John Mwirigi (Suing as the Legal Representative of the Estate of Mwambia Kiara, Deceased) v Felix M'Kinoti M'Mugambi

lodged statement of defense dated 8th August 2023, list of witnesses and bundle of documents dated 8th august 2023 and further list of documents dated 1 st October 2024. 3. The said suit was slated for hearing on various dates whereby the appellant and the respondent each called two witnesses and their respective cases were closed. For clarity, the documents listed in the list of documents were also produced as exhibits. 4. It was the appellant’s case that the deceased was his father and that the respondent his cousin by virtue of the respondent’s mother, one Wanja being the deceased’s sister. The appellant contended that he had been tilling the LR NO. NKUENE/URUKU/365 (hereinafter referred to as the suit land) for many years though same never resided on it. He contended that the suit land belonged to the deceased and the deceased handed the suit land to one Wanja to use. The respondent later transferred the land to his name when he heard that the deceased was intending to transfer the suit land to the appellant. 5. The respondent on the other hand denied the allegations contained in the Plaint and maintained that same bought the suit land from the deceased way back in 1972 and that same has been in in exclusive occupation. He denied that the appellant had been in occupation. His case was that the deceased relocated with his family to Timau with his children and settled thereon and sold the suit land to him. This was also corroborated by the son of the deceased, one Samson Nkanatha Mwambia, PW2. Page 2 of 21

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6. The trial court after hearing the parties, delivered a judgment on the 18 th June 2025; whereby the suit was dismissed with no orders as to costs. It is the said judgment that has necessitated the instant appeal. 7. Having reviewed the record of appeal, the pleadings by the parties, the evidence tendered, both oral and documentary, the written submissions and upon taking into account the applicable law, I come to the conclusion that Three [3] issues crystallize for determination. 8. The issues are: i. Whether the Appellant proved the plea of customary trust to the requisite standard or otherwise; ii. Whether the suit land was illegally obtained iii. Whether the Learned Trial Magistrate misapprehended and misapplied the law as pertains to customary trust or otherwise. 9. Before venturing to address the thematic issues that have been isolated in the preceding paragraph, it is important to highlight that what is before me is a first appeal. By virtue of being a first appeal, this court is mandated to undertake a fresh and exhaustive scrutiny, review, and analysis of the totality of evidence tendered before the court of first instance. The court is obligated to review the evidence and determine whether the finding and conclusion arrived at by the trial magistrate accord with the evidence on record and the legal principles. Page 3 of 21

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10.The court is seized of the authority and jurisdiction to arrive at an independent conclusion and to depart from the findings of the trial court. However, it is established that the appellate court can only depart from the factual finding and conclusion of the trial court where it is demonstrated; that the conclusions were based on no evidence; the conclusions are perverse to the evidence on record; the findings are based on misapprehension of the evidence and law; and that there is a demonstrable error of principle, which vitiates the findings of the trial court. 11.Suffice it to state that, barring the foregoing, the first appellate court is enjoined to defer to the findings and conclusions of the trial court. Notably, the jurisdiction of the first appellate court to interfere with the findings/conclusions of the trial court is circumscribed. The jurisdiction is not at large. Furthermore, the Jurisdiction is not to be exercised at will, or for the mere asking. Section 78 of the Civil Procedure Act, Chapter 21, Laws of Kenya, regulates same. 12.The jurisdictional remit of the first appellate court, while undertaking its mandate as pertains to the first appeal, has been the subject of various court decisions. In the case of Odera t/a AJ Odera & Associates v Machira t/a Machira & Co Advocates [2013] KECA 208 (KLR). The Court of Appeal expounded on the scope of the jurisdiction. 13.The court stated thus: “46. We also wish to be guided by the reasoning of this court in the case of Mwana Sokoni versus Kenya Business Limited (1985) KLR 931 page 934,934 thus:-“Although this court on appeal will not lightly differ from Page 4 of 21

