Gideon Mangu alias Gideon Sarry Mangu (suing through his legal attorney Titus Kaatine Mangu) v Kennex Ventures Limited & 3 others

application, dated 23 January 2026 and brought against the 1st defendant, the plaintiff prays for the following reliefs: a) Spent. b) THAT this honourable court be pleased to lift or pierce the corporate veil of KENMEX VENTURES LIMITED for purposes of enforcement of this court's orders. c) THAT upon lifting of the corporate veil, Abdi Abullahi Yussuf, Isack Abdullahi Ragie, Ibrahim Mohamed Abdullahi, Aden Ali lftin and Abbas Aden Ahmed, being the directors of KENMEX VENTURES LIMITED, be and are hereby held personally liable company in honourable for willful court's the acts of the said disobedience of this on 18 orders issued December 2025. d) THAT the said Abdi Abullahi Yussuf, Isack Abdullahi Ragie, Ibrahim Mohamed Abdullahi, Aden Ali Iftin and Abbas Aden Ahmed be and are hereby cited and punished for contempt of court, and are committed to civil jail for six (6) months or as this honourable court may deem fit. L E147 OF 2025 RULING 2

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e) THAT the costs of this application be borne by the respondent. 2. The motion is based on the grounds set out on its face and on Titus Igatine Mangu’s supporting affidavit, sworn on the instant date. In summary, he alleges that the 1st defendant is in contempt of court for repeatedly violating court orders prohibiting any sale, transfer, dealings, subdivision, eviction, or quarrying on land reference no. 26681/18 (suit land) in Athi River. Despite being served with, and fully aware of, the orders issued on 18 December 2025, which were served on the 1st defendant, or having knowledge thereof through its counsel, the 1st defendant is continuing stone harvesting and quarrying on the suit land, causing ongoing, irreparable harm and undermining the court’s authority. The deponent also swore a supplementary affidavit on 2 February 2026 and attached a copy of a court order. 3. The motion is opposed by the replying affidavit of Abdi Abdullahi Yussuf, a director of the 1st defendant, sworn on 28 January 2026. Concisely, the 1st defendant asserts that it has fully complied with the court orders restricting activities on the suit land. It clarifies that its only involvement was leasing machinery to the 2nd defendant under a valid agreement, and that it has not participated in any stone harvesting or quarrying activities. The 1st defendant claims that the plaintiff has no evidence linking it or its directors to any prohibited L E147 OF 2025 RULING 3

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activities, and argues that there is no basis to hold its directors personally liable. It also contends that the plaintiff has not met the burden of proof required for contempt of court, and that any alleged damage is not attributable to it. 4. Upon filing an amended plaint on 3 February 2026, which joined the 2nd defendant to these proceedings, the plaintiff also filed the 2nd application, dated 3 February 2026, in which he seeks the following prayers: - a) Spent. b) Spent. c) THAT pending the hearing and determination of this suit, the injunctive orders issued on 18 December 2026 by this honourable court in this matter as against the 1st defendant, requiring no sales, transfer dealings, charge or subdivisions of the suit land or shall there be any evictions, stone harvesting or quarrying activities over the suit land pending the hearing of the suit, be and are hereby extended to apply and bind the 2nd defendant by themselves, their members, officials, employees, lessees, servants, agents, representatives, assigns or any other persons acting under their authority and the Officer Commanding Athi River Police Station, Machakos L E147 OF 2025 RULING County do assist in the 4

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service and implementation of the court orders herein. d) THAT ELC LAND CIVIL SUIT NO. E147 OF 2025 and ELCOS NO. E001 of 2026, being suits arising from the same subject matter and involving similar parties and issues, be consolidated and heard together. e) THAT ELC LAND CIVIL SUIT NO. E147 OF 2025 be elected as the lead file for purposes of the determination of the consolidated suits. f) THAT the costs of this application be borne by the Respondent. 5. The motion is based on the grounds set out on its face and on Titus Igatine Mangu’s supporting affidavit, sworn on 3 February 2026. Succinctly, he informs the court that the plaintiff filed the suit in December 2025 seeking various remedies, including a permanent injunction, eviction, restoration of the suit land, and compensation. The court issued injunctive orders against the 1st defendant, but the 2nd defendant continued stone harvesting on the property, arguing the orders did not apply to them; hence, the joinder of the 2nd defendant to the suit in February 2026. 6. He claims the ongoing activities are causing substantial and irreparable damage to the land. Meanwhile, the 2nd defendant filed a separate case seeking a declaration of ownership by L E147 OF 2025 RULING 5

