George Matiko Chacha v Gati Wambura & Land Registrar, Kuria West

permanent fence around parcel 1173 under the supervision of the surveyor and the OCS Isebania. The judgment did not make an order directing rectification of the Registry Index Map. 3. The Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal for, among other reliefs he sought were, the rectification of the land records to reflect the boundary on the ground. The appeal was dismissed with costs. 4. In March 2026, the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Motion. The 1 st Respondent objected to the Motion principally on the grounds that it was barred by being res judicata, and that it constituted a disguised review or appeal. Applicant’s Application. 5. The Motion was brought under Articles 26, 27, 40, 48, 50 and 159 of the Constitution, sections 1A, 1B, 3A and 99 of the Civil Procedure Act, Sections 18 and 19 of the Land Registration Act, 2012 and Order 51 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The prayer for certification of urgency is spent. What remains is this: a) That the threatening, 1st Respondent interfering with be restrained from or endangering the Applicant, his family or his homestead; b) That the OCS Mabera Police Post ensure compliance with the orders of this court and provide security; c) That a consequential order issue directing the Land Registrar, Kuria West, to rectify and amend the Registry Index Map and all land records to conform to the physical boundary in the adopted report; RULING ELC NO. 972 OF 2017 2

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d) That the rectification be done within a period to be directed; and e) Costs. 6. The Notice of Motion was supported by the Applicant’s Affidavit sworn on 23rd March 2026. His case was that the court adopted the report but issued no order to align the map with it. He deponed that the 1 st Respondent relied on that gap to claim that his homestead sat on her land. He deponed further that she had threatened to burn his homestead. That he had reported the threats to the police and that what he sought was not a review of the judgment, but its implementation. The Preliminary Objection 7. The 1st Respondent filed a Notice of a Preliminary Objection filed on 10th April 2026. The objection was taken under Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution, section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act, Sections 18 and 19 of the Land Registration Act, 2012 and Section 26 of the Environment and Land Court Act, 2011. Its grounds were these: a) That the court was functus officio, having delivered a final judgment on 22nd October 2020; b) That the judgment was affirmed on appeal and was now final and unassailable; c) That the motion was a disguised review or appeal dressed up as a request for consequential orders; d) That the Motion was barred for being res judicata; and RULING ELC NO. 972 OF 2017 3

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e) That the Motion was an abuse of the process of the court and should be struck out in limine with costs on an advocate-client basis. 8. The 1st Respondent swore a Replying affidavit on 27 th April 2026 in Response to the Application. It was filed on 18 th May 2026. She deponed that she was a widow and a retired primary school teacher. She had lived on the land for over thirty years. Her late husband was buried there and that she was the successful party in the suit and on appeal. 9. She deponed further that this court delivered final judgment on 22nd October 2020. The judgment and the decree were annexed as GW-1 and GW-2. The judgment adopted the Land Registrar’s report in full. The report was annexed as GW-5. Further, that the Applicant appealed. His Memorandum of Appeal was annexed as GW-3. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal with costs. That judgment was annexed as GW-4. 10. She deponed that the decree was decisive. It contained four operative orders only. None of them directed the Land Registrar to rectify, amend or alter the Registry Index Map. She maintained that this was not an accidental omission but a deliberate decision by the Court. 11. She referred to paragraph 38 of the judgment, where the Court considered Sections 79 and 80 of the Land Registration Act and, according to her, declined to grant rectification. She further contended that the reason was apparent from the report itself, which found that the boundary could not be changed without affecting parcels 112 and 1172. RULING ELC NO. 972 OF 2017 4

