moreover, the involvement of the Director of Public Prosecutions provides an additional safeguard against the initiation of proceedings motivated by malice. Were a file to be submitted that was wholly vexatious or devoid of merit, the DPP is constitutionally obliged under Article 157(11) to decline prosecution, thereby preventing any abuse of the legal process. There is no evidence before this Court to suggest that the Director of Public Prosecutions regarded the Petitioner’s file as constituting such abuse; on the contrary, the matter was under careful consideration, which indicates that it possessed genuine and legitimate substance. With respect to the Petitioner’s claim of discrimination, it is noted that he has not identified any prohibited ground such as race, sex, or other constitutionally protected characteristic on which he was allegedly targeted. In the absence of specific particulars or supporting evidence, this claim must fail. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/17811/eng@2025-05-22 6

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26. The Petitioner’s narrative of harassment includes frequent summons, an early-morning raid, alleged press leaks, and verbal threats. The Court must separate what is inherent in any criminal investigation from what would qualify as unlawful harassment. Being summoned multiple times or even being arrested in an investigation of a complex crime is not unusual; it is often necessary for suspects to be interviewed or for investigators to execute search warrants. These actions, if done lawfully and respectfully, do not amount to harassment they are part of normal procedure. The evidence before the Court (such as copies of summons letters and the search warrant) shows that the Petitioner was indeed summoned on at least two occasions by Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission and once by Directorate of Criminal Investigations, and that a search was conducted with judicial authorisation. 27. There is no evidence that the officers used excessive force, abusive language, or any form of physical or psychological torture during these encounters and none was documented or reported contemporaneously. The Petitioner’s feeling of inconvenience or embarrassment, while subjectively understandable, does not rise to the level of a constitutional infringement. As the Court of Appeal observed in Mwangi & 4 others v Attorney General [2012] eKLR, investigations are inherently intrusive to some degree, but intrusion by itself is not unconstitutional if it is done under lawful authority and for a proper purpose. 28. No direct evidence was tabled to show that any of the Respondents or their agents were responsible for the media articles alluded to by the Petitioner. In any event, unfair media coverage, while unfortunate, is not in itself a violation by the Respondents unless they orchestrated it. The Petitioner has alternative remedies, such as a defamation suit against media houses or a complaint to the Media Council, if he feels aggrieved by false reporting. It would be too tenuous to label the entire investigative process as harassment based on media reports that were not conclusively traced back to the Respondents. 29. The Petitioner also cites a “threat” allegedly made by a Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) officer along the lines of “we will arrest you in a manner that will teach you a lesson.” However, this allegation was flatly denied by the Directorate of Criminal Investigations, and it rests solely on the Petitioner’s word without corroboration. In the absence of supporting evidence, it is essentially one person’s assertion against another’s. Even if taken at face value, an isolated intemperate remark, while regrettable, would not suffice to prove a systematic campaign of harassment by the entire Respondent agencies. The Constitutional standard for state harassment would require showing that state power is being used in an excessive or arbitrary way to deliberately oppress the individual. No such pattern emerges here. 30. The Petitioner’s privacy claim had two main facets: the home search and the obtaining of personal financial information. Starting with the home search and Article 31 guarantees the sanctity of one’s home against unlawful searches. The evidence, however, shows that the search was backed by a courtissued search warrant. The warrant, as annexed by the Respondents, detailed the premises and items sought, and it was issued by a Magistrate upon an affidavit by an investigator as required by law. The Petitioner did not challenge the validity of that warrant through judicial review or any other legal mechanism at the time; instead, he complied with the search. If the Petitioner believed the warrant was improperly issued or executed, the proper channel would have been to contest it in the criminal process (for instance, by seeking the return of seized items or suppression of evidence). 31. In the present petition, the Petitioner has not demonstrated that the warrant was obtained through misrepresentation or that the search exceeded the warrant’s scope. Without such proof, the Court must presume the search was legally conducted. A lawful search cannot be characterised as a breach of privacy; it is a constitutionally permitted limitation on the right, so long as it meets the standard https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/17811/eng@2025-05-22 7