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adverse possession. Both cases involve the same land and parties, raising overlapping issues. In the circumstances, an order consolidating the two cases should be made to avoid conflicting judgments and ensure efficient resolution. 7. The 2nd defendant challenges this application via the replying affidavit of Jackson Kasamu Kavisu, deposed on 9 February 20266. Concisely, he asserts that interim court orders issued on 18th December 2025 cannot be applied retroactively to the 2nd defendant, as it was not a party to the proceedings at that time. Doing so would breach principles of natural justice and constitutional rights. He further states that the 2nd defendant had separately filed for a declaration of ownership by adverse possession and sought injunctive protection, with a hearing already scheduled. 8. He maintains the plaintiff is aware of these proceedings, and the instant application is viewed as an attempt to circumvent or undermine the adverse possession claim. He prays that if the cases are consolidated, all relevant applications be heard together, and no interim orders should affect the 2nd defendant’s possession. 9. The last application, dated 23 February 2026, is by the 1st defendant and it prays for the following reliefs: L E147 OF 2025 RULING 6

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a) The suit as against the 1st defendant, KENMEX VENTURES LIMITED, be struck out. b) The name of the 1st defendant be removed from these proceedings. c) Costs of the suit and of this application be awarded to the 1st defendant. 10. The motion is based on the grounds set out on its face and on Abdi Abdullahi Yussuf's supporting affidavit, sworn on 28 January 2026. He states that the 1st defendant is improperly sued since the amended plaint introduces the actual responsible party. He states that no cause of action exists against the 1st defendant, who has no interest in the suit land, and urges the court to remove the 1st defendant from the suit to avoid unnecessary litigation and costs. 11. On service, the plaintiff, through the replying affidavit of Titus Kaatine Mangu sworn on 7 May 2026, briefly alleges that the 1st and 2nd defendants are illegally occupying the suit land and are responsible for ongoing stone excavation, despite claims that the equipment was only leased by the 1 st to the 2nd defendants. The plaintiff asserts that the defendants control and benefit from the operations on the suit land and are using the lease agreement as a front. The supposed lease agreement is described as a tactic to evade responsibility and frustrate justice. L E147 OF 2025 RULING 7

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12. The motion is canvassed by written submissions. The plaintiff’s set of submissions, filed by his law firm on record, Ms. Gladys Gichuki & Associates Advocates, are dated 8 May 2026. As for the defendants, their law firm on record, Ms. OG Makowade Advocates, filed a set of written submissions dated 14 May 2026. Accordingly, having carefully considered the motion, its grounds, the affidavits, the rival submissions, and guided by the law and judicial precedents, the succinct issues for determination are: a) whether a cause of action has been disclosed against the 1st defendant, b) whether the 1st defendant can be found in contempt of court orders, and c) whether court orders can apply retrospectively to non-parties at the time of issuance. 13. Prior to proceeding further, it is pertinent to note that, from the various documents and court appearances, it is manifest that the parties do not oppose the consolidation of this matter and ELCOS No. E001 of 2026. Therefore, the defendants cannot now be permitted to approbate and reprobate on the issue of joinder. Accordingly, the court finds no reason to decline the relief sought and finds the relief for consolidation merited. We now proceed to address the previously identified issues for determination in chronological order. a) Whether a cause of action has been disclosed against the 1st defendant L E147 OF 2025 RULING 8

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14. Regarding this issue, the prevailing legal framework on the drawing and framing of pleadings is found in our Orders 2 Rule 15 (1) (a), 3 Rule 4, and 4 Rule (1) (f) of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), which require a plaintiff in every suit to include his entire claim regarding the cause of action, and if the claim fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action, the court may order the striking out of the pleadings or an amendment. 15. This court’s interpretation of Orders 2, 3, and 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) is that pleadings serve to disclose the mutual disagreements between the parties involved, typically documented through a recital of facts in accordance with legal standards. Significantly, the claimant's statement of claim enhances the cause of action by setting forth pertinent facts, outlining the circumstances of occurrence, including time and place, explicitly revealing the nature of the cause of action, demonstrating the injuries incurred, and informing the court of its jurisdiction as well as the reliefs sought. 16. Regarding the definition of a cause of action, the Court of Appeal decision in Attorney General & Ministry of State for Immigration & Registrar of Persons v Andrew Maina Githinji & Zachary Mugo Kamunjiga [2016] KECA 817 (KLR) states that it is an act by the defendant that gives the plaintiff a cause of complaint. L E147 OF 2025 RULING 9

