Shem Andrew Gichimu v Higher Education Loans Board

3. That the Honourable Court be pleased to order additional payment to the Claimant, over and above the decretal amount already paid, to fully satisfy the Judgment of the Honourable Byram Ongaya dated 16th November 2023, for the period he was out of office on termination before reinstatement. 4. That such further and other relief be granted to the Applicant as the Court deems fit and expedient in the circumstances. 5. That costs of this application be provided for. 2 The Application is premised on the grounds set out on its face and is supported by the affidavit of Shem Andrew Gichimu, the Applicant herein, sworn on 19 th November 2025. Respondent/Applicant’s Case 3 It is the Applicant's case that on 16th November 2023, this Court delivered Judgment in this Cause, concluding as follows: "1) The declaration is hereby issued that the termination of the claimant's employment with HELB was wrongful, unfair, discriminatory and null and void or rescinded. (2) Consequential to order (1) above, the order of automatic reinstatement or continuation of the contract of employment of the Claimant effective the date of the termination with full back payment of Kshs. 26,247,054.50 Page 2 of 27

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payable less PAYE and the Claimant to continue in employment of the Respondent as Chief Finance Officer with attendant remuneration and benefits and to be deployed forthwith and the Claimant be treated by the Respondent as if the contract of employment had not been terminated at all. (3) The Respondent to pay the Claimant a sum of Kshs. 10,000,000.00 being compensation for discrimination. (4) The sum of money in orders (2) and (3) above be payable by 31.03.2024 failing interest to be payable thereon at court rates from the date of this judgment until full payment. (5) The respondent to pay the claimant's costs of the suit." 4 The Applicant avers that the Respondent reinstated him to the position of Chief Finance Officer vide its letter dated 4 th January 2024 and made certain payments to him, which he acknowledged but which he considered to be less than what the Judgment had awarded. 5 He states that at the time of his termination his remuneration was as per Appendix A, while upon reinstatement his remuneration was as per Appendix B, being what he would have earned had he not been terminated. He further states that the Respondent made payments in settlement of orders (3) and (5) to the satisfaction of both parties. Page 3 of 27

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6 The Applicant states that the parties have, however, disagreed on the payment due under order (2) for the period he stayed out of employment as a result of the termination. He has therefore approached this Court seeking clarification of order (2), specifically on the extent of the salary and benefits payable to him, since the termination was declared null and void and the Court directed that he be treated as if the contract of employment had not been terminated at all. 7 It is the Applicant's contention that the Respondent has not fully satisfied the directive of the Court, because it failed to pay him as if the contract had not been terminated at all. He asserts that, in the circumstances, his payments ought to include annual basic salary increments, leave allowance, end of year gift vouchers, airtime, bonus, pension and other allowances which he would have earned had he not been terminated. 8 The Applicant avers that, in addition to the unpaid amount, the Respondent computed the pension payable without taking into account the annual basic salary increments. 9 He further avers that the Respondent calculated PAYE at a flat rate of 35%, rather than the actual PAYE which would have been deducted at the end of each month, leading to further underpayment. Page 4 of 27

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10 The Applicant contends that order (2) is to be interpreted to mean that all benefits payable to him should place him in a position as if he had not been terminated at all. He maintains that denying him the benefits he had accrued during that period is a violation of his rights. 11 By way of example, he states that he was in a salary scale where his salary automatically went up annually, and since the termination was null and void, he is entitled to the annual increments. 12 The Applicant further contends that, in terms of order (4) of the Judgment, interest has accrued on the underpaid amount from 1st April 2024 until the date of payment. 13 In response to the Replying Affidavit sworn by Mr. Geoffrey Monari, the Respondent's Chief Executive Officer, dated 12th February 2026, the Applicant filed a Supplementary Affidavit sworn on 30th April 2026. 14 The Applicant disputed the Respondent’s assertion that he confirmed receipt of the payments and that there is therefore no dispute that the Judgment has been complied with. He states that from the onset he disputed the manner in which the calculations were done, and that negotiations ensued between the parties' advocates. These culminated in the Respondent's letter dated 30 th Page 5 of 27

