Gor Mahia FC v Sports Disputes Tribunal & another; Sydney Ochieng Wahongo (Interested Party)

irrational for failure to analyze the arrears due as the same ought to have been considered as special damages requiring pleading and proving in the particulars of the claim. That the decision therefore violates the Petitioner’s rights under Articles 27(1), 47(1) and 50(1) of the Constitution. As the Petitioner, it seeks orders that: i. A declaration that the decision is in violation of the Petitioner’s rights under Article 27(1) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010. ii. A declaration that the decision is in violation of the Petitioner’s rights under Article 47 of the Constitution of Kenya. iii. A declaration that the decision is in violation of the Petitioner’s rights under Article 50(1) of the Constitution of Kenya. iv. A declaration that the 1st Respondent does not have jurisdiction over employment disputes under the Sports Act. v. A declaration that parties to a dispute cannot grant a tribunal jurisdiction as set out at section 58(b) of the Sports Act where the Constitution and the law have granted jurisdiction to another forum. vi. An Order of Certiorari do issue directed at the 1st Respondent, the Sports Dispute Tribunal, to remove into the Employment ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD 2

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and Labour Relations Court of Kenya and quash its Decision in SDT Cause E059 of 2025. vii. The costs of the Petition be provided for. 3. The 1st Respondent did not challenge the Petition. 4. The 2nd Respondent vide its grounds of opposition opposed the Petition on the grounds that: it has been improperly and unnecessarily enjoined in these proceedings; that the Petitioner is an independent legal entity capable of suing and being sued in its own name and is solely responsible for the management of its employment and human resource functions; that the Petition does not disclose any reasonable cause of action against the 2 nd Respondent; that the dispute arises from a private employeremployee relationship that the 2nd Respondent is not privy to; no relief capable of enforcement has been specifically pleaded or sought against the 2nd Respondent and its presence in this proceedings is unnecessary for the effectual and complete adjudication of the dispute; the joinder is misconceived, bad in law, and amounts to an abuse of court process and therefore prayed that its name be struck out of the proceedings with costs. 5. The Interested Party responded to the Petition vide his Replying Affidavit sworn on 30th June 2026. He deposed that he was the Claimant in SDT Cause No. E059 of 2025, from whose Judgment which this Petition arises. He termed the Petition as fundamentally incompetent as it seeks to challenge a concluded decision of a statutory tribunal through ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD a constitutional petition while 3

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simultaneously seeking an Order of Certiorari, a remedy traditionally invoked under the Court's supervisory judicial review jurisdiction. He observed that the Petition is an appeal against the Tribunal's Judgment disguised as a constitutional petition. He added that constitutional litigation ought not to be invoked where adequate statutory constitutional remedies controversy exist and requiring where no interpretation genuine of the Constitution has been demonstrated. He further added that the Petition does not disclose with precision the manner in which his rights or those of the Petitioner under Articles 27, 47 and 50 of the Constitution of Kenya were allegedly violated. 6. The affiant deponed that the Petitioner neither objected to the proposed forum indicated in the demand letter nor asserted that the Sports Disputes Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to determine the dispute, but voluntarily submitted itself to the Tribunal's jurisdiction by filing a Memorandum of Response and Counterclaim. That the Petitioner subsequently filed an Amended Response and Counterclaim through which it sought substantive reliefs against the claimant before the same Tribunal whose jurisdiction it now disputes. He deposed further that the Petitioner actively invoked the Tribunal's jurisdiction by prosecuting both its defence and Counterclaim to conclusion. He stated that the said conduct constitutes acquiescence and is wholly inconsistent with the Petitioner's present position, and which invokes the doctrine of estoppel. He termed the Petition as an afterthought intended solely to avoid compliance with the Tribunal's Judgment. ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD 4

