Asili Godana v Halima Mohammed & 4 others

b. General damages for trespass and compensation for the destroyed boundaries therein. c. Costs of the suit and interests thereon. 2. The Appellant’s suit was premised on various assertions. The assertions are: The Appellant was duly allocated plot number 1010 Kambi Garba [hereinafter referred to as the suit plot]; the suit plot was allocated to the Appellant in 1993; the suit plot was allocated by the County Council of Isiolo – now defunct; the Appellant duly entered upon and took possession of the suit plot; the Appellant has extensively developed the suit plot; and the Appellant is lawfully entitled to possession of the suit plot. 3. Additionally, the Appellant posited thus: The Appellant has being paying the land rates and rents; the Appellant is the sole and registered owner of the suit plot; nevertheless, the defendants herein have illegally trespassed onto the suit plot; the fourth Respondent has commenced to lay a claim to ownership of the suit plot; and the fourth Respondent has taken over and assumed possession of the suit plot; and the actions of the Respondents have violated the appellant’s right to and interest over the suit plot. 4. Premised on the foregoing, the Appellant sought the various relief, whose details have been enumerated elsewhere herein before. details of the reliefs shall be reverted to shortly. Page 2 of 23 The

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5. The 1st and 2nd Respondent duly entered appearance and thereafter, filed a statement of defence. The 1st and 2nd Respondent denied the assertions by the Plaintiff. In addition, the 1st and 2nd Respondent contended that what is claimed by the Appellant constituted land that was gathered by the 1st respondent. Be that as it may, the 1 st and 2nd Respondents have contended that the Appellant’s claim to the suit property is misconceived. 6. The 4th Respondent duly entered appearance and filed a statement of defence dated the 15.03.2022. The 4th Respondent denied the assertions by the appellant. In addition, the 4 th Respondent posited thus: The property which is being claimed by the Appellant belonged to the 2nd respondent; the 2nd Respondents sold the designated portions of land to the 4th Respondents ; the portions that were sold were thereafter captured at the foot of approved part development plan; the sale to the 4 th Respondent also attracted the approval of the County Government of Isiolo; and the 4th Respondent is the sole proprietor of the plots numbers 1356 and 1357- Kambi Garba. 7. Furthermore, the 4th Respondent contended thus: Prior to entering into the sale agreement with the 2nd Respondent, same visited the designated portions of land; the 4th Respondent also verified ownership rights from the sub area; the designated plots were not fenced; the 4 th Respondent thereafter purchased the plots in question; the 4 th Respondent entered upon and developed the 2 plots; and the 4th Respondent has not trespass onto the suit plot. Page 3 of 23

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8. The suit in the lower court was heard and disposed of vide judgment delivered on the 27.05.2025, whereupon the Learned Trial Magistrate [Hon. E. W Ndegwa – SRM] found and held that the Appellant had neither proved nor established any rights to and in respect of the suit plot. 9. In addition, the trial court found that the Appellant had failed to tender inter alia, the minutes of the county council of Isiolo [now defunct], approving allocation of the suit plot. Moreover, the Learned Trial Magistrate also held that the evidence tendered by the Appellant and her witnesses were inherently contradictory and inconsistent. 10.Flowing from the findings, the Learned Trial Magistrate proceed to and dismissed the appellant’s suit. It is the dismissal of the suit that has provoked the subject appeal. 11.The Appellant filed the memorandum of appeal dated the 19.06.2025 and wherein the Appellant has highlighted eleven grounds of appeal. The grounds are: i. That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to properly evaluate the evidence presented by the Appellant and particularly, the documents of ownership in respect of plot No. 1010 Kambi Garba and thereby erroneously dismissed the Appellant’s claim. ii. That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by dismissing the appellant’s suit on the basis that the Appellant had approached the court with clean hands Page 4 of 23

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despite her earlier finding that the Appellant had indeed demonstrated a legitimate claim over plot number 1010 Kambi Garba. iii. That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by dismissing the appellant’s suit on the basis that the minutes allocating plot number 1010 Kambi Garba to the Appellant were not produced and that there were anomalies in the PDP produced by the Appellant whereas the Appellant had tendered overwhelming documentary and oral evidence with irresistibly confirmed that Appellant was the owner of said plot. iv. That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to consider the evidence that the Appellant was in occupation of the plot number 1010 Kambi Garba since the years 2008 long before the Respondents stated trespassing thereon in the year 2017. v. That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to find that plot number 1010 Kambi Garba had been allocated to the Appellant from as early as the year 2008 and therefore the same plot or part of it was not available for allocation to the 2nd Respondent or any of the Respondents and therefore the Respondents claim was invalid from the word go. Page 5 of 23

