Justus Ogutu Arodi v Stephen Kipkoech Bor & 18 others

under Order 40 Rule 1(a) and 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010. The Applicant seeks the following prayers: 1. [spent] 2. An interlocutory injunction restraining the 1st to 18th respondents, whether by themselves, their servants or agents, or otherwise, from entering or remaining on Land Title Numbers: Kisumu/Chemelil/B1.1(Ngeta)/11; Kisumu/Chemelil/B1.1(Ngeta)/20; Kisumu/Chemelil/B1.1(Ngeta)/22 Kisumu/Chemelil/B1.1(Ngeta)/21; and Kisumu/Chemelil/B1.1(Ngeta)/23 (hereinafter referred to as the suit lands) until further order of the Court. 3. An interlocutory injunction restraining the 1st to 18th respondents, whether by themselves, their servants or agents, or otherwise, from cultivating, harvesting, transporting, or in any other way selling or delivering the sugar crop from the suit lands to the 19th Respondent until further orders of the Court are granted. 4. An interlocutory injunction restraining the 19th Respondent, whether acting by itself, its servants or agents, or otherwise, from purchasing or accepting the sugar crop delivered by the 1st to 18th Respondents from the suit lands until further orders of the Court are granted. ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 2

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5. The 19th Respondent be restrained, whether by itself, its servants or agents, or otherwise, from cultivating, harvesting, and transporting the sugar crop from the suit lands until the hearing and determination of this suit. 6. The costs of this application be provided. The Plaintiff/Applicant’s Case [2] The application is based on the grounds set out in the Notice of Motion and further elaborated in a Supporting Affidavit sworn by the Applicant on 24th February 2026. He stated that he is the absolute registered owner of five parcels of land in Chemelil Location, Muhoroni Sub-County, Kisumu County. The gravamen of his complaint is that, since 2011, Respondents 1 to 18, whom he described as neighbours initially occupying adjacent plots, have trespassed onto his properties. The Applicant identified specific Respondents and the particular land parcels they are alleged to occupy. He claims that these individuals have repeatedly and unlawfully cultivated, harvested, and supplied sugarcane to the 19th Respondent, Kibos Sugar & Allied Industries Limited, a licensed milling company. [3] Before 2022, the Applicant informed the Area Chief of Chemelil Location, who then officially requested (Annexure JOA-2) that the 19th Respondent cease accepting the disputed sugarcane. On January 5, 2022, the Applicant directed his lawyers to seek assistance from the Kisumu County Commissioner and the National Land Commission (NLC) to protect their interests and remove the ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 3

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trespassers (JOA-4). The conflict reportedly worsened on May 19, 2025, when the Assistant Chief of Nyangore Sub-Location allegedly witnessed a transaction (JOA5) in which the 6th Respondent sold 1.2 acres of the Applicant’s land to the 17th Respondent. Between December 2025 and January 2026, formal police reports were filed, resulting in OB Numbers 03/16/12/2025 and 04/05/01/2026 (JOA-6 “a” & “b”), but investigations have yet to yield results. [4] Despite these numerous warnings and interventions, the Applicant asserts that the 19th Respondent, acting in flagrant defiance of the law, has continued to deploy its tractors, as corroborated by annexed photographic evidence (JOA-3 “a " to “j "), to transport illicitly harvested sugarcane. [5] The Applicant claims to continue to suffer irreparable loss, estimated at Kshs. 264,000,000 as at February 2026. As a result, the Applicant requests the Court to grant the necessary injunctions and to order the 19th Respondent to disclose its register of out-growers. He avers that this will enable the Court to review the supply agreements, harvested quantities, and financial transactions in detail. The 1st to 18th Respondents’ Replies [6] The 1st to 18th Respondents opposed the application by filing a Replying Affidavit, sworn on 10th March 2026 by the 1st Respondent, Stephen Kipkoech Bor, who deposed that he had the requisite authority and competence to swear the ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 4