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July 2025, in which the Respondent referred to the Applicant's letter dated 2nd May 2024 disputing the calculation of the amount due. 15 He avers that the Respondent stated unequivocally in that letter that it owed no other or further payments or monies at all, and that this necessitated his moving this Court. 16 The Applicant reiterates prayer 2 of the Application and contends that he is only seeking clarification of the expression that he be treated as if the contract of employment had not been terminated at all. 17 He asserts that he is within his rights to do so under Rule 74(1)(c) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, which allows a party to move the Court where a judgment or ruling requires clarification. 18 He states that it is precisely the Respondent's interpretation of the Judgment at paragraphs 11 to 18 of the Replying Affidavit that he disputes, as he holds an alternative interpretation which is in line with that of the Respondent's Human Resources department. 19 The Applicant contends that the Respondent's attempt to limit the Judgment to the expressly quantified sum ignores the Court's directive that he be treated as though he had Page 6 of 27

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not been terminated at all and that he be paid all benefits due to him. 20 It is his case that the wording of the Judgment obligates that he be treated as though his employment was continuous for all contractual and statutory benefits beyond the specified back pay. 21 He asserts that the application does not seek to impose additional components or to import additional benefits and entitlements. 22 He avers that upon reinstatement he signed a contract effective the date of termination, and he should therefore not be treated as a non-working employee. He contends that Mr. Monari's interpretation of the Judgment is flawed. 23 He further contends that dismissal of the application would deprive him of substantive relief and would be prejudicial to him. It would also, he contends, preclude full recovery of legitimate damages arising from miscalculation, which would be unfair and unlawful. 24 The Applicant states that a proper assessment of tax liability and any refund due must be computed in accordance with the law and not dismissed outright. He contends that enforcing the Judgment on back pay is not contrary to the Salaries and Remuneration Commission Page 7 of 27

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(SRC) guidelines and restrictions, since the Judgment specifically orders that he be treated as if his employment continued. 25 He states that he seeks enforcement of the Judgment granting full benefits, including tax adjustments and allowances, interpreted in the context of uninterrupted employment. He asserts that none of the allowances he has claimed are facilitative allowances. 26 It is the Applicant’s case that the application is constitutional and lawful, as it seeks enforcement of a judgment expressly awarded by the Court and does not involve unconstitutional or unlawful expenditure of public funds. 27 He avers that the application is not an abuse of the Court process. He has a legitimate enforcement proceeding to give effect to a conclusively determined judgment, and not an attempt to re-litigate settled matters. 28 It is his case that the application is neither an appeal nor a review. Further, it is not a disguised attempt at clarification to circumvent legal procedures, but a proper enforcement action under the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules aimed at securing compliance with the Judgment. Page 8 of 27

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Respondent’s Case 29 The Respondent opposed the application through the Replying Affidavit of Geoffrey Monari, its Chief Executive Officer, sworn on 11th February 2026. 30 It is the Respondent's case that the Judgment delivered on 16th November 2023 was clear, explicit and unambiguous in its terms, particularly with respect to the remedies granted to the Claimant. 31 The Respondent avers that, pursuant to the Judgment, it reinstated the Claimant to the position of Chief Finance Officer by its letter dated 4th January 2024, and the Claimant resumed duty accordingly. 32 It further avers that it paid the Claimant the sums awarded by the Court, including the back pay expressly quantified at Kshs. 26,247,054.50 payable less PAYE, and the compensation for discrimination. 33 The Respondent states that the Claimant confirmed receipt of these payments in correspondence forming part of the record, and that there is therefore no dispute that the Judgment has been complied with. 34 The Respondent compliance with contends the that, Judgment, notwithstanding full the has Claimant approached this Court through an application framed as Page 9 of 27

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one seeking clarification under Rule 74 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules. 35 It avers that the substance of the application reveals that it is not a request for clarification of any ambiguity, clerical error or accidental slip in the Judgment. 36 The Respondent asserts that the Claimant instead seeks to reopen the issue of quantum already determined by the Court, and to introduce new and additional heads of monetary entitlement not awarded in the Judgment. 37 It states that Respondent to the Applicant recompute seeks to statutory compel the deductions retrospectively and to obtain further payments beyond those expressly decreed. 38 It is the Respondent's contention that such reliefs do not fall within the scope of Rule 74 and amount to an impermissible attempt to vary, review or expand a final judgment of this Court. On this ground alone, it urges, the Application ought to be dismissed with costs. 39 The Respondent avers that the Judgment expressly quantified the back pay at Kshs. 26,247,054.50, calculated as the Claimant's gross monthly salary multiplied by 50 months, payable less PAYE. Page 10 of 27

