Stubbs v Murage & 3 others

2. The Applicants further led a Notice of Motion application dated 6th May 2026 seeking Orders: 1. That this application be heard on priority to all other applications to allow the Applicants to participate in the pending applications. 2. That pending the hearing and determination of this Application inter partes, this Honourable Court be pleased to stay the execution, enforcement, implementation and/or all consequential proceedings arising from the Ruling and Orders delivered on 18th March 2026, in so far as the same relate to, aect, refer to, impose liability upon, or purport to bind Murage Juma & Company, Advocates. 3. That this Honourable Court be pleased to join Joseph Nicholas Murage and Kagoro Juma, trading as Murage Juma & Company Advocates, as the 1st and 2nd Applicants herein, together with Mark Irungu, the 3rd Applicant, solely and strictly for the limited purpose of prosecuting and being heard on this Application. 4. That pursuant to prayers 1,2, and 3 above the court do make a nding that within the court record and or within the court proceedings, there is no positive order directed towards the rm of Murage Juma & Company Advocates that has been breached by the law rm capable of being found in contempt. 5. That the costs of this Application be provided for. Claimant’s Case 3. The Claimant avers that vide a Ruling dated and delivered on 18th March 2026, this Court, Wasilwa J., made a nding that the Claimant and the Interested Party had acted in contempt of the Court's orders by proceeding to execute and attach the Respondent's motor vehicle against the Court's express orders. 4. He states that, aggrieved by the said decision, he instructed his Advocates, who led a Notice of Appeal together with a letter bespeaking certied copies of the Ruling, proceedings and orders for purposes of appeal, copies whereof are exhibited to his Adavit. 5. It was stated that by dint of Order 42 Rule 6(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, an appeal to the Court of Appeal is deemed to have been led once a notice of appeal has been given under the Rules of that Court, and that an appeal is accordingly deemed to have been led in the instant case. 6. The Claimant further avers that at all material times in this suit, his Advocates represented his interests and acted under his instructions and for his sole benet. 7. He states that he will suer irreparable harm because the nature of the nding by the Court carries criminal and reputational consequences. 8. He asserts that his application has been brought without undue delay and in utmost good faith, and that he is willing to provide such security as shall be reasonable and necessary in the circumstances of the case. 9. The Claimant contends that he has an arguable appeal and a prima facie appeal with high chances of success, as borne out by the draft Memorandum of Appeal attached to his supporting adavit. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/2529/eng@2026-09-22 2

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10. The Claimant states that under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, this Court, being the court appealed from, has jurisdiction to grant a stay of execution of its own judgment, decree and/ or order pending appeal. Applicants’ Case 11. The Applicants’ application was supported by an adavit sworn by the 3rd Applicant, Mark Irungu, an Advocate of the High Court practising in the rm known as Murage Juma & Company Advocates, which has been on record for the Claimant. 12. The Applicants aver that the rm was never a substantive party to the proceedings, was never joined as an interested party, respondent, contemnor or proposed contemnor, and that on the record there is no direct or specic positive order directed at the rm capable of having been breached so as to warrant contempt proceedings against it. 13. They state that, notwithstanding this, the Court, vide its Ruling of 18th March 2026, made adverse ndings against the rm, held it personally liable for the alleged contempt, and directed that the costs of the application be borne by the Claimant's counsel and the auctioneer, exposing the 1st and 2nd Applicants as partners, and the 3rd Applicant as an advocate practicing therein, to imminent penal, nancial, professional and reputational prejudice. 14. It is the Applicants' case that Murage Juma & Company Advocates is merely a rm or business name under which the 1st and 2nd Applicants carry on legal practice, and not a natural person, body corporate or juristic entity capable of being found guilty of contempt or punished in its own name; that the appearance of an advocate on record for a client does not transform the advocate, the partners, or the rm name into a substantive party to the proceedings; and that the nding of contempt against the rm is accordingly nebulous as to which party or entity is held liable, and a nullity to the extent that it purports to impose personal or penal liability upon a non-juristic entity. 