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12. She deponed that the orders sought in the motion fall outside the decree. Rectification of the map, fresh injunctions and police assistance were not orders the decree directed or implied. They were new orders. 13. She deponed that the Motion was therefore not an application in execution of the decree. Execution of this decree would mean the Applicant erecting his fence, the injunction against him being enforced, and her removing any encroachments. The motion sought none of that. 14. The 1st Respondent deponed further that the Court was functus officio and that res judicata also barred the Motion, contending that the boundary dispute, the question of rectification and the issue of costs had already been determined by this Court and, on appeal, by the Court of Appeal 15. She denied the threats and deponed that she had never threatened the Applicant or his family with arson or violence. She stated that the OB entries were fabrications made to create urgency and that no police report or independent evidence had been produced. 16. The 1st Respondent denied cutting the boundary features, beating the Applicant’s son and grazing animals on his crops. She deponed it was the Applicant who destroyed the common sisal boundary, as the court found at the trial. 17. She deponed that the constitutional articles cited by the Applicant were being misused. That Article 159(2)(d) did not override the doctrine of functus officio. She deponed that section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act could not create jurisdiction where there was none. RULING ELC NO. 972 OF 2017 5

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18. Further, that the Applicant owed her taxed costs of Kshs. 130,094/= and Kshs. 165,025/=. The taxation ruling, decree and certificate were annexed as GW-6 to GW-9. She deponed that the motion was meant to delay payment. 19. The 1st Respondent deponed further that the Applicant had attacked this court in publications and online and that his real aim was to take her land because she had no son. 20. She prayed that the motion be dismissed in its entirety with costs on an advocate-client basis. Applicant’s Response to the Notice of Preliminary Objection 21. The Applicant was acting in person. He filed a response to the Objection dated 14th June 2026 together with his submissions to the motion. He argued that he did not seek to reopen, review or vary the judgment. He stated that the decree ordered him to fence under the supervision of the surveyor and the OCS, and that he could not comply. He argued further that he approached the OCS Isebania, the County Surveyor and the Land Registrar. He paid the prescribed fee and annexed a receipt. That the Land Registrar declined to attend because the decree did not name his office. He argued that the OCS declined, until the boundary was shown on the ground. He invoked section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution. SUBMISSIONS 22. The application was argued by way of written submissions which the parties were invited to file. Applicant’s Submissions RULING ELC NO. 972 OF 2017 6

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23. In his submissions, the Applicant asked for beacons to be placed and for security during fencing. He also complained that the 1st Respondent filed no objection by the end of May 2026 as by the court’s directions. 1st Respondent’s Submissions 24. Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent filed submissions dated 11th June 2026. She framed three issues, jurisdiction and functus officio, res judicata and abuse of process, and costs. She relied on Odinga & another v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 6 others [2017] KESC 52 (KLR) for the finality of concluded controversies. She relied on Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 others [2012] KESC 8 (KLR) for the proposition that a court cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction it does not have. She relied on Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission v Maina Kiai & 5 others Civil Appeal 105 of 2017; [2017] KECA 477 (KLR) on res judicata. She urged that the refusal of rectification was deliberate and not a gap to be filled. Issues for determination 25. I have considered the Preliminary Objection in relation to the Notice of Motion, the Replying Affidavit, the response thereto and the rival submissions. In my view, the determination of the Preliminary Objection turns on two issues, namely: A. Whether the grounds of objection satisfy the threshold of a Preliminary Objection B. Whether the grounds are merited RULING ELC NO. 972 OF 2017 7

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C. Who should bear the costs. 26. I first dispose of the Applicant’s complaint that the 1 st Respondent did not file her objection by the date directed by the Court. The record does not support that complaint. The Preliminary Objection is dated 10 th April 2026, while the Replying Affidavit was filed on 18th May 2026. Both were therefore on the record before the date complained of. In any event, the mere failure to comply with a procedural filing direction does not, without more, determine the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain a matter. A question going to jurisdiction may properly be raised at any stage of the proceedings, including by the Court on its own motion. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver, acquiescence or default. A. Whether the grounds of objection satisfy the threshold of a Preliminary Objection 27. The law on Preliminary objection is well settled in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696. Law JA in describing a Preliminary Objection held that, “A preliminary objection consists of a point of law which has been pleaded or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings, and which if argued as a preliminary point may dispose of the suit.” Sir Charles Newbold P. added that a Preliminary Objection is in the nature of what was formerly known as a demurrer. It raises a pure point of law argued on the assumption that the facts pleaded by the other side are correct, and cannot properly be raised where facts have first to be ascertained or where the Court is called upon to exercise a discretion. RULING ELC NO. 972 OF 2017 8