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40 It contends that the Court neither left the computation of back pay open-ended nor deferred quantification to the parties, and that once the Court expressly quantified the back pay, that quantification exhausted the monetary effect of the order relating to back payment. 41 The Respondent asserts that the Claimant's attempt to superimpose additional components is wholly unsupported by the Judgment. These components are annual basic salary increments, airtime, gift bonuses, vouchers, facilitative pension allowances, restructuring and alternative PAYE methodologies. 42 The Respondent further contends that a party cannot, through a post-judgment application, import into a decree benefits and entitlements that were neither pleaded, proved nor awarded. 43 It is the Respondent's case that the Claimant places undue reliance on the phrase that he be treated as if the contract of employment had not been terminated at all. It argues that this must be interpreted contextually and harmoniously with the rest of the Judgment, particularly the express quantification of back pay. 44 It asserts that the phrase cannot be read in isolation or as authorising unlimited retrospective reconstruction of every Page 11 of 27

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conceivable benefit, allowance or discretionary entitlement. 45 It avers that a literal interpretation, as suggested by the Claimant, would lead to absurd and unworkable consequences. These would include the payment of benefits not expressly awarded by the Court, in contravention of the public finance and remuneration frameworks that govern the Respondent. 46 On PAYE, the Respondent avers that it made all statutory deductions from the sums payable to the Claimant strictly in accordance with the law, and duly remitted the PAYE deducted to the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) as required by statute. 47 It contends that once PAYE has been deducted and remitted, it has no legal authority to refund, reallocate or retrospectively alter such tax deductions. 48 The Respondent asserts that any dispute regarding alleged over-deduction of tax, the applicable tax bands, tax reliefs or the impact of Covid-era tax measures falls squarely within the statutory mandate of KRA. The claim for a tax refund is therefore, in its view, misplaced and for dismissal. Page 12 of 27

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49 It further contends that the Income Tax Act and related tax legislation provide specific administrative and appellate mechanisms for resolving disputes on tax computation and overpayment. In its view, this Court lacks jurisdiction to determine tax disputes or to compel an employer to reverse or restructure tax deductions already remitted to KRA. 50 The Respondent avers that the allowances claimed by the Claimant were facilitative in nature, intended solely to enable the effective discharge of duties while actively at work. It contends that they do not constitute automatic or guaranteed earnings accruing merely by virtue of the existence of an employment relationship. Such allowances are ordinarily payable only where an employee is actively rendering service and incurring work-related costs. 51 The Respondent avers that since the Claimant did not render service during the period in respect of which he claims them, they are not payable to him. Further, paying facilitative allowances to an employee who did not work during the relevant period would be contrary to the Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC) guidelines governing remuneration in the public service. 52 It is the Respondent's case that, being a public body, it is bound by the SRC guidelines and cannot lawfully make payments outside the approved remuneration framework. Page 13 of 27

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Therefore, such payment would amount to an illegality, which this Court cannot sanction, endorse or compel, even in the context of enforcement or clarification of a judgment. 53 The Respondent states that it is a State corporation funded by public funds and accountable to the public for the lawful and prudent use of taxpayer resources, thus, it would be unconstitutional and unlawful to compel it to expend public funds on claims not grounded in law or expressly awarded by the Court. 54 It is the Respondent’s case that the application is an abuse of the Court process, as it seeks to re-litigate matters already conclusively determined. 55 It avers that the Claimant has neither filed an appeal nor satisfied the legal threshold for review of the Judgment. In its view, the application is therefore a disguised attempt to achieve through clarification what the law does not permit through review or appeal. Claimant/Applicant's Submissions 56 The Applicant submitted on three issues: whether Order (2) of the Judgment has been fully complied with or whether it requires payment of full salary progression, allowances, and benefits and interest thereon from the date of the Judgment; whether the Respondent was Page 14 of 27