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the Judge at first instance on a finding of fact, it is undeniable that we have the power to examine and re-evaluate the evidence on a first appeal if this should become necessary. As was said by the House of Lords in Sottos Shipping versus Sauviet Sohold, The Times, March 16, 1983.“It is uncertain whether their Lordships should have reached the same conclusion on the evidence, but it is important that, sitting in the appellate court they should be over mindful of the advantages enjoyed of the trial Judge who saw and heard the witnesses and was in a comparably better position than the Court of Appeal to assess the significance of what was said, how it was said, and equally impotent what was not said” Again in Peters versus Sunday Post Limited (1958) EA424, a decision of the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa, Sir Kenneth O’ Conner, P said at page 429: “It is a strong thing for an appellate court to differ from the finding on a question of fact of the Judge who tried the case and who has had the advantage of seeing and hearing and the witnesses.” 14.Recently, the Court of Appeal re-visited the jurisdictional remit in the case of Kenya Urban Roads Authority & another v Belgo Holdings Limited [2025] KECA 764 (KLR). The Court stated as hereunder; “We have considered the appeal, and this being a first appeal, we are under a duty to subject the entire evidence and the judgment to a fresh and exhaustive examination with a view to reaching our own conclusions in the matter. In carrying out this duty, we have to remember that we had no opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses who testified during the trial and to make an allowance for the same. We have also to remember that it is a big thing to overturn Page 5 of 21

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the findings of a trial court which has had the singular opportunity of reaching its conclusions based on a combination of the evidence adduced and observation by the court of the demeanor of witnesses. In a nutshell, a first appellate court must of necessity proceed with caution in deciding whether or not to interfere with the findings of a trial court, but of course, where such findings are not supported by the evidence on record or where they are founded on a misapprehension of the law, the axe must fall on the impugned judgment. This position is anchored in section 78 of the Civil Procedure Act, which requires a first appellate court to re-evaluate, reassess, and reanalyze the extracts of the record and draw its own conclusions. These provisions have been underscored in numerous decisions of the Superior Courts among them Peters v Sunday Post Limited [1958] EA 424, where the predecessor to this Court expressed itself as follows: “Apart from the classes of case in which the powers of the Court of Appeal are limited to deciding a question of law an appellate court has jurisdiction to review the record of the evidence in order to determine whether the conclusion originally reached upon that evidence should stand; but this jurisdiction has to be exercised with caution. If there is no evidence to support a particular conclusion (and this really is a question of law), the appellate court will not hesitate so to decide. But if the evidence as a whole can reasonably be regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived at on conflicting testimony by a tribunal which saw and heard the witnesses, the appellate court will bear in mind that it has not enjoyed this opportunity and that the view of the trial Judge as to where credibility lies is entitled to great weight. This is not to say that the Judge of first instance can be treated as infallible in determining which side is telling the truth or is Page 6 of 21

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refraining from exaggeration. Like other tribunals, he may go wrong on a question of fact, but it is a cogent circumstance that a judge of first instance, when estimating the value of verbal testimony, has the advantage (which is denied to the courts of appeal) of having the witnesses before him and observing the manner in which their evidence is given…Where a question of fact has been tried by a judge without a jury, and there is no question of misdirection of himself, an appellate court which is disposed to come to a different conclusion on the printed evidence, should not do so unless it is satisfied that any advantage enjoyed by the trial Judge by reason of having seen and heard the witnesses, could not be sufficient to explain or justify the trial Judge’s conclusion. The appellate court may take the view that, without having seen or heard the witnesses it is not in a position to come to any satisfactory conclusion on the printed evidence. The appellate court, either because the reasons given by the trial Judge are not satisfactory, or because it unmistakably so appears from the evidence, may be satisfied that he has not taken proper advantage of his having seen and heard the witnesses, and the matter will then become at large for the appellate court. It is obvious that the value and importance of having seen and heard the witnesses will vary according to the class of case, and, it may be, the individual case in question… It not infrequently happens that a decision either way may seem equally open, and when this is so, then the decision of the trial Judge who has enjoyed the advantages not available to the appellate court becomes of paramount importance and ought not be disturbed. This is not an abrogation of the powers of a Court of Appeal on questions of fact. The judgment of the trial Judge on the facts may be demonstrated on the Page 7 of 21