15. The Applicants further aver that no notice to show cause, summons, penal notice or equivalent process was ever served upon them, whether personally or as partners, requiring them to answer to a charge of contempt; that no pleadings were amended and no directions were issued enjoining them as distinct contemnors; and that any response or appearance led by counsel on behalf of the Claimant was led in a representative capacity only and cannot be construed as a waiver of their right to be separately joined, charged and heard in respect of personal contempt liability. 16. They contend that contempt proceedings, being penal and quasi-criminal, require that an alleged contemnor be clearly identied, properly brought before the Court, informed of the charge, and heard before adverse ndings are made, and that mere alleged knowledge of court orders does not suce to ground contempt absent proper service, joinder and hearing. 17. It is their case that they were condemned unheard, contrary to natural justice and the right to a fair hearing, and that the alleged contempt was not proved to the requisite standard. 18. The Applicants deny having acted in willful, deliberate or contumacious disobedience of any court order, and state that they acted at all times within the scope of their professional and lawful duties, holding the Court and its orders in the highest respect. 19. Responding to the Replying Adavit of Kelvin Amota, they deny that the Application is a disguised appeal, asserting instead that it is a legitimate invocation of the Court's inherent jurisdiction to review, vary or set aside its own orders where issued in violation of natural justice, and deny that they are seeking to evade compliance with lawful orders, delay execution, or re-litigate concluded issues, maintaining https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/2529/eng@2026-09-22 3

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that the application is conned strictly to procedural improprieties and breaches of natural justice in the impugned Ruling. 20. The Applicants contend that no prejudice incapable of compensation by costs will be occasioned to the Respondent should the orders sought be granted, whereas they themselves stand to suer substantial and irreparable prejudice, including exposure to contempt sanctions, adverse costs and reputational and professional harm, should the orders not be granted. Respondent’s Case 21. In opposition to Claimant and Applicants’ case, the Respondent led replying adavits both dated 11th May 2026 and sworn by its Senior Legal Ocer, Kelvin Amota. 22. The Respondent avers that both applications are misconceived, premature, incompetent, legally untenable, vexatious and an abuse of the process of court, calculated to delay, defeat or suspend the lawful consequences of the Ruling delivered on 18th March 2026. 23. As regards the Claimant's Application, the Respondent contends that although framed as one for stay pending appeal, it is in substance an attempt to arrest the nal stage of contempt proceedings after a nding of guilt has already been made, and that a Notice of Appeal does not by itself constitute an appeal or operate as an automatic stay. 24. It avers that under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules the Claimant was required to demonstrate substantial loss, promptitude and provision of security, and has failed to do so, having relied on bare and speculative allegations of irreparable harm, reputational prejudice and criminal consequences. 25. The Respondent contends that contempt proceedings are sui generis and that a contemnor has no right of audience unless he has purged the contempt or been sentenced; that this Court has not yet heard mitigation or imposed sentence, rendering the claim of prospective harm premature. 26. The Respondent contends that an appeal in contempt matters properly lies only upon sentencing, such that the Claimant will suer no prejudice in submitting to the Court's jurisdiction for mitigation before pursuing any appellate remedy. It thus prays that the Claimant’s application be dismissed with costs and that the Court proceed to mitigation and sentencing. 27. As regards the Applicants' application, the Respondent avers that it is not a bona de attempt to assist the Court but a calculated and self-serving attempt by the Claimant's Advocates to shield themselves from the consequences of the Ruling, amounting to a collateral attack on that Ruling disguised as an application for joinder, stay and clarication, and inviting the Court to sit on appeal over its own decision without any appeal having been led. 28. It contends that the Court's contempt jurisdiction attaches to conduct in relation to a subsisting order and is not conned to formal party status, such that any person with knowledge, actual or constructive, of an order who acts in disobedience of it is liable regardless of joinder. 29. It is the Respondent’s case that the Applicants and the rm were at all material times on record for the Claimant, participated in the proceedings and execution, issued instructions in that regard, and were expressly addressed in the Ruling, such that they cannot now present themselves as innocent strangers condemned unheard. 30. Reliance is placed on Winnie Muthoni Mburu & others v Nairobi City County & others, Dr. Fred Matiang'i v Miguna Miguna & Others, and Carey v Laiken for the propositions that joinder of alleged https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/2529/eng@2026-09-22 4

