Mary Jerop Bett & 1 other v Samson Kiprotich Keino & 3 others

ii. That the Grant of Letters of Administration issued to the Administrators herein Mary Jerop Bett and Simon Kipruto Sang on 20th December, 2024 be confirmed before the lapse of the statutory six (6) months iii. That this Honourable Court do order a resurvey of LR. No. Nandi/Ndalat/300 by the County Land Surveyor, Nandi to ascertain its true size/acreage before sub-division can be effected as per the agreed mode of distribution. iv. That the Officer Commanding Kipkaren Salient Police Station be directed to offer security and/or maintain law and order during the resurvey exercise in (3) above. v. That the entitlements of the late Barnaba Kipkorir Metto and the late Joram Kuto Lagat as per the Will dated 12/09/1984 be registered in the names of the 2nd and 4th Objectors respectively in trust for all the other legal beneficiaries entitled thereto. vi. That the costs of the application be in the appeal. 4. The Application is supported by the Affidavit sworn jointly by the 1st and 2nd Petitioners/ Administrators. They basically stated that there is need for the size of the sole estate property, LR. No. Nandi/Ndalat/300, to be ascertained before the estate can be distributed to the beneficiaries and/or any other persons legally entitled thereto as per the agreed mode of distribution. They deponed that the beneficiaries of the late Barnaba Kipkorir Metto and the late Joram Kuto Lagat have consented to their entitlements as per the Will to be registered in the names of the 2nd and 4th Objectors, respectively, to hold the same in trust for them as the legal beneficiaries. They further deponed that given the acrimony between the 1st Objector and the other beneficiaries, there is need for the Officer Commanding (OCS) Kipkaren Salient Police Station to be directed to offer security and/or maintain law and order during the resurvey exercise. They also stated that the Administrators are elderly and sickly hence rendering the confirmation of the Grant necessary before lapse of the statutory 6 months in the interest of justice. The proposed varied mode of distribution containing an expanded list of the intended beneficiaries, and consents thereto (including copies if identity cards), were then attached to the Affidavit. 5. The 2nd Application is the one dated 10/02/2022, filed through Messrs Songok & Co. Advocates on behalf of the 1st Objector, and seeks orders as follows: 6. i. [………..] spent ii. [……….] spent iii. There be temporary stay of execution of the Judgment and orders of this Honourable Court delivered on 20th December 2024, there be interim orders of injunction restraining the Respondents either by themselves or through their agents, employees and/or servants from selling, alienating, charging, disposing of, leasing out, dealing in, wasting, fencing or otherwise destroying crops or trees on that parcel of land allocated to the beneficiaries pending hearing and determination of the intended Appeal. iv. Costs be in the cause. The Application is supported by the Affidavit sworn by the 1st Objector. He basically deponed that the Petitioners are on the verge of initiating execution of the Judgment and the Objectors stand to suffer irreparable loss and/or damage, and that aggrieved with the Judgment, they wish to appeal against it. He urged that the Appeal is meritorious and arguable, and that the Petitioners will not be prejudiced if the orders are issued. He contended that the Objectors are ready and willing to abide by any reasonable condition(s) as may be imposed by the Court. He also urged that he Objectors stand to https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/13935/eng@2025-08-01 2

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suffer substantial loss unless the orders are granted since the intended Appeal may be rendered nugatory should the Petitioners proceed to execute. 7. 8. The 3rd Application is dated 17/02/2022, and is also filed through Messrs Songok & Co. Advocates on behalf of the 1st Objector. It seeks orders as follows: i. [………..] spent ii. That the Applicants/Intended Appellants herein be granted leave to appeal against the Judgment of the Honourable Court delivered on 20th December 2024. iii. That the Judgment delivered on 20th December 2024 in the matter herein, the proceedings herein including the said Judgment together with all consequential orders/decree, transmission, survey, lease, sale or any transaction relating to the estate property herein be stayed in the interest of justice and fairness pending hearing and determination of the intended Appeal The Application is again supported by the Affidavit sworn by the 1st Objector who deponed that the Objectors, being dissatisfied with the Judgment, have moved with speed to lodge a Notice of Appeal, that there is no automatic right of appeal from the decision of the High Court to the Court of Appeal on Probate and Administration matters and hence leave is mandatory before the Appeal is filed. He then basically repeated the matters already deponed in the Affidavit he swore in support of the 2nd Application above. He then exhibited a copy of the Notice of Appeal dated 20/12/2024. 