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17. On preliminary review of the plaintiff’s plaint dated 10 December 2025, the plaintiff alleges that the 1st defendant trespassed on the suit land in November or December 2025, installed stone-harvesting machinery, purportedly carried out quarrying activities, and hurriedly harvested and sold building stones from the suit land. Consequently, the plaintiff sought orders of eviction, a permanent injunction, restoration of the suit land, and damages. These assertions and prayers are also sought in the amended plaint dated 3 February 2026. Following this, this court finds that the cause of action in trespass has been disclosed against the defendants. 18. Notwithstanding, the amended plaint satisfies all legal requirements by disclosing a reasonable cause of action against the defendants concerning the suit land; a significant issue has arisen: the 1st defendant asserts that it is a stranger to the suit land and contends that its only connection is that it is a mere lessor of equipment to the 2nd defendant as lessee. 19. To substantiate these assertions, it has provided this court with a lease agreement for machinery, dated 21 August 2023, between the defendants. The terms of the agreement reveal that, save for leasing the equipment, control of the machinery was in the 2nd defendant's hands, except for maintenance. In other words, the 2nd defendant was solely liable for the alleged trespasses, which may explain why the plaintiff amended his plaint to include the 2nd defendant as the L E147 OF 2025 RULING 10

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appropriate party. In determining joinder of parties to proceedings, the Supreme Court of Uganda case, Departed Asians Property Custodian Board v Jaffer Brothers Ltd [1999] 1 EA 55 (SCU), which was cited with approval in Julius Meme v Republic [2004] KEHC 2623 (KLR), stated the & another guiding principles thus:“In order for a person to be joined on the ground that his presence was necessary for the effective and complete settlement of all questions involved in the suit, it was necessary to show either that the orders sought would legally affect the interests of that person and that it was desirable to have that person joined to avoid a multiplicity of suits, or that the defendant could not effectually set up a desired defence unless that person was joined or an order made that would bind that other person.” 20. In light of the circumstances of this case and pursuant to jurisprudence and Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, this court finds that the 1st defendant is not a necessary party to these proceedings, as the resolution of the issues of trespass and adverse possession can be effectively determined solely between the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant. Any orders arising from the final judgment of these L E147 OF 2025 RULING 11

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claims will exclusively affect these parties and not the 1st defendant. b) Whether the 1st defendant can be found in contempt of court orders 21. Regarding the issue of contempt relief, it must be observed that Section 5 of the Judicature Act does not prescribe a procedure for initiating contempt proceedings. As such, this court must adopt the procedure applicable in the High Court of Justice in England and Wales. These procedures were thoroughly examined in the Court of Appeal decision in Christine Wangari Gachege v Elizabeth Wanjiru Evans & 11 others [2014] eKLR. 22. Of significance, this court’s authority to hear contempt proceedings is derived from Section 29 of the Environment and Land Court Act. Accordingly, it is prudent for this court to stipulate the relevant law. Rule 81.4 of the England and Wales Civil Procedure Rules, which deals with the ingredients of contempt applications, provides thus: “(1) Unless and to the extent that the court directs otherwise, every contempt application must be supported by written evidence given by affidavit or affirmation. L E147 OF 2025 RULING 12

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(2) A contempt application must include statements of all the following, unless (in the case of (b) to (g)) wholly inapplicable— (a) the nature of the alleged contempt (for example, breach of an order or undertaking or contempt in the face of the court); (b) the date and terms of any order allegedly breached or disobeyed; (c) confirmation that any such order was personally served, and the date it was served, unless the court or the parties dispensed with personal service; (d) if the court dispensed with personal service, the terms and date of the court’s order dispensing with personal service; (e) whether a penal notice had been added to the front of any order allegedly breached or disobeyed included a penal notice; (f) the date and terms of any undertaking allegedly breached; (g) confirmation of the claimant’s belief that the person who gave any undertaking understood its terms and the consequences of failure to comply with it; (h) a brief summary of the facts alleged to constitute the contempt, set out numerically in chronological order; L E147 OF 2025 RULING 13