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contemnors is not automatic and requires a direct interest, and that knowledge of an order coupled with an inconsistent act suces to found liability irrespective of joinder or subjective intent. 31. On service, the Respondent avers that the Applicants were duly served on 27th October 2025, by email to their ocial addresses, with the contempt application and orders, generating delivery reports, and that the application itself bore a penal notice. 32. It contends that the Applicants have not disputed ownership of those email addresses, and that their claim of never having been served is misleading. 33. It further avers that the issue of contempt has already been canvassed and determined, such that any complaint as to procedure or hearing goes to the merits of the Ruling and lies in appeal, not in the present collateral Application. 34. The Respondent additionally avers that on 22nd September 2025 the 3rd Applicant misled the Court from the Bar as to non-payment of the decretal sum, when the Claimant's own replying adavit had admitted receipt thereof, and contends that this demonstrates a sustained eort by the Claimant's Advocates to evade the consequences of the nding on unlawful execution and contempt, blurring the distinction between their role as counsel and as interested litigants. 35. It is the Respondent's case that advocates, as ocers of the court, cannot rely on professional representation to justify disobedience of court orders, that the Applicants have approached the Court with unclean hands and do not deserve audience, and that the Court ought rst to sentence the Applicants for contempt before entertaining their Application. The Respondent accordingly prays that the application too be dismissed with costs to the Claimant. Claimant’s Submissions 36. The Claimant submitted on two issues: whether this Court has jurisdiction to grant a stay of execution of the Ruling dated 18th March 2026 pending hearing and determination of an Appeal at the Court of Appeal; and whether the Applicants have met the threshold for the grant of a stay of execution of the stay of execution of the Ruling dated 18th March 2026 pending hearing and determination of the Appeal at the Court of Appeal. 37. On jurisdiction, the Claimant submitted that the Court from which an appeal is preferred retains jurisdiction to grant a stay pending appeal. Reliance was placed on Order 42 Rule 6(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, which expressly empowers the court appealed from, for sucient cause, to order a stay of execution, notwithstanding that the appellate court may subsequently consider the application. He therefore argued that the Respondent’s contention that only the Court of Appeal could grant a stay, or that this Court was functus ocio, had no legal basis. 38. The Claimant relied on Endere v Ochiri for the Estate of Pauline Kasesya Mwinzi [2023] KEHC 19864 (KLR), where the Court held that a stay pending appeal may be granted either by the court from which the appeal is preferred or by the appellate court. 39. He further relied on Thiong’o (Suing as the Legal Representative of the Estate of Michael Thiong’o Gatete) & another v Ontonyi & 3 others [2023] KEELC 20245 (KLR), where the Court armed that an unsuccessful party may seek a stay pending appeal and that, under Order 42 Rule 6(4), a notice of appeal is sucient for purposes of establishing that an appeal is pending. The Claimant submitted that it had lodged a Notice of Appeal dated 24th March 2026 and had consequently satised that aspect of the jurisdictional requirement. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/2529/eng@2026-09-22 5