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28. That test has been repeatedly affirmed by the superior courts. The Supreme Court in Hassan Ali Joho & another v Suleiman Said Shahbal & 2 others [2014] KESC 34 (KLR) reiterated that a Preliminary Objection must raise a pure point of law. The Court of Appeal in Oraro v Mbaja [2005] KEHC 3182 (KLR), Justice Ojwang echoed the definition of a Preliminary Objection and stated that: “A "Preliminary Objection " correctly understood is now well defined as, and declared to be a point of law which must not be blurred with factual details liable to be contested and in any event, to be proved through the processes of evidence. Any assertion, which claims to be a preliminary objection, yet it bears factual aspects calling for proof, or seeks to adduce evidence for its authentication, is not, as a matter of legal principle, a true preliminary objection which the court should allow to proceed. Where a court needs to investigate facts, a matter cannot be raised as a preliminary objection. Anything that purports to be a preliminary objection must not deal with disputed facts, and it must not itself derive its foundation from factual information which stands to be tested by normal rules of evidence.” 29. There is, however, an important qualification to this argument. The invocation of a legal doctrine does not, by itself, convert an objection into a Preliminary Objection because some objections require evidence to show how the legal point raised came about, and such evidence needs to be tested in law. The Court must consider whether the particular ground raises a pure question of law capable of determination on the facts as pleaded or otherwise apparent from the undisputed court record, and whether, if upheld, it would dispose of the suit or application or claim before the RULING ELC NO. 972 OF 2017 9

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court. Where determination of the objection requires the Court to ascertain disputed facts, evaluate evidence or exercise judicial discretion, the objection ceases to be a proper Preliminary Objection. 30. That distinction is material in the present case. The 1 st Respondent relies on functus officio, the finality of the appellate judgment, disguised review or appeal, res judicata and abuse of process. Those doctrines are essentially and indeed matters of law. The question, however, is whether each ground, as framed and in light of the record before the Court or pleadings, can be determined as a pure question of law and, if upheld, would dispose of the Motion without requiring the Court to undertake a substantive determination of the fact on the matters raised therein. 31. I shall therefore consider each ground separately. I shall not determine the merits of the Notice of Motion. The question is whether the objection, or any part of it, is capable of being determined as a preliminary point and, if so, whether it is sufficient to dispose of the Motion or any identifiable part thereof. B). Whether the grounds are merited 32. This court has considered above what constituted a preliminary objection. Thus, it now turns to analyze the merits of each of the grounds. a) Whether the contention that the court is functus officio is a proper Preliminary Objection 33. The first ground is that this Court is functus officio, having delivered judgment on 22nd October 2020. The law on functus officio is clear and may be properly understood by RULING ELC NO. 972 OF 2017 10

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first defining the doctrine, and then discussing a number of case law that clarify it, and courts have held about it. 34. In learned author’s words, Daniel Malan Pretorius, in his Book “The Origins of the functus officio Doctrine, with Specific Reference to its Application in Administrative Law,” (2005) 122 SALJ 832, has thus explicated this concept: “The functus officio doctrine is one of the mechanisms by means of which the law gives expression to the principle of finality. According to this doctrine, a person who is vested with adjudicative or decision-making powers may, as a general rule, exercise those powers only once in relation to the same matter.… The [principle] is that once such a decision has been given, it is (subject to any right of appeal to a superior body or functionary) final and conclusive. Such a decision cannot be revoked or varied by the decision-maker.” 35. There is no doubt that functus officio is, in an appropriate case, capable of founding a Preliminary Objection. The doctrine prevents a court from reopening and reconsidering a matter which it has finally determined, subject to recognised exceptions and the jurisdiction of the court to deal with matters incidental to or arising from the judgment. In Mbita v Barasa & 2 others; Laborde & 10 others (Intended Defendant) [2024] KEELC 22168 (KLR), the Environment and Land Court held that the doctrine is a jurisdictional bar against a Court having a second bite at the merits of a case and found that such a ground satisfied the threshold for a Preliminary Objection. 36. The same approach was taken in Okoiti v Equity Bank & another [2022] KEHC 12499 (KLR), where the Court RULING ELC NO. 972 OF 2017 11

