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3. Spent. 4. An order of interim injunction do issue restraining the Defendant/ Respondent from obstructing, occupying, constructing upon or in any way interfering with the public usage of the suit property pending the hearing of the substantive suit; 5. An order do issue directing the OCS Huruma Police Station to provide police assistance in enforcing the interim orders above; 6. The costs of this application be provided for; 7. Any other orders this Honourable Court may deem t and just to grant. 3. The Application is supported by the Plainti/Applicant’s Supporting Adavit sworn on 09.02.2026. The Plainti explained that the present suit is brought on behalf of the residents of Shauri estate in Huruma ward within Uasin Gishu County. The Plainti deponed that Plot No. 7789/672 situated in Shauri estate in Huruma ward (“the suit property”) has always been used as a public road by the residents of Shauri estate. That it connects the said residents to Pemugi road, Huruma hospital, Huruma police station, Huruma chief’s oce and other public institutions. In addition, that the suit property is also a wayleave for 2nd and 3rd Interested Parties through which high voltage electricity lines and water pipes respectively pass. The Plainti claims that the Defendant/Respondent has without any colour of right, threatened to encroach into the suit property and impede access thereto by the said residents and the public by fencing it o. 4. The Plainti termed the Defendant’s actions as constituting a public nuisance and an attempt to illegally acquire public land. The Plainti averred that he has a prima facie case with a likelihood of success. He also averred that unless the orders sought are granted, the Defendant will proceed to impede the residents’ access to key government institutions and expose them to risks arising from construction under a high voltage power wayleave, from which irreparable harm/injury might be suered. He averred that the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting the interim orders sought pending the hearing and determination of the suit, and asked the Court to allow the application as prayed. He further deponed that the application herein is brought in absolute good faith to prevent undue hardship being visited upon the residents of Shauri estate in what is an outright case of public nuisance. 5. The Motion is opposed by the Defendant through her Replying Adavit dated 02.03.2026. She termed the present Motion incompetent, frivolous and an abuse of process of court, and further averred that it lacked merit as it failed to meet the criteria for grant of injunctions. She denied obstructing, occupying, constructing or interfering with the public use of the suit property. She claimed that the alleged Plot No. 7789/672 does not exist and no evidence had been presented to the contrary in this Motion. She claims that the suit has no chances of success as it was only brought to harass and cause her hardship. That the Plainti had no locus to sue her as only the National Land Commission (NLC), joined as 1st Interested Party herein, could litigate issues of public land. She accused the Plainti of material non-disclosure of facts regarding the existence of the road as public roads do not have plot numbers. 6. The Defendant averred that the area MCA had previously attempted to interfere with her property known as Eldoret Municipality Block 1/18 claiming that there was a road passing over it. That she wrote a demand letter, and thereafter a public baraza was convened, which was attended by the area chief, the County Commissioner, the areas OCS-Huruma Police Station, the County Land Surveyor, The County Physical Planner and area residents, to deliberate on the issue. That she presented her https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5633/eng@2026-07-24 2

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ownership documents, which in addition to a survey report by the County Land Surveyor, led to the conclusion that no public road passes over her land. The Defendant explained that she applied and obtained approval to construct a fence on her parcel, which would not have been granted if there was a public road passing over it. 7. The Defendant deponed that due to continued interference by the area MCA and some residents, she led CM ELC Case No. E221 of 2025 and an injunction was issued restraining them for interfering with her occupation and use of the land. She refuted the allegation that the proceedings had been brought on behalf of the residents of Shauri Estate. She claimed that no complaint had been made against her to the relevant authorities, including the 1st Interested Party, that she encroached or interfered with public land. She asserted that there is no existing public road in the area as shown in the Registry Index Map (RIM) that she annexed. She deponed that while she had no issue with ELDOWAS, she had complained to KPLC about the power lines passing over her land. She asserts that Section 26 of the Land Registration Act safeguards her right to property. 