1st Objector’s Preliminary Objection and Afidavit of Protest Against the 1st Application 9. In response to the 1st Application, the 1st Objector, through Messrs Songok & Co. filed the Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 19/02/2025. It was stated therein that the Application is not tenable in law since the 1st Objector has filed a Notice of Appeal and the Applications for stay of execution are yet to be determined. It was urged further that the Petitioners have irregularly added new beneficiaries to their proposed mode of distribution, which beneficiaries were not provided for in the impugned Judgment. It was also contended that the Application offends the strict and mandatory requirements of Section 93 of the Law of Succession Act, the Advocates Act, the Law Society Act, and the Law Society of Kenya Code of Standards of Professional Practice and Ethical Conduct, June 2016 as one of the irregularly added beneficiaries, one Laureen Mugasia Isiaho, allocated 3.30 acres, is an Advocate in this very matter, which is conflict of arrest. 10. Further in response to the 1st Application, the 1st Objector also filed the Affidavit of Protest sworn also on 19/02/2025. He repeated matters already stated in the Notice of Preliminary Objection and added that this Cause has been active in Court since 2003 and not a single day has the list of the purported purchasers been presented to Court neither have they applied as interested parties. He contended that the said persons are intermeddlers and urged the Court to call for their Sale Agreements, if any. He further deponed that during the subsistence of this case, she informed the Court that the Petitioner’s Advocate was ploughing 2 ½ acres and wondered whether this was not intermeddling. Petitioners’ Replying Afidavit to the 2ndand 3rdApplications 11. On their part, the Petitioners/Administrators, through Messrs Too Koskey & Co., filed the Affidavit they swore jointly on 24/03/2025 in opposition to the 2nd and 3rd Applications above. Regarding the 2nd Application, they deponed that the Application is fatally defective for want of leave to appeal as there is no automatic right of appeal in this matter. They deponed further that the 1st Objector has forcefully been in use for years, of portions awarded to other beneficiaries, and the Application is therefore a https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/13935/eng@2025-08-01 3

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gimmick for him to continue retaining such use at the expense of the said beneficiaries. They also contended that this Court is functus officio having rendered itself on the issue of entitlement of the beneficiaries, that allowing the prayers sought amounts to this Court reviewing its orders, and that this matter having been instituted in the year 1985, any further delay in bringing finality is prejudicial to the Petitioners given their advance age and ill-health. They further deponed that the 1st Objector has purported to sell portions/shares awarded to other beneficiaries to unsuspecting 3rd parties during the pendency of these proceedings and he has therefore filed the Applications to avert the possibility of his said purchasers being evicted once the estate is fully transmitted. 12. In respect to the 3rd Application, they repeated the same matters deponed in opposition to the 2nd Application and added that the Application is a ploy to cure the 2nd Application, which was filed without leave, and the same should fail as it cannot purport to apply retrospectively. They also urged that granting the orders will amount to evicting the parties who have been utilizing portions comprising the estate for years hence changing the status quo to their detriment. 2nd and 4th Objector’s Replying Afidavit to the 2nd and 3rd Applications 13. The 2nd and 4th Objectors, through Messrs Isiaho & Co. Advocates, in opposing the 2nd and 3rd Applications, filed the identical Replying Affidavits, both sworn on 21/03/2025. 14. In his Affidavit, the 2nd Objector, Christopher Kemei, deponed that he is the Administrator of the estate of his late father, Barnaba Kipkorir Metto (a purchaser of a portion of the estate land) and that contrary to the insinuation created by the 1st Objector, members of his family are in total agreement with the Judgment. He stated that his late father was a beneficiary of 5 acres of the estate land, although they have sold 1 acre to her Advocate, Ms. Isiaho, after delivery of the Judgment. The rest of the matters deponed are basically identical to those contained in the Replying Affidavits sworn by the Petitioners. 