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affidavit on behalf of himself and his co-defendants. The 1st Respondent averred that he had peacefully and continuously occupied a 10-acre portion of the disputed land for over 20 years, cultivating sugarcane. He further asserted that the 2nd to 18th Respondents had been in continuous possession of the same land since childhood, and that their parents and grandparents had settled on and used the land long before the Applicant claimed to have acquired ownership. [7] To substantiate the claim of long-standing, generational occupation, the 1st Respondent relied on an introductory letter dated 13th March 2026 from Mr Philip Serem, the Assistant Chief of Nyangore Sub-Location (SKB 1(a)). The letter states that the Respondents are well-known and established residents of Abundas Village within the Chemelil Location. It further attests that the Respondents have lived in the area with their families, deriving their livelihoods from the land, long before the current Assistant Chief assumed office. Photographic exhibits (SKB 1(b) to 1(e)) demonstrate the established, permanent nature of their homesteads and agricultural developments. [8] Further, the 1st Respondent introduced a historical and equitable dimension to the dispute, alleging that the late Hon. William Odongo Omamo ought to have formally granted them their rightful share of the suit land. He contended that the Applicant is well aware of this history. Accordingly, the Respondents argue that granting the sought interlocutory orders would effectively determine the ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 5

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substantive suit at a preliminary stage, resulting in their summary eviction and economic ruin before they have had a fair opportunity to mount a full defence, adduce evidence, and pursue their intended counterclaim. They urge the Court to dismiss the application and direct all parties to comply with the pre-trial procedures under Order 11 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010. The 19th Respondent’s Reply [9] The 19th Respondent opposed the application by Grounds of Opposition dated 29th May 2026. The 19th Respondent argued that the orders sought by the Applicant contravene the statutory operating protocols established for licensed millers. Section 19(1) of the Sugar Act No. 11 of 2024 is cited, which provides that: “A miller shall not purchase sugar crop from, or accept, sugar crop delivered by a grower and a grower shall not sell or deliver sugar crop to a miller, unless the- (a) grower is registered with, and has in force a valid supply agreement with the miller; (b) factory of the miller is situated within the grower’s sugarcane catchment area’’. [10] Additionally, the 19th Respondent cited Section 16 of the Sugar Act General Regulations of 2025, which requires any grower intending to deliver sugarcane to execute a formalised agreement (Form 25) with the miller at least three months ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 6

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before the harvest. The 19th Respondent contends that the Applicant has failed to discharge the burden of proving, through technical or documentary evidence, that the 1st to 18th Respondents are cultivating sugarcane within the boundaries of the Applicant's registered parcels, or that the 19th Respondent is engaged in any commercial undertaking involving cane harvested from those specific geolocations. The 19th Respondent characterises the application as entirely founded on suspicions and surmises, arguing that such speculative grounds cannot form the legal basis for granting equitable injunctive orders that would inherently infringe its operational and property rights enshrined under Article 40 of the Constitution. Parties’ Submissions The Applicant’s Submissions [11] Ng’ani & Oluoch Advocates filed written submissions dated 28th May 2026 and further submissions dated 30th June 2026. They stated that the Applicant owns the suit properties, having purchased them at a public auction from the Agricultural Finance Corporation. The counsel argued that the 1st to 18th Defendants, former employees of the late Hon. William Odongo Omamo and original settlers on nearby plots (Nos. 6, 7, 23, 24 “A’’, 24 “B’’, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31), encroached unlawfully onto the properties without the owner’s permission. The ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 7