8. The 2nd Interested Party (KPLC) led an Adavit sworn on 12.06.2026 by Stephen Koech, expressing its support of the Motion herein. He averred that the 2nd Interested Party has been joined to this suit due to its critical electricity infrastructure that passes along the suit land. He averred that the 2nd interested Party constructed an electricity line in 1982 using maps provided by the physical planning oce, which lines were constructed along a public road adjacent to Plot No. 18. That the Defendant has since exceeded the boundary of her plot No 18 and encroached onto the public road adjacent to her property. He deponed that the Defendant had constructed a building right below the powerlines contrary to the provisions of the law and safety requirements. 9. He averred that the Defendant’s actions have created a hazardous situation and exposed national critical infrastructure, members of the public, herself and other occupiers of the building to risk. He asked the court to grant the injunction to restrain the Defendant from carrying on any further activity on the suit property pending determination of this suit. He further asked the court to grant a permanent injunction restraining the Defendant from carrying on any further activity under the electricity infrastructure. He claims that the 2nd Interested Party relayed its position to the Defendant vide its letter dated 12.03.2026, however, the Defendant has ignored and/or failed to heed to the contents of the said letter. That she has instead persisted with her actions which expose the public, herself, any other occupiers of the building as well as the electricity infrastructure itself to harm, thus it is in the interests of justice that the orders be granted. 10. The Plainti led a Supplementary Adavit dated 16.03.2026 denying the contents of the Defendant’s Replying Adavit. He reiterated that the Defendant had without any colour obstructed, occupied, constructed on and interfered with the public usage Plot No. 7789/672. He claimed that the Defendant’s averments on the issue of locus standi are legally incompetent. He states that as a resident of Shauri estate in Huruma ward who has been inconvenienced and whose life has been put at risk by the by the Defendant’s actions in regard to a public road and construction under a high voltage power line, he had locus to institute this suit. The Plainti asserts that the public nuisance is as a result of the Defendant’s illegal acquisition of public land. Further, that he has the necessary locus under Article 3(1), 22 and 258 of the Constitution of Kenya to challenge both the Defendant’s alleged acquisition of the suit property and the resulting inconveniences for himself and on behalf of the residents of Shauri Estate. 11. The Plainti claims that the documents annexed to his Supporting Adavit clearly identify the land as a road. The Plainti denied knowledge of the Defendant’s interactions with the Huruma Ward MCA and the alleged public barazas, as well as the alleged MCELC/E221/2025 and the orders issued therein as he was not a party to the case. He denied any attempt at circumventing the lower court orders https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5633/eng@2026-07-24 3

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through ling of the present suit. Instead, he claimed that he sought to secure his rights and those of the other residents to access to the public road and to ensure public safety, which is threatened by the Defendant’s construction under a high voltage power line. 12. He pointed out that while the Defendant claims he applied and obtained approvals to construct a fence, her annexure marked “JMK-5” indicates that she intends to construct a Residential building on the suit property. He averred that following the Defendant’s complaint to the 2nd Interested Party, the Defendant was expressly informed that she was encroaching on public land and endangering public safety. That the response by the 2nd Respondent as well as the other documents contained in his List & Bundle of Documents establish a prima facie case of illegal acquisition of public land and resulting public nuisance with likelihood of success. In light of the foregoing, the Plainti states that it is necessary that the Court issues interim injunctions herein against the Defendant pending the hearing and determination of the suit. He therefore asked the Court to allow his application as prayed. B. The Defendants’ Notice of Preliminary Objection; 13. The Defendant also led a Notice of Preliminary Objection (PO) dated 16.04.2026 seeking to have the Plainti’s suit dismissed with costs for reason that:1. The Plainti lacks the requisite locus standi to institute and maintain this suit in a representative capacity on behalf of the alleged residents of Shauri Estate and has failed to comply with Order 1 Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules and further to demonstrate authority, consent, or identiable common interest among the said residents. 2. The issue raised in the Plaint relate to an alleged public land namely a purported public road, if such land were public land the constitutional and statutory mandate to manage, investigate and litigate over the public land rests under Article 67 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, with the National Land Commission and consequently the Plaintis have failed to exhaust the statutory dispute resolution mechanisms provided by law before coming to court and hence this suit is premature and incompetent. 