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found a functus officio objection properly raised because the relevant background was undisputed and could be determined from the court record without ascertaining facts from elsewhere. The question, however, is whether this case falls within that category. 37. The doctrine itself is not in dispute. In Telkom Kenya Ltd v Ochanda (Suing on His Own Behalf and on Behalf of 996 Former Employees of Telkom Kenya Ltd) [2014] KECA 600 (KLR), the Court of Appeal explained that a court becomes functus officio when it has performed all its duties in a particular case, while recognising that the doctrine does not prevent the court from dealing with matters that properly remain incidental to or arise from the perfected judgment or order. 38. The doctrine does not, therefore, render a court incapable of dealing with every proceeding filed after judgment. The court retains jurisdiction, within the limits prescribed by law, to deal with matters incidental to its judgment, including proceedings concerning execution, implementation, discharge or satisfaction of its decree. What the court cannot do under the guise of such proceedings is reopen and determine afresh a matter that has already been finally adjudicated. 39. In the present case, the Applicant contends that the decree directed him to erect a permanent fence under the supervision of the Surveyor and the OCS Isebania, and that he has encountered difficulty in implementing that direction. The Motion also seeks police assistance and directions concerning the implementation of the existing orders. RULING ELC NO. 972 OF 2017 12

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40. The question is therefore not simply whether judgment has already been delivered. It is whether, having regard to the judgment, the decree and the prayers in the present Motion, the relief sought is properly incidental to the execution or implementation of the decree, or whether it seeks to introduce or obtain substantive relief which the Court has already declined or which was not granted by the decree 41. The distinction Environment and was recently considered Land Court Kamuti in by the Properties Limited v Peter Riechi Okara [2025] KEELC 4359 (KLR). There, a decree-holder filed an application concerning execution of the decree and sought, among other things, police security and supervision of the execution process. A Preliminary Objection was raised on the ground of functus officio. The Court rejected the objection, holding that execution proceedings fall within the recognised exceptions to functus officio because the Court was not being invited to engage afresh with the merits of its judgment. 42. The existence of a final judgment therefore does not, of itself, establish that the Court is functus officio in respect of every matter subsequently brought before it. The Court must consider the nature of the particular relief sought and its relationship to the judgment and decree. 43. That exercise requires the Court to examine the prayers in the Motion against the terms and effect of the judgment and decree. While such examination may be undertaken from the court record, the characterisation of the relief sought RULING ELC NO. 972 OF 2017 13

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cannot be determined merely from the fact that the original judgment has become final. 44. In the circumstances of this case, the ground of functus officio, as framed, does not establish that the entire Motion is barred. The Motion contains prayers which the Applicant characterises as relating to implementation of the decree, as well as a prayer for rectification which raises a distinct question as to whether the Court is being invited to grant substantive relief previously considered or not granted. 45. I therefore find that the plea of functus officio, insofar as it is advanced as a bar to the Motion in its entirety merely because judgment has been delivered, does not satisfy the threshold for disposing of the Motion by way of a Preliminary Objection. b) Whether the affirmation of this Court’s judgment on appeal is a proper Preliminary Objection 46. The second ground is that the judgment of this Court was affirmed on appeal and is therefore final and unassailable. There is no dispute that the Applicant appealed against the judgment herein and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal with costs. That fact is apparent from the court record and the judgment of the Court of Appeal. However, the dismissal of an appeal does not, standing alone, deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to deal with every matter arising after judgment. Subject to the limits imposed by the appellate judgment and the doctrine of finality, the trial court may still entertain matters properly relating to execution, implementation, discharge or satisfaction of its decree. RULING ELC NO. 972 OF 2017 14

