Mary Kathanga Kiugu & 2 others v Lilian Ngugi Ikiugu & another

interrogated. Simply put, the pleadings filed provide the contours /beacon of the dispute. 3. In the case of Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & another v Mule & 3 others [2014] KECA 890 (KLR), the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the place and importance of pleadings in the following manner: “…..it is now a very trite principle of law that parties are bound by their pleadings and that any evidence led by any of the parties which does not support the averments in the pleadings, or put in another way, which is at variance with the averments of the pleadings goes to no issue and must be disregarded.” …………….. 9 “……..In fact, that parties are not allowed to depart from their pleadings is on the authorities basic as this enables parties to prepare their evidence on the issues as joined and avoid any surprises by which no opportunity is given to the other party to meet the new situation.” 4. The determination of the subject appeal shall turn on the issue of the pleading that were filed by the parties; and whether the evidence tendered by the parties, or either party, which does not support the pleadings on record, can be deployed by a court of law in arriving at the decision of the court. 5. Before then, it is apposite to put the facts into context. 6. The respondents herein, who are siblings of the appellants, filed the suit vide plaint dated the 07.03.2024. The respondents contended thus: LR No. Abuthuguchi/Kariene /1896 [the suit property] belonged to M’Iriungi M’Imanyara [deceased]; the suit property had however, been bequeathed to M’Ikiugu M’Iriungi [deceased]; M’Ikiugu M’Iriungi was the father of the disputants; the suit property was the subject of the succession proceedings; the suit property was transmitted to Paskwalina Gaceri Page 2 of 21

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M’Ikiugu; Paskwalina Gaceri thereafter transferred the suit property to the respondents; the respondents are the lawful owners of the suit property; and therefore, the respondents are entitled to exclusive possession and use. 7. Additionally, it was contended that: The appellants herein were allowed to reside on a portion of suit property on temporary basis. The appellants were thereafter to relocate to their respective portions in LR No. Abuthuguchi /U-Kaongo /126; the appellants have declined to relocate; the appellants have remained in occupation of the suit property; the impugned actions by the appellants constitute trespass; and the respondents are entitled to orders of eviction and permanent injunction. 8. The appellants, who were the defendants in the lower court, duly entered appearance and filed a statement of defence. The statement of defence is dated 24.06.2024. The appellants opposed the claims by the respondents. In addition, the appellants averred that the suit property was the subject of the succession proceedings vide Nkubu PM Succession number 199 of 2019. To this end, the appellants posited that same shall canvass a preliminary objection on a point of law. 9. The suit in the lower court was heard and determined vide judgment dated and delivered on the 05.11.2025, whereupon the learned trial magistrate [Hon. S K Ngetich- SPM] found and held that the respondents had established and proved their claim as pertains to the ownership of suit property. The learned trial magistrate invoked the provisions of Sections 24 and 26 of the Land Registration Act, 2012 [2016]; and decreed that the respondents were entitled to exclusive possession, occupation and use of the suit property. Page 3 of 21

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10.Additionally, the learned trial magistrate found and held that though the appellant had tendered evidence touching on inter alia, fraud in the transfer of the suit property; beneficial ownership; and family occupation on the basis of family rights, the appellants had not pleaded the said issues and hence same [the issues raised vide evidence], were not available for determination. The learned trial magistrate emphasized the role of pleadings. 11.Flowing from the foregoing, the learned trial magistrate entered judgment in favour of the respondents and directed that the appellants do vacate the suit property within three months from the date of the judgment. In addition, the learned trial magistrate issued an order of permanent injunction. Costs were also awarded to the respondents. 12.Aggrieved, the appellants have now approached this court vide memorandum of appeal dated the 02.12.2025. 13. The grounds of appeal are: i. That the learned Senior Principal Magistrate erred in law and facts by misinterpreting the law applicable in the matter thus came up with a wrong decision. ii. That the learned trial court erred in law and facts by misconstruing the evidence tendered by the parties and thus came up with the wrong findings. iii. That the learned trial court in law and facts in rejecting the Appellants’ evidence which was well founded on the issue of the customary law trust established by the Appellants Page 4 of 21