3. There exist similar proceedings in Eldoret Chief Magistrates Court MC ELC E221/2025 led earlier touching on the same subject matter as the suit herein and if these proceedings are entertained, they may lead to a situation of judicial embarrassment and contradictory pronouncements. Submissions: 14. The court directed that both the Application and the PO be canvased by way of written submissions. In compliance, the Plainti led submissions dated 18.03.2026 in support of his application, as well as submissions dated 29.06.2026 opposing the Defendant’s PO. The Defendant led written submissions dated 16.04.2026 opposing the Plainti’s application, whereas in support of her PO, she led submissions dated 25.06.2026. The 2nd Interested Party having expressed its support for the application, led submissions dated 12.06.2026. On its part, the 3rd Interested Party led submissions dated 08.06.2026 with respect to the Defendant’s PO. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5633/eng@2026-07-24 4

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Analysis and Determination: 15. Having considered the Plainti’s applications alongside the adavits led in support thereof, the replying adavit, the Defendant’s PO and the rival submissions by the parties, the Court is of the view that the issues for determination are:i. Whether the Defendant’s PO is merited; ii. Whether the Plainti is entitled to the interim injunction sought in his present Application; iii. Who shall bear the costs of the present application? a. Whether the Defendant’s PO is Merited; 16. The principles that a court is enjoined to apply in determining the merits or otherwise of a Preliminary Objection were set out in the case of Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd vs West End Distributors Ltd (1969) EA 696 at page 700 where Law JA as he then was had this to say:“ … A Preliminary Objection consists of a point of law which has been pleaded, or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings and which if argued as a preliminary point may dispose of the suit. Examples are an objection to the Jurisdiction of the court or a plea of limitation, or a submission that the parties are bound by the contract giving rise to the suit to refer the dispute to arbitration.” 17. In the same case, Sir Charles Newbold, P. at pg.701 paragraph B-C added the following:“ A Preliminary Objection is in the nature of what used to be a demurrer. It raises a pure point of law which is usually on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct. It cannot be raised if any fact has to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of Judicial discretion…” 18. Drawing from the Mukisa Biscuit Case (supra), the test to be applied in determining whether the Defendant’s PO meets the threshold of a proper PO or not is rstly, that the PO raises a pure point of law, secondly, that there is demonstration that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct; and third, that there is no fact that needs to be ascertained. 19. The Defendant raised three objections against the Plainti’s suit herein. The rst is with regards to the issue of the Plainti’s capacity to sue and/or locus standi. Under this objection, the Defendant states that the Plainti does not possess the requisite locus standi to sue on behalf of the Residents of Shauri Estate. Pursuant to this, the Defendant questions the Plainti’s compliance with Order 1 Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules which provides as follows:8. One person may sue or defend on behalf of all in same interest [Order 1, rule 8] (1) Where numerous persons have the same interest in any proceedings, the proceedings may be commenced, and unless the Court otherwise orders, continued, by or against any one or more of them as representing all or as representing all except one or more of them. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5633/eng@2026-07-24 5

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(2) The parties shall in such case give notice of the suit to all such persons either by personal service or, where from the number of persons or any other cause such service is not reasonably practicable, by public advertisement, as the court in each case may direct. (3) Any person on whose behalf or for whose benet a suit is instituted or defended under sub-rule (1) may apply to the court to be made a party to such suit. 20. The Defendant claims that in ling the suit as a representative of the residents of Shauri Estate, the Plainti has not complied with the above provision and therefore has no locus standi to commence or prosecute the suit. However, per order 1 Rule 8(1), a suit may be instituted for or against a group of persons who have the same interest in the proceedings, by one or more of them as a representative for the entire group. 