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40. As to the threshold for stay, the Claimant relied on Order 42 Rule 6(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, submitting that an applicant must demonstrate substantial loss, absence of unreasonable delay and willingness to furnish security for the due performance of the decree or order. It was argued that the Court ought, in applying those principles, to preserve the status quo so as to prevent the intended appeal from being rendered nugatory. 41. On substantial loss, the Claimant submitted that the consequence of executing the impugned Ruling would be particularly grave because the Court had found the Claimant in contempt and directed that the matter proceed to punishment or sentencing. Reliance was placed on Tropical Commodities Suppliers Ltd & Others v International Credit Bank Ltd (in liquidation) [2004] 2 EA 331, where substantial loss was described as a qualitative concept referring to loss of real worth or value, rather than a merely nominal loss. 42. Relying on In re of DPN [2020] KEHC 5410 (KLR), where a stay of contempt proceedings was granted upon the Court nding that the contemnor’s liberty was threatened by the possibility of committal to civil jail, monetary punishment and attachment of property. The Claimant submitted that similar considerations arose in the present case, since execution of the Ruling would expose the Claimant to punishment or sentencing and thereby risk rendering the intended appeal nugatory. 43. The Claimant emphasized that the consequences of contempt extended beyond ordinary monetary execution, implicating the Claimant’s liberty, reputation and property. 44. On delay, the Claimant submitted that the application had been made timeously. He asserted that following delivery of the Ruling, the Claimant promptly bespeaking proceedings and an order for purposes of appeal on 23rd March 2026, and lodged and served a Notice of Appeal dated 24th March 2026. The present application was thereafter led on 6th May 2026. 45. Relying on Elena Doudoladova Korir v Kenyatta University [2014] eKLR, the Claimant submitted that applications for stay ought to be made without undue delay and contended that the steps taken demonstrated diligence notwithstanding that the Claimant resided outside the country. 46. On security, the Claimant submitted that he has demonstrated good faith by expressly undertaking to provide such security as the Court considered reasonable. Reliance was placed on Focin Motorcycle Co. Limited v Ann Wambui Wangui & another [2018] eKLR, where the Court held that an applicant’s willingness to provide security may demonstrate that an application for stay is not intended merely to deny the respondent the fruits of judgment, while the nature and suciency of security remain matters for the Court’s discretion. 47. The Claimant further argued that there was no justication for requiring substantial monetary security in the circumstances. It was submitted that the decretal sum arising from the judgment for unfair termination had already been paid and that the motor vehicle in question had also been released. 48. In support thereof, he cited Wekesa & 4 others v Kisibo [2023] KEELC 21901 (KLR), where the Court declined to impose security of Kshs.1,000,000 on the basis that it would practically stie the appellants’ right of appeal. The Claimant therefore argued that imposing a further onerous monetary security requirement would similarly impede its right of appeal. 49. On prejudice, the Claimant submitted that the Respondent would suer no prejudice if the stay was granted because the substantive employment dispute had already been determined by the judgment nding that the Claimant had been unfairly terminated, the decretal amount had been paid and the party-and-party costs had been taxed. The only outstanding issue, as framed by the Claimant, concerned the impugned contempt-related ndings and consequential orders. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/2529/eng@2026-09-22 6

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50. Reliance was placed on Soft White Beach Limited v Kombe & 4 others [2023] KECA 970 (KLR), where the Court of Appeal held that the question of prejudice requires a balancing of the competing interests of the parties, namely the successful party’s entitlement to enjoy the judgment and the applicant’s constitutional right to pursue an appeal. 51. The Claimant submitted that, in the circumstances, the balance of convenience favours the preservation of the status quo pending the determination of the appeal, particularly given the potential consequences of contempt proceedings for liberty, reputation and property. 52. The Claimant also submitted that the intended appeal is arguable and therefore not frivolous. Relying on Stanley Kangethe Kinyanjui V Tony Ketter & 5 others [2013] eKLR, he argued that an arguable appeal need not succeed but only needs to raise a bona de issue deserving consideration by the appellate court; indeed, a single arguable ground would suce. 53. In that regard, the Claimant submitted that the draft Memorandum of Appeal raised substantial questions concerning the nding of contempt. In particular, the intended appeal challenged whether the Court had properly identied and applied the constituent elements of civil contempt, including the existence and terms of the order, knowledge of the order, actual breach and wilful and deliberate disobedience. 54. It is the Claimant’s submission that the nding of contempt was legally questionable because the stay order of 22nd September 2025 was conditional upon deposit of the decretal sum by 26th September 2025, thereby raising an arguable question as to whether the stay remained operative after noncompliance with that condition. 