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since the parties are siblings and the subject matter is a family land. iv. That the learned trial court erred in law and facts by referring the matter to Probate and Administration court and thus declined to exercise his decision over the issues involved and thus came up with the wrong findings. v. That the learned trial court erred in law and facts by failing to find as a fact that the Respondent’s title was impeached having been obtained through probated and administration proceedings in Nkubu Succession 199 of 2019 were the appellant were beneficiaries and dependents who were left out whereas the parties are siblings and shared one grandfather and the deceased is in the said succession matter. vi. That the learned trial court judgment and decree was against the facts and the law applicable thus wrong in law. 14.The instant appeal came up for directions on the 07.07.2026, whereupon the learned counsel for the appellants intimated to the court that same had filed and served the record of appeal. In addition, counsel posited that the record of appeal was complete. Thereafter, learned counsel for the appellant invited the court to give directions as pertains to the hearing and disposal of the appeal. Moreover, counsel proposed to have the appeal canvassed by way of written submissions. 15.With the concurrence of counsel for the respondents, the court proceeded to and issued directions. The directions were : The appeal shall be heard before one judge sitting at Meru; the appeal shall canvassed by way of written submissions; the appellant shall file and serve written submissions Page 5 of 21

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within 21 days from the date of the directions; the respondents shall file and serve written submissions within 21 days from the date of service; and the appellants shall be at liberty to file and serve rejoinder submission [if any] within 7 days from the date of service. 16.The appellants filed written submissions dated the 18.07.2026. The appellant has raised and canvassed four key issues. The issues are: The learned trial magistrate failed to properly evaluate and analyze the evidence on record; the learned trial magistrate misconstrued and misapplied the law as pertains to customary trust; the learned trial magistrate erred in law in failing to appreciate that fraud was duly established as against the respondents; and the learned trial magistrate erred in referring the dispute back to the succession court oblivious of the fact that the disputes touched on and concerned ownership/claim over land. 17.Learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that the totality of the evidence that was tendered, showed and demonstrated that the appellants are siblings of the respondents. In addition, it was submitted that the appellants were born and had been in occupation of suit property and thus, proper basis had been laid to warrant invocation and application of the doctrine of customary trust. 18.It was the further submission by learned counsel for the appellants that during the trial, evidence was tendered to demonstrate that the transfer of the suit property to and in favor of the respondents was fraught with fraud and thus the respondents’ title to the suit property was impeachable. In Page 6 of 21

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particular, it has been submitted that the learned trial magistrate misapprehended and misapplied the tenor of the provisions of Section 26 of the Land Registration Act, 2012[2016]. 19.Learned counsel for the appellants has thereafter cited and referenced various decisions. The decisions are: Peter Gitonga versus Francis Maingi M’Ikiara [2007] eKLR; Mukangu versus Mbui [2004] 2KLR; Kiebia versus M’Lintari and another [2018] KESC 2022; the Estate of Prisca Ong’ayo Nande [deceased] [2020] KEHC 6553 and the Estate of the late Gedion Manthi Nzioka [deceased] [2015] KEHC, respectively. 20.In a nutshell, learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the appeal before hand is meritorious. The court has been implored to allow the appeal; set aside the impugned judgment; dismiss the respondents’ suit; and to award costs to the appellants. 21.The respondents filed written submissions dated the 17.08.2026 and where in same have highlighted two key issues. The issues are: Whether the respondents hold the suit property in trust for the appellants; and whether the respondents’ title to the suit property is impeachable. 22.Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that customary trust is a question that requires to be proven on the basis of the evidence. However, it has been submitted that the appellants herein did not tender or adduce credible evidence, to demonstrate trust. It has been contended Page 7 of 21

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that absent evidence of trust, the trial court correctly found that the appellants have no rights to the suit property. 23.Further, and in addition, learned counsel for the respondents has also submitted that the respondents herein acquired the suit property lawfully. In particular, it has been submitted that the suit property was transmitted to and in favor of Paskwalina Gaceri M’Ikiugu vide succession in Nkubu PM Succession number 199 of 2019; and thereafter, the said Paskwalina transferred to suit property to the respondents. To this end, it has been posited that the root of the respondents’ title is lawful and valid. 24.Learned counsel for the respondents has thereafter cited various decisions. The decisions include: Kiebia versus M’Lintari [2018] eKLR; Njenga Chogera versus Maria Wanjiru Kimani and 2 others [2005] eKLR; and Munyua Maina versus Hiram Gathiha Maina [2013] eKLR, respectively. 25.Flowing from the foregoing, learned counsel for the respondents has contended that the impugned decision is well grounded; safe; sound; and thus ought to be affirmed. The court has been implored to find and hold that the appeal is bereft of merits. 26.Having reviewed the record of appeal; the pleadings filed by / on behalf of the parties; the evidence tendered [both oral and documentary]; and taking into account the written submissions on behalf of the respective parties, three [3] key issues emerge for determination. The issues are: Whether the plea of fraud, collusion and customary trust were placed Page 8 of 21