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printed evidence to be affected by material inconsistencies and inaccuracies, or he may be shown to have failed to appreciate the weight or bearing of circumstances admitted or proved or otherwise to have gone plainly wrong.” 15.Bearing in mind the principles enunciated in the decisions [supra], It is now apposite to revert to the issues for determination. I shall address the issues sequentially. ISSUE NO. 1 Whether the Appellant proved the plea of customary trust to the requisite standard or otherwise; 16.It seems that the appellant pegged his claim on the longevity of his occupation on suit property. That can be discerned in the reliefs sought in the plaint. If I got the appellant right, his case was that the suit land is family land. According to his evidence, the deceased had given the suit land to one Wanja to take care of it and the respondent decided to have the suit transferred to his name. He produced P EXH 1-2 which were the grant of letters of administration ad litem and a copy of green card in respect of the suit land. I have not seen the certificate of official search as alluded in the list of documents. I have also discerned that the copy of green card was certified on the 10 th August 2016 while the suit was lodged in the year 2023, approximately 7 years later. 17.Be that as it may, PW1 also the appellant herein adopted his witness statement as evidence in chief. He acknowledges that the respondent was the son to his Page 8 of 21

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aunt, one Wanja. His testimony was that the respondent was to hold the suit land in trust for him and somebody else he didn’t mention (PW1 continued to refer to ‘us’ and ‘plaintiffs’ while he was the only plaintiff). His evidence was that he was 20 years in the year 1972 when the suit land was registered in the name of the respondent. The connotation being that he had attained the age of majority. 18.DW2 was one Samson Mwambia who denied the appellant being his brother. According to him, the appellant has never stayed with the deceased neither did he attend the deceased’s burial. Interestingly, the appellant confirmed that the respondent has been in occupation of the suit land since 1972 and that same has developed the suit land. He confirmed and stated during cross examination that,’…there is nothing of mine in the property…’ This contradicted his evidence in chief whereby he stated in his statement that,’…we had farmed the land in question over the years…’ He accused the respondent for having obtained the suit land fraudulently. 19.According to PW2 one Charles Nkoroi Rukaria, he stated,’… that the deceased had left the suit land to the respondent to look after and that when the appellant and his siblings were mature, they will be given the land…’ (see page 60 of the record of appeal). I find this evidence strange and the witness untruthful as the appellant in his evidence in chief stated that,’…Wanja had been given the land by my father to tend to and farm…’ (see page 8 of the record of appeal). Besides, the appellant at page 81 of the record of appeal had testified that,’…in 1972, I was 20 years old…’ I can only arrive at a conclusion that the appellant and his witness contradicted themselves thus same were not Page 9 of 21

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credible witness. They did not know much about the suit land. PW2 testified at page 60 of the record of appeal that,’…upon inquire, we realized that the land had changed hands and it had been apparently given a gift to Felix by Mr. Mwambia…’ 20.The deceased did not sue the respondent over the suit property. The court proceedings alluded to by parties did not disclose the nature of the claim therein thus doesn’t help the case. What can be discerned is that deceased was aware that the suit land had been transferred to the respondent during his lifetime. In fact, the deceased passed on in the year 1999, that is to say, 27 years after the transfer and registration of the suit land to the respondent. PW2 confirmed that the deceased was aware about the transfer but there were no court proceedings placed before the trial court to prove that the deceased had taken action on the issue of the transfer and registration of the suit property to the respondent. 21.The appellant was thus duty bound to prove that the suit property was ancestral land and that same had acquired some recognizable interest. It has been established that the appellant was not in occupation. The appellant confirmed that he was not on the suit land. That since 1972 it the the respondent who has been in occupation. 22.While still addressing the first issue, it is thus critical to interrogate whether the ingredients that must be proven before a plea of customary trust were demonstrated. The elements to be established were distilled by the Supreme Court of Kenya in the case of Kiebia v M’lintari & another [2018] KESC 22 (KLR) the court stated thus: Page 10 of 21