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Applicant’s counsel averred that the 19th Respondent has been illegally purchasing sugarcane from the alleged trespassers in contravention of the Sugar Act and its regulations. [12] To support the claim to an indefeasible right to property and to the illegality of the Respondents’ actions, the Applicant relied on Article 40 of the Constitution of Kenya, which provides that: ‘’1. Subject to Article 65, every person has the right, either individually or in association with others, to acquire and own property- (a) Of any description, and (b) In any part of Kenya. 2. Parliament shall not enact a law that permits of the state or any person(a) To arbitrary deprive a person of property of any description or any interest in or right over, any property of any description.’’ [13] Counsel further emphasised the criminal nature of the encroachment by citing Section 3 of the Trespass Act, which provides: ‘’Any person without reasonable excuse enters, or remains upon, or erects any structure on, or cultivates or, grazes stock or permits stock to be on private land without the consent of the occupier thereof shall be guilty of offence.’’ ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 8

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[14] In terms of procedure, the Applicant’s counsel raised several points of law in response to the Respondents’ responses. Counsel contended that the 1st to 18th Defendants failed to file their written submissions within the 14-day window set by the Court on 6th May 2026, and therefore prayed that the application dated 24th February 2026 be heard unopposed. [15] Similarly, the Applicant’s counsel asserted that the 19th Respondent filed its Grounds of Opposition out of time on 29th May 2026, without seeking the Court’s leave, and prayed that those grounds be struck out. [16] Further, the Applicant challenged the Replying Affidavit sworn by the 1st Respondent on behalf of the 2nd to 18th Respondents, arguing that it is fatally defective for lack of written authority, contrary to Order 1 Rule 13 (1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules. On this point, counsel relied on Research International East Africa Ltd vs Julius Arisi & 13 others (Civil Appeal No. 231 of 2003) (UR), as cited in James Kiprono Kimeto & others v the Chief Magistrate, Eldoret & others, Eldoret HCC No. 141 of 2006, where the Court held that: ‘’Rather, the suit is filed by all the 214 persons through their advocate as authorized by Order 1 Rule 12(1) of the Civil Procedures Rules. In that case, each of the plaintiffs is personally responsible for the conduct of his own suit. In our view, none of the 214 plaintiffs has any right to take any step in the suit on behalf of any other plaintiff - without an express ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 9

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authority in writing. Thus, Julius Arisi cannot take any step in the suit on behalf of all the other plaintiffs including filing a verifying affidavit unless he has been expressly authorized by any of the plaintiffs to so act as provided by Order 1 Rule 12(1) Of Civil Procedures.’’ The 1st to 18th Respondents’ Submissions [17] Arap Mitei & Company Advocates filed written submissions dated 2nd July 2026. They argued that the Applicant failed to satisfy the burden of proof under Sections 107, 108, and 109 of the Evidence Act. They stated that they have been lawful, long-term residents of Nyangore Sub-Location, supported by an introductory letter from the Assistant Chief dated March 13, 2026, and by photographs of their homesteads and farms. They further argued that the Applicant did not produce a survey report, boundary verification, mutation forms, or expert evidence to prove that their occupation falls within the boundaries of the Applicant’s registered land. [18] Citing Munyu Maina v Hiram Gathiha Maina [2013] eKLR, they argued that when the root of title is challenged, a registered owner must prove the legality of their land acquisition beyond the title document, particularly against long-standing occupants. Relying on Park Towers Limited v John Mithamo Njika & 7 Others ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 10

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[2014] eKLR, they added that a trespass claimant must prove possession and that the Respondents’ occupation is unlawful. [19] Counsel also contested the Applicant’s claims, arguing that the mesne profits claim of Kshs. 264 million constitutes special damages, which require strict proof, such as a valuation or financial records, citing Attorney General v Halal Meat Products Ltd [2016] eKLR. Additionally, they claimed the Applicant failed to produce cane supply contracts or weighbridge tickets linking any Respondent to transactions with the 19th Respondent. The 19th Respondent’s Submissions [20] Richard B. O. Onsongo, Advocate for the 19th Respondent, filed written submissions dated 29th May 2026. Counsel opposed the application on the ground that it contravenes Section 19 of the Sugar Act No. 11 of 2014 and Rule 16 of the Sugar Act General Regulations 2025. Counsel argued that the Applicant failed to produce essential technical evidence, such as a ground report from a licensed surveyor, NTSA records confirming tractor ownership, or a certificate of electronic evidence from a Scenes of Crime Support Officer, to directly link the sugarcane supply to his specific land parcels. [21] In invoking equitable defences, counsel argued that the Applicant’s action is caught by the doctrine of laches, noting that the suit was filed in 2026, approximately five and a half years after the alleged invasion on 5th January 2022. ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 11

