Eliud Njuguna Uno, Liquidator of Nkuene Farmers Co-operative Society Ltd v Kenya Tea Development Agency Limited & 8 others

1st Respondent and its subsidiaries were unconstitutional, illegal, null, and void ad initio. ii. A declaration that the said parcel constitutes community land held in trust for the members of Nkuene Farmers’ Cooperative Society [in liquidation]. iii. An order of mandamus compelling the 2nd Respondent to rectify the land register by cancelling all entries, leases, subdivisions, and transfers arising from the impugned transactions. iv. An order of permanent injunction restraining the Respondent, their agents, servants or assigns from dealing with transferring, or interfering with the said suit parcel pending lawful redistribution by the liquidator. v. A permanent injunction Respondent/Interested Party, 9th restraining the his political agents, supporters, servants or any person acting under his instructions/incitement, from trespassing, felling trees, clearing vegetation, erecting structures, allocating, or in any other manner interfering with the land parcel Nkuene/Mituunguu/189. vi. An order directing the officer commanding Station [OCS], Mitunguu Police Station to strictly enforce the court’s permanent injunctions, maintain peace, and facilitate the immediate removal of any illegal settlers incited or placed onto the suit property by the 9th Respondent/Interested Party. Page 2 of 24

page 2 of 24

vii. A declaration that the Respondents conduct violated Articles 10,27,40,47 and 63 of the Constitution and the principles of good governance, public participation and transparency. viii. Costs of this petition and such further or other relief as this Honourable court may deem just and expedient. 3. The amended petition is premised on various assertions. The assertions are: The society herein was duly allocated LR No. Nkuene/Mitunguu/189 [hereinafter referred to as the suit property]; the allotment matured vide reservation of the suit property; the reservation of the suit property was duly minuted and captured at the foot of the green card/register of the suit property; the lessor of the suit property remained as the county council of Meru [now defunct]; upon the allotment/reservation of the suit property, same lawfully belonged to the society; the society was entitled to exclusive rights thereto; the suit property could not be re-allocated to any third party; nevertheless, the 7 th Respondent [the county government of Meru], proceeded to and reallocated the suit property to the 1st Respondents and its affiliate factories; the re-allocation and dealings over the suit property were irregular and unlawful; the actions of the 7th respondent constituted a violation of the petitioner’s right; and the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity to canvass /defend its rights to the suit property. 4. Additionally, it has been contended thus: Having allocated and reserved the suit property in favour of the petitioner, the 7th respondent had no right to the suit property; the resolutions of the 7th respondent touching and concerning the suit property were unlawful/ultra vires ; the actions Page 3 of 24

page 3 of 24

by the 7th respondent breached the petitioners rights under Articles 10, 27,40,47 and 63 of the Constitution, 2010; and the petitioner has therefore established sufficient basis to warrant the grant of the orders sought. 5. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents duly entered appearance through the Honourable Attorney General. However, the 2nd and 3rd respondents neither filed a replying affidavit/response to the petition, nor any list and bundle of documents. Be that as it may, the 2 nd and 3rd respondent participated in the proceedings. 6. The 7th Respondent dully entered appearance and filed a response to the petition. The 7th respondent denied the assertions by the petitioner. In addition, the 7th respondent posited thus: The suit property formed /constituted part of the trust land; the trust land fell within the jurisdiction/mandate of the county council of Meru [defunct]; the county council of Meru allocated the suit property to the plaintiff; the allocation was vide reservation; however, the reservation was later varied; the 7 th respondent generated resolutions; the suit property was re-allocated to and in favor of KTDA; the 7th Respondent had the mandate to vary the reservation; the petitioner did not acquire any lawful rights to the suit property; the actions complained of were lawful; and the petition is bereft of merits. 7. The Petition against the 1st Respondent was withdrawn. Nevertheless, before the petition could be withdrawn, the 1st respondent had not filed any responses. Page 4 of 24