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7. He deposed that disputes arising from professional player contracts possess unique characteristics governed not only by the Employment Act but also by specialized sporting regulations including the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP), which regulate contractual stability, just cause, sporting sanctions and compensation principles unique to professional football. He added that Parliament established the Sports Disputes Tribunal as a specialist institution under the Sports Act to determine sports-related disputes requiring expertise in sports law and regulation. He contended that the Petitioner's present interpretation of Section 58(b) of the Sports Act would substantially undermine the purpose for which Parliament established the Sports Disputes Tribunal. He stated that unless the orders sought herein are declined, he shall continue to be unjustly deprived of the fruits of a lawful Judgment obtained after a full hearing. 8. The Interested Party further provided expert opinion vide the affidavit sworn by George Okwaro Mutuli, an Advocate of the High Court of Kenya, serving as Legal Advisor to the Football Federation for Africa (FFA). He stated that he holds a Global Master in International Sports Law from the Instituto Superior de Derecho y Economía (ISDE), Madrid, Spain, and an Executive Certificate in Sports & Entertainment Law from Strathmore Law School. He stated that by virtue of his education, professional training, research, and practical experience in sports law, he is competent to provide an independent expert opinion. 9. He stated that professional sports employment contracts possess unique structural, regulatory, and institutional characteristics that ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD 5

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fundamentally distinguish them from ordinary contracts of employment. That professional football employment contracts are governed simultaneously by domestic employment law, international sports regulatory instruments, and the rules and regulations governing the sport. He stated that within association football, international contractual relations and player transfers are principally governed by the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP). He added the FIFA RSTP contains mandatory provisions governing contractual stability, termination with just cause, overdue payables, sporting just cause, and the legal consequences arising from termination of professional football employment contracts. 10. That Article 17 of the FIFA RSTP establishes specialized principles for assessing compensation following termination of contract, considering factors like the residual value of the contract, replacement contracts, the specificity of sport, sporting sanctions, and protected periods. He stated that the specialized remedies and methods of assessment differ materially from the statutory remedies ordinarily available under Sections 49 and 50 of the Employment Act. He deposed that international sports jurisprudence developed by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), recognizes professional football employment disputes as disputes arising within a specialized regulatory framework and applies principles developed specifically for the resolution of such disputes. He added that CAS jurisprudence places significant emphasis on the principles of contractual stability, sporting integrity, regulatory consistency, and the orderly administration of competitions, ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD 6

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considerations which differ materially from those ordinarily applicable in general employment disputes. 11. He opined that the resolution of disputes arising from professional football employment contracts frequently requires the interpretation and application of domestic legislation together with FIFA regulations, FIFA circulars, and established international sports jurisprudence. He stated that professional football employment contracts commonly incorporate the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, either expressly or by necessary implication, thereby making those regulatory provisions part of the contractual framework governing the relationship between the player and the club. He stated that the Sports Disputes Tribunal is established under the Sports Act, No. 25 of 2013, as a specialized statutory forum for the determination of sports-related disputes arising within the regulated sporting environment. Submissions 12. In its submissions the Petitioner and supplementary submissions submitted on the following issues for determination: (i) whether there was an employer-employee relationship between the Petitioner and the Interested Party; (ii) whether the tribunal had jurisdiction to determine SDT E059 of 2025; and whether the Petitioner is entitled to the orders sought. 13. On the first issue, it was submitted that the wording in the Interested Party’s claim proved the existence of an employer employee relationship that falls within this Court’s jurisdiction. Reliance was placed on Christine Adot Lopeiyo v Wycliffe Mwathi ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD 7

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Pere [2013] eKLR and Francis Mutunga Musau V Devki Steel Mills Limited [2015] eKLR. 14. On the second issue, it was submitted that due to the existence of the employment relationship, therefore the Tribunal lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the matter; as the same is preserve of this Court. The same was termed ultra vires. Reliance was placed on Gladys Mwaniki (Regional Club) & 6 others v Gordon Oluoch & 7 others [2015] eKLR and further reliance was placed on Gor Mahia FC v Sports Disputes Tribunal & another; Ayisi (Interested Party) (Petition E170 of 2023) [2023] KEELRC 3224 (KLR) (7 December 2023) (Judgement). 15. On competence of the Petition, it was urged that the purpose of the Petition is to challenge the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and its exercise of powers reserved for this Court. It was added that the same is aimed at determining whether Parliament conferred the Tribunal jurisdiction over employment matters under section 58(b) of the Sports Act. 16. On whether section 58(b) confers the jurisdiction to determine employment matters, it was submitted that interpreting the section as such, would not withstand any constitutional scrutiny. It was added that it would create concurrent original jurisdiction with this Court. 17. On the doctrine of estoppel, it was submitted that although parties may waive their procedural rights, they may not create jurisdiction where it has not been conferred by statute or the constitution. It ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD 8