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In support, counsel cited Edward Akong’o Oyugi & 2 others v Attorney General [2019] eKLR: “The doctrine of laches is a legal defense that may be claimed in a civil matter, which asserts that there has been an unreasonable delay in pursuing the claim (filing the lawsuit), which has prejudiced the defendant... Laches is associated with the maxim of equity. 'Equity aids the vigilant, not the sleeping ones' that is, those who sleep on their rights).’’ [22] Ultimately, counsel contended that the Applicant has not met the threshold for an injunction, relying on the settled principles in Giella v Cassman Brown & Company Limited [1973] E.A. 358: “First, an applicant must show a prima facie case with a probability of success. Secondly, an interlocutory injunction will not normally be granted unless the applicant might otherwise suffer irreparable injury, which would not adequately be compensated by an award of damages. Thirdly, if the court is in doubt, it will decide an application on the balance of convenience’’. [23] Counsel further quoted Nguruman Limited Vs Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] KECA 606 (KLR) regarding the establishment of a prima facie case: ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 12

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“The party on whom the burden of proving a prima facie case lies must show a clear and unmistakable right to be protected which is directly threatened by an act sought to be restrained, the invasion of the right has to be material and substantive, and there must be an urgent necessity to prevent the irreparable damage that may result from the invasion’’ [24] Finally, relying on Pius Kipchirchir Kogo v Frank Kimeli Tenai [2018], the counsel argued that the balance of convenience requires the injunction to be denied, as the Applicant’s alleged damage is quantifiable and compensable by damages, whereas granting the injunction would result in mature sugarcane going to waste. Analysis and Determination [25] The Court has evaluated the application, the affidavits, the documentary exhibits appended thereto, and the competing legal arguments advanced by counsel for the respective parties. The only issue for determination is whether the Applicant has discharged the burden of proof required to trigger the Court’s equitable jurisdiction to grant temporary injunctive relief. Before delving into the substantive merits of the interlocutory injunction, the Court is compelled to resolve several procedural objections raised by the Applicant. Resolution of Procedural/Technical Objections ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 13

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[26] The Applicant has raised procedural objections seeking to strike out the Respondents’ responses. First, the Applicant contended that the 1st to 18th Respondents failed to file their written submissions within the 14-day window set by the Court on 6th May 2026. Further, the Applicant asserted that the 19th Respondent filed its Grounds of Opposition out of time on 29th May 2026, without seeking the requisite prior leave of the Court to extend the time. Relying on these points, the Applicant prayed that the application dated 24th February 2026 be heard and determined as unopposed. [27] The Court’s approach to procedural technicalities is guided by the overarching constitutional requirements set out in Article 159(2)(d) of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, which mandates that justice be administered without undue regard for procedural technicalities. This constitutional imperative reinforces Sections 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act (Cap. 21), which codify the Oxygen Principles and empower the Court to facilitate the just, expeditious, proportionate, and affordable resolution of civil disputes. [28] While the Court discourages lethargy and the deliberate flouting of its casemanagement timelines, striking out pleadings at an interlocutory stage is an exceptional power that must be exercised with extreme circumspection, depending on the circumstances of each case. In the current application, the issues canvassed in the impugned responses raise fundamental questions of law and fact, including ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 14

