Adolph-Laroche & another v Boru (Sued as the Representative of Dima Boru Jarso)

ii. That there be an order that the applicants/plainti be registered as the sole proprietor of the whole land parcel No. Marsabit/Jirme/581 in place of the respondent. iii. That the deputy registrar and or executive ocer of the honorable court be directed and or entered to execute transfer instruments and all other attendant documents to facilitate the transfer and registration of the suitland i.e Marsabit/Jirme/581, in favour of the applicants/ plaintis in event of default by the respondent. iv. That there be an order of permanent injunction, restraining the defendant by himself, agents, servants, brothers and sisters or employees from interfering with the plaintis peaceful possession and occupation of land parcel No. Marsabit/Jirme/581 in any manner whatsoever and or however. v. That costs of this originating summons be borne by the defendant. 4. The Originating summons is premised on the grounds, which have been enumerated in the body thereof. The grounds are: The Plaintis entered into a land sale agreement with one Dima Boru Jarso [now deceased] ; the sale agreement was in respect of LR No. Marsabit/Jirme/581[herein after referred to as the suit property]; the suit property belonged to the vendor; the suit property was indicated to measure 8 acres at the time of the sale; the vendor was duly paid and acknowledged the purchase price; the vendor allowed/authorized the plaintis to take possession; the plaintis indeed took possession in the year 2003; and the plaintis have remained in occupation to date. 5. In addition, it has been posited thus: The vendor endeavored to transfer the suit property to the plaintis; the endeavor to transfer the suit property did not materialize; the suit property remains registered in the name of the vendor [now deceased]; nevertheless, the plaintis have remained in possession; the possession by the plaintis has been open, continuous, and uninterrupted; and the possession has been adverse to the rights of the Vendor, or the Estate of the Vendor. 6. The originating summons is supported by the adavit of the 1st plainti sworn on the 28.01.2025 and to which the deponent has annexed assorted documents. The documents include: Copy of the land sale agreement; copy of the adavit of Dima Boru Jarso [ vendor] sworn on the 05.12.2017; copy of the application for land control board consent; copy of the duly executed transfer instrument; copy of the title deed; copy of certicate of ocial search, assorted photographs depicting occupation and use of the suit property; and copy of the caution that was registered against the title by the plaintis. 7. Moreover, the deponent of the supporting adavit has reiterated the grounds contained in the body of the summons. In particular, the deponent has asserted that same has been in occupation/possession of the suit property since 2003. Besides, it has been posited that the occupation has never been interrupted save that the defendant herein purported to issue an eviction notice dated the 28.05.2024. 8. The defendant duly entered appearance and led a replying adavit sworn on the 01.04.2025 and wherein same has denied the claims by the plaintis. In addition, the defendant has asserted thus: The deceased [Dima Boru Jarso] was his father; the deceased never sold the suit property; on the contrary, the deceased only allowed the plaintis to use the suit property; the plaintis entry upon the suit property is predicated on permission; the plaintis have not acquired any lawful right to the suit property; and the plaintis’ claim is devoid of merits. 9. The originating summons came up for directions in line with Order 37 Rules, 16, 17 and 19 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010. The Advocate[s] for the parties agreed to have the summons canvassed by way of oral evidence. To this end, the court proceeded to and issued directions pertaining to the hearing of the summons. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5742/eng@2026-09-17 2