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vi. That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact and failing to find that the sale agreements between the 2 nd Respondents and the 4th Respondent dated 2.8.2017 were in respect of unregistered and unsurveyed land and therefore the said sale was fictitious and was only a scheme to stake a claim on the Appellant’s land. vii. That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to find that the documents presented by Respondents were obtained during the pendency of the suit before the trial court with the sole intention of validating that their claim on the appellant’s land and further ignored the numerous inconsistencies in the respondent’s documents. viii. That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to find that the appellant’s claim in the disputed land was the first time compared to the of the Respondents [if any] and therefore proceed to give effect to the appellant’s claim. ix. That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by misapprehending the disputes before the court as one of the double allocation whereas the claim was purely one of trespass by the Respondents on the appellant’s land. x. That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by dismissing the appellant’s claim on the basis that County Government of Isiolo was not joined as party to the suit Page 6 of 23

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whereas it Respondent and not the County Government of Isiolo was not joined as party to suit whereas it is the Respondents and not the County Government of Isiolo was, in any event, not fatal to the claim. xi. That the judgment of the Learned Trial Magistrate is against the law and weight of evidence on record. 12.The subject appeal came up for directions on the 01.07.2026, whereupon learned counsel for the Appellant intimated to the court that same had filed and served the record of appeal. In addition, it was posited that the record of appeal was complete. Counsel thereafter sought directions pertaining to and concerning the disposal of the appeal. Moreover, Learned counsel for the Appellant proposed to canvass the appeal by way of written submissions. 13.With the concurrence of the learned counsel for the Respondents, the court proceeded to and issued directions. The directions were: The appeal shall be heard before one judge sitting at Isiolo; the appeal shall be canvassed by way of written submissions; the Appellant shall file and serve written submissions within 14 days; the Respondents shall file and serve written submissions within 14 days from the date of service; and the Appellant shall be at liberty to file and serve rejoinder submissions [if any] within 7 days from the date of service. 14.The Appellant filed two sets of written submissions. The first set is dated the 30.06.2026, whereas the second set [rejoinder submissions] is dated the 21.07.2026. The Appellant has raised and canvassed four key issues. The issues are: Whether the Appellant proved/established her Page 7 of 23

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claims pertaining to trespass; whether the Learned Trial Magistrate correctly appraised and appreciated the evidence on record; whether the Appellant is entitled to the reliefs sought vide the plaint; and whether the 4th Respondent acquired lawful rights/interest over the disputed plots or otherwise. 15.It was the submission by learned counsel for the Appellant that the Appellant tendered and produced before the trial court assorted evidence including: copy of the letter dated 30.08.1993 indicating allotment of the plot; copy of application of part development plan; and copy of approved development plan. Learned counsel posited that the documents which were tendered clearly demonstrated that the Appellant was the lawful owner of the suit plot. 16.Additionally, it was submitted that the Appellant also tendered oral evidence by himself and various witnesses who, it is argued, placed before the trial court credible evidence proving the appellant’s entitlement to and in respect of the suit property. 17.Secondly, it has been submitted that even though the 4th Respondent purport[s] to have purchased her plot from the 2 nd respondent, the 2nd Respondent did not tender or place before the court any evidence to demonstrate that same ever owned the plots in question. It has been submitted that the sale agreements that were tendered to demonstrate the sale between the 2nd and the 4th Respondent did not relate to any land. 18.Furthermore, it has been submitted that insofar as the second Respondent did not have any title to and in respect of the plots in question, same [2 nd Page 8 of 23