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obligated to apply proper statutory and PAYE computations; and who bears the costs of the suit. 57 The Applicant submitted that the application is necessitated by the Respondent's partial, selective and erroneous implementation of Orders (1) and (2) of the Judgment. He submitted that after he was reinstated and paid the decretal sum, he specified through his advocate the benefits he believed had been omitted, but the Respondent maintained that it had fully satisfied the decree. 58 He argued that he is properly before the Court under Rule 74(1)(c) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, which permits a party to apply for review of a judgment or ruling if the judgement or ruling requires clarification. 59 Relying on Anyuna v Board of Management Maasai Girl's Secondary School & another [2025] KEELRC 1105 (KLR); the Applicant submitted that in that case, where the parties held opposing views on the orders of the Court, the Court held that "the application by the Claimant is merited as it required clarification and the court has endeavoured to clarify the same". Page 15 of 27

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60 On the first issue, the Applicant submitted that Order (2) read in isolation, may appear ambiguous as to his entitlements after reinstatement. However, paragraph 64(b) of the Judgment lends credence to his position that the orders have not been fully implemented. He referred to Section 49(3)(a) of the Employment Act, 2007, which empowers the Court to "reinstate the employee and treat the employee in all respects as if the employee's employment had not been terminated". 61 The Applicant submitted that on the finding of the Trial Court that automatic reinstatement is distinct from reinstatement under Section 49, reproducing the following passage: "It is that because the termination is found null and void or is rescinded in the words of the claimant herein, the impugned termination for all purposes never was and the parties must then be deemed to continue in the employment relationship per prevailing terms and conditions of the employment – a scenario very much like it obtains when a classical reinstatement order is made. Automatic reinstatement then is an emphatic position that in view of a finding that a termination or dismissal is a nullity, unless for good reason, the parties continue in the relationship per prevailing terms of the contract of employment." 62 He further relied on the Court's finding that the Respondent violated Article 236(a) of the Constitution, Page 16 of 27

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which provides that a public officer shall not be victimized or discriminated against for having performed the functions of office in accordance with the Constitution or any other law. He cited the Court's holding that, the termination being null and void under Article 2 of the Constitution, "the claimant must revert to the office held as the termination was like it never was, but, a void". 63 From these passages, the Applicant argued that the termination was a nullity, and that the Court intended that the parties continue in the relationship on the prevailing terms of the contract as though no termination had occurred. 64 The Applicant submitted that the Court awarded the back pay of Kshs. 26,247,054.50, computed as a gross monthly salary of Kshs. 524,941.09 multiplied by 50 months, in addition to, and not in substitution of, the directive that he be treated as though he had not been terminated at all. It was his argument that, there having been no termination, he had a legitimate expectation to receive all the perks of his position as Chief Finance Officer. 65 He submitted that the Respondent's own management took this position on two occasions. In March 2024, management presented to the Finance, Staff and GeneralPurpose Committee of the Board a figure of Kshs. 31,503,989 as the amount due to him, inclusive of Page 17 of 27

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attendant benefits. In October 2025, it presented a figure of Kshs. 31,808,494.49 to the Board. He reasoned that the Board ought to have acted on this advice, as those tabulations fully satisfy the order. 66 The Applicant further submitted that the Respondent selectively implemented the Judgment. The reinstatement letter dated 4th January 2024 reinstated him effective 27 th September 2019 and stated that the terms and conditions of employment shall remain the same as outlined in your letters of appointment. He argued that upon reinstatement his basic pay rose from Kshs. 270,121.09, as per his September 2019 payslip, to Kshs. 339,416.85. 67 It is the Applicant’s submission that this demonstrates that the Respondent applied the incremental credits accrued during the period he was out of office. He contended that the salary did not increase on its own during that period, but was arrived at by applying a formula for annual increments. The same formula, he argued, ought to have been applied to his monthly salary, pension contributions and other benefits for the period. 68 In support thereof, the Applicant cited National Bank of Kenya v Mutonya [2019] KECA 404 (KLR), where the Court of Appeal held that: "Other reliefs attendant to the relief of reinstatement namely; salary arrears from the date of termination to the date of reinstatement together Page 18 of 27