15. On his part, the 4th Objector, Mathew Kutto, deponed that he is the Administrator of the estate of his late father, Joram Kuto Lagat (another purchaser of a portion of the estate land). He, too, urged that contrary to the insinuation created by the 1st Objector, members of his family are in total agreement with the Judgment. He stated that his late father was a beneficiary of 12 acres of the estate land. On his part, too, the rest of the matters he has deponed are identical to those contained in the Replying Affidavits sworn by the Petitioners. Hearing of the Applications 16. When the matter came up for taking of directions on 25/03/2025, Ms. Isiaho, acting for the 2nd and 4th Objectors, informed the Court that she had already filed her written Submissions on the Applications. However, although a physical copy of the said Submissions was handed over to the Court, there is no trace of the same in the Judiciary Case Tracking System (CTS) online portal, the official platform via which all Court pleadings are required to be filed. For this reason, the rules do not allow me to consider the Submissions, which, procedurally, remains unfiled. 17. Ms. Too, acting for the Petitioners, stated that she would not be filing any Submissions and would rely on her clients’ Affidavits on record. 18. On his part, Mr. Songok, acting for the 1st Objector, sought and was granted 10 days to file his Submissions. However, up to the time of concluding this Ruling, I had not come across any Submissions from him. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/13935/eng@2025-08-01 4

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Determination 19. 20. The issues that arise for determination in this matter can be summarized as follows: i. Whether leave should be granted to the 1st Objector to appeal against the Judgment delivered herein. ii. Whether an order should be granted staying execution of the said Judgment pending the hearing and determination of the intended appeal. iii. Whether the Certificate of Confirmation of Grant to be issued should contain a list of beneficiaries that is varied from the list or mode distribution set out in the Judgment, so as to reflect shares donated or sold to 3rd parties by some beneficiaries, and to also reflect the names of representatives of the families of deceased beneficiaries. Regarding the prayer for leave to Appeal, the Court of Appeal in the case of Rhoda Wairimu Karanja & Another v Mary Wangui Karanja & Another [2014 eKLR made the following observations as regards filing of appeals in Succession matters against the decisions of the High Court while exercising its original jurisdiction: “ We think we have said enough to demonstrate that under the Law of Succession Act, there is no express automatic right of appeal to the Court of Appeal; that an appeal will lie to the Court of Appeal from the decision of the High Court exercising original jurisdiction with leave of the High Court or where the application for leave is refused, with leave of this court. Leave to appeal will normally be granted where prima facie it appears that there are grounds which merits serious consideration. We think this is good practice that ought to be retained in order to promote finality and expedition in the determination of probate and administration disputes.” 21. It was therefore the correct move for the 1st Objector to have moved this Court for grant of leave to appeal. Needless to state, such leave will only be granted where justifiable circumstances are demonstrated such as where it is shown that there are weighty issues requiring further serious judicial interrogation by the Court of Appeal. 22. In this matter, the 1st Objector has not presented any draft Memorandum of Appeal to this Court for scrutiny. Further, in his Affidavits, he simply makes general statements that he has a weighty and arguable appeal and that the mode of distribution adopted by the Court is unfair to him. He does not however make any attempt to demonstrate the nature of such alleged “weighty” or “arguable” appeal. 23. In the Judgment delivered on 20/12/2025, at paragraph 39 thereof, I stated as follows: “ From the record, litigation over the estate of the deceased began in 1985 at the Kapsabet Magistrate’s Court. That is almost an astonishing 40 years ago! A number of the beneficiaries and/or Objectors are now dead and their interests are now being pursued by their legal representatives. As captured in my recital of the witness testimonies, the surviving beneficiaries are themselves also now quite old and in their 80s. By all means, this litigation must now come to an end and this is precisely what I now intend to do with finality.” 24. With this express declaration, coupled with the Court of Appeal guidance in the case of Rhoda Wairimu Karanja (supra) that grant of leave to appeal is not automatic, and that it “will normally be granted where prima facie it appears that there are grounds which merits serious consideration”, https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/13935/eng@2025-08-01 5