55. The Claimant further contended that where the existence, subsistence, scope or legal eect of an order is reasonably contestable, contempt jurisdiction ought not to be invoked to impose penal consequences. 56. It was submitted that the Claimant’s interpretation that the conditional stay had lapsed constituted a bona de legal position rather than willful disobedience. The intended appeal would consequently challenge the nding that the Claimant and its advocates were in contempt in the absence of proof of a clear, precise, unequivocal and subsisting order restraining execution as at 24th October 2025. 57. The Claimant also challenged the factual basis of the impugned Ruling, submitting that the Court proceeded on the understanding that the Claimant and the auctioneers continued to hold the motor vehicle, whereas the vehicle had allegedly been released on 27th October 2025. 58. It was further contended that the Court erred in nding a business name in contempt, on the basis that a business name lacks legal capacity to sue or be sued and consequently could not properly be subjected to contempt proceedings. Applicants’ Submissions 59. The Applicants submitted on three issues: whether this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to review, vary, set aside, discharge and/or vacate adverse ndings and consequential orders made against persons who were not properly joined, cited, or heard; whether contempt-related ndings and personal or professional consequential orders can lawfully be made against advocates or a law rm without proper joinder, citation, service, and hearing; and whether alleged knowledge of court orders can cure the absence of due process in contempt proceedings. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/2529/eng@2026-09-22 7

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60. On the rst issue, the Applicants submitted that the application did not invite the Court to sit on appeal over its earlier decision or reopen the merits of the dispute between the parties, but sought to correct a fundamental procedural and constitutional irregularity arising from the condemnation of a person who had not been made a party to the contempt proceedings. 61. The Applicants submitted that it is trite that a court of law retains jurisdiction t to correct or review its orders where the impugned decision was aected by a breach of natural justice, an error apparent on the face of the record or a miscarriage of justice. 62. They further submitted that the doctrine of functus ocio does not bar a court from exercising a jurisdiction expressly reserved by law to review, vary, set aside or correct orders made in breach of due process. This position was fortied in Cogno Ventures Limited & 4 others v Bia Tosha Distributors Limited & 15 others; Kenya Breweries Limited & 6 others (Interested Parties); Ferran & 24 others (Contemnor) [2023] KESC 33 (KLR), where the Supreme Court recognized the general application of the functus ocio doctrine while acknowledging the Court’s residual jurisdiction to review or clarify its orders where permitted by law. The Applicants particularly relied on the Supreme Court’s treatment of contempt proceedings, arguing that persons could not be introduced as contemnors for the rst time through an application without proper procedural foundation. 63. Relying on Directline Assurance Company Limited v Mercy Nyambura Wangui [2021] eKLR, where the High Court held it highly irregular for an applicant to bring in persons who were not parties to the original cause and seek contempt orders against them without leave of court, and that even where contempt is established, no order would be made against non-parties whose joinder had not been sanctioned. It was submitted that this authority is on all fours with the Applicants' complaint, Murage Juma & Company Advocates never having been joined as a respondent, interested party, contemnor or proposed contemnor, never served with a notice to show cause, never given a specic charge to answer, and never aorded a hearing prior to the impugned ndings. 64. The Applicants’ argued that the right to be heard is a substantive constitutional guarantee, not a matter of technical procedure, and that where a court makes adverse ndings against a non-party capable of attracting personal costs, professional embarrassment or disciplinary exposure, that person is entitled to approach the same court to set aside, vary or discharge such ndings for violation of the audi alteram partem rule. 65. On the second issue, the Applicants submitted that it is common ground that Murage Juma & Company Advocates acted at all material times in its professional and representative capacity as advocates on record, and was not, prior to the Ruling, a substantive party, interested party, respondent, contemnor or proposed contemnor, this being expressly deponed to in the Supporting Adavit of Mark Irungu. 