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10. The directions issued were: The originating summons and the supporting adavit were deemed as the plaint; the replying adavit by the defendant was deemed as the statement of defence; the plaintis were to le and serve list and bundle of documents, list of witness and witness statements, within 14 days from the date of the directions; the defendant was at liberty to le and serve list and bundle of documents, list of witnesses, and witness statements within 14 days from the date of service. 11. The parties duly complied and thereafter the matter proceeded for hearing. The plaintis’ case is premised on the evidence of two witnesses. The witnesses are David Harold Adolph – Laroche and Betty Laroche. The witnesses testied as PW1 and PW2, respectively. 12. It was the testimony of PW1 that same is a citizen of the United States of America [USA]. In addition, the witness averred that the 2nd Plainti is also a citizen of the USA. Further, the witness posited that the 2nd plainti is his wife /spouse. 13. It was the further testimony of the witness that same is conversant with the facts of the case. Moreover, the witness posited that same has since sworn an adavit dated the 28.01.2025; recorded a witness statement dated 28.01.2025; sworn further adavit dated 20.06.2025; and which the witness sought to adopt as his evidence in chief. The documents were thereafter adopted and constituted as the evidence in chief of the witness. 14. Additionally, the witness referenced the list and bundle of documents dated 28.03.2025, containing 10 documents. The witness sought to tender and produce the documents as exhibits. In the absence of any objection, the documents were produced and marked as exhibits P1 – P10, respectively. 15. On the other hand, the witness also adverted to the originating summons dated the 28.01.2025 and which summons, the witness sough to adopt and rely on. Moreover, the witness invited the court to grant the reliefs contained thereunder. 16. On cross examination by learned counsel for the defendant, the witness averred that same is a citizen of the United States of America. In addition, the witness averred that the 2nd plainti and himself entered into a sale agreement with Dima Boru Jarso [now deceased]. Moreover, the witness asserted that the agreement was entered in the year 1999 and that the same was duly reduced into writing. 17. Additionally, the witness averred that by the time same entered into the sale agreement, the land was registered in the name of the vendor. The witness asserted that the map and the survey documents contained the name of the vendor. However, the witness conceded that same has not tendered the map and the survey documents before the court. 18. It was the further testimony of the witness that the sale agreement indicated that the land measures 8 acres. Besides, the witness posited that same entered into the land in the year, 2003 and erected a structure thereon. In addition, the witness claried that he entered and took possession of the land on the basis of the sale agreement. 19. While still under cross examination, the witness averred that though the land was sold to the 2nd plainti and himself in 1999, the title of the suit property was issued in the name of the vendor. The witness added that he discovered that the title had been issued in the name of the vendor in the year 2015. In this regard, the witness averred that same was constrained to and lodged a caution. 20. Regarding payment of the purchase price, the witness averred that he paid the sum of Kshs. 70,000 only. Moreover, the witness added that the purchase price was indicated in the sale agreement. It was the further testimony of the witness that the sale agreement was reduced into writing; signed by the https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5742/eng@2026-09-17 3

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parties; and witnessed. The witness added that same have been in continuous occupation of the suit property. 21. The second witness who testied on behalf of the plainti was Betty Jean Laroche. The witness testied as PW2. The witness intimated that same is equally conversant with the facts of the matter. In addition, the witness asserted that she has recorded a witness statement dated the 03.10.2025 and which statement, the witness sought to adopt and rely on. Thereafter, the witness statement was duly adopted and constituted as the evidence in chief of the witness. 22. On cross examination by learned counsel for the defendant, the witness averred that same is familiar with the sale agreement that was entered into between them [plaintis] and Dima Boru Jarso. Moreover, the witness testied that same entered into and took possession of the suit property in the year 2003. The witness claried that the position was taken on the basis of the sale agreement. 23. With the foregoing testimony, the plaintis’ case was closed. 24. The defendant’s case is anchored on the evidence of two witnesses. The witnesses are: Mohammed Dima and Tadicha Turuba. The witnesses testied as DW1 and DW2, respectively. 25. It was the testimony of DW1 [Mohammed Dima] that same is conversant with the facts of this case. In addition, the witness posited that same recorded a replying adavit sworn on the 01.04.2025. The witness thereafter sought to adopt and rely on the replying adavit as his evidence in chief. Suce it to state that the replying adavit, was duly adopted and constituted as the evidence in chief. 26. The witness further referenced the list and the bundle of documents dated the 01.04.2025, containing 12 documents. Thereafter, the witness sought to produce the documents as exhibits before the court. In the absence of any objection, the documents were duly adopted and marked as exhibits D1 to D12, respectively. 27. On cross examination by learned counsel for the plaintis, the witness averred that Dima Boru Jarso [now deceased] was his father. However, the witness posited that same was not aware whether his father sold the suit property. In particular, the witness denied the sale. 28. It was the further testimony of the witness that the rst time he came across the sale agreement was in the year 2014. The witness stated that he subsequently lodged a complaint with the police to undertake investigations pertaining to the validity of the sale agreement. To this end, the witness averred that same was issued with an OB number. The witness claried that the number was 45/28/02/2017. 29. While still under cross examination, the witness testied that same has indicated that the plainti sought permission to graze their camels on a portion of the suit property. The witness added that the permission was granted by his father in 1999. It was the further testimony of the witness, that the plaintis are still on the land to date. 30. The witness conceded that the plaintis have constructed structures on the suit property. The witness also admitted that the plaintis are residing on the suit property. 31. It was the further testimony of the witness that the land in question measures 5 acres and not 8 acres. Nevertheless, the witness posited that his family do not stay on the land. Moreover, the witness rearmed the position that it is the plaintis who are in occupation of the land. 32. The second witness who testied on behalf of the defendant was Tadicha Turuba. Same testied as DW2. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5742/eng@2026-09-17 4