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I would have expected the 1st Objector when, seeking leave to appeal, to have strongly sought to demonstrate and persuade this Court that there are indeed weighty issues that merit perpetuating this litigation any further after 40 years of being tossed around the Court corridors. This was also important since, I note from the record, that Mr. Songok, Counsel for the 1st Objector was present in Court when the Judgment was delivered and he did not seek any such leave at that time. Was the instant Application therefore an afterthought? 25. Without a draft Memorandum of Appeal and with no attempt whatsoever in the Affidavits to demonstrate the alleged prima facie arguable appeal, I am afraid I have no material before me to enable me exercise my discretion. Granting the leave to Appeal under these circumstances would, in my view, amount to capricious exercise of discretion and acting on whims. 26. The above finding alone would be sufficient to dispose of the 2nd and 3rd Applications. I shall however also still consider the other matters on their merit. 27. Regarding the prayer for stay of execution, Rules 49 and 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules, read together, permit the Court to invoke its inherent jurisdiction to issue appropriate orders in order to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process. It is therefore generally agreed that the said provisions, read with Section 47 aforesaid, are wide enough to cover the prayer for stay of execution of a judgment or decree in Succession proceedings. In any event, it has not been denied that indeed this Court has the jurisdiction to grant the order of stay of execution pending appeal. 28. In this case, the initial Application (2nd) seeking stay pending Appeal, was obviously unsustainable and fatally defective for the reason that it purported to pray for an order of stay pending Appeal when leave to appeal had itself not been sought or obtained. However, realizing that blunder, the 1st Objector quickly filed the subsequent Application (3rd) whereof he belatedly sought such leave. Although the Respondents to the Applications argued that it was improper to file the subsequent Application to remedy the earlier blunder, in my view, I do no think so. As long as the initial Application had not been determined, the 1st Objector was within his rights to cure the blunder, by amending the Application, or by filing the subsequent Application as he did. I find nothing wrong with that. 29. Having found as above, I may mention that, like grant of leave to appeal, stay of execution pending appeal is similarly a discretionary power but, which, needless to state, must also not be exercised on whims, but judiciously, on defined principles and on the basis of the facts of the case. It is also the position that the objective of stay of execution is to prevent “substantial loss” from befalling an applicant and thus to prevent the appeal from being rendered nugatory. 30. It is also trite law that an Applicant for stay of execution of a decree or order pending Appeal is required to satisfy the conditions that the Application has been made “without unreasonable delay”, that “substantial loss” may result to the Applicant unless the order is granted, and where applicable, that the Applicant is willing or ready to “deposit security” for due performance of the decree or order. 31. The first condition that I need to consider is therefore whether the Applications have been made without unreasonable delay. In this case, the Judgment the subject of the Applications was delivered on 20/12/2024. The initial Application for stay was then filed on 10/02/2025, about 2 months later, and the subsequent one on 17/02/2025. Relatively therefore, I would not say that there was “unreasonably delay”. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/13935/eng@2025-08-01 6

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32. The second condition is whether the 1st Objector will suffer “substantial loss” should the order not be granted. As to what constitutes “substantial loss”, F. Gikonyo J in the case of James Wangalwa & Another v Agnes Naliaka Cheseto [2012] eKLR, stated as follows: “ 11. No doubt, in law, the fact that the process of execution has been put in motion, or is likely to be put in motion, by itself, does not amount to substantial loss. Even when execution has been levied and completed, …………., does not in itself amount to substantial loss under Order 42 Rule 6 of the CPR. This is so because execution is a lawful process. The applicant must establish other factors which show that the execution will create a state of affairs that will irreparably affect or negate the very essential core of the Applicant as the successful party in the appeal. This is what substantial loss would entail, a question that was aptly discussed in the case of Silverstein N. Chesoni [2002] 1KLR 867, and also in the case of Mukuma v Abuoga quoted above. The last case, referring to the exercise of discretion by the High Court and the Court of Appeal in the granting stay of execution, …..., emphasized the centrality of substantial loss thus: “… the issue of substantial loss is the cornerstone of both jurisdictions. Substantial loss is what has to be prevented by preserving the status quo because such loss would render the appeal nugatory.” With this observation, of course, a frivolous appeal cannot in practical terms be rendered nugatory. The only admonition however, is that the High Court should not base the exercise of its discretion …….. only on the chances of the success of the appeal. Much more is needed in accordance with the test I have set out above.” 