page 4 of 24

8. The rest of the Respondents neither entered appearance nor filed a response. In addition, the rest of the respondent did not participate in the hearing of the petition. 9. The Petition came up for directions whereupon the advocates for the parties sought directions as pertains to the hearing of the petition. In addition, learned counsel for the petitioner proposed to have the petition canvassed vide Viva Voce evidence. The proposal by the learned counsel for the Petitioner was conceded to by the rest of the advocates. To this end, the court proceeded to and issued directions. Instructively, the petition proceeded for hearing on the basis of viva voce evidence. 10.The petitioner’s case is anchored on the evidence of one witness. The witness is Eliud Njuguna Uno. Same testified as PW1. 11.It was the testimony of the witness [PW1] that same is the duly appointed liquidator of Nkuene Farmers Cooperative Society. In this regard, the witness averred that same is therefore authorized and mandated to act on behalf of the society. In addition, the witness posited that same placed before the court various gazette notices confirming his appointment as the liquidator. 12.Additionally, the witness averred that same is familiar with the facts of the case. The witness asserted that he has since recorded/sworn a supporting affidavit dated the 19.06.2026 and which supporting affidavit, the witness sought to adopt and rely on as his evidence in chief. To this Page 5 of 24

page 5 of 24

end, the supporting affidavit was duly adopted and constituted as the evidence in chief of the witness. 13.Furthermore, the witness referenced the various annextures attached the supporting affidavit and thereafter sought to tender and produce the annextures as exhibits before the court. There being no objection to the production of the documents, same were adopted and marked as exhibits P1 – P6, respectively. 14. The witness thereafter adverted to the amended petition dated the 19.06.2026. The witness invited the court to grant the reliefs sought thereunder. 15.On cross examination by learned counsel for the 2 nd and 3rd respondents, the witness averred that the land in question used to be freehold. It was the further testimony of the witness that the land was subsequently converted to leasehold. The witness added that the details of the land in question are captured at foot of Exhibit P3. 16.While still under cross examination, the witness averred that the lessee of the suit property is indicated as the society. The witness averred that the entry in favour of the society was made on the 13.05.1966. In addition, the witness posited that the transfer and registration of the suit property in favor of the society was undertaken in the year 1966. 17.It was the further testimony of the witness that even though the suit property belonged to the society, the same was transferred to and Page 6 of 24

page 6 of 24

registered in the name of KTDA- the First Respondent herein. The witness asserted that the transfer to and registration of the suit property in favour of KTDA was undertaken in the year 2012. 18.On cross examination by learned counsel for the 7 th respondent, the witness averred that same was duly appointed/constituted as the liquidator of the society. The witness asserted that by virtue of his appointment same operates within the scope of the Cooperative Societies Act. In addition, the witness averred that same was mandated to gather the assets of the society and to distribute same on behalf of the society. 19.Furthermore, the witness averred that same is familiar with the suit property. The witness added that the suit property belonged to and was registered in the name of the society. In addition, the witness asserted that the society herein was the only registered society and same was issued with a certificate of registration. 20.While still under cross examination, the witness testified that the register of the suit property was opened on the 13.05.1996. Regarding the proprietorship section, the witness averred that the lessor of the land is indicated to be the county council of meru. The witness added that the land was to be held on trust for Nkuene Cooperative Society Limited. 21.It was the further testimony of the witness that the register of the suit property does not indicate that the land was effectively transferred to the society. However, the witness clarified that the register shows that the land was reserved for the society. Moreover, it was the testimony of the Page 7 of 24