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33. It was the testimony of the witness [DW2] that same is familiar with facts of this case. In addition, the witness averred that same has since recorded and led a witness statement. The witness referenced the statement dated [sic] the 05.09.2024. Thereafter, the witness statement was adopted and constituted as the evidence in chief of the witness. 34. On cross examination, the witness averred that he has not been a witness to any sale agreement. Furthermore, the witness averred that he did not witness the sale agreement between the plaintis and Dima Boru Jarso. 35. While under further cross examination, the witness averred that he cannot remember whether he was a witness to the sale agreement. However, the witness conrmed that his identity card number, namely; ID NO. 0022062, is reected in the sale agreement. The witness also admitted that his thumb print is also shown on the sale agreement. 36. Nevertheless, it was the testimony of the witness that even though his identity card number is shown on the sale agreement, same has never taken any steps, to challenge the inclusion and validity of his ID Card in the sale agreement. 37. With the foregoing testimony, the defendant’s case was closed. 38. Upon the conclusion of the hearing, the advocate for the parties sought time to le and exchange their written submissions. To this end, the court proceeded to and issued directions. The directions were: The Plaintis’ shall le and serve their written submissions within 21 days from the date of the directions; the defendants shall le and serve written submissions within 21 days from the date of service; and the plainti’s shall be at liberty to le and serve rejoinder submissions [if any] within 7 days from the date of service. 39. The plainti led written submissions dated [undated] and wherein same has highlighted two key issues. The issues are: Whether the plainti’s have proved the essentials of adverse possession; and whether the court can order the registration of freehold interests pursuant to Article 65 [1] of the Constitution, 2010. 40. To buttress the submissions, learned counsel for the plaintis have cited and referenced various decisions. The decisions cited are: Kuria Kiarie and 2 others versus Sammy Magera [2018] eKLR; Gabriel Mbui versus Mukindia Maranya [1993] eKLR, Hosea and others versus Njiru and others [1974] EA; and Richard Wefwafwa Songoi versus Bernard Munyifwa Songoi [2020] eKLR, respectively. 41. The defendant led written submissions dated [sic] the 31.07.2026, which are indicated to be led before the Senior Principal Magistrate’s court at Marsabit. However, the submissions found their way into the subject matter and thus, I assume that same were [sic] intended for this le. Inspite of the erroneous title, the names of the parties correspond and the facts, appear to relate to the instant matter. 42. The submissions under reference have highlighted and wherein same two key issues. The issues are: Whether the plaintis have met and fullled all the ingredients in a claim of adverse possession; and whether the plainti’s claim of purchase and absolute ownership is factually consistent and lawful. 43. Learned counsel for the defendant has thereafter, cited and referenced various decisions. The decisions cited are Njuguna versus Kamau [2025] KECA; Richard Wefwafwa Songoi versus Bernard Munyifwa Songoi [2020] KECA 942; Mbira versus Gachuhi [2002] EALR; and Kimani Ruchine versus Swift Rutherford company limited [1980] KLR, respectively. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5742/eng@2026-09-17 5