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(i) that the defendant has the right to be legally represented in the contempt proceedings; (j) that the defendant is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal representation and to apply for legal aid which may be available without any means test; (k) that the defendant may be entitled to the services of an interpreter; (l) that the defendant is entitled to a reasonable time to prepare for the hearing; (m )that the defendant is entitled but not obliged to give written and oral evidence in their defence; (n) that the defendant has the right to remain silent and to decline to answer any question the answer to which may incriminate the defendant; (o)that the court may proceed in the defendant’s absence if they do not attend but (whether or not they attend) will only find the defendant in contempt if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the facts constituting contempt and that they do constitute contempt; (p)that if the court is satisfied that the defendant has committed a contempt, the court may punish the defendant by a fine, imprisonment, confiscation of assets or other punishment under the law; L E147 OF 2025 RULING 14

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(q) that if the defendant admits the contempt and wishes to apologise to the court, that is likely to reduce the seriousness of any punishment by the court; (r) that the court’s findings will be provided in writing as soon as practicable after the hearing; and (s) that the court will sit in public, unless and to the extent that the court orders otherwise, and that its findings will be made public.” 23. Concerning jurisprudence, as held in the Supreme Court of Kenya decision of Republic v Ahmad Abolfathi Mohammed & Sayeed Mansour Mousavi [2018] KESC 51 (KLR), contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal and must be exercised with utmost care and only as a last resort; an applicant must establish that the alleged contemnor’s conduct was deliberate, in the sense that he or she willfully acted in a manner that flouted the court order. 24. Further, as stated in the decision of Aaron Gitonga Ringera & 3 Others vs. P. K. Muite & Others, Nairobi HCCC No. 1330 of 1991, which was cited with approval and summarized in KAR v JR [2023] KEHC 18588 (KLR), in contempt proceedings, (a)there must be an existing court order capable of being disobeyed;(b)the alleged contemnor must have been made aware of the existence of the court L E147 OF 2025 RULING 15

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order; and (c)there must be shown to be a breach (disobedience) of the said court order. 25. Usually, as stated in the decision of Mutitika v. Baharini Farm Limited [1985] KLR 229, 234, which was cited with approval in Republic v Ahmad (Supra), the standard of proof in contempt proceedings is higher than the balance of probabilities, approaching but not quite beyond a reasonable doubt. This decision resonates with Rule 81.4(o) of the England and Wales Civil Procedure Rules, which provides that the court will hold a person in contempt only if it is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the facts constituting contempt. Therefore, this is the standard that will be applied to the motion. 26. The first step in contempt proceedings is service. In this case, the consent order of 18 December 2025 was adopted by the court in the presence of the 1st defendant’s counsel, and this court is satisfied with the service in relation to this. Therefore, this court finds that the first and second tests, namely the existence of a court order and the 1st defendant’s knowledge thereof, have been met. 27. The third test pertains to willful disobedience. The 1st defendant, through counsel, Mr. Ochieng, was present when the order was issued and was aware that its equipment was being used on the suit land. Its counsel, on 18 December 2025, L E147 OF 2025 RULING 16

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informed the court that although the 1st defendant lacked a proprietary interest in the suit land, the existing status quo could be preserved. Consequently, the court issued consent orders on 18 December 2026, which were clear and unequivocal, set out in some of the following terms: “1. THAT the status quo currently prevailing on LR NO. 26681/18 Athi River area be maintained pending hearing and determination of the suit. 2. THAT status quo means that there shall be no sale, transfer, dealings, change, subdivision of the property or shall there by any evictions, interference, stone harvesting or quarrying activities on the suit property by the defendant.” 28. In support of his argument that the 1st defendant cannot escape liability even if the 2nd defendant leased its equipment, the plaintiff relied on Miguna Miguna v Fred Matiang’i, Cabinet Secretary Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government & 8 others [2018] KEHC 7683 (KLR), which affirmed that, in appropriate cases, courts can hold a government officer individually liable for contemptuous conduct. The plaintiff also relied on Kariuki & 2 others v Minister for Gender, Sports, Culture & Social Services & 2 others [2004] KEHC 2652 (KLR); however, this court has not taken kindly to his counsel’s reliance on a non-existent portion of this ruling. Further, he L E147 OF 2025 RULING 17