21. In the present suit, the Plainti claims to have commenced the present suit for himself and on behalf of the residents of Shauri Estate in Huruma Ward. Order 1 Rule 8(2) requires that once such a suit has been instituted, notice of the suit is to be issued to all such persons, either by personal service or advertisement. The requirement for notice to my understanding is to allow the parties represented in that suit of its existence and enable them seek to be joined should they wish. 22. This is conrmed by Order 1 Rule 8(3) which allows any person so represented to apply to be joined to the suit. In this case however, I note that annexure 1 of the Plainti’s Supporting Adavit is a list of the residents of Shauri Estate in Huruma Ward who are in support of the suit. The said list contains names and signatures of the said residents as well as their ID numbers. Therefore, the requirement of notice would have been fullled. 23. There is no evidence that the names, signatures and ID Numbers on the list of residents were forged or not genuine for any reasons. The Defendant has not claimed that the persons named in the said list and who appended their signatures thereto are not real people, or that they are not residents of Shauri Estate in Huruma Ward. The list of residents duly signed does in my opinion suce to demonstrate that the residents of Shauri Estate are well aware of the present suit, thus fully complies with the requirements oF Order 1 Rule 8. 24. Secondly, the Defendant asserts that the NLC, joined herein as the 1st Interested Party, is the relevant entity empowered to manage, investigate and litigate matters relating to public land. The Defendant further claims that the Plainti ought to have rst submitted the dispute to the NLC for determination. The Defendant then goes on to state that the Plainti failed to exhaust statutory dispute resolution mechanisms before coming to court, making the suit premature and incompetent. 25. There can be no doubt that the NLC is the relevant statutory body vested with authority to administer public land. The functions of the NLC are set out at Section 5 of the National Land Commission Act, which provides as follows:5. Functions of the Commission (1) Pursuant to Article 67(2) of the Constitution, the functions of the Commission shall be— (a) to manage public land on behalf of the national and county governments; https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5633/eng@2026-07-24 6

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(2) (b) to recommend a national land policy to the national government; (c) to advise the national government on a comprehensive programme for the registration of title in land throughout Kenya; (d) to conduct research related to land and the use of natural resources, and make recommendations to appropriate authorities; (e) to initiate investigations, on its own initiative or on a complaint, into present or historical land injustices, and recommend appropriate redress; (f) to encourage the application of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in land conicts; (g) to assess tax on land and premiums on immovable property in any area designated by law; and (h) to monitor and have oversight responsibilities over land use planning throughout the country. In addition to the functions set out in subsection (1), the Commission shall, in accordance with Article 67(3) of the Constitution— (a) on behalf of, and with the consent of the national and county governments, alienate public land; (b) monitor the registration of all rights and interests in land; (c) ensure that public land under the management of the designated state agencies is sustainably managed for the intended purposes; and (d) may develop and maintain an eective land information system for the management of public land; 26. Notably, even where the NLC has power to conduct investigations, the same can only result in recommendations on the appropriate redress. Evidently, there is a title that was issued to the Defendant herein. There is no tribunal established under the NLC Act before which such a dispute can be taken for determination. Moreover, should the court eventually determine that the land in question is public land, then there would be need to nullify the said title. 27. However, as already indicated the investigative power of the NLC can only end at recommending possible redress and not cancellation of title. Only this court has jurisdiction to determine matters relating to the use, occupation and title to land. It thus follows that the present suit is properly before this court. Therefore, the second ground of the PO equally fails. 28. Finally, the Defendant claims that there is another suit before the Eldoret Magistrate’s Court namely, Eldoret CM ELC No. E221 of 2025 touching on the same subject matter as the present suit, and that if these proceedings are allowed to proceed, it will lead to judicial embarrassment and contradictory pronouncements. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5633/eng@2026-07-24 7