page 7 of 24

witness that the land in question was duly entered into the society’s book of accounts. 22.Additionally, the witness testified that the land in question was reserved for the society. Nevertheless, the witness clarified that despite the reservation, the land remained under the supervision of the county council of meru. 23.Upon being referred to annexture MH2 , attached to the replying affidavit on behalf of the 7th respondent, the witness stated that the documents are the minutes of the County Council of Meru. The witness averred that the minutes refer to the society as “former Allottee”. Besides, the witness testified that the Allottee of the public land is the user of the land for public purposes. However, the witness conceded that the Allottee of public land is not the owner of the land. 24.While still under cross examination, the witness averred that same was duly appointed as the liquidator vide the gazette notice. However, the witness posited that the gazette notice did not constitute /confer any title over the suit property. 25.With the foregoing testimony, the Petitioners’ case was closed. 26.I indicated elsewhere hereinbefore that the 2nd and 3rd respondents entered appearance but did not file any response to the petition. In addition, learned counsel for the 2nd and 3rd respondents, intimated to the court that the Honourable Attorney General shall not be calling any Page 8 of 24

page 8 of 24

witness. To this end, the 2nd and 3rd respondents’ case was closed without any evidence being tendered. 27.Though the 7th respondent had filed a response to the petition, the 7th respondent did not call any evidence. Notably, the 7 th respondent’s case was closed without any evidence being tendered. 28.Upon the close of the hearing, the advocates for the parties sought time to file and exchange written submissions. To this end, the court issued various directions. The directions were: The petitioner shall file and serve the written submissions within 14 days from the date of the directions; the respondents shall file and serve the written submissions within 14 days from the date of service; and the petitioner shall be at liberty to file rejoinder submissions [if any] within 7 days from the date of service by the Respondents. 29.The Petitioner filed two [2] sets of written submissions. The petitioner has highlighted four [4] key issues. The issues are: The suit property was lawfully alienated vide reservation in favour of the society; the society acquired lawfully rights and entitlement over the suit property; the actions complained of were undertaken without regard to the due process of the law; and the Petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought. 30.The 2nd and 3rd Respondents filed written submissions dated the 15.09.2026 and wherein same has highlighted one key issue. The issue is: Whether the 2nd Respondent irregularly registered and processed Page 9 of 24

page 9 of 24

transfer of the suit property to the 1st respondent without due regard to the law. 31.In particular, it has been submitted that the 2nd respondent is charged with the statutory mandate of receiving; acting upon; and registering instrument[s] of conveyance, subject to confirming that same has been duly executed and attested. Besides, it was argued that the 2 nd respondent was at liberty to proceed with and register the suit property in favour of the 1st respondent, insofar as the transfer instruments had been duly executed by the lessor. 32.Moreover, it has been posited that the 2nd respondent did not require the consent of the petitioner herein as a lessee. Learned Counsel for the 2 nd and 3rd respondents has thereafter cited and referenced the provisions of Sections 54 and 55 of the Land Registration Act, 2012. In short, learned counsel has invited the court to find and hold that the petition is devoid of merits. 33.The 7th Respondent filed written submissions dated the 27.08.2026 and wherein same has highlighted three [3] key issues. The issues are: Whether the suit property constituted an asset of the society [now defunct] in accordance with Section 65 [2] And 66 [1] [h] of the Cooperative Societies Act; and whether the alienation of the suit property to the 1st respondent was lawful or otherwise; and whether the petitioner has proved its case to the requisite standard or otherwise. Page 10 of 24

page 10 of 24

34.In particular, learned counsel for the 7th respondent has submitted that the suit property comprised part and parcel of trust land, which fell within the domicile of the local authorities [now defunct]. In addition, it has been submitted that the suit property was therefore under the supervision and mandate of the 7th respondent. Moreover, it has been argued that the 7th respondent was seized of the authority to vary the reservation of the suit property from the society to KTDA. In any event, it has been posited that the county government of Meru, correctly exercised its mandate pursuant to the provisions of Sections 114, 115, and 117 of the retired Constitution; as read together with Section 13 [1] and [2] of the Trust Land Act, Chapter 288. Laws of Kenya [now repealed]. 35.Based on the foregoing, learned counsel for the 7th respondent has implored the court to find and hold that the petition is premature, misconceived; and devoid of merits. The court has been implored to dismiss same with costs. 36.Having reviewed the amended petition; the affidavit in support therein; and upon taking into account the evidence tendered [both oral and documentary]; and upon consideration of the written submissions by /on behalf of the parties, four [4] key issues emerge for determination. The issues are: Whether the suit property stood alienated in favour of the society on the basis of reservation or otherwise; whether the 7 th Respondent was seized of any mandate over the suit property subsequent to its reservation in favour of the society; and whether the actions of the 7th respondent constituted arbitrary infringements of the Property rights of the society; and What appropriate reliefs [ if any] ought to be granted. Page 11 of 24