66. The Applicants argued that contempt proceedings, being sui generis and quasi-criminal, carry consequences including nes, attachment, sequestration, committal to civil jail, personal costs and disciplinary exposure, such that minimum procedural safeguards, namely clear identication of the alleged contemnor, proper citation, service of the application and supporting material, particularization of the acts complained of, and a distinct opportunity to respond, are not procedural ornaments but go to jurisdiction, due process and validity of the resulting order. 67. They again relied on Directline Assurance Company Limited v Mercy Nyambura Wangui (Supra) and Cogno Ventures Limited v Bia Tosha Distributors Limited (Supra) for the proposition that contempt jurisdiction cannot be exercised casually against persons not properly joined or cited. The Applicants submitted that if newly introduced contemnors cannot lawfully be proceeded against without proper https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/2529/eng@2026-09-22 8

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procedural foundation, a rm never introduced, joined, cited or served cannot be subjected to adverse contempt ndings and personal consequential orders. 68. It was submitted that the Respondent's contention that the Applicants cannot rely on non-joinder and want of service is misconceived; that while ordinary procedural lapses may in appropriate circumstances be cured under Article 159 of the Constitution, the requirements of notice, joinder, citation and hearing in contempt proceedings, where personal or penal consequences arise, are substantive safeguards incapable of being dismissed as mere technicalities. 69. The Applicants argued that knowledge of a court order, even if assumed, does not cure want of personal citation and a separate hearing, drawing a fundamental distinction between knowledge of an order, which speaks only to awareness of the Court's command, and notice that one is personally accused of contempt, which triggers the constitutional and procedural right to answer a quasi-criminal allegation. 70. It is the Applicants’ submission that the Respondent's argument collapses this distinction and, if accepted, would expose advocates to personal penal consequences merely for representing clients, with a chilling eect on legal representation and the independence of the Bar. 71. It was further submitted that Murage Juma & Company Advocates is merely a rm name under which legal practice is carried on, and that contempt liability, being personal and penal, must be tied to an identied natural person against whom specic acts of willful disobedience are pleaded and proved, a general adverse nding against counsel or a rm name without such identication and hearing being unable to stand; and that personal costs against counsel, being exceptional and punitive, ought not to be imposed without prior notice and an opportunity to show cause, a principle applying with even greater force to contempt ndings. 72. On the third issue, the Applicants submitted that alleged knowledge of court orders, even if assumed, cannot in law cure the absence of due process, knowledge of an order not being synonymous with notice of a personal charge of contempt, nor a substitute for joinder, citation, service, particularization and a distinct hearing. 73. The Applicants argued that the Respondent's position conates the evidentiary requirement of knowledge with the jurisdictional and constitutional requirement that an alleged contemnor be properly brought before the court, and that while personal service of an order may in appropriate circumstances be dispensed with where actual knowledge is clearly proved, this addresses only one ingredient of contempt and does not dispense with the requirement that the person be personally cited, served with the contempt process, informed of the precise allegations, and heard before condemnation. 74. They again relied on Directline Assurance Company Limited v Mercy Nyambura Wangui (Supra) and Cogno Ventures Limited v Bia Tosha Distributors Limited (Supra) submitting that an advocate's professional knowledge of orders made in a matter cannot automatically translate into personal liability for contempt, since advocates act on instructions and advance legal arguments, and that any contrary approach would undermine the administration of justice. 75. The Applicants’ submitted that their complaint is not merely that they were not personally served with the order, but that they were never personally cited, joined, served with the contempt application, informed of the charge, or heard before the adverse ndings and personal consequential orders were made. 76. They further argued that the audi alteram partem rule is not displaced by proof of knowledge of an order, being especially indispensable where the nding sought may result in punishment, personal costs or professional embarrassment. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/2529/eng@2026-09-22 9