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before the trial court for determination or otherwise; whether the respondents proved their claim to the requisite standard or otherwise; and whether the learned trial magistrate misapprehended or misapplied the law as pertains to the customary trust. 27.Before venturing to address the thematic issues that have been isolated in the preceding paragraph, it is important to highlight that what is before me is a first Appeal. By virtue of being a first Appeal, this court is mandated to undertake a fresh and exhaustive scrutiny, review, and analysis of the totality of evidence tendered before the court of first instance. The court is obligated to review the evidence and determine whether the findings and conclusion[s] arrived at by the trial magistrate, accord with the evidence on record and the legal principles. 28.The court is seized of the authority and jurisdiction to arrive at an independent conclusion and to depart from the findings of the trial court. However, it is established that the appellate court can only depart from the factual finding and conclusion of the trial court where it is demonstrated; that the conclusions were based on no evidence; the conclusions are perverse to the evidence on record; the findings are based on misapprehension of the evidence and law; and that there is a demonstrable error of principle, which vitiates the findings of the Trial Court. 29.Suffice it to state that, barring the foregoing, the first appellate court is enjoined to defer to the findings and conclusions of the trial court. Page 9 of 21

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Notably, the jurisdiction of the first appellate court to interfere with the findings/conclusions of the trial court is circumscribed. The jurisdiction is not at large. It is a jurisdiction that cannot be exercised for the mere asking. In addition, it cannot be invoked, or exercised at will. Section 78 of the Civil Procedure Act, Chapter 21 Laws of Kenya, regulates its exercise. 30.The jurisdictional remit of the first appellate court, while undertaking its mandate as pertains to the first Appeal, has been the subject of various court decisions. In the case of Odera t/a AJ Odera & Associates v Machira t/a Machira & Co Advocates [2013] KECA 208 (KLR). The Court of Appeal expounded on the scope of the jurisdiction. The court stated thus: “46. We also wish to be guided by the reasoning of this court in the case of Mwana Sokoni versus Kenya Business Limited (1985) KLR 931 page 934,934 thus:-“Although this court on Appeal will not lightly differ from the Judge at first instance on a finding of fact, it is undeniable that we have the power to examine and reevaluate the evidence on a first Appeal if this should become necessary. As was said by the House of Lords in Sottos Shipping versus Sauviet Sohold, The Times, March 16, 1983.“It is uncertain whether their Lordships should have reached the same conclusion on the evidence, but it is important that, sitting in the appellate court they should be over mindful of the advantages enjoyed of the trial Judge who saw and heard the witnesses and was in a comparably better position than the Court of Appeal to assess the significance of what was said, how it was said, and equally impotent what was not said” Again in Peters versus Sunday Post Page 10 of 21

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Limited (1958) EA424, a decision of the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa, Sir Kenneth O’ Conner, P said at page 429: “It is a strong thing for an appellate court to differ from the finding on a question of fact of the Judge who tried the case and who has had the advantage of seeing and hearing and the witnesses.” 31.Recently, the Court of Appeal revisited the jurisdictional remit in the case of Kenya Urban Roads Authority & another v Belgo Holdings Limited [2025] KECA 764 (KLR). The Court highlighted the principle in the following manner: “We have considered the Appeal, and this being a first Appeal, we are under a duty to subject the entire evidence and the judgment to a fresh and exhaustive examination with a view to reaching our own conclusions in the matter. In carrying out this duty, we have to remember that we had no opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses who testified during the trial and to make an allowance for the same. We have also to remember that it is a big thing to overturn the findings of a trial court which has had the singular opportunity of reaching its conclusions based on a combination of the evidence adduced and observation by the court of the demeanour of witnesses. In a nutshell, a first appellate court must of necessity proceed with caution in deciding whether or not to interfere with the findings of a trial court, but of course, where such findings are not supported by the evidence on record or where they are founded on a misapprehension of the law, the axe must fall on the impugned judgment. This position is anchored in section 78 of the Civil Procedure Act, which requires a first appellate court to Page 11 of 21