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47. The fact of an appeal being unsuccessful is therefore relevant to the doctrines of finality, functus officio and res judicata. However, it is not, without more, a self-standing jurisdictional bar to every subsequent application. More importantly, whether the present Motion is barred by the affirmation of the appellate judgment cannot be determined merely from the fact that an appeal was dismissed. The Court must identify the relief now sought and determine whether it invites the Court to revisit a matter determined by this court in that judgment already on record and on appeal or merely seeks to give effect to an existing decree. 48. That inquiry substantially overlaps with the first and fourth grounds. It cannot be resolved merely by the fact that an appeal existed and was dismissed. I therefore find that the second ground, standing alone, does not constitute a Preliminary Objection capable of disposing of the Motion. c) Whether the argument that the Motion is a disguised review or appeal is a proper Preliminary Objection 49. The third ground is that the Motion is a disguised review or appeal dressed up as a request for consequential orders. This ground presents a difficulty for the 1st Respondent. Whether an application is, in substance, an application for review, an appeal or a proceeding incidental to execution cannot be determined solely by it being labelled as such by either party. The Court must consider the nature of the reliefs sought as against the earlier decision or order which the Applicant seeks, in substance, to revisit and find it whether the application, indeed, contained an element and grounds of review and if it seeks as a fact to vary the RULING ELC NO. 972 OF 2017 15

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content of the judgment or order impugned or in issue. This would call for evidence being given by the parties and the could delving into the merits of the same in order to arrive at the conclusion proposed by the party raising the objection. 50. That does not mean that a contention that an application is a disguised appeal or review can never be raised as a Preliminary Objection. Where the nature of the application and the decision sought to be revisited are apparent from the record, the question may, in an appropriate case, be determined as a pure question of law. The difficulty for the 1st Respondent in the present case is that the Motion contains prayers of different character, some of which are presented as matters concerning implementation of the existing decree and others which seek rectification of the land records 51. I therefore find that the third ground, as framed so as to characterise the entire Motion as a disguised review or appeal, does not establish a pure point of law capable of disposing of the Motion in its entirety. d) Whether the contention of res judicata, is a proper Preliminary Objection 52. Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act embodies the doctrine. It states that; “No court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which RULING ELC NO. 972 OF 2017 16

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such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such court.” 53. The doctrine is founded upon the public policy that litigation must attain finality. The Supreme Court in John Florence Maritime Services Ltd & another v Cabinet Secretary Transport & Infrastructure & 3 others [2021] KESC 39 (KLR) restated the essential elements of the doctrine. It held that; “For res judicata to be invoked in a civil matter the following elements have to be demonstrated: a. there was a former judgment or order which was final; b. the judgment or order was on merit; c. the judgment or order was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and d. there had to be between the first and the second action identical parties, subject matter and cause of action.” 54. Res judicata is undoubtedly capable of constituting a Preliminary Objection where the elements of the doctrine are apparent from the pleadings and the court record and can be determined without receiving evidence. The fact that a plea of res judicata is raised, however, does not dispense with the requirement that the Court ascertain whether the statutory elements of the doctrine are satisfied in respect of the particular relief or issue sought to be litigated afresh. RULING ELC NO. 972 OF 2017 17

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55. The Environment distinction in and Land Mungai v [2024] KEELC 5820 (KLR). Court addressed Ngunya The & Court 3 this others observed that although res judicata goes to jurisdiction and may dispose of a matter preliminarily, there are cases where determining whether the present matter is the same as the former matter requires probing of evidence. In such circumstances, the objection does not satisfy the Mukisa Biscuit threshold. 56. The 1st Respondent’s plea of res judicata must therefore be examined against the particular reliefs sought in the present Motion. The Court would be called upon to examine the pleadings, judgment, decree and other proceedings forming part of the court record for the purpose of determining whether the matter now sought to be litigated was directly and substantially in issue and finally determined in the former proceedings. What the Court cannot do at the preliminary stage is resolve disputed factual matters which are not apparent from that record. 57. The present Motion contains more than one prayer or relief sought. Thus, the Respondent ought to demonstrate how each of them speak to res judicata. From the record, it is clear that the original suit concerned the boundary between the parties’ parcels, and the question of rectification was considered in the judgment. The record further shows that the issue of rectification was raised in the appeal. The question of rectification is therefore distinguishable from the prayers founded upon alleged events said to have occurred after judgment. 58. To that extent, the record establishes that the issue of rectification was previously before the Court and was RULING ELC NO. 972 OF 2017 18