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the potential displacement of long-standing residents and the operation of a commercial enterprise. Striking out these responses for missed deadlines would amount to condemning the Respondents unheard, thereby violating the fundamental tenets of natural justice. Consequently, relying on the Court’s inherent powers under Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, the Court exercises its discretion to enlarge the time retrospectively, deeming the late submissions and the 19th Respondent’s Grounds of Opposition duly filed and formally admitted to the record for consideration. [29] The Applicant’s second objection concerns the 1st Respondent’s legal capacity to swear the Replying Affidavit on behalf of the 2nd to 18th Respondents. The Applicant asserts that the Replying Affidavit, sworn on 10th March 2026, is fatally defective for lack of any written authority from the co-defendants, thereby contravening Order 1 Rule 13 (1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010. Order 1 Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 provides as follows: “(1) Where there are more plaintiffs than one, any one or more of them may be authorized by any other of them to appear, plead or act for such other in any proceeding, and in like manner, where there are more defendants than one, any one or more of them may be authorized by any other of them to appear, plead or act for such other in any proceeding. ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 15

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(2) The authority shall be in writing signed by the party giving it and shall be filed in the case.’’ [30] The jurisprudence on representative suits and the requirement for written authority is unequivocal. In Kahindi Katana Mwango & Another v Cannon Assurance (K) Ltd (2013) eKLR, and subsequently in Shadrack Mwamuu Nzioka & 2 others v Tropical Blooms Limited [2020] eKLR, the courts have consistently held that a party instituting or defending a suit in a representative capacity must exhibit written authority, signed by the specific persons they purport to represent, and file it with the pleadings. [31] Upon reviewing the electronic court file in the Case Tracking System (CTS), the Court confirms that the 1st Respondent neither annexed nor subsequently filed any written document signed by the 2nd to 18th Respondents authorising him to swear the Replying Affidavit or to conduct the defence on their behalf. The critical legal question that follows is: does this procedural omission render the entire Replying Affidavit fatally defective, warranting its expungement from the record? [32] The Court answers this in the negative. While the 1st Respondent lacks the requisite legal authority to act as a representative of his seventeen co-defendants, the affidavit remains valid and competent insofar as it relates to his own defence to the application. Accordingly, the Court will treat the Replying Affidavit sworn on 10th March 2026 as reflecting the factual averments and the individual defence of ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 16

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the 1st Respondent. The 2nd to 18th Respondents are, strictly speaking, deemed not to have expressly authorised the 1st Respondent to swear replying affidavits to this specific application, though they remain parties to the main suit. This omission cannot therefore result in the striking out of the affidavit in its entirety, but rather curtails its evidentiary scope as regards the other respondents. Having resolved the preliminary objections, the Court now turns to whether the threshold for granting interlocutory injunctions is met. The Legal Threshold for Interlocutory Injunctions [33] An interlocutory injunction is a discretionary equitable remedy designed to protect an applicant's rights pending the final determination of a suit. Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd (supra) sets out the parameters governing this judicial discretion. The tripartite test formulated by Spry, VP, requires an applicant to demonstrate, in sequence: 1. That they have established a prima facie case with a probability of success. 2. That an interlocutory injunction is necessary because they might otherwise suffer irreparable injury, which would not adequately be compensated by an award of damages. 3. If the Court remains in doubt regarding the first two elements, the application will be decided on a balance of convenience. ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 17

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These three conditions pose distinct hurdles that an applicant must overcome. As noted in Kenya Commercial Finance Co. Ltd v Afraha Education Society [2001] 1 EA 86, the conditions are considered in sequence; failure to surmount the first hurdle generally negates the need to consider the subsequent ones, preventing an applicant from ‘’leap-frogging’’ directly to the balance of convenience. The Court in this case held that: “The conditions stated in Giella’s case are sequential so that the second condition can only be addressed if the first one is satisfied, and when the court is in doubt then the third condition can be addressed.” [34] The first pillar of the Giella test requires establishing a prima facie case with a probability of success. A prima facie case was defined by the Court of Appeal in Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others [2003] KLR 125 as: “A case in which on the material presented to the Court a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter’’. [35] In the present matter, the Applicant asserts infringement of his proprietary rights. He relies on the sanctity of private property under Article 40 of the Constitution and has produced copies of certificates of title for land parcels 11, 20, 21, 22, and 23. Under Section 26 of the Land Registration Act (No. 3 of 2012), a ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 18