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re-evaluate, reassess, and reanalyse the extracts of the record and draw its own conclusions. These provisions have been underscored in numerous decisions of the Superior Courts among them Peters v Sunday Post Limited [1958] EA 424, where the predecessor to this Court expressed itself as follows: “Apart from the classes of case in which the powers of the Court of Appeal are limited to deciding a question of law an appellate court has jurisdiction to review the record of the evidence in order to determine whether the conclusion originally reached upon that evidence should stand; but this jurisdiction has to be exercised with caution. If there is no evidence to support a particular conclusion (and this really is a question of law), the appellate court will not hesitate so to decide. But if the evidence as a whole can reasonably be regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived at on conflicting testimony by a tribunal which saw and heard the witnesses, the appellate court will bear in mind that it has not enjoyed this opportunity and that the view of the trial Judge as to where credibility lies is entitled to great weight. This is not to say that the Judge of first instance can be treated as infallible in determining which side is telling the truth or is refraining from exaggeration. Like other tribunals, he may go wrong on a question of fact, but it is a cogent circumstance that a judge of first instance, when estimating the value of verbal testimony, has the advantage (which is denied to the courts of Appeal) of having the witnesses before him and observing the manner in which their evidence is given…Where a question of fact has been tried by a judge without a jury, and there is no question of misdirection of himself, an appellate court which is disposed to come to a different conclusion on the printed evidence, should not do so unless it is satisfied that any advantage enjoyed by the trial Page 12 of 21

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Judge by reason of having seen and heard the witnesses, could not be sufficient to explain or justify the trial Judge’s conclusion. The appellate court may take the view that, without having seen or heard the witnesses it is not in a position to come to any satisfactory conclusion on the printed evidence. The appellate court, either because the reasons given by the trial Judge are not satisfactory, or because it unmistakably so appears from the evidence, may be satisfied that he has not taken proper advantage of his having seen and heard the witnesses, and the matter will then become at large for the appellate court. It is obvious that the value and importance of having seen and heard the witnesses will vary according to the class of case, and, it may be, the individual case in question…It not infrequently happens that a decision either way may seem equally open, and when this is so, then the decision of the trial Judge who has enjoyed the advantages not available to the appellate court becomes of paramount importance and ought not be disturbed. This is not an abrogation of the powers of a Court of Appeal on questions of fact. The judgment of the trial Judge on the facts may be demonstrated on the printed evidence to be affected by material inconsistencies and inaccuracies, or he may be shown to have failed to appreciate the weight or bearing of circumstances admitted or proved or otherwise to have gone plainly wrong.” [see also the decision in the case of County Government of Bungoma & 2 others v JOO & 2 others [2024] KECA 1377 (KLR) and County Government of Narok v Ntutu & 2 others [2026] KECA 880 (KLR) – [paragraphs 56 and 57 thereof]” Page 13 of 21

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32.Back to the issues for determination. I shall deal with the issues sequentially. The first issue is; whether the plea of fraud, collusion and customary trust were placed before the trial court for determination or otherwise. Learned counsel for the appellants has extensively submitted on the question of fraud, which is contended to have informed the transmission of the suit property, to and in favor of Paskwaline Gaceri Ikiugu; and thereafter the transfer of the suit property to the Respondents. 33.In addition, it has been contended, that evidence abound to show that the suit property initially belonged to M’Irungi M’Imanyara who was the grandfather of the parties and therefore the suit property could not have been transmitted to Paskwalina Gaceri and to the respondents, while excluding the appellants. 34.Furthermore, learned counsel for the appellants has also submitted that what constitute[s] the suit property was family land and that the appellants herein have been and remain in occupation thereof todate. To this end, it has been submitted that the appellants duly proved the claim based on customary trust. Be that as it may, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the trial court misapprehended the evidence on record and thus failed to find in favour to the appellants. 35.Counsel for the appellant has also submitted that the transfer of the suit property vide transmission and thereafter the transfer thereof to and in favour to the respondents, was based on collusion. Simply put, it was contended that Paskwalina Gaceri Ikiugu, colluded with the respondents to defraud/disinherit the appellants. Page 14 of 21

