Allo & 5 others v Dabel Sakuye Community & 4 others

2. Contemporaneously, the Petitioners /Applicants also led an application date the 26.08.26 and wherein the applicants have sought various reliefs. The reliefs sought vide the application include a conservatory order, barring the 1st Respondent [Registered Community] from inter alia, convening; holding; conducting; or formalizing the community land management committee representing the 1st Respondent. In addition, the applicants have also sought an order of injunction restraining the respondents from undertaking the process of identication; demarcation; and registration of the community land on the basis of the exclusive ethnic /tribal identity of the 1st Respondent/Community. 3. Crucially, the applicants have contended that same have been duly constituted as representatives of the other communities which have been using the community land in question for grazing; access to water; seasonal migration; cultural practices and other communal purposes. To this end, it has been posited that the land in question cannot be registered in the name of the 1st Respondent and without regard to the other interested communities. 4. Upon being served, with the petition and the application, the respondents took out and led to two [2] sets of preliminary objections. The 1st Respondent led the notice of preliminary objection dated the 25.09.2026. The preliminary objection has highlighted various grounds. 5. The grounds are: 6. I. The petition has led a fatally defective and incompetent insofar as it purports to institute proceedings against the Dabel Sakuye Community”, which is not a legal person. II. That 1st Respondent is an amorphous entity without juristic personality, incorporation, or statutory recognition, and therefore cannot be subjected to legal proceedings in its own name. Communities, clans, or ethnic groups per se do no possess a such capacity unless represented through duly authorized legal persons or registered associations. III The petition oends the provisions of order 1 rule 8 of the civil procedure rules, which requires that suits brought on behalf of numerous persons with the same interest must be instituted trough representatives. IV. The petition further oends the provisions of the Community Land Act, 2016, wish provides that communities may only act through duly registered legal structures. No such committee or registered entity has been demonstrated in the pleadings. V. Consequently, the petition as framed is incompetent, misconceived, and an abuse of the court process, and ought to be struck out in limene with costs. The 2nd, 3rd and 5th respondents [the Honourable Attorney General] led a preliminary objection dated the 17.09.2026. The objection by the Honourable Attorney General has raised the following grounds: i. The petition is a nullity ab initio and fatally defective for instituting proceedings against a non - existent entity. ii. The 2nd Respondent has no statutory role Impugned in the petition and there is no pleaded legal nexus between the 2nd Respondent and the subject matter of the petition. iii. The Petitioners lack the requisite locus standi. iv. The petition is premature and oends the doctrine of ripeness. v. The petition oends the doctrine of exhaustion of the statutory dispute resolution mechanisms. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5926/eng@2026-09-28 2