page 11 of 24

37.Regarding the first issue, that is, whether the suit property stood alienated on the basis of reservation or otherwise, I wish to start by observing that government land [now public land], can be alienated by way of reservation. It then means that where a particular plot or parcel of land has been reserved for a particular body or organization, or better still, designated for a particular purpose, then such land ceases to be unalienated land. Such land becomes alienated and belongs to the party or body in whose favour the land was reserved. 38.In the case of Board of Trustees, National Social Security v Keiyo Teachers Co-operative Savings and Credit Society & 6 others [2026] KECA 327 (KLR), the Court of Appeal highlighted the legal position and stated thus: 36“Decided cases are in agreement that once land is gazetted as public land, it falls under a separate category of land that has already been alienated for a specific public use. (See Mungania & 3 Others vs. County Government of Meru & 6 Others (Petition E010 of 2024) (2025) KEELC 3299 (KLR) (23 April 2025) (Judgment). Once land is gazetted for a specific purpose or use, it is reserved for that purpose only and therefore, it is not available for general, private or alternative use. Public land is gazetted for a particular use enjoys a high level of legal protection, therefore, it is not available for re-alienation or sub-division or allotment. In contrast, un-alienated public land is essentially public land that has not yet been committed for a specific lease or allotment. Page 12 of 24

page 12 of 24

39.Back to the subject matter. Evidence was tendered by PW1 that the suit property was duly allocated and transferred to the society. The transfer of the land to and in favor to the society was entered into the register of land on the 13.05.1966. In addition, it was asserted that the ownership of the suit property was vide reservation which was duly reflected in the register. Moreover, PW1 averred that following the reservation the society became the lessee whereas the county council of Meru [now defunct] remained the lessor. 40.This is what PW1 stated during cross examination by the Senior State Counsel: “ Referred to exhibit P3 and the witness states that the document is a green card in respect of LR No. Nkuene/Mitunguu/189. The leassee at the foot of the green card is Nkuene Cooperative Society Limited. I do wish to reiterate the lease at the foot of the green card. The entry in respect of the 13. 05.1966 shows/indicates the name of Nkuene Cooperative Society Limited. The transfer is shown to have been undertaken in 1966.” 41.Additionally, and while being cross examined by learned counsel for the 7th respondent, PW1 reiterated the ownership rights of the society vide reservation. 42. The witness stated thus: “I do confirm that Nkuene Cooperative Society was the only society at the material time. The green card references that the land was being reserved for Nkuene Cooperative Societies. I do confirm that the only registered society at the time was Nkuene.” 43.Furthermore, PW1 stated thus: Page 13 of 24

page 13 of 24

“ I do confirm that the register in respect of the parcel number 189 was opened on the 13.05.1966. referred to the proprietorship section and the witness states that the county counsel of Meru was registered the hold the land in trust of Nkuene Cooperative Society. The title is indicated to be absolute.” 44.From the evidence on record, there is not gainsaying that the suit property stood alienated to the society on the basis of reservation. The society was clearly shown to be the lessee. The county council of meru [now defunct] was indicated as the lessor. Moreover, evidence abound that the land was reserved for the society. 45.The society may not have been issued with the certificate of lease, but the fact that their name was captured/reflected in the green card as the lessee, denotes that same had acquired title to or entitlements over the suit property. The Land therefore lawfully belonged to it. It had rights thereto. 46.In a nutshell, my answer to issue number one is to the effect that the suit property was indeed alienated vide reservation and a lease hold interest was created in favor of the society. Simply put, the suit land was not unalienated public land, which the 7th Respondent could purport to reallocate or otherwise. 47.Moreover, it is quite interesting for Learned Counsel for the County Government of Meru [the 7TH Respondent] to contend that the County Government properly exercised its mandate and allocated the Land to the First Respondent in 2012. It is equally puzzling for Learned Counsel to Page 14 of 24