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relied on Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 273; however, this decision was not remitted to the court. 29. Significantly, by virtue of the orders, the 1st defendant was aware that the equipment it had leased to the 2nd defendant was being used on the suit land. The plaintiff’s evidence, consisting of photographs accompanied by a certificate of electronic evidence, demonstrates that an excavator machine was excavating material on the suit land with a lorry partially loaded, as captured on 1st February 2026. The question that then arises is: can the 1st defendant, who has no control over the suit land or its equipment in the suit land, be held liable for the contemptuous act? In addressing this, this court must bear in mind that a high standard of proof applies whenever contempt is sought, because contempt of court is quasicriminal in nature and must be committed willfully. See Republic v Ahmad (Supra). 30. Following the determination of the 1st issue, it is established that the 1st defendant has no proprietary interest in the suit land. At the time of entering into the consent, the 1st defendant’s counsel consistently maintained this position, and the court permitted the defendant to make a formal application to be struck out from these proceedings, which was duly filed. Consequently, the plaintiff was aware of the improper joinder of the 1st defendant at the time of the L E147 OF 2025 RULING 18

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consent, and this position has not subsequently changed. Put differently, and though empathising with the plaintiff, the orders could not have been genuinely complied with by the 1st defendant, as they were directed at a wrong party. In the circumstances, the court finds that the 1st defendant did not willfully disobey the court order. Furthermore, the court finds that the legal threshold for contempt has not been satisfied. It finds the motion in this regard not merited. c) Whether court orders can apply retrospectively to non-parties at the time of issuance. 31. As submitted by the defendants’ counsel, this is a strange prayer and cannot stand because at the time of the issuance of the court orders dated 18 December 2025, the 2nd defendant was not a party to the proceedings and was not heard in relation to the application dated 10 December 2025. Allowing for the retrospective enforcement of court orders would undoubtedly violate the principles of natural justice and the right to a fair hearing guaranteed under Article 50(1) of the Constitution. These principles have been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Gerita Nasipondi Bukunya & 2 others versus Attorney General [2019] eKLR, which stated: - “There must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that L E147 OF 2025 RULING 19

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men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them.” 32. Notwithstanding the court’s determination that the orders of 18 December 2025 cannot be applied retrospectively, and guided by the court’s inherent powers under Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, which authorizes the court to make such orders as may be necessary to serve the ends of justice, the court finds it necessary to issue appropriate orders to preserve the substratum of the suit, given the significant risk that the suit land may suffer. 33. In the end and for the foregoing reasons and findings, this court hereby issues the following final orders: a) THAT the 1st defendant is hereby struck out as a party, with no order as to costs. b) THAT ELC LAND CIVIL SUIT NO. E147 OF 2025 and ELC LOS NO. E001 OF 2026 are hereby consolidated with ELC LAND CIVIL SUIT NO. E147 OF 2025 being elected as the lead file for purposes of the determination of the consolidated suits. L E147 OF 2025 RULING 20

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c) THAT the originating summons in ELC LOS NO. E001 OF 2026 shall be deemed a counterclaim in the lead file of ELC LAND CIVIL SUIT NO. E147 OF 2025. d) THAT the parties are directed to fully comply with Order 11 of the Civil Procedure Rules within 45 days hereof and to file and exchange indexed and paginated trial bundles within 60 days hereof. e) THAT, from the date of this ruling, the status quo prevailing in LR NO. 26681/18 in the Athi River area be maintained pending the hearing and determination of the suit. f) THAT status quo means that there shall be no sale, transfer, dealings, charge, or subdivision of LR NO. 26681/18 in the Athi River, and that there shall be no evictions, interference, stone harvesting, or quarrying activities on LR NO. 26681/18 by the 2nd defendant, by themselves, their members, officials, employees, lessees, servants, agents, representatives, assigns, or any other persons acting under their authority. g) THAT unless with leave of the court, no further applications shall be entertained in this matter. h) THAT a mention date shall be issued for pretrial directions before Mavoko ELC. L E147 OF 2025 RULING 21

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i) THAT this matter is hereby transferred to Mavoko ELC. Orders accordingly. Delivered and Dated at Machakos this 29th day of September, 2026. HON. A. Y. KOROSS JUDGE 29.09.2026 Ruling delivered virtually through Microsoft Teams Video Conferencing Platform; In the presence of; Ms. Kanja Court Assistant. Miss Mutuku holding brief for Miss Gichuki for plaintiffs. Mr. Owade for the defendants. L E147 OF 2025 RULING 22

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