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vi. The court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petition at this stage. vii. The petition is fatally defective, incompetent and an abuse of the court process. 7. The matter came up for directions as pertains to the hearing and disposal of the notice of motion application and the notices of preliminary objections. The advocates for the parties sought directions as pertains to the hearing of the pending of the application and the preliminary objections. In addition, the advocates for the parties agreed to canvass the preliminary objection beforehand. Moreover, it was also agreed that the preliminary objections be canvassed by way of oral submissions. 8. Thereafter, the court proceeded to and issued directions. The directions were: The preliminary objections by the respondents shall be canvassed before the hearing of the pending application; the preliminary objection shall be heard vide oral submissions; and the court shall determine the preliminary objection at the earliest, before giving further directions in respect of the application. 9. Learned counsel for the 1st Respondent adopted the preliminary objection dated the 25.09.2026. Thereafter, learned counsel highlighted three [3] key issues. The issues are: The petition before the court is defeated by the doctrine of exhaustion; the Petitioners are devoid of the requisite locus standi to mount and maintain the subject petition and by extension the application; and the petition is defeated by the provision of Order 1 Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010. 10. Learned counsel for the 2nd, 3rd and 5th Respondents [the Hon. Attorney General] adopted the grounds of the preliminary objection dated the 17.09.2026. moreover, learned counsel proceeded to and highlighted four key issues. The issues are: The Petitioners are divested of the requisite locus standi to mount and maintain the petition; the petition is defeated by the doctrine of exhaustion; the court is devoid of jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the issues raised vide the petition; and the issues raised vide the petition are well provided for under the Community Land Act, 2016. 11. Learned counsel for the Petitioners opposed the preliminary objections and highlighted ve [5] key issues. The issues are: The Preliminary Objection raised by the Respondent do not constitute pure points of law; the question of locus standi is a matter of fact/evidence to be proved during the plenary hearing; the Petitioners herein are representatives of the other communities who have been using the disputed land; the Petitioners have the requisite locus standi to mount and maintain the petition and the application; and the 1st Respondent is a duly constituted and registered community and thus same is seized of capacity to be sued. 12. Additionally, learned counsel for the Petitioners has also submitted that this court is seized of the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute beforehand. In particular, it has been submitted that the issues raised vide the petition and the application constitute violations/infringement of basic human rights protected by the Constitution, 2010. To this end, learned counsel invited the court to take cognizance of Article 165 of the Constitution, 2010, which [sic] gives the High Court the Mandate to protect the Human Rights and fundamental freedoms. 13. It was the further submissions by the learned counsel for the Petitioners that even though the Community Land Act, 2016; and the regulations made thereunder, contain alternative mechanisms, the existence of such mechanisms, do not divest this court of jurisdiction to grant the reliefs sought by the Petitioners. Furthermore, it was contended that this court is seized of the mandate to ensure that the petition and the application are not rendered nugatory. 14. Lastly, learned counsel for the Petitioners has submitted that the 1st Respondent is a duly registered community and therefore capable of being sued. In this regard, learned counsel referenced annexture EAK – 03[copy of an advertisement by the community land registrar, Scheduling a meeting of the https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5926/eng@2026-09-28 3

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1st respondent]. It has been posited that the publication of the advertisement denotes that the 1st Respondent is duly registered. 15. Premised on the foregoing, learned counsel for the Petitioners has implored the court to nd and hold that the preliminary objections by the respondents, are misconceived and legally untenable. The court has been invited to dismiss the preliminary objections. The court has also implored to award costs to the Petitioners. 16. Having reviewed, the notice of preliminary objections; the oral submissions by and on behalf of the respective parties; and bearing in mind the provisions of the Community Land Act, 2016; and the Community Land Regulations [2017], three [3] key issue emerge for determination. The issues are: Whether the applicants have the requisite locus standi to mount the subject petition or otherwise; whether the petition discloses a reasonable and justiciable cause of action; and whether the petition is defeated by the doctrine of exhaustion. 17. Regarding the rst issue, that is, whether the applicants have the requisite locus standi to mount the subject petition or otherwise, it is important to recall that the Petitioners herein have brought the petition on their own behalf and on behalf of communities with communal interest in the disputed land. In addition, it has also been contended that the petition has been brought in public interest. 18. The crux of the petition before the court is thus: The disputed land has been used by the various communities for purposes of grazing, accessing water, seasonal migration, settlement, cultural practices and other communal activities. Moreover, it has been posited that the land in question is therefore of signicant communal and cultural importance to communities beyond the Sakuye communities. 19. What I hear the Petitioners to be stating is that the suit property [disputed land] has been used by the communities including the Gabra community, which is represented by the 1st petition. Moreover, the 1st petitioner seems to be suggesting that because of the historical occupation and use, the Gabra communities are entitled to and have an interest over the disputed land. 20. The assertions by the Petitioners may or may not be true. The stage for determining the veracity or the accuracy of the assertions is yet to be reached. For good measure, such assertions can only be interrogated during the plenary hearing of the petition or at the time of inter - partes hearing of the application. For now, the question that falls for determination is whether or not the Petitioners are seized of locus standi, to approach this court; and to champion what is called [sic] community interests and rights of the Gabra community and the other community, which is said to have a stake hold in the disputed land. 21. It is imperative to underscore that locus standi is a legal question. In addition, locus standi is a threshold question, which must be determined at the onset. Locus standi denotes the right of a party to appear and to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. In addition, locus standi is contra distinct from a cause of action. Suce it to state that where a person is divested of locus standi, such a person cannot be heard by the court. It is immaterial whether such a person has a reasonable cause of action or otherwise. 22. In the case of Kenya Railways Corporation & 2 others v Okoiti & 3 others [2023] KESC 38 (KLR), the Supreme Court addressed the question of locus standi in constitutional petitions. The apex court stated thus: “ 97. We nd it necessary to caution that, whereas article 22 of the Constitution entitles every person to institute court proceedings claiming that a right or a fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights has been denied, violated or infringed or is threatened, and article 258 entitles every person to institute https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5926/eng@2026-09-28 4