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Respondent’s Submissions 77. The Respondent submitted on four issues: Whether the Applications meet the threshold for the grant of stay of execution, implementation, enforcement, and all consequential proceedings arising from the contempt ruling delivered on 18th March 2026; whether the 1st –3rd Applicants are entitled to the orders of joinder, review, setting aside, clarication and/or discharge sought in their Application; whether Murage Juma & Company Advocates and/or the persons practicing under the said name and style can evade accountability for contempt on the basis of alleged non-joinder, want of personal service and lack of separate juristic personality; who should bear the costs of the Application. 78. On the threshold for stay, it was submitted that stay is a discretionary remedy governed by the cumulative conditions under Order 42 Rule 6(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, namely substantial loss, absence of unreasonable delay, and provision of security, and that neither Application had discharged this evidentiary burden. 79. Relying on James Wangalwa & Another V Agnes Naliaka Cheseto[2012]eKLR, it was argued that substantial loss must be actual, pleaded and proved, not speculative, and that the Claimant's reliance on alleged criminal and reputational consequences, and the Applicants' reliance on alleged professional embarrassment and disciplinary exposure, did not meet this standard. 80. The Respondent submitted that the prayer for stay of sentencing was in any event premature since no sentence had yet been pronounced and no coercive order had crystallized capable of being stayed, relying on Wendano Matuu Co Ltd & 2 others v Joshua Kimeu Kioko & 6 others [2020] eKLR, where the court held it prudent for the Applicants to approach the appellate Court for orders of stay once the trial court had found contempt and directed mitigation. It further relied on Muturi v Ndumbi & 3 others [2026] KEELC 523 (KLR) holding that a "claim for substantial loss is... unfounded as the Court is yet to pass sentence." 81. It was further submitted that contempt jurisdiction exists to protect the administration of justice rather than for personal vindication, relying on Econet Wireless Kenya Ltd v Minister for Information & Communication of Kenya & another [2005] eKLR, that "a contemnor would have no right of audience in any court of law unless he is punished or he purges the contempt," and on Fred Matiang’i the Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Interior and Co-ordination of National Government v Miguna Miguna & 4 others [2018] KECA 789 (KLR), that courts will deny audience to contemnors evincing headstrong contumaciousness until they purge their contempt. 82. On the Claimant's specic reliance on the Notice of Appeal, it was submitted that under Order 42 Rule 6(1) a Notice of Appeal does not of itself operate as a stay, and that the Claimant had not shown how the appeal would be rendered nugatory. It cited Kenya Shell Limited v Benjamin Karuga Kibiru & anorther [1986] KECA 94 (KLR), that "substantial loss in its various forms is the corner stone of both jurisdictions for granting a stay." 83. On the prayer for stay of proceedings, the Respondent submitted that this is a graver step requiring cautious exercise of discretion, citing Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn, Vol 37) that a stay of proceedings should not be imposed unless the proceedings beyond all reasonable doubt ought not to be allowed to continue. Further in Re Global Tours & Travel Ltd, HCWC No. 43 of 2000, wherein Ringera J, held that the court must weigh "the need for expeditious disposal of case, the prima facie merits of the intended appeal... the scarcity and optimum utilization of judicial time." https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/2529/eng@2026-09-22 10

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84. It is the Respondent’s submission that no substantive issues remained pending save mitigation and sentencing, such that staying proceedings would serve only to prevent completion of the contempt process, contrary to Article 50(2)(e) of the Constitution on expeditious disposal of disputes. 85. Relying on Muturi v Ndumbi & 3 others (Supra), the Respondent submitted that the interests of justice overwhelmingly favour the completion of the contempt proceedings. It argued that the Court has already rendered a reasoned determination on liability. What remains is the consequential stage of mitigation and sentencing, thus, it would be contrary to the overriding objective of the Court and the constitutional imperative of expeditious disposal of disputes to halt proceedings at the very threshold of completion. 