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52. Flowing from this analysis, we now declare that a customary trust, as long as the same can be proved to subsist, upon a first registration, is one of the trusts to which a registered proprietor is subject under the proviso to Section 28 of the Registered Land Act. Under this legal regime (now repealed), the content of such a trust can take several forms. For example, it may emerge through evidence that part of the land, now registered, was always reserved for family or clan uses, such as burials, and other traditional rites. It could also be that other parts of the land, depending on the specific group or family setting, were reserved for various future uses, such as the construction of houses and other amenities by youths graduating into manhood. The categories of a customary trust are therefore not closed. It is for the court to make a determination, on the basis of evidence, as to which category of such a trust subsists as to bind the registered proprietor. Each case has to be determined on its own merits and quality of evidence. It is not every claim of a right to land that will qualify as a customary trust. In this regard, we agree with the High Court in Kiarie v. Kinuthia that what is essential is the nature of the holding of the land and the intention of the parties. If the said holding is for the benefit of other members of the family, then a customary trust would be presumed to have been created in favour of such other members, whether or not they are in possession or actual occupation of the land. Some of the elements that would qualify a claimant as a trustee are:1.The land in question was before registration, family, clan or group land; 2.The claimant belongs to such family, clan, or group; 3.The relationship of the claimant to such family, clan or group is not so remote or tenuous as to make his/her claim idle or adventurous; 4.The claimant could have been entitled to be registered as an owner or Page 11 of 21

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other beneficiary of the land but for some intervening circumstances; 5.The claim is directed against the registered proprietor who is a member of the family, clan or group. 23.The Appellant was enjoined to prove and demonstrate that the suit land was family or ancestral land. However, it is common ground that the suit property was originally registered in the name of the deceased. The alleged transfer was effected on the 14th October 1972 while the deceased passed on the 24 th October 1999. This transfer was done when the deceased was alive. He died 27 years later after the transfer and registration of the respondent as the owner of the land. 24. The respondent and DW2 who is the son to the deceased denied that the appellant was a son to the deceased. The statement for DW2 was filed in court on the 9th August 2023. He had denied in the witness statement that the appellant was his brother. His evidence at page 25 of the record of appeal was that,’…the plaintiff claims to be my brother. The plaintiff came to our home while an old and married man but my late father Mwamba Kiara was against him joining our family as his son since he was raised by M’Ndegwa from Kibirichia….when my father sold the land in 1971, we were not staying or working on the land but our Timau home before we relocated to Ex-Lewa in 1973 to date…The plaintiff has never lived in the home of Mwambia Kiara and in fact never even attended his burial when our father died…the land parcel LR NO. NKUENE/URUKU/365 is not trust our family land as the same is property of Felix Kinoti M’Mugambi…’ Page 12 of 21

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25.The Appellant was in possession of the said witness statement thus needed to prove that he was related to the deceased. He testified at page 82 of the record of appeal that,’…I have 3 brothers. I am the eldest…’ My humble view is that having been served with the statement of DW2 who was his alleged brother and that he had other brothers, it was incumbent upon him to either produce a birth certificate or any other document that would prove relationship with the deceased and/or call his other brothers to confirm that indeed he was a son to the deceased and that DW2 was lying in court. He decided to call PW2 who was a clan elder and not related to the family of the deceased. Even his testimony was slippery when he now changed his story that the deceased had given his sister the suit land to tend to it. 26.I am afraid but to hold that the appellant failed to establish that he was related to the deceased. It was his legal duty to establish that he is a family member of the deceased. He failed to demonstrate that the suit land was a family land. PW2 confirmed that the appellant was never around, unfortunately it was not stated where he had been. 27.The relationship between the appellant and the respondent is remote. DW2 confirmed that the appellant was not his brother but a busy body. That he only remembered the appellant coming to their home when he was quite aged but the deceased declined to accept him. Having failed to prove that the deceased was his father, thus court can only conclude that that parties herein were not related. 28.Fourthly, having concluded that the parties herein are not related, then the appellant could not have been registered as the owner of the suit land. The Page 13 of 21

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bottom line is that the appellant was duty bound to show that the land in question could very well have been registered in his name, save that the claimant was either a minor, of unsound mind, was not available at the point in time, or there was a family agreement warranting the registration in the name of the registered owner. 29.The deceased passed on 27 years later after the respondent was registered as the owner of the suit land. In fact, DW2 testified that the deceased moved his family to Timau after selling the suit land to the respondent. During these periods, the deceased did not sue the respondent as there were no court proceedings placed before the trial court to appreciate the nature of the claim. The respondent enjoyed exclusive ownership of the suit land for 27 years without any interruption. And even after the deceased passed on, he continued to be in occupation of the said property for another 24 years before the suit in the trial court was lodged. 30.Can it be said that the suit property could have been registered in the name of the Appellant? The suit land did not belong to the ancestry or family of the Appellant as his paternity was being questioned and he failed to demonstrate that he was related to the deceased. Lastly, the claim on trust has not been directed to a member of the family of the appellant. His alleged brother denied him yet he had two more brothers according to his testimony, that he could have called to assist the court on the issue of family relation. PW2 as already observed, was not a truthful witness as his testimony kept on changing. To that extent, it is my considered view that the appellant failed to prove the ingredients of customary trust. Page 14 of 21