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determined. If the present Motion seeks, in substance, to have the Court revisit that determination and grant rectification which was previously declined, that aspect of the Motion is caught by the principle of finality and, insofar as the statutory elements are satisfied, by res judicata. 59. The difficulty of the 1st Respondent’s contention is, however, that the Preliminary Objection is framed as a challenge to the Motion in its entirety, which means to him, all prayers are res judicata. The Motion also contains prayers concerning alleged threats, police protection and the implementation of the existing decree. 60. The alleged threats and other events said to have occurred after the judgment could not, by their very nature, have been directly and substantially in issue in proceedings determined in 2020. Whether those allegations are true, and whether they justify the relief sought, are matters for determination on the Motion and not for determination by way of the present Preliminary Objection. 61. I therefore distinguish between the specific prayer seeking rectification of the land records and the other prayers in the Motion. The former concerns a matter that appears from the record to have been previously considered and determined. The latter raise matters which, at least on the face of the Motion, concern events or circumstances arising after judgment and cannot simply be treated as matters directly and substantially determined in the former proceedings. 62. Accordingly, the plea of res judicata is a proper legal objection to the extent that it challenges the reopening of the previously determined issue of rectification. However, that plea does not, on the present record, dispose of the RULING ELC NO. 972 OF 2017 19

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Motion in its entirety because the Motion contains additional reliefs which are not shown to have been directly and substantially in issue in the former proceedings. 63. The fourth ground therefore succeeds only to that limited extent. It does not, however, furnish a basis for striking out or dismissing the entire Motion in limine. Apart from the prayer for rectification of the judgment, the rest have never been granted or refused by this court hence cannot be res judicata. e) Whether the contention that the application is an abuse of the process of court is a proper Preliminary Objection 64. The fifth ground alleges that the Motion is an abuse of the process of the Court, that it was brought to delay payment of taxed costs, that the Applicant fabricated police reports, and that he is motivated by an intention to take the 1 st Respondent’s land. 65. Those allegations involve disputed questions of fact, including the Applicant’s motive, the circumstances in which the police reports were made and the purpose for which the Motion was brought. Their determination would require the Court to evaluate competing factual accounts and, potentially, evidence. They therefore cannot be determined on the assumption that the facts pleaded by the Applicant are correct and do not satisfy the Mukisa Biscuit threshold for a Preliminary Objection. 66. The fifth ground of objection is, accordingly, not a Preliminary Objection properly so called and cannot be determined in limine. RULING ELC NO. 972 OF 2017 20

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Conclusion 67. Having considered each ground, I am not persuaded that the Preliminary Objection, as framed, is capable of disposing of the Notice of Motion dated 23rd March 2026 in its entirety. I must emphasize here that this finding does not amount to a determination of the merits of the Motion. I have, however, found that only the question of rectification stands on a different footing and the prayer for it is rejected, as res judicata. That finding is without prejudice to the determination of the remaining prayers in the Motion in accordance with the law. 68. Accordingly, the Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 10 th April 2026 is dismissed in so far as it seeks to strike out or dispose of the Notice of Motion dated 23 rd March 2026 in its entirety. The remaining prayers shall be considered on their own merits during the determination of the Notice of Motion. B. Costs 69. On costs, Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act gives the Court a discretion, which must be exercised judicially. Although the Preliminary Objection has not succeeded in disposing of the Motion, the objection was not wholly without basis. Taking that consideration, together with the fact that the Applicant is acting in person, into account, I consider it just that each party bear its own costs of the Preliminary Objection. 70. The application dated 23rd March 2026 shall now be heard on 18th November, 2026. The applicant to file written submission within the next fourteen (14) days and the Respondent to submit written ones in fourteen (14) days after service of the Applicant’s. Each parties submissions RULING ELC NO. 972 OF 2017 21

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not to exceed five (5) pages of New Times Roman Font 12 of 1.5 spacing. 71. It is so ordered. Ruling Dated, Signed and Delivered virtually via the Teams Platform this 24th September 2026. HON. DR. IUR NYAGAKA JUDGE In the presence of, Mwanje Advocate holding brief for Mr. Olao for the 1 st Defendant Mr. George Matiko Chacha No Appearance for the other parties. RULING ELC NO. 972 OF 2017 22

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