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certificate of title issued by the Registrar upon registration is recognised as prima facie evidence that the person named therein is the absolute and indefeasible owner of the land, subject only to encumbrances, overriding interests, or evidence that the title was acquired through fraud, misrepresentation, or an illegal or unprocedural scheme. [36] Conversely, the 1st Respondent has tabled evidence, including a letter from the area Assistant Chief, suggesting that he and his co-defendants have been in occupation of the land for over two decades, predating the Applicant’s purported acquisition of the properties. They claim an equitable interest arising from a historical unformalised settlement by the late Hon. William Odongo Omamo. Where ownership is in dispute, the Court cannot conclusively uphold the absolute sanctity of the registered title on affidavit evidence alone. [37] Regarding the 19th Respondent, the Applicant alleges that the miller aided and abetted trespass by purchasing illicitly harvested cane. In rebuttal, the 19th Respondent invokes a statutory defence under the newly operationalised Sugar Act No. 11 of 2024. The Act, enacted to regulate the sugar industry, manages the value chain through designated geographical catchment areas (established in the First Schedule) and mandatory licensing. [38] Indeed, Section 19 of the Sugar Act explicitly restricts millers from purchasing cane outside their designated zones and without a valid Form 25 supply ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 19

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agreement. The Applicant has not provided any evidence, such as weighbridge tickets, supply contracts, or financial ledgers, that directly implicates the 19th Respondent in transactions involving the disputed parcels. The photographic evidence of tractors operating on roads (Annexures JOA-3) is entirely circumstantial and, without a hearing on the merits, is insufficient to establish clear liability on the part of the 19th Respondent at this preliminary stage. [39] The Court finds that while the Applicant holds registered titles, thereby presenting an arguable case, the contested facts regarding historical occupation and the lack of direct documentary linkage to the 19th Respondent cast a significant shadow over the probability of success. The Applicant has demonstrated a case that requires the Respondents to answer, but the Court harbours significant reservations as to whether it constitutes a strong prima facie case capable of justifying summary, far-reaching injunctive relief before trial. [40] Assuming, solely for academic discussion, that the Applicant has indisputably cleared the first hurdle, the Court must then consider the second requirement: irreparable injury. As the Court of Appeal explained in Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, irreparable injury refers to harm that is real, significant, and provable, harm for which monetary compensation, no matter how much, would never suffice as a remedy. An injury is considered irreparable when there is no standard by which its extent can be accurately measured. ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 20

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[41] The Applicant’s own pleadings undermine this requirement. In paragraph 21 of the Supporting Affidavit, the Applicant quantified his financial loss, as follows: “As at February 2026, I have incurred a loss of Kshs 264 million in lost earnings. The 1st to 18th respondents have supplied and the 19th respondent has purchased sugarcane worth Kshs 264 million since the trespass’’. It is a trite principle of equity that where the injury complained of is quantifiable, and remediable by an award of damages, an interlocutory injunction ought not to issue. The Applicant’s claim is fundamentally for special damages, mesne profits, and loss of commercial earnings. If the Applicant ultimately succeeds at trial and proves pecuniary loss, this Court has the requisite jurisdiction to order compensation in special damages and mesne profits against all the Respondents. Consequently, the Applicant has failed to satisfy the second, critical condition of the Giella test. [42] Even if the Court were in doubt about the first two conditions, the law requires the Court to decide the application on a balance of convenience. This principle requires the Court to compare the mischief, prejudice, or inconvenience that would result from granting the injunction with that resulting from withholding it. As articulated in Amir Suleiman v Amboseli Resort Limited [2004] eKLR: “The court in responding to prayers for interlocutory injunctive reliefs should always opt for the lower rather than the higher risk of injustice.’’ ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 21