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36.Though learned counsel for the appellants has submitted extensively on the foregoing questions, it is not lost on me that the appellants herein did not implead fraud; collusion; or customary trust, at the foot of the statement of defence dated the 24.06.2024. It was incumbent upon the appellants to plead the assertions raised in the submissions and thereafter, provide particulars thereof. 37. Absent pleadings and the requisite particulars, the appellant herein cannot be heard to complain about the manner the learned trial magistrate disposed of the assertions of fraud/customary trust. 38.The provisions of Order 2 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Rules are instructive. 39. The provisions stipulate thus: “10. Particulars of pleading [Order 2, rule 10] (1) Subject to subrule (2), every pleading shall contain the necessary particulars of any claim, defence or other matter pleaded including, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing— (a) particulars of any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default or undue influence on which the party pleading relies; and (b) where a party pleading alleges any condition of the mind of any person, whether any disorder or disability of mind or any malice, fraudulent intention or other condition of mind except knowledge, particulars of the facts on which the party relies” Page 15 of 21

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40.Regarding the question of fraud, the position of the law is settled. Fraud must be pleaded; particularized; and thereafter, proven to the requisite standard. The position was highlighted in the case of Kiarie & 2 others v Magera [2018] KECA 467 (KLR). 41.The court of appeal stated thus: “25……….The law is clear and we take it from the case of Vijay Morjaria vs Nansingh Madhusingh Darbar & Another [2000] eKLR, where Tunoi, JA. (as he then was) stated as follows:“It is well established that fraud must be specifically pleaded and that particulars of the fraud alleged must be stated on the face of the pleading. The acts alleged to be fraudulent must, of course, be set out, and then it should be stated that these acts were done fraudulently. It is also settled law that fraudulent conduct must be distinctly alleged and distinctly proved, and it is not allowable to leave fraud to be inferred from the facts.” [Emphasis added].The same procedure goes for allegations of misrepresentation and illegality. See Order 2 Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules. 26.As regards the standard of proof, this Court in the case of Kinyanjui Kamau vs George Kamau [2015] eKLR expressed itself as follows;-“…It is trite law that any allegations of fraud must be pleaded and strictly proved. See Ndolo vs Ndolo (2008) 1 KLR (G & F) 742 wherein the Court stated that: “...We start by saying that it was the respondent who was alleging that the will was a forgery and the burden to prove that allegation lay squarely on him. Since the respondent was making a serious charge of forgery or fraud, the standard of proof required of him was obviously higher than that required in ordinary civil cases, namely proof upon a balance of probabilities; but the burden of proof on the respondent was certainly not one beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases...”...In cases where fraud is alleged, it is not enough to simply infer fraud from the facts." 42.Flowing from the foregoing, my answer to issue number is three -fold. Firstly, the appellants herein did not plead and particularized fraud; collusion; and customary trust. In the absence of the pleading, the Page 16 of 21

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learned trial magistrate could not engage with and make determinations, over non-issues. 43.Secondly, the evidence which was tendered by the appellants touching on and concerning the impropriety concerning the transfer of the suit property; and the assertions of customary trust, went towards proving no issue. The said evidence were incapable of being relied upon by the trial court. 44.Thirdly, the submissions by learned counsel for the appellants, which has propagated the foregoing assertions, cannot take the place of the requisite pleadings and the evidence. Submissions do not have probative value. 45.In the case of Moi v Muriithi & another [2014] KECA 642 (KLR), the court of appeal highlighted the place of submissions by stating thus: “Submissions cannot take the place of evidence. The 1 st respondent had failed to prove his claim by evidence. What appeared in submissions could not come to his aid. Such a course only militates against the law and we are unable to countenance it. Submissions are generally parties’ “marketing language”, each side endeavouring to convince the court that its case is the better one. Submissions, we reiterate, do not constitute evidence at all. Indeed there are many cases decided without hearing submissions but based only on evidence presented.” 46.I now wish to turn to the second issue. The issue touches on whether the respondents proved their claim to the requisite standard. The respondent Page 17 of 21