page 14 of 24

posit that the alienation by the County Government was undertaken pursuant to the provisions of Sections 114-117 of the Retired Constitution. 48.Surely, the provisions of the Retired Constitution could not be invoked and applied in the year 2012, when the Land is [sic] stated to have be allocated to the First Respondent. Suffice it to point out that Kenya had given unto itself a new Constitution on the 27.08.20210. The previous Constitution had rested; and was retired. 49.I now turn to the second issue. The second issue relates to whether the 7th respondent was seized of any mandate over the suit property subsequent to its reservation in favour of the society. While dealing with issue number one, I have pointed out that the suit property stood alienated in favour of the society. The alienation in favour of the society was by way of reservation. The reservation was clearly reflected in the green card of the suit property. 50.Insofar as the suit property was alienated and coupled with the fact the society became the lessee, the question that does arise is whether the 7 th respondent could purport to deal with or reallocate the same to the 1 st respondent? I hasten to state that the 7th Respondent could only exercise mandate, subject to Article 67[2] of the Constitution, over and in respect of trust land; or public land, falling under its jurisdiction, albeit which had not been alienated. 51.Put differently, the 7th Respondent could not convene and hold a meeting; and thereafter pass resolution to divest the petitioner/society of Page 15 of 24

page 15 of 24

the suit property. For coherence, the suit property was no longer trust land or better still, unalienated public land. On the contrary the suit property was private land belonging to the society. 52.To my mind, the actions by the 7th respondent including the resolutions which purportedly allocated the suit land to KTDA and its affiliate factories, were unlawful; invalid; and ultra vires. The impugned actions were illegal and constituted unwarranted overreach. 53.In the case of Benja Properties Limited v Syedna Mohammed Burhannudin Sahed & 4 others [2015] KECA 457 (KLR), the Court of Appeal highlighted the positions that the commissioner of land [now defunct] could not purport to alienate/allocate land which was already alienated. 54. The court stated thus: “24……The alienation to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents is the grant [that] takes priority; at the time another grant was being made to the appellant, the suit land had already been alienated; there was nothing for the 5th respondent to allot and alienate to the original allottees. 25.In arriving at our decision, we note that an interest in land cannot be allotted, alienated or transferred when the specific parcel of land allotted is not in existence. Allotment of an interest in land is a transaction in rem attaching to and running with a specific parcel of land. In the instant case, the allotment by the Commissioner of Land to the original allottees did not attach in rem to any land since there was no parcel upon which the allotment could attach. What the 5th respondent, the appellant and the original allottees did was to engage in paper transactions without a parcel of land upon which any interest in land would attach and vest – it was paper transactions without any parcel of land as its substratum.” Page 16 of 24

page 16 of 24

55.In my humble view, the 7th respondent herein could not purport to vary the reservation of the land in favour of the society. The land in question was no longer available to be allocated or reallocated by the 7 th respondent, under the guise of “variation of the reservation”. Suffice it to state that the reservation of the land in favour of the society and the creation of the lease in its favor, took away the land from the mandate/authority of the 7th respondent. Simply put, the actions by the 7th Respondent, which impacted on the suit property, were a nullity ab initio. 56.To buttress the foregoing holding, it is appropriate to reference the case of Henry Muthee Kathurima v Commissioner Of Lands & another [2015] KECA 892 (KLR). The Court of Appeal Stated Thus: “The Commissioner of Lands had no power to alienate public land and any action taken without due authorization is a nullity. We cite the case of Said Bin Seif v. Shariff Mohammed Shatry, (1940)19 (1) KLR 9, and reiterate that an action taken by the Commissioner of Lands without legal authority is a nullity; such an action, however, technically correct, is a mere nullity, and not only voidable but void with no effect, either as legitimate expectation, estoppel or otherwise.” 57.The Court of Appeal was dealing with the mandate of the commissioner of land to allocate land outside its statutory mandate. It was emphasized Page 17 of 24