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respondent] could not purport to sell what same did not own. To this end, learned counsel for the Appellant has cited and referenced the doctrine of Nemo dat quod non habet. 19.Thirdly, it has been submitted that the Appellant herein duly proved her case and thus same was entitled to the various reliefs sought. In particular, it has been submitted that the Appellant was entitled to an order of permanent injunction; and an award of general damages in the sum of Kshs. 5,000,000/= on account of trespass. 20.Thereafter, the learned counsel for the Appellant has cited various decisions to support the claim for general damages. The decisions cited are: Mariera and another versus Ongwacho and two others [2023] KEELC 21423; and Willesden Investments limited versus Kenya Hotel properties Limited Nairobi HCC No. 367 of 2000 [unreported]. 21.Premised on the foregoing, learned counsel for the Appellant has submitted that the appeal beforehand is merited. The court has been implored to allow the appeal; set aside the impugned judgment; substitute therefore an order allowing the appellant’s suit in the lower court; award general damages in the sum of Kshs. 5,000,000/= only; and award costs of the appeal. 22.The 4th Respondent filed written submissions dated 15.07.2026 and wherein the 4th Respondent has highlighted three key issues. The issues are: The Appellant did not prove/establish her claim to the suit property; the Appellant did not prove the plea of trespass or at all; and the evidence tendered by the Appellant was wrought with inherent contradiction and inconsistences. Page 9 of 23

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23.Learned counsel for the 4th Respondent thereafter highlighted various decisions to bolster the submission pertaining to what constitutes trespass and the elements, which must be proven to establish trespass. decisions are: Doshi v Chemutut & 7 The others [2025] KECA 776 (KLR) ; Charles Ogejo Ochieng v Geoffrey Okumu [1995] KECA 169 (KLR); and William Kamunge Gakui v Eustace Gitonga Gakui (Civil Appeal 16 of 2013) [2014] KECA 39 (KLR). 24.Flowing from the foregoing, learned counsel for the 4th Respondent has submitted that the instant appeal is devoid of merits and thus courts dismissal. To this end, the court has been invited to dismiss the appeal; affirm the judgment and decree of the lower courts and award costs to the 4th respondent. 25.The rest of the Respondents, namely; the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents, never filed any submissions. Furthermore, the said Respondents also did not participate in the hearing of the said appeal. For the avoidance of doubt the submissions on record, relate to the appellant; and the 4 th Respondent only. 26.Having reviewed the record of Appeal; the impugned judgment; and upon considering the written submissions on record, two key issues emerge for determination. The issues are: Whether the Appellant duly established and proved her case before the lower court; and whether the Learned Trial Magistrate correctly apprehended the evidence tendered and applied the law thereto. Page 10 of 23

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27.Before venturing to address the thematic issues that have been isolated in the preceding paragraph, it is important to highlight that what is before me is a first Appeal. By virtue of being a first Appeal, this court is mandated to undertake a fresh and exhaustive scrutiny, review, and analysis of the totality of evidence tendered before the court of first instance. The court is obligated to review the evidence and determine whether the findings and conclusion[s] arrived at by the trial magistrate, accord with the evidence on record and the legal principles. 28.The court is seized of the authority and jurisdiction to arrive at an independent conclusion and to depart from the findings of the trial court. However, it is established that the appellate court can only depart from the factual finding and conclusion of the trial court where it is demonstrated; that the conclusions were based on no evidence; the conclusions are perverse to the evidence on record; the findings are based on misapprehension of the evidence and law; and that there is a demonstrable error of principle, which vitiates the findings of the Trial Court. 29.Suffice it to state that, barring the foregoing, the first appellate court is enjoined to defer to the findings and conclusions of the trial court. Notably, the jurisdiction of the first appellate court to interfere with the findings/conclusions of the trial court is circumscribed. The jurisdiction is not at large. It is a jurisdiction that cannot be exercised for the mere asking. Further, and in addition, it cannot be invoked at will. Most importantly, Section 78 of the Civil Procedure Act, Chapter 21 Laws of Kenya, regulates its exercise. Page 11 of 23

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30.The jurisdictional remit of the first appellate court, while undertaking its mandate as pertains to the first Appeal, has been the subject of various court decisions. In the case of Odera t/a AJ Odera & Associates v Machira t/a Machira & Co Advocates [2013] KECA 208 (KLR). The Court of Appeal expounded on the scope of the jurisdiction. The court stated thus: “46. We also wish to be guided by the reasoning of this court in the case of Mwana Sokoni versus Kenya Business Limited (1985) KLR 931 page 934,934 thus:-“Although this court on Appeal will not lightly differ from the Judge at first instance on a finding of fact, it is undeniable that we have the power to examine and reevaluate the evidence on a first Appeal if this should become necessary. As was said by the House of Lords in Sottos Shipping versus Sauviet Sohold, The Times, March 16, 1983.“It is uncertain whether their Lordships should have reached the same conclusion on the evidence, but it is important that, sitting in the appellate court they should be over mindful of the advantages enjoyed of the trial Judge who saw and heard the witnesses and was in a comparably better position than the Court of Appeal to assess the significance of what was said, how it was said, and equally impotent what was not said” Again in Peters versus Sunday Post Limited (1958) EA424, a decision of the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa, Sir Kenneth O’ Conner, P said at page 429: “It is a strong thing for an appellate court to differ from the finding on a question of fact of the Judge who tried the case and who has had the advantage of seeing and hearing and the witnesses.” Page 12 of 23