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[43] The reliefs sought by the Applicant are expansive and may have far-reaching implications. Restraining the 1st to 18th Respondents from “entering, remaining upon, cultivating or harvesting’’ effectively amounts to an eviction order and an order for the destruction of mature crops at an interlocutory stage. The Respondents assert that they have occupied these parcels for decades. Granting an injunction that could displace the Respondents, based on contested affidavit evidence, would cause grave prejudice and likely trigger a breach of the peace. An interlocutory injunction should preserve the subject matter of the suit, not be used as an instrument of summary eviction without the benefit of a full trial. [44] However, the Court cannot abandon its duty to preserve the substratum of the suit. The Applicant, as the registered proprietor, has a legitimate apprehension of continued commercial exploitation of the land and the potential permanent alienation of portions thereof (as evidenced by the purported, Chief-witnessed sale agreement between the 6th and 17th Respondents in Annexure JOA-5). The least risk of injustice lies in preserving the status quo. The status quo means freezing the current state of affairs as it exists on the ground. The Respondents currently in physical occupation shall not be summarily evicted, nor shall their existing mature sugarcane crops be destroyed. However, to protect the Applicant’s proprietary interests, the Respondents must be restrained from expanding their area of ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 22

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occupation, erecting any new permanent structures, or attempting to alienate, sell, or subdivide any portion of the disputed land. [45] Regarding the 19th Respondent, the Court notes the compliance requirements under the Sugar Act No. 11 of 2024. The 19th Respondent is obliged to accept cane only from registered out-growers within its designated catchment area under Form 25 supply agreements. The Court cautions the 19th Respondent that any commercial engagement involving sugarcane harvested from the disputed parcels remains subject to the final determination of ownership in this suit, and that any such engagement proceeds at the 19th Respondent’s own commercial peril. [46] The Applicant’s prayer to compel the 19th Respondent to produce its outgrower register and financial ledgers is an evidentiary matter. It is better suited to the discovery, interrogatories, and case-conferencing stages under Order 11 of the Civil Procedure Rules and is therefore premature as an interlocutory prayer in the motion. Final Orders [47] In the final analysis, having carefully balanced the competing rights and interests of the parties, the Court finds that the Notice of Motion dated 24th February 2026 succeeds only in part and issues the following orders: ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 23

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1. The Applicant’s prayer for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the 1st to 18th Respondents from entering or remaining on the suit properties (Kisumu/Chemelil/Chemelil/Bl.1(Ngeta)/11, 20, 21, 22, and 23) is hereby declined. 2. An order for the maintenance of the status quo is hereby issued. For the avoidance of doubt, the status quo requires that the 1st to 18th Respondents, whether by themselves, their agents, or their servants, be restrained from alienating the suit properties pending the hearing and determination of the main suit. 3. The prayer for an injunction against the 19th Respondent is declined. The 19th Respondent is, however, directed to strictly comply with the regulatory provisions of the Sugar Act No. 11 of 2024 and the Sugar Act General Regulations of 2025 relating to sugarcane procurement, and shall not enter into any new Form 25 supply agreements relating to the disputed parcels until ownership is resolved by this Court. 4. The prayer compelling the 19th Respondent to produce its register of outgrowers and related financial documents is deferred to the pre-trial directions and discovery stage under Order 11 of the Civil Procedure Rules. 5. The costs of this application shall abide the final outcome of the main suit. Dated, signed, and delivered virtually at Kisumu this 24th day of September 2026. ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 24

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C.C. Oluoch Judge In the presence of: Mr Oluoch for the Plaintiff/Applicant Mr Kipyegon for the 1st to 18th Defendants/Respondents Mr Onsongo for the 19th Defendant/Respondent Faith Court Assistant ELCLC E010 OF 2026-RULING Page 25

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