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was urged that where jurisdiction is absent, participation by parties cannot validate proceedings taken without legal authority. Reliance was placed on Republic v Sports Disputes Tribunal & 3 others Ex Parte Moses Adagala & 2 others [2018] eKLR. further reliance was placed on Salim (as administrator of the estate of Said Salimdeceased) v Abdi & another (Civil Appeal 103 of 2016) [2018] KECA 14 (KLR) (19 April 2018) (Judgement). 18. On expert evidence, it was submitted that the same is admissible where it assists the Court on matters requiring specialized knowledge beyond ordinary judicial experience. Counsel added that the same is not admissible in constitutional interpretation or determining jurisdiction. Counsel urged the court to allow, the Petition as prayed. 19. Counsel for the 2nd Respondent submitted on: (i) whether the Petition discloses any reasonable cause of action against it; (ii) whether it is a necessary party to the proceedings; and (iii) whether the Petition ought to be struck out as against the it with costs. 20. On the first issue, it was submitted that the Petition did not contain any averment that the 2nd Respondent committed any unlawful act, failed to discharge any constitutional or statutory duty, participated in the proceedings, influenced the impugned decision or in any manner violated the Petitioner’s rights. Counsel added that none of the reliefs sought was directed towards the 2 nd Respondent; and therefore, were it be successful, no order would issue against to it. 21. On the second issue, it was submitted that the Attorney General’s constitutional mandate did not render the Attorney General (AG), a ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD 9

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necessary/proper party to every suit involving the interpretation of the constitutionality of legislation. Counsel submitted that the AG does not exercise supervisory authority over sports Disputes Tribunal nor participate in the adjudication of disputes before it. Reliance was placed on Werrot & Company Ltd & others v Andrew Douglas Gregory & others [1998] eKLR and Kizito M. Lubano v KEMRI Board of Management & 8 others [2015] eKLR. 22. On the third issue, it was submitted that in the absence of any cause of action or substantive relief against the 2 nd Respondent, the continued joinder served no useful purpose. It was submitted that having been unnecessarily joined, it was entitled to costs of defending the Petition. 23. The Interested Party through his counsel’s submission raised the following issues arise for determination: (i) whether the Petition is competent before this Honourable Employment and Labour Relations Court; (ii) whether Court enjoys the exclusive jurisdiction over all employment disputes and, in particular, sportsrelated employment disputes; (iii) whether, upon a purposive interpretation of Section 58(b) of the Sports Act, the Sports Disputes Tribunal possesses jurisdiction to determine sports-related employment disputes voluntarily referred to it by the parties; (iv) whether the Petitioner, having fully participated in the proceedings before the Tribunal, is estopped from challenging its jurisdiction after an adverse Judgment. 24. Counsel submitted incompetent and that the constituted ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD Petition an was impermissible fundamentally attempt to 10

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challenge the merits and legality of a judgment of the Sports Disputes Tribunal through a constitutional petition. Counsel submitted that it is now well settled that where legislation provides an adequate statutory mechanism for challenging the decision of a tribunal, parties ought not to invoke the Constitution merely because they are dissatisfied with the outcome. Counsel added that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance demands that constitutional jurisdiction be invoked only where it is strictly necessary. That the Petitioner had failed to satisfy the threshold set out in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic [1979] KLR 154 as reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 others [2013] eKLR; and this failed both procedurally and substantively and ought to be dismissed in limine. 25. On the second issue, it was submitted that the Petition proceeded upon the fundamental assumption that every dispute possessing an employment element falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court; yet the same had no support in either the Constitution or statute. It was added that neither the Constitution nor this Employment and Labour Relations Court Act (ELRC Act) provided that every employment dispute must invariably be determined by this Court to the exclusion of every other dispute resolution mechanism established by law. Counsel contended that section 15 of this ELRC Act recognized conciliation, mediation, arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms as legitimate means of resolving employment disputes. Counsel added that the statutory framework ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD therefore demonstrated that 11