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31.Back to the issues for determination. I shall deal with the issues sequentially. The first issue relates to whether the Appellant duly proved and established her case/claims in the lower court. It is common ground that the Appellant bore the burden of proving the assertions that were adverted to at the foot of the amended plaint. Furthermore, there is no gainsaying that the assertions could only be proven/established on the basis of cogent and credible evidence. 32.Additionally, it is apposite to state that proof of ownership of or entitlement to land, can only be established by tendering such documents or evidence, which accord with the law. The nature of evidence required to prove ownership of or entitlement to land, depend on the applicable legal regime. In this regard, it is imperative to highlight that one, the Appellant not excepted, cannot just walk to court a heap of document[s] and thereafter believe such “documents” would suffice, unless the documents accord with the prescription of the Law. 33.Did the Appellant prove her case? To begin with, the Appellant had posited that what constitutes the suit property was duly allocated to her by the County Council of Isiolo [now defunct] in the year 1993. Despite making the said assertions, the Appellant did not tender or produce before the court the minutes or resolutions of the county council [if any] that were deployed to [sic] allocate the suit plot to the appellant. In the absence of the minutes, it was not possible for the trial court to authenticate the appellant’s claim. 34.The importance of the minutes of the County Council recommending /approving allocation cannot be gainsaid. Such minutes, which must be Page 13 of 23

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duly signed and confirmed by the chairperson of the County Council, were /are critical. [see the provisions of Section 80 [1] and [2] of The Local Authority Act, Chapter 265 Laws of Kenya [now repealed]. In addition, Section 13 [2] [d] of the Trust Land Act, Chapter 288, Laws of Kenya [now repealed] is also instructive. 35.Moreover, the Court of Appeal has highlighted the importance of the resolutions and approval of local authorities [now defunct] in the allocation of what was previously part of trust land. In the case of Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission v. Eunice N. Mugalia & Sammy Silas Komen Mwaita, Kisumu Court of Appeal, Civil Appeal No. 39 of 2019, [Unreported], the Court of Appeal laid down the process that was to be followed. 36. The court stated thus: “32. The first Respondent was purportedly allocated government land under the Government Lands Act and was to be issued with a certificate of lease in the form of a grant under the Registration of Titles Act. How a government grant that was issued and accepted by the 1st Respondent under the Government Lands Act, pursuant to which the government was to be the lessor, changed to be the lease under the Registered Land Act under which the municipal council of Kakamega became the lessee is a mystery. As we have already stated, the government land act vested in the president and the commissioner of lands power to alienate government land as long as the procedure laid out in the act was followed. Trust land act on the other hand vested in the county council the power to alienate the land in their respective counties Page 14 of 23

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and the commissioner of lands had no power to alienate the same save as directed by the county council through a resolution. In the circumstances, we do not see how the letter of allotment dated 31st July 1998 under which the commissioner of lands offered to the 1st Respondent a grant of the government land could have given rise to the lease dated 2nd June 2000 of trust land that was vested in the municipal council of Kakamega. So under what regime of the law was the commissioner of lands acting when he alienated the suit property? We ask this question because the two legal regimes, that is, the government lands act and the trust land act have different processes as regards to alienation of land”. [Underlining Supplied]. 37.Besides, even though the Appellant had alluded to the allocation of the suit plot, the Appellant yet again failed to tender or produce a copy of [sic] the letter of allotment. It is common ground that one can only speak to allocation upon being issued with the letter of allotment. In respect of the instant matter, the Appellant did not produce any. It then begs the question, as to what is the foundation of the appellant’s assertion, that same was allocated the suit plot. 38.The Appellant also sought to rely on an application for part development plan and a part development plan to [sic] prove ownership of the suit plot. I am afraid that an application for part development plan; and a part development plan, cannot per se, constitute a foundation to lay a claim of ownership to land. I have stated times without number that a part development plan [PDP] is a planning tool. The same is deployed by the directorate of physical planning to inter alia, discern the availability [if at Page 15 of 23