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31.Proof of trust, including customary trust, is dependent on the evidence tendered. The evidence must be consistent, credible and compelling. Absent evidence, the plea of trust, including customary trust dissipates into thin air; or collapses as in the instant case. 32.In the case of Kazungu Fondo Shutu vs Japhet Noti Charo [2021] KECA, the Court of Appeal dealt with the circumstance[s] under which the claim of Trust does arise; and the need to tender credible Evidence. The Court stated thus: 28. The concept of trust must however, be proved. This Court in the case of Mumo v Makau [2002] 1EA.170, held that “trust is a question of fact to be proved by evidence…..” See also Kanyi Muthiora v Maritha Nyokabi Muthiora, Nairobi Court of Appeal No.19 of 198 29. In Juletabi African Adventure Limited & another v Christopher Michael Lockley [2017] eKLR, this Court dealt with the issue of trust at length. The Court referred Twalib Hatayan Twalib Hatayan & Anor v Said Saggar Ahmed Al-Heidy & Others [2015] eKLR and re-stated the law on trusts as follows: “According to Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition, a trust is defined as “1. The right, enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property to which another holds legal title; a property interest held by one Page 15 of 21

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person (trustee) at the request of another (settlor) for the benefit of a third party (beneficiary).” Under the Trustee Act, “… the expressions' trust' and 'trustee' extend to implied and constructive trust, and cases where the trustee has a beneficial interest in the trust property…” In the absence of an express trust, we have trusts created by operation of the law. These fall within two categories: constructive and resulting trusts. Given that the two are closely interlinked, it is perhaps pertinent to look at each of them in relation to the matter at hand. A constructive trust is an equitable remedy imposed by the court against one who has acquired property by wrongdoing. … It arises where the intention of the parties cannot be ascertained. If the circumstances of the case are such as would demand that equity treat the legal owner as a trustee, the law will impose a trust. A constructive trust will thus automatically arise where a person who is already a trustee takes advantage of his position for his own benefit (see Halsbury’s Laws of England supra at para 1453). As earlier stated, with constructive trusts, proof of parties’ intention is immaterial; for the trust will nonetheless be imposed by the law for the benefit of the settlor. Imposition of a constructive trust is thus meant to guard against unjust enrichment. … A resulting trust is a remedy imposed by equity where property is transferred under circumstances which suggest that the transferor did not intend to confer a beneficial interest upon the transferee ... Page 16 of 21

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This trust may arise either upon the unexpressed but presumed intention of the settlor or upon his informally expressed intention. (See Snell’s Equity 29th Edn, Sweet & Maxwell p.175). Therefore, unlike constructive trusts, where unknown intentions may be left unexplored, with resulting trusts, courts will readily look at the circumstances of the case and presume or infer the transferor’s intention. Most importantly, the general rule here is that a resulting trust will automatically arise in favour of the person who advances the purchase money. Whether or not the property is registered in his name or that of another is immaterial (see Snell’s Equity at p.177) (supra).” 31. As earlier stated, the existence of a trust is a question of evidence. In the Juletabi case (supra), the court held that the onus lies on the party relying on the existence of a trust to prove it through evidence. That is because: “The law never implies, the Court never presumes a trust, but [only] in case of absolute necessity. The Courts will not imply a trust save in order to give effect to the intentions of the parties. The intention of the parties to create a trust must be clearly determined before a trust will be implied.” 32. The onus to prove the existence of a trust lay squarely on the Appellants. Section 107 of the Evidence Act further provides that: “Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist. (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.” Page 17 of 21