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Parliament never intended the jurisdiction of this Court to operate in absolute exclusivity. 26. On the third issue, it was submitted that the issue was whether Parliament intended sports related employment disputes to be capable of voluntary reference to the specialist Tribunal established under the Sports Act. Counsel added that the question had to be answered through a purposive interpretation of the Sports Act. Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decisions in Gatirau Peter Munya v Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 others [2014] eKLR and Law Society of Kenya v Attorney General & another [2019] eKLR which affirmed that statutes should be interpreted in a manner that advanced the legislative purpose rather than defeat it. Counsel added that sports employment disputes therefore involved considerations extending far beyond ordinary employer-employee relationships. It was contended that although the Honourable Court possessed the judicial competence to interpret international sporting regulations where appropriate, Parliament nevertheless considered it necessary to establish a specialist tribunal possessing expertise in sports governance. It was argued that the decision of this court in Gor Mahia FC v Sports Disputes Tribunal & another; Ayisi (Interested Party) [2023] KEELRC 3224 (KLR) was not binding upon this Court as it is a decision of a court of concurrent jurisdiction to this court. 27. On the fourth issue, it was submitted that despite being informed that the dispute would be referred to the Sports Disputes Tribunal, the Petitioner raised no objection. That it did not raise the issue throughout the proceedings. It was submitted that Section 58(b) ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD 12

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merely required parties to agree to refer the dispute to the Tribunal, but no requirement that the same must be in writing. Counsel added that the Petitioner's conduct constituted clear submission to the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Reliance was placed on the decision in Makhanu, Odhiambo & Co Advocates v Bett [2024] KEELC 1229 (KLR) which cited Titus Muiruri Doge v Kenya Canners Ltd [1988] eKLR, in submitting that a party who, by its conduct, induces another to proceed on a particular state of affairs cannot thereafter resile from that position to the prejudice of the other party. counsel urged the court to dismiss the Petition be dismissed with costs to the Interested Party. 28. The issues that arise for determination by this Court are: (i) whether the Petition meets the threshold for constitutional petitions; (ii) whether the Petition is properly before this Court; and (iii) whether the Petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought. 29. On the first issue, the Interested Party contended that the Petition did not conform to the principle outlined in the Anarita Karimi Njeru case. The structure and form of constitutional petitions is governed by Rules 4 and 10 of the Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules 2013, (hereinafter the Mutunga Rules) as follows: 30. The said Rule 4 of the Mutunga Rules provides for scope and locus as follows: (1) Where any right or fundamental freedom provided for in the Constitution is allegedly denied, violated or infringed or threatened, a person so affected or likely to be affected, ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD 13

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may make an application to the High Court in accordance to these rules. (2) In addition to a person acting in their own interest, court proceedings under sub rule (1) may be instituted by— (i) a person acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; (ii) a person acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; (iii) a person acting in the public interest; or (iv) an association acting in the interest of one or more of its members. 31. Rule 10 states thus: 10. Form of petition (1) An application under rule 4 shall be made by way of a petition as set out in Form A in the Schedule with such alterations as may be necessary. (2) The petition shall disclose the following— (a) the petitioner’s name and address; (b) the facts relied upon; (c) the constitutional provision violated; (d) the nature of injury caused or likely to be caused to the petitioner or the person in whose name the petitioner has instituted the suit; or in a public interest case to the public, class of persons or community; ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD 14

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(e) details regarding any civil or criminal case, involving the petitioner or any of the petitioners, which is related to the matters in issue in the petition; (f) the petition shall be signed by the petitioner or the advocate of the petitioner; and (g)the relief sought by the petitioner. (3) Subject to rules 9 and 10, the Court may accept an oral application, a letter or any other informal documentation which discloses denial, violation, infringement or threat to a right or fundamental freedom. (4) An oral application entertained under sub rule (3) shall be reduced into writing by the Court. 32. Similarly, the Court in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic [1979] eKLR as follows: “We would, however, again stress that if a person is seeking redress from the High Court on a matter which involves a reference to the Constitution, it is important (if only to ensure that justice is done to his case) that he should set out with a reasonable degree of precision that of which he complains, the provisions said to be infringed, and the manner in which they are alleged to be infringed.” 33. The point of focus in this instant petition is the decision of the Tribunal. The Petitioner contends that the Tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction offended its constitutional rights. The Petitioner’s contention is that its rights were violated because this Court was stripped of the jurisdiction to handle the dispute. ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD 15