page 17 of 24

that such actions were a nullity. I beg to underscore that the ratio in the decision [supra] applies to the subject matter. Notably, the 7th respondent was assuming a jurisdiction over a private land and thereby violating the society’s property rights. 58.The next issue relates to whether the actions of the 7th respondent constituted arbitrary infringement of the rights of the society. I have pointed out that the society acquired lawful rights to and in respect to the suit property. The suit property was clearly reserved for the society. The reservation thereof was captured and reflected at the foot of the register [See entry of 13.05.1966]. 59.In addition, the rights of the society were clearly stipulated as a lease. It then means that the society held leasehold interest over the suit property. Such rights are protected under the constitution. To this end, the 7 th respondent could not purport to divest the society of its rights to the land, under the pretext of “variation of reservation”. The actions by the 7 th respondent was indeed arbitrary and unconstitutional. 60.I wish to add that the actions by the 7 th respondent breached and violated the society’s property rights, without regard to the due process of the law. In any event, it is not lost on me that the 7 th respondent, undertook the impugned actions without affording the society or its liquidator an opportunity to be heard. I hold the view that the impugned actions contravene Articles 10[2] [B], 40, 47, 50 And 159 [2] [A] and [E] of the Constitution, 2010. Page 18 of 24

page 18 of 24

61.Whatever the rights that the 7th respondent deemed to hold over the suit property, there is no way same could purport to invalidate the rights of the society without affording the society the right to be heard. 62. It is common ground that no adverse action can be taken against a person or body, without the body being heard beforehand. This is the import and tenor of the Rule of Natural Justice. 63.In the case of County Assembly of Kisumu & 2 Others V Kisumu County Assembly Service Board & 6 Others [2015] KECA 397 (KLR), the Court of Appeal highlighted the significance of the due process and the necessity to afford the party likely to be affected by the decision, a reasonable opportunity to be heard. 64.The Court stated thus: “ 71. The primary meaning of the rule of law as anybody who has anything to do with the law knows, “is that everything must be done according to law.” In relation to governmental power, this means that every government authority must justify its action, which deprives an individual of his right or infringes his liberty, as authorized by law. This “is the principle of legality.” But the rule of law demands more than just the principle of legality. It demands, and this is the second meaning of the rule of law, “that government should be conducted within a framework of recognized rules and principles which restrict discretionary power.” This is the principle of due process. 72. Due process is a fundamental aspect of the rule of law. Due process is the right to a fair hearing. The right to a fair hearing encapsulated in the audi alteram partem rule (no person should be condemned unheard) and founded on the well-established principles of natural justice, is not a privilege to be graciously accorded by courts or any quasi-judicial body to parties before Page 19 of 24

page 19 of 24

them. As is clear from Articles 47 and 50 of our Constitution, it is a constitutional imperative.” 65.The last issue for determination relates to the appropriate reliefs [if any] to be granted. To begin with, the petitioner has sought a plethora of reliefs. However, the critical reliefs sought relates to the declaration that the invalidation of the society’s right to the suit property were illegal, null and unconstitutional. 66.I wish to highlight that in the course of discussing issues numbers one, two and three, elsewhere herein before, I have pointed out the following key points: i. The suit property stood alienated vide reservation. ii. The reservation was in favor of the society. iii. The society became a lessee of the suit property. iv. The society’s rights could not be impacted upon or invalidated without due regard to the law. v. The 7th respondent had not powers/mandate to reallocate the suit property. vi. The purported actions by the 7th respondent were ultra vires. vii. The 1st respondent and its affiliate factories did not acquire any legal rights to and in respect of the suit property. viii. The transfer and registration of the suit property in favour of the 1st respondent and the affiliate factories was null and void. ix. The titles held by the 1st respondent are invalid. Page 20 of 24