33. Further, Platt, Ag. JA (as he then was) in Kenya Shell Limited vs. Kibiru [1986] KLR, expressed himself as follows: “ ……... If there is no evidence of substantial loss to the applicant, it would be a rare case when an appeal would be rendered nugatory by some other event. Substantial loss in its various forms, is the corner stone of both jurisdictions for granting a stay. That is what has to be prevented. …………………………..”. 34. On his part, Gachuhi, Ag. JA (as he then was) in the same case, stated as follows: “ ………... What sort of loss would this be? In an application of this nature, the applicant should show the damage it would suffer if the order for stay is not granted. By granting a stay would mean that status quo should remain as it were before judgement. What assurance can there be of appeal succeeding? On the other hand, granting the stay would be denying a successful litigant of the fruits of his judgement.” 35. On the merits of the Appeal, I have already made a finding that in the absence of a draft Memorandum of Appeal, and in the absence of any attempt in the 1st Objector’s Affidavits to explain the nature of the grievances intended to be placed before the Court of Appeal, this Court is devoid of any material to enable it determine that the intended Appeal “is not a frivolous” one. Under these circumstances, the result is that the 1st Objector has failed to demonstrate that the intended Appeal “is not frivolous”. The Application would therefore also fail on this ground. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/13935/eng@2025-08-01 7

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36. On “substantial loss”, the 1st Objector, again, in both his Affidavits, simply makes the general statement that he will suffer “substantial loss” but he does not go further to explain the nature of such alleged “substantial loss”. He seems to leave it to the Court to speculate or “grope in the dark” to try and unravel what the alleged “substantial loss” could be. This, the Court will not do, as it is the Applicant’s duty and burden to discharge. 37. In any event, even if the Judgment were to be enforced or executed, the 1st Objector has not demonstrated that the same cannot be undone or cured should he succeed before the Court of Appeal. There is therefore also no demonstration that the Appeal would be rendered “nugatory” if the order is not granted. Although execution may cause some inconvenience to the 1st Objector, I do not think that such inconvenience would amount to rendering the Appeal “nugatory”. 38. Having found that no “substantial loss” to be suffered has been demonstrated, consideration of the third condition - deposit of security - does not now arise. 39. In the circumstances, after very carefully weighing and balancing the competing interests of the protagonists herein, and considering all relevant factors, I find that had I even granted leave to appeal, the prayer for stay of execution would still have failed as the scales of justice clearly tilt towards denying the prayer. 40. The remaining issue is now issue (iii), which arises from the Petitioners’ prayer seeking that the Certificate of Confirmation of Grant be issued in an altered or varied manner different from the list of beneficiaries or mode of distribution set out in the Judgment. The 1st alteration relates to the share of 5 acres allocated to the late Barnabas Kipkorir Metto, a purchaser of that portion of the estate land, and which share I am now being asked to direct to be reflected in the name of his son, Simion Kipruto Sang. The 2nd alteration relates to the share of 12 acres allocated to the late Joram Kutto Lagat, another purchaser, and which share I am now being asked to direct to be reflected in the name of his son, Matthew Kutto. Consents from members of the two concerned respective families have been attached to the Affidavit to demonstrate that there is unanimity regarding the said proposed reallocation of the shares. 41. I am reluctant to entertain the said prayer for the reason that it amounts to this Court engaging in distributing the estates of other deceased persons when this Succession Cause relates strictly to only the estate of Kipkeino Arap Cheplangat. Procedure requires that for each deceased person, distribution of his estate should be conducted in a Succession Cause commenced specifically for that purpose. The danger of allowing the said prayer in this Cause is that should a dispute subsequently arise within those families regarding the said shares allocated herein to their late fathers, despite this Court being now functus officio, such disputes will again find their way back to this same Succession Cause in which the subject orders would have been issued. What that will mean is that this Court file will then have to be reopened for purposes of determining such disputes when the Cause relates to a totally different deceased person. 