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court proceedings claiming that the Constitution has been contravened or is threatened with contravention, these provisions ought not to be abused in the name of 'public interest'. This is, more so, where the litigants seek to advance private or political interests or other considerations through proxies. Attractive as it may sound, public interest litigation must abide by laid down rules of procedure and the law, and must be aimed at addressing genuine public interests and not used for personal gain or vendetta” 23. It is also worthy to reference the holding in the case of Rajesh Pranjivan where Chudasama v Sailesh Pranjivan Chudasama [2014] KECA 250 (KLR), the Court of Appeal highlighted the legal implication of locus standi. The court stated thus: “ In Alfred Njau & Others v City Council of Nairobi (supra) this Court had occasion to discuss the two. They stated: “Lack of locus standi and a cause of action are two dierent things. Cause of action is the fact or combination of facts which give rise to a right to sue whereas locus standi is the right to appear or be heard, in court or other proceedings; …” The court proceeded to state: “To say that a person has no cause of action is not necessarily tantamount to shutting the person out of the court but to say he has no locus standi means he cannot be heard, even on whether or not he has a case worth listening to.” 24. There is no gain saying that locus standi is a legal question. To this end, the contention by learned counsel for the Petitioners that locus standi, is a question of fact and evidence, is clearly misguided. Suce it to underscore that a party must be seized of the capacity, before approaching the jurisdiction of the court. Absent locus standi the suit, whether by petition or otherwise, would be stillborn. 25. Have the Petitioners demonstrated locus standi as pertains to matters of community land? To begin with, interest in community land can only be canvassed by registered communities. It then means that before a particular community or representative thereof, can approach a court of law, same must demonstrate registration. Notably, a community can only exist and be recognized upon registration. 26. Section 7 of the Community land Act, 2016, states thus: 7. Procedure for registration of communities (1) A community claiming an interest in or right over community land shall be registered in accordance with the provisions of this section. (2) The community land registrar shall by notice in at least one newspaper of nationwide circulation and a radio station of nationwide coverage, invite all members of the community with some communal interest to a public meeting for the purpose of electing the members of the community land management committee. (3) The notice shall also be given to the national county administrators and county government administrators in the area where the community land is located. (4) The community land registrar may use all available means of communication including electronic media to reach the community members. (5) The community shall elect between seven and fteen members from among themselves to be the members of the community land management committee as provided in https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5926/eng@2026-09-28 5

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section 15, who shall come up with a comprehensive register of communal interest holders. (6) The community land management committee shall come up with the name of the community and shall submit the name, register of members, minutes of the meeting and the rules and regulations of the committee to the Registrar for registration. 27. The Petitioners herein have not indicated or asserted that the Garbra community which same represent before the court, has been registered in accordance with the Community Land Act. In the absence of registration, it means that neither the Garbra Community or the Petitioners herein, can stake a claim to [sic] the community land. The right to stake a claim to and in respect of community land, accrues upon registration of the community. 28. In the case Obo & 3 others v National Land Commission & 5 others [2024] KECA 232 (KLR), the court of appeal illuminated the legal position and stated as hereunder: “ From the foregoing, it is clear that what gives a community the standing to claim land in that capacity is registration under the Act. In this case, the learned Judge found that there was no evidence of registration by the appellants. In their submissions, the appellants have not addressed this particular nding. We agree with the learned Judge that in the absence of registration, the appellants had no locus to make a claim for the suit land.” 29. Bearing in mind the ratio in the decision [supra] and taking into account that the Petitioners herein have not demonstrated the registration of the community the same allude to, I nd and hold that the Petitioners are divested of the requisite locus standi. The Petitioners cannot lay or stake a claim to the suit land outside the corners of the community land act. Simply put, any claim touching on and concerning interest in community land, must accord with the prescription of the said law. 30. I now wish to move to the second issue. The second issue relates to whether the Petitioners have established a justiciable claim; or whether the petition beforehand, meets the threshold of ripeness. The Petitioners claim is that the disputed land has been used by various communities including the Gabra community for grazing; access to water; seasonal migration; settlement; cultural practices; and other aspects of community livelihood. Simply put, the Petitioners are asserting an interest in the community land. The ascertainments of the rights and interest of the Petitioners and the communities that same [sic] purport to represent can only be done in accordance with provisions of Section 8 of the Community Land Act, 2016. 31. Pertinently, whatever, rights that the Petitioners may stake or claim over the suit land can only be discerned during the demarcation and adjudication process. It is the designated adjudication ocers and not the court, who can determine the claims. 32. Additionally, it is important to highlight that the petitioner would be obligated to canvass their interest before the adjudication ocers and thereafter allow same to determine the claims. As it is, the adjudication ocer has not appropriated their mandate. Quite clearly, the petition and the issued raised therein, are premature and therefore violate the Doctrine of Ripeness. 33. In the case of Wanjiru Gikonyo & 2 others v National Assembly of Kenya & 4 others [2016] KEHC 5536 (KLR), the court [Per J L Onguto – Judge] stated thus: “ It is clear from a review of the above case law that there is now a distinct and coherent jurisprudence within our jurisdiction on the justiciability dogma. There is settled policy with clear arguments as well as out of repetitive precedent that courts and judges are https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5926/eng@2026-09-28 6