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posited that the suit property was the subject of succession proceeding before Nkubu Principal Magistrate’s court. The respondents contended that the suit property was lawfully transmitted to and in favour of Paskwalina Gaceri Ikiugu. Thereafter, it has been contended that Paskwalina Gaceri Ikiugu, transferred the suit property to and in favour of the respondents. 47.Additionally, it was contended that the succession proceedings and the grant of the letters of the administration, which were issued in favour of Paskwalina Gaceri Ikugu; and which underpin the transmission, have never been challenged or revoked. 48.Owing to the fact that the transmission of the suit property in favour of Paskwalina Gaceri Ikiugu, remains in situ, it was contended that the foundation of the respondents’ title cannot be impugned. Simply put, the respondents assert that same are the lawful owners of the suit property. To this end, the respondents have invoked Sections 24 and 25 of the Land Registration Act, 2012 [2016]. 49.To my mind, the transfer and registration of the suit property in favour of the respondent was/is well documented. The appellants have not placed before the court any credible evidence to warrant the impeachment of the respondents’ title. It is not enough to throw vague assertions of fraud and customary trust. Such assertions must be proven, subject to appropriate pleadings. Page 18 of 21

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50.In a nutshell, I find and hold that the respondents duly proved their entitlement to the suit property. Indeed, for as long as the certificate of title has not been impugned, the respondents’ rights to the suit property, cannot be assailed. I agree with the learned trial magistrate. Moreover, section 24 of the Land Registration Act, 2012, [2016] obligates this court to uphold the rights of the land owner, subject only to the statutory limitations. 51.Next is the issue as the whether the learned trial magistrate misapprehended and misapplied the law as pertains to customary trust. I have already pointed out that the appellants did not implead customary trust at the foot of the statement of defence. Other than the failure to plead customary trust, the appellants also did not tender credible evidence. 52.In the case of Kazungu Fondo Shutu & another v Japhet Noti Charo & another [2021] KECA 592 (KLR), the court of appeal spoke to the circumstances under which the plea of trust, can be implied. 53. The court stated thus: “31. As earlier stated, the existence of a trust is a question of evidence. In the Juletabi case (supra), the court held that the onus lies on the party relying on the existence of a trust to prove it through evidence. That is because: “The law never implies, the Court never presumes a trust, but [only] in case of absolute necessity. The Courts will not imply a trust save in order to give effect to the intentions of the parties. The intention of the parties to create a trust must be clearly determined before a trust will be implied.” Page 19 of 21

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54.Bearing in mind the ratio in the decision [supra], I cannot fault the judgment of the learned trial magistrate. Be that as it may, it is not lost on me that if there were proper pleadings before the trial court, certainly, different parameters would have applied. I repeat, courts of law only act on the basis of pleadings, the evidence and the law. 55.Sadly, sympathy and empathy, do take a back seat. Judges though human, are called upon to determine matters on the basis of the Law. No affection. No favour. No iil-will. And certainly, no Sympathy. Conclusion: 56.The appellants herein were obligated to prove, the existence of errors and misapprehensions on the part of the trial court. It is only the proof of misapprehension; misapplication; or erroneous interpretation of the law, that would warrant the intervention of this court. 57.Where no error; misapprehension or wrong application of the legal principles are proven, the court must defer to the findings of the trial court. In respect of the instant matter, I come to the conclusion that the learned trial magistrate dully appreciated and correctly applied the law. 58.In a nutshell, I find and hold that the impugned judgment is sound. The judgement deserves an affirmation. It is hereby affirmed. Final orders: 59.In the upshot, the final orders that do commend themselves to the court are: i. The Appeal be and is hereby Dismissed. Page 20 of 21

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ii. The Judgment of the trial magistrate dated 05.11.2025 and the consequential decree arising therefrom be and is hereby affirmed. iii. Each party shall bear own costs of the appeal. 60.It is so ordered. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT MERU THIS 24TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026. OGUTTU MBOYA, FCIArb; CPM[MTI-EA] JUDGE In the presence of-: Court Assistant: Zakayo Mr. Gikunda Anampiu for the Appellants Mr. Murithii holding brief for Mr. Frank Gitonga for the Respondents Page 21 of 21

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