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44. According to learned counsel for the defendant, the plaintis’ occupation of the suit property, is predicated on the permission and consent of the defendant’s father, now deceased. Insofar as the plaintis’ occupation is consensual in nature, the plea of adverse possession does not suce. 45. Moreover, it has been submitted that the plaintis’ claim to have bought the suit property, cannot be utilized to claim adverse possession. For good measure, it has been posited that the plea of a purchaser, is factually and legally inconsistent with a claim for adverse possession. 46. Flowing from the foregoing, learned counsel for the defendant has invited the court to nd and hold that the plaintis’ claim, is misconceived and legally untenable. 47. Having reviewed the pleadings on record; upon taking into account the evidence tendered [both oral and documentary]; and bearing in mind the submissions led by /on behalf of the respective parties, two key issues emerge for determination. The issues are: Whether the plaintis have proven and established the plea of adverse possession; and What appropriate reliefs [if any] ought to issue. 48. Regarding the rst issue, it is important to underscore that whosoever seeks to prove a claim of adverse possession, the plaintis’ herein not excepted, is obligated to demonstrate certain established elements. The elements that underpin the plea of adverse possession; and which must be proven, were distilled and rearmed in the case of Richard Wefwafwa Songoi v Ben Munyifwa Songoi [2020] KECA 942 (KLR). The court of appeal stated thus: “ 40. A person who claims adverse possession must inter alia show: (a) on what date he came into possession. (b) what was the nature of his possession? (c) whether the fact of his possession was known to the other party. (d) for how long his possession has continued and (e) that the possession was open and undisturbed for the requisite 12 years.” 49. It is pertinent for the claimant to establish and prove occupation or possession. In addition, the claimant must also demonstrate that the possession being relied upon, is neither permissive nor consensual. The possession must not also be secretive [stealth] or forceful. In addition, it must be shown that the owner of the land, against whom the claim is being made, or his /her representative, has been aware and knowledgeable of adverse occupation. 50. In the case of Njuguna v Kamau [2025] KECA 368 (KLR), the Court of appeal stated thus: “ 24. The principles distilled from these cases are that in order to establish a claim of adverse possession, the possession must be: a. adverse to the interests of the owner – meaning that the claimant is in possession as owner in contradistinction to holding in recognition of or subordination to the true owner or to a recognized superior claim of another; b. Actual - as opposed to constructive possession where the test is the degree of the actual use and enjoyment of the parcel of land involved by the claimant or his agent, tenant or licensee; https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5742/eng@2026-09-17 6

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c. Open and notorious - meaning that the possession must be open and conspicuous to the common observer so that the owner or his agent on visiting the land might readily see that the owner’s rights are being invaded. Dierently put, the possession must be manifest to the community; d. Without force - meaning that the possession and occupation must have been achieved peaceably not through actual or threatened violence; e. Exclusive - meaning that the possession must be of such exclusive character that it will operate as an ouster of the owner of the legal title. Dierently put, the claimant must demonstrate that she wholly excluded the owner from possession for the required period; f. Continuous and uninterrupted for the period of twelve years - meaning that the title owner did not re-enter the property under circumstances showing her intention to assert dominion against the adverse user for at least twelve years.” 51. Where the plea of adverse possession is anchored on a purchase/sale agreement, which birthed the taking of the possession, then the claimant must demonstrate that same paid, or has since paid the entire purchase price. Moreover, the computation of time for purposes of discerning the 12 -year duration, runs from the date when the purchase price paid, or when the last instalment was paid. 52. In the case of Ouko & another (Suing as the Personal Representatives and Administrators of the Estate of Jason Atinda Ouko (Deceased)) v Kageni (Sued as the Personal Representative and Administrator of the Estate of Samuel Muhika Kageni (Deceased) [2025] KECA 2126 (KLR), the court of appeal discussed the manner of determining timelines for adverse possession. 53. The court stated thus: 49. In a situation where a claim for adverse position is premised on the existence of a purchase agreement, time only starts running once the contract is repudiated. Thus, in Sisto Wambugu vs. Kamau Njuguna [1983] KECA 69 (KLR), it was held that:“There have been several cases, of which the Livingstone Ndeete case is one, in which the claimant of land puts his case in the alternative, that is to say by pleading the agreement under which he is entered, and then asking for an order based on subsequent adverse possession. For instance in Hosea vs. Njiru & Others [1974] EA 526, Simpson J, following Bridges vs. Mees [1957] 2 All ER 577, held that once payment of the last instalment of the purchase price had been eected, the purchaser’s possession became adverse to the vendor and that he thenceforth, by occupation for twelve years, was entitled to become registered as proprietor of it.” 54. Have the plaintis proved their claim of adverse possession? The plaintis testied and adduced evidence that the same entered into a sale agreement with Dima Boru Jarso [now deceased]. The plaintis averred that the sale agreement was entered into on the 09.02.1999. Further, and in addition, the plaintis posited that the agreement was reduced into writing and same was signed by both parties; and witnessed by inter alia, DW2. The agreement was produced as exhibit P1. 55. Furthermore, PW1 averred that the sale of the suit property, was conrmed by the vendor vide an adavit sworn on the 05.12.2017. The adavit in question was tendered and produced as exhibit P4. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5742/eng@2026-09-17 7