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At paragraph 2.3 of the Petition, it averred as follows: “2.3 The Petitioner contends that the decision violates his right to fair administrative action by stripping this Court of her powers to decide dispute between employers and employees as per the provisions of the Constitution of Kenya and the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act.” 34. From the above assertion it is clear that the grievance is on behalf of the Court. There is no indication of how the actions were unfair or in contravention of Article 47 or section 4 of the Fair Administrative Actions Act. Furthermore, it is apparent that the Petitioner voluntarily submitted itself to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and only felt aggrieved when the outcome was not favourable to it. This is evidenced by the evidence on record showing that the Petitioner filed its response, counter-claim and set-off, adduction of evidence and witness testimony and filed submissions dated 16 th February 2026. Largely, the Petition is an afterthought and does not demonstrate how the alleged rights were infringed or threatened. In the courts view the Petition does not meet the test of precision established in the Anarita Karimi Njeru case. 35. On the second issue, in Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Ltd & 5 others [2014] KESC 53 (KLR) the Supreme Court observed as follows regarding constitutional avoidance: [256] The appellants in this case are seeking to invoke the “principle of avoidance”, also known as “constitutional avoidance”. The principle of avoidance entails that a Court ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD 16

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will not determine a constitutional issue, when a matter may properly be decided on another basis. In South Africa, in S v. Mhlungu, 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) the Constitutional CourtKentridge AJ, articulated the principle of avoidance in his minority Judgment as follows [at paragraph 59]:I would lay it down as a general principle that where it is possible to decide any case, civil or criminal, without reaching a constitutional issue,that is the course which should be followed.” [257] Similarly the U.S. Supreme Court has held that it would not decide a constitutional question which was properly before it, if there was also some other basis upon which the case could have been disposed of (Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)). [258] From the foundation of principle well developed in the comparative practice, 3rd respondents’ claim we hold that the 1 st, in the High Court, 2nd and regarding infringement of intellectual property rights, was a plain copyright- infringement claim,and it was not properly laid before that Court as a constitutional issue. This was, therefore, not a proper question falling to the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court. 36. Similarly in KKB v SCM & 5 others [2022] KEHC 289 (KLR) the court held: 32.The doctrine of avoidance is primarily viewed by courts from the position that although a court could take up a matter and hear it, it would still decline to do so if there is ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD 17

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another mechanism through which the dispute could be resolved. In that regard, the Supreme Court stated in Communication Commission of Kenya & 5 Others v Royal Media Services Ltd & 5 others (at para 256) that the principle of determine a avoidance means constitutional that issue a when Court a will not matter may properly be decided on another basis. In the South African case of S v Mhlungu (supra) Kentridge AJ, stated in the dissenting opinion respecting the principle of avoidance (at paragraph 59), that he would lay down as a general principle that where it is possible to decide any case, civil or criminal, without reaching a constitutional issue, that is the course which should be followed. And in Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Authority20 the U.S. Supreme Court held that it would not decide a constitutional question which was properly before it if there was also some other basis upon which the case could have been disposed of. Courts will not normally consider a constitutional question unless the existence of a remedy depends on it; if a remedy is available to an applicant under some other legislative provision or on some other basis, whether legal or factual, a court will usually decline to determine whether there has been, in addition, a breach of the Declaration of rights.21Currie and de Waal22 opine that the principle of constitutional avoidance is of crucial importance in the application of the Bill of Rights. The author’s state: “When applying the Bill of Rights in a legal dispute, the principle of avoidance is of crucial importance. As we have seen, the Bill of Rights always applies in a legal ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD 18