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36.It is thus my humble view that the appellant did not demonstrate that the suit land was an ancestral and/or family land thus the respondent did not hold the suit land in trust for the appellant. Issue No. 2 Whether the suit land was illegally obtained At paragraph 8 of the Plaint, the appellant listed particulars of illegality on the part of the APPLICANT 37.Respondent herein. At page 82 of the record of appeal, the appellant testified that,’…the defendant obtained the property fraudulently…’ It was the duty of appellant to not only plead fraud but specifically prove the allegations therein. Interestingly, the appellant never sought for an order for cancellation and/or revocation of the title to the suit land in the name of the respondent. 38.As already discerned from the preceding paragraphs, the appellant was aware of the registration of the respondent as the owner of the suit land even before the year 1999 when the deceased passed on. Besides, P EXH 2 being the green card of the suit land, demonstrated that as at 10 th August 2016, the appellant was aware that the respondent was the registered owner of the suit land. Section 4 of the Limitation of Actions Act prescribed that the claim of fraud be brought 3 years from the date of cause of action or pursuant to Section 26 of the Limitation of Actions Act alleged fraud was to be lodged within 3 years from the date of discovery. The claim on fraud was thus statute barred. 39.The particulars of illegality and unlawfulness in my humble view have not been proved. For clarity, the appellant accused the respondent for transferring the suit land to his name after the death of the deceased while the transaction Page 18 of 21

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occurred in the year 1972 and the deceased passed on in the year 1999. PW2 confirmed that the deceased was aware of the transfer. DW2 was a son to the deceased and same confirmed that he received the purchase price from the respondent’s deceased wife which proceed he later on purchased another property. 40. At page 69 of the record of appeal is a document deemed as a receipt in respect of a transfer and that stamp duty was being paid. The deceased having been aware of the registration of the suit property in the name of the respondent and not taken any action against the respondent, can it be said that the suit land was obtained illegally? My answer is in the negative. The appellant was aware of the registration when he returned back to the deceased. PW2 testified that the deceased was aware of the said registration and that no document was placed before the trial court to prove that the deceased had opposed and/or objected to the transfer and registration of the suit property in the name of the respondent. 41.The appellant was aware that the claim of fraud had been extinguished upon lapse of statutory timelines. He tactfully avoided to refer to the claim of fraud and conveniently at paragraph 8 referred to the transaction as being illegal and/or unlawful yet the cause of action was one of fraud pursuant to Section 4 of the Limitation of Actions Act. 42.In the case of JAMES MUNIU MUCHERU V NATIONAL BANK OF KENYA LIMITED [2019] EKLR, the honorable appellate judges held that, ‘…indeed it is settled law that in civil cases the standard of proof is on a Page 19 of 21

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balance of probability. This is in effect to say that the courts will make a finding based on which party’s version of the story is more believable…’ Section 107 of the Evidence Act places the burden of proving the alleged on the person alleging. That burden was not discharged by the appellant herein. 43.Sections 107 and 108 of the Evidence Act places the burden of proof on the party who alleged that the respondent illegally obtained the suit land. He who alleges must prove the alleged. Was that burden been discharged by the appellant before the trial court? The answer is in the negative. The deceased despite being aware of the ownership of the suit land, did not sue the respondent during his life time. Same passed on 27 years later after the registration of the suit land in the name of the respondent. I thus conclude that the allegations of fraud were not proved to the required standards. ISSUE NO. 3 Whether the Learned Trial Magistrate misapprehended and misapplied the law as pertains to customary trust or otherwise 44.Having read the judgment of the trial court, I conclude that the learned trial magistrate appreciated the elements that a party claiming customary trust must prove, or establish. In respect of the Subject matter, the elements were neither proved nor justified. 45.Further, and in addition, I find and hold that the conclusion and findings which were arrived at by the trial magistrate were anchored by the evidence on record. The impugned Judgment is well grounded; and thus un-assailable. Page 20 of 21

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46.In a nutshell, I conclude that the Appeal beforehand is devoid of merits. Same courts dismissal. On the contrary, the Judgment deserves affirmation. I hereby affirm same. Final orders 47.Flowing from the analysis contained elsewhere hereinbefore, the final orders of the court are: i. The Appeal be and is hereby Dismissed. ii. The Judgment of the Learned Trial Magistrate dated 18.06.2025 and the consequential decree arising therefrom, be and are hereby upheld. iii. The Costs of the Appeal is hereby awarded to the respondent. 48.It is so ordered. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT MERU THIS ……24TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026. OGUTTU MBOYA, FCIArb; CPM[MTI-EA] JUDGE In the presence of-: Court Assistant: Zakayo Mr. Karanja for the Appellant N/a for the rRspondent Page 21 of 21

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