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not advise-givers. The court ought not to determine issues which are not yet ready for determination or is only of academic interest having been overtaken by events. The court ought not to engage in premature adjudication of matters through either the doctrine of ripeness or of avoidance. It must not decide on what the future holds either.” 34. I hold the opinion that the claims and the interests [if any] that are being propagated by the Petitioners herein can only be addressed by the designated ocers. The ascertainments of such rights, lies elsewhere. The court is divested of the jurisdiction to ascertain the rights. The Petitioners have no doubt, jumped the gun. To my mind, the subject petition amounts to placing the cart before the horse. The issues are not justiciable. 35. Moving to the third issue, namely; whether the subject petition is defeated by the doctrine of exhaustion or otherwise. I beg to state that the doctrine of exhaustion has been found to be one of the key pillars of the rule of law. In addition, it has been pointed out that even where a party has the right to approach a court of law, such a party is obligated to exhaust the statutory avenues stipulated under the law. 36. In the case of Mumba & 7 others (Sued on their own behalf and on behalf of predecessors and or successors in title in their capacities as the Registered Trustees of Kenya Ports Authority Pensions) v Munyao & 148 others (Suing on their own behalf and on behalf of the plaintis and other members/ beneciaries of the Kenya Ports Authority Pensions Scheme)) [2019] KESC 83 (KLR), the supreme court [the apex court] highlighted the doctrine of exhaustion thus: “ The foregoing verdict also nds support in an adage principle in administrative law of “Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies” and from the jurisprudence emanating from this court and the lower Courts, which has been restated with notoriety to the eect that, where there exists an alternative method of dispute resolution established by legislation, the courts must exercise restraint in exercising their Jurisdiction conferred by the constitution and must give deference to the dispute resolution bodies established by statutes with the mandate to deal with such specic disputes in the rst instance. see Alphonse Mwangemi Munga & 10 Others v African Safari Club Ltd [2008] eKLR Narok County Council case v Trans Mara County Council [2000] 1 EA 161 Kones vs Republic & Another ex parte Kimani wa Nyoike & 4 Others (2008)3 KLR (EP); Speaker of the National Assembly vs Njenga Karume (2008)1 KLR (EP) 425, Francis Mutuku vs Wiper Democratic Movement - Kenya & others [2015] eKLR David Ochieng Babu v Lorna Achieng Ochieng & 2 others [2017] eKLR among other cases not referred to. The Court of Appeal in Georey Muthinja & another vs Emanuel Muguna Henry & 1756 others [2015] eKLR held that:“We see this as the crux of the matter in this and similar cases. It is imperative that where a dispute resolution mechanism exists outside courts, the same be exhausted before the jurisdiction of the courts is invoked. Courts ought to be the fora of last resort and not the rst port of call the moment a storm brews within churches as is bound to happen. The exhaustion doctrine is a sound one and serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is rst of all diligent in the protection of his own interest within the mechanism in place for resolution outside of courts. This accords with article 159 of the constitution which commands Courts to encourage alternative means of dispute resolution.” 117. Of precise relevance to this case is Bethwell Allan Omondi Okal v Telkom (K) Ltd (Founder) & 9 others [2017] eKLR. In that case, the appellants who were former employees of Telkom (K) Ltd felt aggrieved and discriminated https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5926/eng@2026-09-28 7