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all] of the designated plot either for allocation or for a particular project. The said document is inchoate and thus can only be a precursor to the issuance of a letter of allotment and thereafter the preparation of the consequential instruments towards the issuance of a certificate of lease or title, whichever is the case. 39.To my mind, the reference to the application for part development plan and the part development plan [PDP], does not help the Appellant’s case. Simply put, the impugned document[s] cannot be relied upon by and of themselves, to underpin the claim of ownership. 40.In the case of Wreck Motor Enterprises v Commissioner of Lands & 3 others [1997] KECA 391 (KLR), the Court of Appeal illuminated the manner in which title or entitlement to land accrues. 41. The court stated thus: “Title to landed property normally comes into existence after issuance of a letter of allotment, meeting the conditions stated in such a letter and actual issuance thereafter of title document pursuant to provisions held.” 42. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is also important to point out that the application for part development and the part development plan that were being relied upon by the Appellant were found to be deficient and inconsistent. In fact, the appellant’s own witness [PW4] was spot on. The witness admitted and acknowledged various /material deficiencies in the application for part development plan and part development plan. Page 16 of 23

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43.This is what PW4 stated in her examination in chief: The Witness said: “The PDP seem to have been prepared from our office, but lacks the geographical coordinates that help in detecting the plot on the ground. I cannot ascertain the signatures of the document. The signatories have since left the office and cannot be traced at the moment.” 44.While under cross examination by the learned counsel for the 4 th Respondent the witness stated thus: “The size of the plot is indicated as 2.168 Ha as per the documents but I cannot say with certainty until the scene is visited. Application for PDP referred to. It was made on 29.10.2015 by Asili Godana. The application is not signed. I cannot ascertain if Asili Godana was the applicant. The signature cannot be an error. Asili Godana did not sign.” 45.From the testimony of PW4 [Physical Planning Assistant] what comes to the fore is to the effect that the documentation that were being relied upon by the Appellant were ex facie deficient. How can such document[s] underpin a claim of ownership? 46.It is not lost on me that whosoever seeks to prove the root of his /her title or entitlement to land, must place before the court coherent and consistent documents to vindicate the root of his/her title. Quite clearly, deficient documentation undermines the root of title. Page 17 of 23

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47.In the case of Presbyterian Foundation v Kibera Siranga Self Help Group Nursery School [2023] KECA 371 (KLR) , the Court of Appeal stated as hereunder: “The best evidence of ownership of immovable property is the title deed to it and that is why the question of the root of title is important. Root of title is the deed to which title to a property is ultimately traced to prove that the owner has good title. Accordingly, when there are competing interests as in this case, the parties are required to give evidence of title starting with a "good root of title." A good root of title and an unbroken chain of ownership is required. To be a good root of title, a document must satisfy each of the following requirements: (a) it must deal with or show the origin of the ownership of the whole legal and equitable interest in the land in question; (b) it must contain a recognizable description of the property; (c) it must not contain anything that casts any doubt on the title.” 48.To my mind, the Appellant herein did not prove or establish the claim of ownership of the suit property. The documentation that were tendered and produced by /on behalf of the appellant, fell short of what is stipulated under the law. I beg to repeat that title or entitlement to land must be underpinned by legally acceptable documents. The documents must be those envisaged under the law. The documents must be ones that accrue probative value. Nothing less. 49.Having failed to prove /establish ownership of or entitlement to the suit property, the appellant’s plea of trespass dissipated. One cannot propagate the plea of trespass unless same can demonstrate ownership of Page 18 of 23

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or the right to immediate and exclusive possession of the land in question. In this case, the Appellant demonstrated neither. 50.In the case of Doshi v Chemutut & 7 others [2025] KECA 776 (KLR), the Court of Appeal spoke to and highlighted the elements that underpin the claim of trespass. 51.The court stated as hereunder: “Trespass, as stated by this Court in the case of Charles Ogejo Ochieng v Geoffrey Okumu [1995] KECA 169 (KLR), is an injury to a possessory right, and therefore the proper plaintiff in an action of trespass to land is the person who has title to it, or a person who is deemed to have been in possession at the time of the trespass. As for the ingredients of trespass, the Court in William Kamunge Gakui v Eustace Gitonga Gakui (Civil Appeal 16 of 2013) [2014] KECA 39 (KLR) stated that trespass is a violation of the right to possession, and that a plaintiff must prove that he has the right to immediate and exclusive possession of the land. Justice Chemutut did not name Mr. Doshi as a defendant in the suit.” 52.My answer to issue number one is to the effect that the Appellant did not prove her title of or entitlement to the suit plot. Absent proof of entitlement, the Appellant could not partake of any favorable order[s] of the court. It suffices to affirm that the court orders are informed by the evidence tendered and the law. There is no room for sympathy or empathy. Equally, a court of law cannot grant orders for the mere asking. Page 19 of 23