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29. To determine whether indeed this ground of the PO is merited, this court would need to read through the Plaint and other pleadings annexed to the Defendant’s Replying Adavit. The last determining factor of a true PO according to the Mukhisa Biscuits Case (supra) is that there must be no fact that requires to be determined. In the case of Oraro vs Mbaja (2005) 1 KLR 141 the Court held as follows:“ … A ‘Preliminary Objection’ correctly understood, is now well dened as, and declared to be, a point of law which must not be blurred with factual details liable to be contested and in any event, to be proved through the process of evidence. Any assertion, which claims to be a Preliminary Objection, yet it bears factual aspects calling for proof, or seeks to adduce evidence for its authentication is not, as a matter of legal principle, a true Preliminary Objection which the Court should allow to proceed. Where a Court needs to investigate facts, a matter cannot be raised as a preliminary point… Anything that purports to be a Preliminary Objection must not deal with disputed facts, and it must not itself derive its foundation from factual information which stands to be tested by normal rules of evidence…” 30. That notwithstanding, aside from the Defendant herein, none of the parties in this suit are parties to the suit known as Eldoret Chief Magistrates ELC No. E221 of 2025. Whereas this suit seeks to enforce a wayleave and/or access to a public road comprised in Plot No. 7789/672, in the lower court, the Defendant herein seeks to be declared the rightful owner of the parcel of land known as Eldoret Municipality Block 1/18. The Defendant herself has alluded to the fact that these two parcels are distinct, and that the said Plot No. 7789/672 does not in fact exist. As KPLC has explained, the road on which the electricity lines run is adjacent to the Defendant’s property and does not pass through it. Consequently, this ground equally fails, and in turn, the Defendant’s PO must be found to lack merit. b. Whether the Plainti is Entitled to the Interim Injunction Sought in his Present Application; 31. The main prayer in the Plainti’s application is for a temporary injunction pending the hearing and determination of the main suit. The conditions for consideration in granting an injunction were settled in the celebrated case of Giella vs Cassman Brown & Company Limited (1973) E A 358, where the court expressed itself on the condition’s that a party must satisfy for the court to grant an interlocutory injunction as follows: “ Firstly, an applicant must show a prima facie case with a probability of success. Secondly, an interlocutory injunction will not normally be granted unless the applicant might otherwise suer irreparable injury, which would not adequately be compensated by an award of damages. Thirdly, if the Court is in doubt, it will decide an application on the balance of convenience.” 32. The question which therefore arises is whether the application meets the threshold set for the grant of orders of temporary injunction. The rst requirement in the Giella Case (supra) is that the applicant must demonstrate that they have a prima facie case with a probability of success. In Mrao Ltd vs First American Bank of Kenya and 2 others, (2003) KLR 125, the Court of Appeal dened a prima facie case as follows:“ In civil cases, a prima facie case is a case in which on the material presented to the court, a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter. A prima facie case is more than an arguable case. It is not sucient to raise issues but https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5633/eng@2026-07-24 8

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the evidence must show an infringement of a right, and the probability of success of the applicant’s case upon trial. That is clearly a standard, which is higher than an arguable case.” 33. The Plainti in this case claims that the Defendant has encroached into the parcel of land known as Pot No. 7789/762 and has fenced it o, preventing them from accessing other public roads as well as other public institutions, amenities and utilities. The Plainti claims that the suit property is public land and that the Defendant has no right to utilise the land as she currently is. That in so doing, the Defendant has endangered the lives of the residents as she is constructing right under a high voltage power wayleave. That as a result, the residents stand to suer irreparable harm/injury. 34. On her part, the Defendant has pointed out in her Replying Adavit, the subject matter as pleaded by the Plainti is a parcel of land known as Plot No. 7789/672 which does not exist, while the parcel of land subject to the suit in the lower court is Eldoret Municipality/Block 1/18. The Defendant has indeed presented a title deed to the parcel of land known as Eldoret Municipality Block 1/18. In addition, the copy of title and search dated 24.09.2025 clearly shows that the Defendant is the registered owner of the property known as Eldoret Municipality/Block 1/18. 35. The Plainti in his List of Documents has attached a document which he has claims shows “the alienation of Shauri estate land showing number 18 (Plot No. 7789/672 or the suit property) as a road”. On the said document, Plot No. 7789/672 is indicted as a road and was in fact not allocated to any individual, not even the Defendant herein. I note that the said Plot No. 7789/672 appears at number 18 on the said alienation list. To my understanding however, this appears to be a serialised list hence the said number 18 is only a serial number on the list. Thus, without any further evidence linking it to the Defendant’s parcel of land, it bears no connection however with the title issued to the Defendant. More certainly, the parcel numbers of the portions that were being alienated appear thereon under the column titled “Plot No”. 