42. It is not only disputes within those other families that may arise. There may also arise the need for such interventions as Rectification of the Grant, which even if uncontested would still will have to be canvassed in this same Cause. Further, for me to determine whether to grant the prayers, although respective consents have been filed as aforesaid, procedure requires me to summon all the members of the respective to attend Court to confirm the consents. Again, this will needlessly convolute this Cause and will be tantamount to re-opening a closed file in respect to which this Court is now clearly functus officio. My view is that this Court having allocated shares to the two deceased beneficiaries, each of the two families should now respectively pursue distribution of the shares within a Succession Cause https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/13935/eng@2025-08-01 8

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commenced for that specific purpose. Within those separate Succession Causes, consents may be filed and adopted therein. 43. There is also another “hidden” prayer sneaked in Paragraph 10 of the Supporting Affidavit but which for reasons not explained, does not appear in the Application. For this reason, I have no basis to even entertain. I will however still comment on it. 44. The “hidden” prayer seeks that the Certificate of Confirmation of Grant to be issued do reflect the names of about 20 purchasers of portions of the estate land. Like the earlier prayer, it also therefore basically also proposes adoption of a schedule of distribution in an altered or varied manner different from the list of beneficiaries or mode of distribution set out in the Judgment 45. In my recent Judgment delivered in the case of In the Matter of the Estate of Joseph Kipkogei Terer, Eldoret High Court Succession Cause No. 369 of 2014, in which one of the Counsels herein, Ms. Isiaho was also involved as Advocate, I held as follows: “ Beneficiaries of estates and also Administrators are also cautioned that once a Court completes the distribution of an estate, the next step and which ought to be concluded within 6 months thereafter, is for transmission of the distributed shares to the respective beneficiaries. It is after such transmission that the beneficiaries, after being registered as owners of the respective properties and obtained titles, are then free to dispose of the same to third parties. The beauty of this situation is that such beneficiary does not need to again involve the Succession Court in disposal of the property. It is therefore only after transmission of shares that beneficiaries should, if they so wish, sell their transmitted portions to purchasers. The practice of disposing of inherited properties, particularly parcels of land, before transmission has been completed then returning to “bother” the Succession Court for amendment of the Certificates of Confirmation of Grant to amend the schedule of distribution to include purchasers, is wrong and technically, unlawful. Purchasers should also learn that any sale of land should always be supported by proof of a document of title in the name of the vendor, duly issued by the Lands Office. A Certificate of Confirmation of Grant is not by itself a document of title capable of confirming or transferring ownership of land, and does not by itself prove a vendor’s right to dispose of a property to a third party. The Succession Court, for all intents and purposes, becomes technically functus officio once it has distributed the estate. Unfortunately, Advocates, who should know better and advise their clients, are complicit in knowingly participating in such irregular dealings. Any fresh dealings between beneficiaries and purchasers after confirmation of a Grant, even before transmission, and/or any disputes arising thereafter are ideally matters that should be placed before the Environment and Land Court (ELC).” 46. Although in the above authority, I was dealing with an Application made post-issuance of the Certificate of Confirmation of Grant, the same logic or principle also applies to the case herein since I have already rendered a Judgment distributing the estate amongst the beneficiaries. 47. I have not even been told when the said purchasers bought the portions and from whom. All indication is however that the portions were sold to them by respective family members after the deceased had already died and before distribution of the estate had been conducted by the Court. Needless to state, sale or transfer of properties owned by a deceased person after his death, and before the Court distributes his estate amounts to the offence of “intermeddling” with the estate of a deceased person, https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/13935/eng@2025-08-01 9