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of reasonableness (having a valid warrant based on probable cause is the epitome of reasonableness in search and seizure law). 32. As for the financial records (bank statements, M-Pesa statements, etc.), these were obtained via court orders under Section 118 of the Criminal Procedure Code and/or Section 26 of Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (ACECA) which allows the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission to seek bank record information ex parte. While the Petitioner might feel a personal invasion, the law explicitly permits such disclosure in the context of investigating economic crimes, precisely because corrupt dealings are often hidden in personal accounts. The Court finds that the Respondents followed due process in accessing this information. 33. It is worth noting that privacy rights must be balanced against the public interest in detecting crime. The Constitution itself, under Article 24, allows rights (including privacy) to be limited by law to the extent reasonable and justifiable for purposes such as public order and rights of others. The search of a suspect’s house and financial records pursuant to a corruption investigation is a textbook example of a justified limitation which is aimed at uncovering evidence of wrongdoing, a matter of significant public interest. Provided the procedures are followed (which they were here), no unconstitutional breach occurs. Therefore, the Petitioner’s privacy rights, while rightly invoked, have not been shown to be violated in this scenario. 34. The overarching theme in the Petitioner’s complaint is that the Respondents were motivated by malice or other improper considerations (harassment, victimisation). However, the record is devoid of evidence that points to malice. On the contrary, the material suggests the Respondents were motivated by a legitimate complaint of corruption. The court in Pauline Adhiambo Raget v DPP & 5 Others 2016 eKLR wisely noted that an investigation of an offence, even if ultimately found unproven, does not by itself mean the investigators acted maliciously; there must be proof of malice in fact. Malice can be inferred if, for example, the investigators had no reasonable basis and yet persisted, or if they acted in outright violation of the law to injure the suspect. 35. In the present case, the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) and the Ethics and AntiCorruption Commission (EACC) had a reasonable and lawful basis to pursue the investigations. There is no evidence of any improper conduct, such as falsification of evidence or the deliberate suppression of exonerating material, that could suggest a wrongful or malicious motive. The oversight exercised by the Director of Public Prosecutions further diminishes any suggestion of malice. The Petitioner, for instance, has not produced any correspondence or other material indicating that the Director of Public Prosecutions was improperly influenced to “get him at all costs.” On the contrary, the absence of an immediate decision to charge the Petitioner is more consistent with caution and due diligence on the part of the Director of Public Prosecutions, rather than an indication of malice. 36. It is also significant that, to date, the Petitioner has not been previously charged in connection with the matter under investigation. This represents the first and only inquiry on record involving him in this context. Accordingly, the suggestion of persistent harassment is not borne out. The role of the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) and the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) in this matter has been primarily investigative. Apart from the lawful execution of searches and the issuance of summonses, these agencies have not directly taken any action against the Petitioner, and their conduct appears to have remained within the statutory framework governing their powers. The conduct of the Director of Public Prosecutions, on the other hand, has been confined to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which, at this stage, has resulted in no decision to prosecute. There is, therefore, no basis to assert that the DPP has harassed the Petitioner; no adverse action has been taken beyond the consideration of potential charges. Any suggestion that the Director of Public Prosecutions breached the Petitioner’s rights to privacy or liberty would be misplaced. At most, an allegation of https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/17811/eng@2025-05-22 8

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complicity could arise if the investigation itself were found to be a sham but, as established, no such finding has been made. Accordingly, on the evidence before this Court, none of the Respondents, individually or collectively, can be said to have victimised or harassed the Petitioner. 37. For example, in Bandika & Another v County Criminal Investigation Officer, Kwale & Another [2024] KEHC 2161 (KLR), a case relied upon by the Petitioner’s counsel, interim relief was granted against alleged police harassment in the context of a land dispute. In that instance, there was prima facie evidence that the police were being exploited by one party to intimidate the other, including acts such as destruction of property and deliberate disregard of court orders. That scenario presented a clear and egregious abuse of power. By contrast, in the present matter, no comparable misconduct by the Respondents is apparent, as this is not a civil dispute disguised as a criminal investigation, but a bona fide inquiry into potential criminal activity. Similarly, in Kipkeori & 4 Others v County Police Commander, Nakuru & 5 Others [2022] eKLR, the Court found harassment where police officers repeatedly raided the petitioners’ homes without warrants and in defiance of court orders. The salient distinction in the present case is that the Respondents sought and obtained the necessary court authorisations and fully complied with them. In essence, Kenyan courts have consistently intervened to curb harassment only where law enforcement acts outside the scope of the law. Here, no such transgression has been established. 38. The Court therefore concludes that the Petitioner has not established that the Respondents, whether acting jointly or severally, have victimised, harassed, or unlawfully intruded upon his privacy. What is evident from the record is that the Respondents conducted investigations into the Petitioner and are considering potential prosecution actions that fall squarely within their lawful mandates and, on the evidence, have been carried out in a proper and regular manner. The allegations of harassment and breach of privacy are consequently unsubstantiated and do not provide a valid basis for the relief sought. Disposition 39. This Court finds that the Petitioner has failed to prove to the required standard that the intended arrest and/or prosecution of the Petitioner violates any provision of the Constitution or statute law. 40. This Court also finds that the Petitioner has failed to prove to the required standard that the Respondents, jointly or severally, have victimised, harassed, or breached the privacy rights of the Petitioner by their conduct. 41. This Petition lacks merit. Orders 1. The Petition herein is without merit and the same is hereby dismissed. 2. Each party to bear its own costs. 3. This file is marked as closed. Orders accordingly. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY THIS 22ND DAY OF MAY, 2025 BAHATI MWAMUYE MBS JUDGE In the presence of: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/17811/eng@2025-05-22 9

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Counsel for the Petitioners – Mr. Langat Counsel for the 3rd Respondents – Mr. Achochi Counsel for the 2nd Respondents – Ms. Sitati H/b for Ms. Githinji Court Assistant – Ms Neema https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/17811/eng@2025-05-22 10

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