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against following the implementation of what was referred to as “Trivial Pension Payout”, by the Authority which they accused of fraud, corruption and mismanagement and for paying some categories of retirees less increments in their pension payments than others. The trial court made a nding that since the complaints were against the Authority, that there were other statutory inbuilt administrative dispute resolution mechanisms under the RBA Act that ought to have been followed before recourse to the High Court. He opined that any dispute should have been referred to arbitration in the rst instance pursuant to Rule 36 of the Consolidated Deed of Trust and Rules, made under the RBA Act and that if the appellant was dissatised with the decision of the arbitrator, then he could appeal to the Retirement Benets Appeals Tribunal established under the RBA Act. On Appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal stating that:“The Appellant might want to argue that he has a constitutional right of access to justice, and we agree that he does, but the High Court and this Court have pronounced themselves many times to the eect that a party must rst exhaust the other processes availed by other statutory dispute resolution organs, which are by law established, before moving to the High court by way of constitutional petitions. See International Centre for Policy and Conict & 4 others vs The Hon. Uhuru Kenyatta and others, Petition No 552 of 2012, and Speaker of National Assembly v Njenga Karume [2008] 1KLR 425.We hold that if indeed the appellant had any dispute with the RBA, he ought to have followed the route prescribed by the RBA, before proceeding to the High Court. We hold like the court below, and for the reasons we have given, that the appellant’s petition lacked merit and was for dismissal.” 118. 37. In the pursuit of such sound legal principles, it is our disposition that disputes disguised and pleaded with the erroneous intention of attracting the jurisdiction of superior courts is not a substitute for known legal procedures. Even where superior courts had jurisdiction to determine profound questions of law, rst opportunity had to be given to relevant persons, bodies, tribunals or any other quasi-judicial authorities and organs to deal with the dispute as provided for in the relevant parent statute.” The court went further and stated thus: “ 119. Such a deferred jurisdiction and the postponement of judicial intervention and reliefs until the mandated statutory or constitutional bodies take action rests, not alone on the disinclination of the judiciary to interfere with the exercise of the statutory or any administrative powers, but on the fact of a legal presumption that no harm can result if the decision maker acts upon a claim or grievance. Such formulation underlies the analogous cases, frequently cited for the exhaustion doctrine, in which the court refuses to enjoin an administrative ocial from performing his statutory duties on the ground that until he has acted the complainant can show no more than an apprehension that he will perform his duty wrongly, a fear that courts will not allay. Such cases may be expressed in the formula that judicial intervention is premature in the absence of administrative action. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5926/eng@2026-09-28 8