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The contents of the said adavit, which were not impeached, authenticate that the deponent [Dima Boru Jarso- deceased] indeed sold the land to the plaintis. 56. Other than the foregoing, PW1 also testied that the vendor, now deceased, also executed the transfer instrument, to facilitate the transfer of the suit property to the plaintis. The transfer instruments and the application for consent were produced as exhibit[s] before the court. It is apparent that the vendor acknowledged that the suit property belonged to the plaintis. 57. Put dierently, the vendor essentially acknowledged that his [vendor’s ] right to the suit property were extinct. 58. Most importantly, the vendor allowed the plaintis to enter into and take possession of the suit property in the year 2003. The plaintis’ entry onto and occupation of the suit property, was premised on the sale agreement; and the fact that the sale price [consideration] had been duly paid and acknowledged. 59. Additionally, evidence abound that the plaintis proceeded to and constructed various structures on the suit property. The plaintis also resided therein. The activities by the plaintis, were open ; continuous and uninterrupted. Notably, the vendor who sold the land to the plainti and allowed same to enter upon the suit property, did not take any actions or steps to terminate the plainti’s occupation. 60. At any rate, the fact that the plaintis have been occupation of the suit property with the knowledge of the defendant, is not in dispute. 61. The defendant who testied as DW1 stated thus: “ I do conrm that I have indicated that the plaintis sought for permission to graze their camels on a portion of my father’s land. The land in question was/is plot number 581. I do conrm that my late father gave the plaintis permission to graze on the land but did not sell the land. The permission to graze was given in 1999. The plaintis are still on the land because my father allowed the same to graze on the land. The plaintis have a house on the land. The plaintis had constructed a house on the land for animal feeds. I do conrm that the plaintis are now residing on the land. The plainti are residing in the grass thatched house. There are other houses that the plaintis have constructed on the land.” 62. Additionally, DW1 is on record stating thus: “ My family are not staying on the land. We are staying outside. The plaintis are the one using and occupying the land.” 63. Though the defendant [DW1] posits that the plaintis’ entry onto the suit property, was based on permission, the defendant has not demonstrated when and how the permission was given. Nevertheless, the very person, who the defendant purports to have given the permission, swore an adavit that he sold the land to the plaintis; and was duly paid [See exhibit P4]. 64. I am afraid that the contention by the defendant that the plaintis’ entry onto the suit property was based on consent, is built on quick sand. There is no evidence at all to buttress the said assertions. I wish to add that the assertion in question, was being made for convenience. 65. On the contrary, there is evidence that the suit property was sold to the plaintis, the purchase price was duly paid; possession was handed over; the plaintis have remained in occupation to date; the possession, has been adverse to the rights of the vendor [now deceased]; and anyone claiming under the vendor. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5742/eng@2026-09-17 8

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66. There is also evidence that ever since the year 2003, when the plaintis entered into possession, their possession, was never disturbed. It suces to state that by the time the defendant issued the eviction notice on the 28.05.2024, the statutory 12-year period, had lapsed. The defendant’s right if any, stood extinguished. The purported Eviction Notice was still-borne. 67. Moreover, it is common ground that the eviction notice dated the 28.05.2024, could not interrupt the running of time, for purposes of adverse possession. In the case of Njuguna Ndatho v Maasai Itumo & 2 others [2002] KECA 324 (KLR), the Court of Appeal stated as hereunder: “ Time which has begun to run under the Act is stopped either when the owner asserts his right or when his right is admitted by the adverse possessor. Assertion of right occurs when the owner takes legal proceedings or makes an eective entry into the land. The old rule was that a merely formal entry was sucient to vest possession in the true owner and to prevent time from running against him. Such a nominal entry, even though it was secret, entitles him to bring an action within a year afterwards, and as it was possible to make such an entry every year, in this case called continual claim, the title to land might be in doubt for longer than the period of limitation. It was therefore provided by the Real Property Limitation Act 1833, in a section which has been repeated in the Limitation Act 1939, that a person shall not be deemed to have been in possession merely because he has made an entry on the land. He must either make a peaceable and eective entry, or sue for recovery of the land.’ I agree that the mere ling of a suit for recovery of possession may not disrupt the possession of the adverse possessor, it being a physical thing, but as regards the stopping of time for the purposes of the Act, I would fully subscribe to the position expounded by Potter JA in Githu v Ndeete, and which has solid backing in the passage I have read from Cheshire. It is the sensible step to take instead of going into the disputed land armed to dislodge the adverse possessor, an act which can only result in a serious breach of the peace or even loss of life. It may well be true that in India the position as set out by Kneller JA in Muthoni v Wanduru does work, but I do not regard it as a practical approach to take in land disputes in Kenya. As there are authorities of this Court going both ways I am free to decide which way to go. An on this particular point I will go with the Potter JA. The only reason I can think of for the apparent contradiction in the decisions I have discussed is the total absence of law reports during the period under review, a calamity which has yet to be redressed.” It is quite clear therefore that the initial steps taken by the appellant did not stop the time from running. The later steps to which 68. To my mind, the totality of the evidence on record, demonstrate that the plaintis’ occupation of the suit property meet, the threshold for declaration of adverse possession. The plaintis’ occupation has been open, continuous and an interrupted for more than 12 years. Moreover, the plaintis occupation was not predicated on permission. On the contrary, the entry upon the suit property that birthed the foundation of the claim was the sale agreement. 69. I now wish to turn to the second issue. The second issue relates to the appropriate relief [if any] to be granted. Having found that the plaintis’ have met/satised the threshold for adverse possession, it would have been easy to proceed and make the declaration sought. However, there is a constitutional question that impacts on the rights [if any] to be declared in favour of the plaintis. 70. Both the plaintis [who testied as PW1 and PW2] intimated to the court that same are both citizens of the United States of America [USA]. It then means that neither of the plaintis can be registered as freehold owners of the suit property. The best that can happen is a declaration that same shall hold https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5742/eng@2026-09-17 9