page 20 of 24

67.In the view of the foregoing findings, I encounter no difficult in holding that the 7th respondent violated the rights of the society [petitioner]. In any event, the impugned actions could not confer any lawful title to the 1st respondent. 68.The other relief that has been sought relates to rectification of the register of the suit property. The rectification is intended to restore the name of the society as the lessee. To the extent that the rights of the society were interfered with; and coupled with the violation of inter alia Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution, 2010, I am minded to and do hereby decree the rectification. Conclusion 69.The Petitioner herein had sought to invalidate the impugned actions by the 7th respondent. The Petitioner highlighted a number of breaches and violation of the constitution. Having highlight the violations in terms of paragraph 26 of the amended petition, it was incumbent upon the petition to prove the assertions. The petitioner was obligated to tender cogent and plausible evidence. 70.I wish to state that the Petitioner through PW1, tendered evidence demonstrating that the suit property had been duly reserved for the society. Moreover, it is worthy to recall that the evidence by PW1, was never controverted. 71.In a nutshell, it is my finding that the petitioner indeed established the claims at the foot of the amended petition to the requisite standard. Suffice it to state that the petitioner discharged the burden of proof in Page 21 of 24

page 21 of 24

terms of Section 108 and 109 of the Evidence Act, Chapter 80 Laws of Kenya. Final orders: 72.Flowing from the foregoing analysis, the final orders that commend themselves to the court are: i. A declaration be and is hereby issued that the leasing, subdivision and transfer of land parcel No. Nkuene/Mitunguu/189 to or in favor of the 1st Respondent and its subsidiaries were unconstitutional, illegal, null, and void ad initio. ii. A declaration be and is hereby issued that the said parcel constitutes community land held in trust for the members of Nkuene Farmers’ Co-operative Society [in liquidation]. iii. An order of Mandamus be and is hereby issued compelling the 2nd Respondent to rectify the land register by cancelling all entries, leases, subdivisions, and transfers arising from the impugned transactions. iv. An order of permanent injunction be and is hereby issued restraining the Respondent, their agents, servants or assigns from dealing with transferring, or interfering with the said suit parcel pending lawful redistribution by the liquidator. v. The be and is hereby issued an order of permanent injunction restraining the 9th Respondent/Interested Party, his agents, political supporters, servants or any person acting under his instructions/incitement, from trespassing, felling trees, clearing Page 22 of 24

page 22 of 24

vegetation, erecting structures, allocating, or in any other manner interfering with the land parcel Nkuene/Mituunguu/189. vi. An order be and is hereby issued directing the Officer Commanding Station [OCS], Mitunguu Police Station to strictly enforce the court’s permanent injunctions, maintain peace, and facilitate the immediate removal of any illegal settlers incited or placed onto the suit property by the 9 th respondent/interested party. vii. A declaration that the respondents’ conduct violated Articles 10,27,40,47 and 63 of the Constitution and the Principles of Good Governance, Public Participation and Transparency. viii. Costs of this Petition be and are hereby awarded to the Petitioner. ix. The Costs in terms of clause [viii] above shall be borne by the 7 th Respondent. 73.It is so ordered. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT MERU ON THIS 1ST DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026 OGUTTU MBOYA; FCIArb; CPM [MTI-EA]. JUDGE. In the presence of Court Assistant: Zakayo. Page 23 of 24

page 23 of 24

Ms. Kinyanjui holding brief for Mr. Kivuva for the Petitioner. Ms. Miranda Senior State Counsel for the 2nd and 3rd Respondent. Mr. Kaaria holding brief for Mr. Kanyimoo for the 7th Respondent. N/ a for the 1st Respondent N/a for the 4th, 5th and 6th Respondents N/ a for the 8th and 9th Respondent Page 24 of 24

page 24 of 24