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53.I now wish to turn to the second issue. The second issue relates to whether the Learned Trial Magistrate correctly analyzed the evidence tendered and thereafter applied the law thereto. It is instructive to recall that the Learned Trial Magistrate reviewed the totality of the evidence tendered by the Appellant and also appreciated the various deficiencies that inflicted the documents produced by the Appellant. 54.Additionally, the Learned Trial Magistrate was alive to the fact the burden of proof fell on the shoulders of the appellant. Notably, the Learned Trial Magistrate appreciated that the appellant’s case would stand or fall on the basis of what was tendered by the appellant. In any event, the Appellant bore both the evidential and legal burden. 55.Having appreciated the burden of proof and on whom same lay, the Learned Trial Magistrate correctly found and held that the Appellant did not prove her case. I agree with the conclusion that was arrived at. 56.Before concluding on this issue, it is appropriate to highlight an aspect of the submissions by the learned counsel for the appellant. Learned counsel attacked the 4th Respondent’s case and invoked the doctrine of nemo dat quod non habet. I agree with learned counsel for the appellant on the Legal implications of the Doctrine. However, it is not lost on me that the appellant’s case must succeed on the strength of her evidence and not [sic] the weakness of the defence. Page 20 of 23

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57.In the case of P.C.E.A. Thro’ The Registered Trustee v County Council of Meru & 2 others [2026] KECA 1353 (KLR), the Court of Appeal stated thus: “However, before that argument can gain traction, it must overcome a prior doctrinal difficulty: Before the Appellant can successfully attack the legality of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ titles, it must establish either a legally protectable interest of its own or a sufficiently proven foundational illegality in the titlecreation process. Put differently, a party cannot rely on generalized suspicion regarding administrative irregularities as a substitute for proving either proprietary entitlement or legally cognisable illegality.” 58.It also instructive to highlight the dicta in the case of Caroget Investment Limited v Aster Holdings Limited & 4 others [2019] KECA 79 (KLR) the Court of Appeal stated thus: “Put differently, a claimant will succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the opponent’s case, save to add that the standard of proof in a case for declaration of title is on a preponderance of evidence.” 59.In a nutshell, I find and hold that the Learned Trial Magistrate correctly apprehended and applied the law to the evidence that was placed before her. The impugned judgement adhered to and complied with the obtaining jurisprudence concerning proof of title. Conclusion: 60.The Appellant herein had sought to impeach the judgment of the Learned Trial Magistrate. The Appellant contended that the learned magistrate Page 21 of 23

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misapprehended the law and thus arrived at an erroneous conclusion. It was argued that the totality of the evidence tendered by the Appellant clearly demonstrated that that the Appellant owned the suit property. 61.However, having undertaken exhaustive scrutiny and review of the evidence, I have come to the conclusion that the Learned Trial Magistrate arrived at the correct findings. I am unable to fault the Learned Trial Magistrate. On the contrary, I am compelled to and do arrive at the same findings. 62.In the premises, the appeal beforehand is devoid of merits. Consequently, the appeal courts dismissal. Final orders: 63.Pulling the threads together, the final orders that commend themselves to the court are: i. The Appeal be and is hereby Dismissed. ii. The Judgment of the trial magistrate dated the 27.05.2025 and the consequential decree be and are hereby upheld/affirmed iii. Costs of the Appeal be and are hereby awarded to the 4th Respondent only. iv. The costs in terms of [iii] shall be agreed upon and in default be taxed in the conventional manner. 64.It is so ordered. Page 22 of 23

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DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT ISIOLO ON THIS 1ST DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026 OGUTTU MBOYA; FCIArb; CPM [MTI-EA]. JUDGE. In the presence of: Court Assistant: Zakayo /Mukami Mr. Karuki and Mr. Odari for the Appellant.. Mr Mwirigi Mbaya for the 4th Respondent N/a for the 1st, Respondent N/a for the 2nd Respondent N/a for the 3rd Respondent Page 23 of 23

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