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the suit property for a leasehold period of 99 years. Thereafter, the reversionary rights shall then vest in the radical owner of the land [the Government of the Republic of Kenya]. 71. Article 65 [1] and [2] of the Constitution, 2010 states thus: 65. 72. (1) A person who is not a citizen may hold land on the basis of leasehold tenure only, and any such lease, however granted, shall not exceed ninety-nine years. (2) If a provision of any agreement, deed, conveyance or document of whatever nature purports to confer on a person who is not a citizen an interest in land greater than a ninety-nine year lease, the provision shall be regarded as conferring on the person a ninetynine year leasehold interest, and no more. Save for the foregoing, it is my nding and holding that the plaintis have established a basis to warrant the grant of the reliefs sought at the foot of the originating summons. In particular, the plaintis are entitled to a declaration that same have acquired title to the suit property by way of adverse possession. Conclusion 73. Flowing from the analysis contained in the body of the judgment, I am convinced that the plaintis’ have proven their case to the requisite standard. The evidence by the plaintis was not only credible, but overwhelming; and compelling. 74. In a nutshell, I come to the conclusion that the plaintis are entitled to the reliefs sought. Final orders: 75. In the end, the nal orders that commend themselves to the court are: i. There be and is hereby issued a declaration that the Defendant’s right to recover the whole of land parcel No. Marsabit/Jirme/581; are barred under the Limitation of Actions Act Chapter 22 Laws of Kenya, and his title thereto extinguished on the grounds that the Plaintis herein have openly, peacefully and continuously been in occupation and possession of the suitland for a period exceeding 12 years. ii. There be and is hereby issued an order that the Plaintis be registered as the proprietors of the whole of occupied land parcel Marsabit/Jirme/581 in place of the Respondent. iii. However, the registration of the plaintis as the proprietors of the suit property shall be for a leasehold period of 99 years only, wef date of the judgment. iv. Upon lapse of the lease period [99 years], the reversionary rights shall vest in the radical owner of the land [the government of the republic of Kenya]. v. The Deputy Registrar and or Executive Ocer of the honorable court be and is hereby directed to execute transfer instruments and all other attendant https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5742/eng@2026-09-17 10

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documents to facilitate the transfer and registration of the suitland i.e Mrsabit/ Jirme/581, in favour of the Plaintis in event of default by the respondent. 76. vi. There be and is hereby issued an order of permanent injunction, restraining the defendant by himself, agents, servants, brothers and sisters or employees from interfering with the Plaintis’ peaceful possession and occupation of land parcel No. Marsabit/Jirme/581 in any manner whatsoever and or however. vii. Costs of this Originating Summons shall be borne by the Defendant. viii. The costs in terms of clause [vii] above to be agreed upon and in default, same to be taxed in the conventional manner. It is so ordered. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT ISIOLO ON THIS 17TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026 OGUTTU MBOYA; FCIArb; CPM [MTI-EA]. JUDGE. In the presence of: Court Assistant: Zakayo /Mukami Mr. Ondari for the Plaintis. Mr. Behailu for the Defendant https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5742/eng@2026-09-17 11

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