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38. Back to the instant matter. The claims that have been raised by the Petitioners are claims that ought to have been dealt with and disposed vide statutory mechanism under the Community Land Act, 2016. The provisions of Sections 39, 40 and 41 of the Community Land Act, 2016, stipulates the manner in which such disputes ought to be canvassed and resolved. 39. Additionally, Rule 25 of the Community Land Regulations [2017] are instructive. The provisions stipulate thus: (1) Any disputes arising from community land may be resolved through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms at rst instance as provided for in the Act. (2) Where the community is unable to resolve the dispute arising from community land recognition, adjudication and registration process within a registration unit, the complainant shall refer the dispute to the land adjudication ocer in Form CLA 11 who shall record the dispute in a register in Form CLA 12. (3) Where the dispute traverses dierent registration units the claim shall be received and recorded by either of the land adjudication ocers in charge of any of the aected registration units and copied to the other. (4) The Cabinet Secretary may appoint an ad hoc committee to hear and determine the disputes led under paragraph (2) consisting of— (a) deputy county commissioner who shall be the chairperson of the committee; (b) two (2) nominees from the county government where the community land is situate; (c) Government Surveyor; and(d)land adjudication ocer, who shall be the secretary. (5) The ad hoc committee shall co-opt not more than four (4) representatives from the communities where the community land is situate. (6) The co-opted representatives shall not be members of the community land management committee and the appointment will comply with the two thirds gender rule. (7) Where the community land under dispute traverses dierent registration units or Counties, the Cabinet Secretary may constitute a special ad hoc committee consisting of not more than nine persons. (8) In constituting the special ad hoc committee, the Cabinet Secretary shall ensure there is representation from the registration units or counties involved. (9) An ad hoc committee shall elect one of its members from nominees in paragraph (4) to be chairman, who shall preside at all meetings at which he is present, and if at any meeting the chairman is absent the members present shall elect one of themselves to preside at that meeting. (10) In hearing the dispute, the ad hoc committee may use alternative methods of dispute resolution mechanisms including traditional dispute and conict resolution mechanisms where appropriate. (11) The process of conducting hearings by the ad hoc committee shall be in accordance with the Fourth Schedule. (12) Nothing in these regulations shall prevent any person or entity from lodging a claim of an interest over community land in accordance with paragraph (3). https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5926/eng@2026-09-28 9

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(13) A party dissatised with the decision of the ad hoc committee may, within thirty days after the date of the determination of the dispute, appeal to the court. 40. I have examined the entire petition and the adavit in support thereof; I have equally examined the notice of motion application; and the annextures thereto, I have not come across any demonstration that the dispute was placed before the committees envisaged under Rule 25 [supra]. 41. Before concluding on this issue, I am reminded of the holding in the case of Muthinja & another v Henry & 1756 others [2015] KECA 304 (KLR), where the Court of Appeal stated thus: “ 38………It is imperative that where a dispute resolution mechanism exists outside courts, the same be exhausted before the jurisdiction of the courts is invoked. Courts ought to be the fora of last resort and not the rst port of call the moment a storm brews within churches, as is bound to happen. The exhaustion doctrine is a sound one and serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is rst of all diligent in the protection of his own interest within the mechanisms in place for resolution outside of courts. This accords with Article 159 of the Constitution which commands Courts to encourage alternative means of dispute resolution.” 42. In my humble view, the issues that have been raised by the Petitioners herein, do not belong to this court. The issues under reference ought to have been lodged in accordance with the provisions of the Community land Act. Moreover, though the issues have been baptized as “constitutional matters”, same are actually a claim for discernment of Interests in Community Land. Conclusion: 43. The respondents herein raised three key issues in the Preliminary Objections. The issues that were raised gravitated around locus standi; the doctrine of ripeness [justiciability]; and doctrine of exhaustion. These issues are pure questions of law. The determination of the said issues did not require interrogation of the facts. 44. Furthermore, there is no gainsaying that a preliminary objection is like a demurer. Same is argued on the basis that the facts contained in the pleadings of the adverse party [the Petitioners herein] are deemed as correct. The proponents of the preliminary objection did not contest the factual matrix. They [the facts] were assumed correct. 45. In a nutshell, it is my nding and holding that the preliminary objections, which were canvassed by the respondents, are merited. The same be and are hereby upheld. Final orders: 46. In the end, the nal orders that commend themselves to the court are: I. The Preliminary Objection dated the 17.09.2026; and 25.09.2026 be and are hereby Allowed. II. The petition dated the 26.08.2026 be and is hereby struck out. III. The Notice of Motion Application dated 26.08.2026 be and is hereby struck out. IV. Costs of the Petition and the Application be and are hereby awarded to respondents, save for the 4th Respondent who did not participate in the proceedings. V. The costs in terms of clause [IV] above shall be agreed upon and in default be taxed in the conventional manner. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5926/eng@2026-09-28 10

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47. It is so ordered. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT ISIOLO THIS 28TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026. OGUTTU MBOYA, FCIArb;CPM[MTI-EA] JUDGE In the presence of Court Assistant: Zakayo/Muami Mr. Athman for the Petitioners Mr. Nyaribo for the 1st Respondent Ms. Nkirote Kinuu for the 2nd, 3rd and 5th Respondents N/a for the 4th Respondent https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5926/eng@2026-09-28 11

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