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which is prohibited under Section 45 of the Law of Succession Act. Gikonyo J, in the case of Re Estate of M’Ngarithi M’Miriti [2017] eKLR, described “intermeddling” in the following terms: “ Whereas there is no specific definition provided by the Act for the term “intermeddling”, it refers to any act or acts which are done by a person in relation to the free property of the deceased without the authority of any law or grant of representation to do so. The category of the offensive acts is not heretically closed but would certainly include taking possession, or occupation of, disposing of, exchanging, receiving, paying out, distributing, donating, charging or mortgaging, leasing out, interfering with lawful liens or charge or mortgage of the free property of the deceased in contravention of the Law of Succession Act. I should add that any act or acts which will dissipate or diminish or put at risk the free property of the deceased are also acts of intermeddling in law. I reckon that intermeddling with the free property of the deceased is a very serious criminal charge for which the person intermeddling may be convicted and sentenced to imprisonment or fine or both under section 45 of the Law of Succession Act. That is why the law has taken a very firm stance on intermeddling and has clothed the court with wide powers to deal with cases of intermeddling and may issue any appropriate order(s) of protection of the estate against any person.” 48. In light of the foregoing, there is a real danger that the “hidden” prayer for this Court to recognize the purchasers is an attempt to mis(use) this Court to belatedly sanitize the illegal and criminal act of intermeddling with the estate of a deceased person. For this further reason, I decline to entertain the prayer. Let the beneficiaries first get registered as owners of their shares as captured in the Judgment then they can subsequently transfer the portions to the 20 purchasers. The Court will not get involved in such shortcuts, especially where there is obvious non-disclosure of material facts. 49. As this matter was determined after a long and protracted viva voce trial, the Petitioners ought to have brought up all these matters for canvassing in the trial. They cannot wait until the Court has rendered a Judgment and subsequently seek to alter the distribution. 50. Having found as above, I see no reason to determine the issue of the impropriety or otherwise, of the inclusion of the name of the 2nd and Objectors’ Counsel in this matter as one of the purchasers proposed to be reflected in the Certificate of Confirmation of Grant. Final Orders 51. In view of above, I issue orders as follows: a. The 1st Objector’s Application dated 10/02/2025 seeking , inter alia, stay of execution of the Judgment delivered herein, and dated 20/12/2025 pending Appeal is dismissed. b. The 1st Objector’s subsequent Application dated 17/02/2025 seeking, inter alia, grant of leave to appeal against the Judgment herein, and also stay of execution, is similarly also dismissed. c. The Petitioners’ Application dated 3/02/2025 is partially allowed, in terms of prayers (2), (3) and (4) thereof, to the following extent: i. The Grant of Letters of Administration issued to the Petitioners herein, Mary Jerop Bett and Simon Kipruto Sang on 20/11/2024 be and is hereby confirmed before the lapse of the statutory six (6) months period, in terms of the schedule set out in the Judgment delivered on the said date, save that for the shares allocated in the Judgment, to Barnabas Kipkorir Metto (2nd Objector), and Daniel Kipsang Bett (husband to 1st https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/13935/eng@2025-08-01 10

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Petitioner), the two being deceased, shall be indicated or described in the Certificate, as allocated to their respective estates. d. ii. The County Land Surveyor, Nandi County, is hereby directed to carry out a re-survey exercise of the parcel of land known as LR. No. Nandi/Ndalat/300, to ascertain its true size/acreage so as to facilitate the identification and sub-division thereof in accordance with the mode of distribution set out in the Judgment. iii. The Officer Commanding Kipkaren Salient Police Station is hereby directed to provide security and/or maintain law and order during the resurvey exercise in referred to above. Each party shall bear its own costs. DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED AT ELDORET THIS 1ST DAY OF AUGUST 2025 ............................. WANANDA J. R. ANURO JUDGE Delivered in the presence of: Mr. Kipkurui h/b for Ms. Isiaho for the 2nd and 4th Objectors N/A for other parties Court Assistant: Brian Kimathi https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/13935/eng@2025-08-01 11

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