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with entitlement to full benefits as an employee restored back to his employment are also affirmed as payable and where withheld, are amenable to the execution process in the normal manner." 69 The Applicant submitted that, upon proper computation, the underpayment before taxes and exclusive of interest comprises the following items: a 5% annual salary increment effective 1st July each year from July 2019 to November 2023, amounting to a difference of Kshs. 2,188,879.35; leave allowance of Kshs. 48,000 for five years, totalling Kshs. 240,000; mobile handset allowance of Kshs. 40,000 every two years, totalling Kshs. 80,000; airtime allowance of Kshs. 3,000 per month for 50 months, totalling Kshs. 156,000; gift vouchers of Kshs. 42,857.14 annually for five years, totalling Kshs. 214,285.70; underpaid pension of Kshs. 143,870.37; and bonus of Kshs. 271,533.48. 70 In response to the Respondent's contention that it cannot be compelled to expend public funds on claims not grounded in law or expressly awarded, the Applicant argued that the sums claimed were awarded by the Court on a proper reading of the Judgment. He submitted that the Respondent's status as a public body cannot be an excuse for failing to fully implement the award. Page 19 of 27

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71 The Applicant placed reliance on Kenya Union of Commecial Food & Allied Workers Union v Kenya Post Office Savings Bank [2022] KEELRC 12701 (KLR), wherein the Court, noting that the publicly owned respondent had failed to fully implement its order, directed that "the claim for the payment of the full award as at March 4, 2020 when employment terminated is the sum of Ksh 9,398,327 which remains unpaid and due and shall be paid with costs and interests from March 4, 2020 and until paid in full". He arged that the underpayment herein likewise attract interest at court rates until payment in full. 72 On the second issue, the Applicant submitted that Order (2), in directing that the back pay be payable less PAYE, was explicit as to the tax mechanism to be applied. He argued that under the Income Tax Act (Cap 470), PAYE is assessed monthly on a progressive basis using tax bands, and not on an arbitrary flat rate. It is therefore his contention that the Respondent's application of a flat rate of 35% on the lump sum is not PAYE and was erroneous. 73 He submitted that reinstatement deems the employment relationship to have continued uninterrupted, as the sums paid constitute salary arrears for the period he was kept out of employment, and do not cease to be salary merely because they were paid as a lump sum. Had he remained in employment, PAYE would have been deducted monthly Page 20 of 27

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in accordance with the tax bands and reliefs applicable to each month. By aggregating the sum and applying a flat rate, he submitted, the Respondent imposed a higher tax burden on him in contravention of the Court's order. 74 The Applicant invoked the principle that no party should benefit from its own wrongdoing. He argued that the Respondent's unlawful termination caused the accumulation of arrears, and it cannot rely on the resulting delay to justify a tax treatment that diminishes the award. He submitted that the purpose of reinstatement is restoration, placing the employee as nearly as possible in the position he would have occupied had the termination not occurred. 75 He relied on Section 5(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act, which provides that any wages, salary, leave pay, bonus or other allowance received in respect of employment or services rendered in a year of income other than the year of income in which it is received shall be deemed to be income in respect of that other year of income. He also relied on the proviso in Section 5(2)(a)(i) of the ITA, which deems amounts relating to a year of income that expired more than five years earlier to be income of the year that expired five years prior. 76 He submitted that the earliest salary period was October 2019 and the arrears were payable by 31st March 2024. Page 21 of 27

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The entire period, he argued, therefore falls within five years, and PAYE ought to have been computed monthly. He added that the Respondent itself computes PAYE monthly when paying gratuity to its Chief Executive Officers at the end of their contracts. 77 On the Respondent's position that any tax dispute lies with the Kenya Revenue Authority, the Applicant argued that his grievance does not concern the collection or remittance of tax. He submitted that it arises from the Respondent's interpretation and implementation of the Judgment, particularly the computation of the decretal sum and its tax treatment, which falls within this Court's supervisory and interpretative jurisdiction over its own orders. 78 He submitted that the Respondent withheld and remitted Kshs. 8,531,660.57 to KRA. He added that, should the Court find an underpayment, the additional sum would itself attract PAYE, potentially raising the tax payable to Kshs. 8,846,873.04. Therefore, that clarification is necessary to guide the parties on the correct tax treatment of the decretal sum, to ensure faithful implementation of the Judgment and bring finality to the dispute. 79 On costs, the Applicant submitted that costs follow the event, and that he was reasonably justified in seeking Page 22 of 27