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dispute. It is usually capable of direct or indirect application and, in a limited number of cases, of indirect application only. The availability of direct application is qualified by the principle that the Bill of Rights should not be applied directly in a legal dispute unless it is necessary to do so.” 33. An important and critical issue arises from the above statements by Currie and de Waal. It is the fact that every legal dispute is capable of either direct or indirect application of the Bill of Rights. Every dispute is essentially a constitutional issue when one looks at it. This arises necessarily because supremacy.23 One of the principle of needs to be however aware constitutional of the singleness of the legal system. This is embodied in the fact that the supremacy of/ the Constitution does not detract from the usefulness of the rest of the body of law. In essence all other laws give full expression to the ideals of the Constitution until found to be inconsistent to it.23 34. The doctrine of ripeness and constitutional avoidance gives credence to the concept that the Constitution does not operate in a vacuum or isolation. It has to be interpreted and applied in conjunction with applicable legislation together with other available legal remedies. Where there are alternative remedies the preferred route is to apply such remedies before resorting to the Constitution. The possibility of the elevation of any dispute to a constitutional issue is what is sought to be averted by the doctrines of ripeness and constitutional avoidance. It is ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD 19

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borne out of a realisation that all legislative or common-law remedies are part of the legal system. 35. In the United States of America, and as long back as 1885, Liverpool, New York and Philadelphia Steamship Co v Commissioners of Emigration24, Matthews J said:24 “(N)ever…anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it; …never…. Formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.” 36. In summation, the doctrines of ripeness and constitutional avoidance shun to deal with a constitutional issue where there exists another legal course which can give the litigant the relief he seeks. In other words, a constitutional issue is not ripe for determination until the determination of the constitutional issue is the only course that can give the litigant the remedy he seeks. Both constitutional avoidance and ripeness avert the determination of the constitutional issues until it becomes very necessary to the extent that it is the only course available to assist the litigant‘s cause. The exceptions to the application of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance are: i. where the constitutional violation is so clear and of direct relevance to the matter, ii. in the absence of an apparent alternative form of ordinary relief and iii. where it is found that it would be a waste of effort to seek a non-constitutional resolution of the dispute. ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD 20

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37. It is trite law that a person aggrieved by a decision made by a body acting ultra vires, ought to seek judicial review and not through a constitutional petition. Section 7 of the Fair Administrative Actions Act provides for judicial review as follows: 7. Institution of proceedings (1) Any person who is aggrieved by an administrative action or decision may apply for review of the administrative action or decision to– (a) a court in accordance with section 8; or (b) a tribunal in exercise of its jurisdiction conferred in that regard under any written law. (2) A court or tribunal under subsection (1) may review an administrative action or decision, if– (a) the person who made the decision– (i) was not authorized to do so by the empowering provision; (ii) acted in excess of jurisdiction or power conferred under any written law; (iii) acted pursuant to delegated power in contravention of any law prohibiting such delegation; (iv) was biased or may reasonably be suspected of bias; or (v) denied the person to whom the administrative action or decision relates, a reasonable opportunity to state the person's case; 38. Section 9 of the FAAA further provides for the procedure as follows: (1) Subject to subsection (2), a person who is aggrieved by an administrative action may, without unreasonable delay, ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD 21

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apply for judicial review of any administrative action to the High Court or to a subordinate court upon which original jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to Article 22(3) of the Constitution. 39. The Upshot of the foregoing is that the Petition is not properly before this Court and is hereby with no orders struck out as to costs. 40. Relatedly, on the Sports Disputes Tribunal is a judicial body clothed with jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes in the realm of sports and the court is not persuaded that the decisions of the tribunal are challengeable in this court by way of a Petition. that the Petition is not properly before this Court and is hereby dismissed with costs to the 2nd Respondent and the Interested Party. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI ON THIS 28th SEPTEMBER, 2026 DR. JACOB GAKERI JUDGE ORDER In view of the declaration of measures restricting court operations due to the COVID19 pandemic and in light of the directions issued by His Lordship, the Chief Justice on 15th March 2020 and subsequent directions of 21st April 2020 that judgments and rulings shall be delivered through video conferencing or via email. They have waived compliance with Order 21 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which requires that all judgments and rulings be pronounced in open court. In permitting ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD 22

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this course, this court has been guided by Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution which requires the court to eschew undue technicalities in delivering justice, the right of access to justice guaranteed to every person under Article 48 of the Constitution and the provisions of Section 1B of the Civil Procedure Act (Chapter 21 of the Laws of Kenya) which impose on this court the duty of the court, inter alia, to use suitable technology to enhance the overriding objective which is to facilitate just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of civil disputes. DR. JACOB GAKERI JUDGE ELRC NAIROBI PET E130 OF 2026 - JUD 23

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