86. On the second issue, the Respondent submitted that joinder is not granted as of right, and that a party seeking it must demonstrate a direct, identiable and legally protectable interest. It relied on Moses Wachira v Niels Bruel & 2 others [2015] eKLR and the Supreme Court's articulation in Communications Commission of Kenya & 3 others v Royal Media Services Limited & 7 others [2014] eKLR, of who qualies as an interested party. 87. It was submitted that the Applicants had shown no legitimate interest in the underlying employment dispute beyond avoiding the consequences of the contempt nding, and that, per Winnie Muthoni Mburu & 25 others v Nairobi City County & 7 others [2016] eKLR, alleged contemnors cannot be joined merely because they are to be cited for contempt. 88. It was further submitted that formal joinder is not the determinant of contempt liability, since contempt jurisdiction targets conduct rather than form, any person with actual or constructive knowledge of a valid order who acts in breach of it being liable, relying on Carey v Laiken [2015] 2 SCR 79 and Shimmers Plaza Limited v National Bank of Kenya Limited [2015] KECA 945 (KLR), which held that knowledge of the judgment or order by the advocate of the alleged contemnor suces for contempt where the advocate was present when the order was made. 89. On the review limb, the Respondent submitted that the Applicants had not met the strict threshold under Section 16 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, Rule 74 of the ELRC (Procedure) Rules 2024, and Order 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules, relying on Republic v Cabinet Secretary for Interior and Co-ordination of National Government Ex parte Abulahi Said Salad [2019] eKLR, National Bank Of Kenya Limited Vs Ndungu Njau[1997]eKLR, and Francis Origo & another v Jacob Kumali Mungala [2005] eKLR, for the propositions that an erroneous conclusion of law is not a ground for review but for appeal, and that the Applicants having chosen the wrong remedy had come to a dead end. 90. On the third issue, the Respondent submitted that obedience of court orders is mandatory and binds all persons with knowledge thereof regardless of formal status, and that the real question was not the juristic status of the rm name but whether the persons practicing under it had knowledge of the subsisting orders of 28th August 2025 and 24th September 2025 and acted inconsistently with them. It cited Shimmers Plaza Limited (Supra) and Fred Matiang’i the Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Interior and Co-ordination of National Government (Supra) 91. It was submitted that the Applicants had been duly notied of the said orders and their consequences, including by direct communication from the Respondent's Advocates, yet proceeded to instruct execution, and cannot now approbate and reprobate by using the rm name to act, defend the contempt application and advance the Claimant's cause, only to disown it once adverse ndings were made. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/2529/eng@2026-09-22 11

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92. On the question of service, the Respondent submitted that personal service is no longer a strict requirement where knowledge is shown. 93. Relying on Basil Criticos v Attorney General & 8 others & 4 others [2012] eKLR, that knowledge supersedes personal service, and it was submitted that the Applicants had not denied ownership of the email addresses through which service was eected nor produced any bounce-back or failure notice to rebut the delivery reports exhibited. 94. On costs, the Respondent relied on Section 27(1) of the Civil Procedure Act and Cecilia Karuru Ngayu v Barclays Bank of Kenya & another [2016] eKLR (citing Republic v Rosemary Wairimu Munene ExParte Applicant v Ihururu Dairy Farmers Co-operative Society Ltd), and submitted that costs follow the event absent good reason to the contrary; and that the Respondent, having been compelled to defend misconceived and repetitive applications, was entitled to costs. 95. I have examined all the averments and submissions of the parties herein. The applicants seek orders of stay pending an intended appeal. The applicants also seek orders of joinder of the applicants trading as Murage Juma & Co advocates in order for them to be allowed to prosecute and be heard on this application. 96. Having considered the averments herein, I do nd that there would be need to stay the proceedings in order for the issues raised in the application and intended appeal to be considered. I therefore allow further stay of execution of the ruling of 18/3/26. 97. In view of the ruling of the application dated 10th April 2026, I will allow joinder of the applicants in this case for purpose of prosecuting and being heard on this application afresh. Costs in the cause. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI THIS 22ND DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2026. HELLEN WASILWA JUDGE https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/2529/eng@2026-09-22 12

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