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clarification of the Judgment and has clearly articulated the underpayment. Respondent’s Submissions 80 The Respondent submitted that although the Application is framed as seeking clarification of the Judgment, it is in reality an attempt to vary, enlarge and reopen a final judgment after the Respondent had fully complied with the decree. The Application therefore falls outside the narrow jurisdiction conferred by Rule 74 and ought to be dismissed with costs. 81 The Respondent addressed three issues: whether the Court has jurisdiction under Rule 74 to grant the orders sought; whether the Applicant is inviting the Court to vary a final judgment; and whether the Respondent fully complied with the Judgment. 82 On the first issue, the Respondent submitted that Rule 74 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules exists to enable the Court to correct clerical mistakes, accidental slips or omissions, or to clarify genuine ambiguities within a judgment. It argued that the Rule is not a mechanism through which parties may revisit substantive findings or obtain additional remedies after judgment. The Respondent contended that the present application goes far beyond clarification. Page 23 of 27

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83 It submitted that the Applicant is asking the Court to award annual salary increments, leave allowance, bonuses, gift vouchers, airtime and pension adjustments, to recompute PAYE deductions, and to order payment of sums over and above those expressly awarded. It argued that these are entirely new monetary claims. 84 It pointed to prayer 3, which expressly seeks additional payment over and above the decretal amount already paid, and submitted that this prayer alone demonstrates that the Application seeks a fresh monetary award rather than clarification. 85 The Respondent argued that Rule 74 cannot be invoked to rewrite a judgment. It submitted that if the Applicant was dissatisfied with the Judgment, the law availed him two avenues, namely appeal or review. He pursued neither, and instead seeks to achieve through clarification what the law prohibits under Rule 74, therefore, the application is incompetent 86 On the second issue, the Respondent submitted that the Judgment was not open-ended, as the Court specifically quantified the back pay at Kshs. 26,247,054.50 less PAYE and nothing in it left the computation open for future determination. It maintained that once the Court quantified the amount, that figure became part of the decree and cannot be substituted with another simply because one party believes it should have been higher. Page 24 of 27

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87 It contended that the Applicant's argument, that additional benefits ought to have been included in arriving at that figure, attacks the correctness of the Judgment itself. It is the Respondent’s submission that an appellate argument and not a clarification argument. 88 The Respondent further submitted that a court becomes functus officio upon delivering its final judgment, save in the limited circumstances recognized by law. It argued that entertaining the Application would amount to the Court reopening its own judgment and substituting the quantified award with an entirely different one, a jurisdiction which Rule 74 does not confer. 89 On the final issue, the Respondent submitted that the evidence before the Court is uncontroverted: following the Judgment, it reinstated the Applicant to the office of Chief Finance Officer and paid the quantified back pay, the discrimination award and the costs awarded. 90 It contended that the Applicant expressly acknowledges receipt of these payments, and that his only complaint is that he believes he ought to have received more than the Court awarded. 91 It is the Respondent’s submission that the Applicant’s complaint is not non-compliance with the Judgment but disagreement with the Judgment itself, therefore, it cannot Page 25 of 27

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be faulted for complying with the decree exactly as issued by the Court. 92 I have examined all the averments and submissions of the parties herein. The application seeks clarity on the judgment delivered by Hon. J. Ongaya (as he then was) on 19th November 2025 and especially in respect of his reinstatement from the time of termination. 93 In this court’s view, the judgment of J. Ongaya (as he then was) was clear in terms of its award that: The claimant applicant be reinstated with full back payment of kshs 26,247,054.50 less PAYE and the claimant to continue in employment as Chief Financé Officer with attendant remuneration and benefits……. and to be treated as if the contract had not been terminated at all. 94 He was additionally to be paid kshs 10,000,000/- as compensation for discrimination. The moneys payable were to be paid by 31/3/2024 and in default to attract interest at court rates with effect from the date of the judgment until payment in full. 95 I may not know the point of departure of this judgment as interpreted by the parties herein but to aid the parties herein, I would expect the following to be considered while computing what is payable:1. Kshs 26,247,054/- as awarded in the judgment. 2. Kshs 10,000,000/- as compensation. Page 26 of 27

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3. Whether any increments have been considered over the period to ensure the applicant was to be put in same position as if he had never been terminated. 4. The period within which the moneys were paid and if any further interest accrued on it. 5. What costs were payable in the cause. 6. Other benefits payable to the applicant under this contract if he was paid as he was to be treated as though never terminated. 7. How tax was to be computed in order to ensure adherence to the judgment as delivered. The parties are urged to work together and ensure what is payable has been done. Costs in the cause. Dated, Signed and Delivered virtually at Nairobi this 5th Day of October 2026. HELLEN WASILWA JUDGE Page 27 of 27

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