36. Consequently, the said document cannot at this stage and without further evidence be relied on to establish a link between the suit property herein being Plot No. 7789/672, and the Defendant’s property known as Eldoret Municipality/Block 1/18. Moreover, all the letters annexed by the Plainti, the Defendant and the 2nd Interested Party do refer to the parcel of land known as Eldoret Municipality/Block 1/18 and not the suit property herein. 37. I am alive to the fact that the issue of existence of the suit property and its connection to the Defendant’s property can only be conclusively determined at trial. However, at this preliminary stage, I see no connection between the suit property and the Defendant’s parcel as to warrant issuance of orders against her. In the circumstances, I am not convinced that the Plainti has satised the requirement for a prima facie case against the Defendant herein. 38. The second requirement is that an applicant must demonstrate that they stand to suer irreparable injury that can not be compensated by way of damages. In Pius Kipchirchir Kogo vs Frank Kimeli Tenai (2018) KEELC 2424 KLR, the court dened a prima facie case in the following words:“ Irreparable injury means that the injury must be one that cannot be adequately compensated for in damages and that the existence of a prima facie case is not itself sucient. The applicant should further show that irreparable injury will occur to him if the injunction is not granted and there is no other remedy open to him by which he will protect himself from the consequences of the apprehended injury. The defendant has been collecting rent since the year 2005 and therefore the issue of irreparable harm if injunction is not granted should not arise so long as the matter is fast-tracked for hearing.” https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5633/eng@2026-07-24 9

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39. Further, in Nguruman Limited vs Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others (2014) eKLR, the Court of Appeal explained that:“ These are the three pillars on which rests the foundation of any order of injunction, interlocutory or permanent. It is established that all the above three conditions and stages are to be applied as separate, distinct and logical hurdles which the applicant is expected to surmount sequentially. See Kenya Commercial Finance Co. Ltd V. Afraha Education Society [2001] Vol. 1 EA 86. If the applicant establishes a prima facie case that alone is not sucient basis to grant an interlocutory injunction, the court must further be satised that the injury the respondent will suer, in the event the injunction is not granted, will be irreparable. In other words, if damages recoverable in law is an adequate remedy and the respondent is capable of paying, no interlocutory order of injunction should normally be granted, however strong the applicant’s claim may appear at that stage. If prima facie case is not established, then irreparable injury and balance of convenience need no consideration. The existence of a prima facie case does not permit “leap-frogging” by the applicant to injunction directly without crossing the other hurdles in between.” 40. Finally, where the court is in doubt, it should decide the matter on a balance of convenience. The Plainti herein has failed to satisfy this court that he has any prima facie case. Having so failed, the Plainti cannot claim that he stands to suer irreparable loss or injury that cannot be compensated by way of damages. In any event, it is trite that a court of law does not act in vain. Since there is no discernible connection between the Plainti and the suit property herein, any orders issued by this court would be made in vain. 41. That aside, in the event that the suit property in this suit is the same as that cited in the lower court in Eldoret CM ELC Case No. E221 of 2025, then since there is already an order of injunction issued in favour of the Defendant herein, any order to the contrary issued by this court would indeed result in judicial embarrassment pointed out by the Defendant herein in his PO. That being the case, the balance of convenience clearly lies in not issuing the injunction sought herein. c. Who shall Bear the Costs of the Present Application? 42. On costs, Section 27(1) of the Civil Procedure Act is the basis of the general rule that costs follow the event. Section 27(1) however, also gives courts full discretion to decide the issue of costs, and such discretion allows the court to depart from the general rule where there is justied reasons for doing so. 43. The Plainti herein has failed in his application for a temporary injunction. The Defendant has equally failed in prosecuting her PO. That aside, I note that from record of the present suit, the same is yet to be heard on merit. That being the case, it is only prudent that the costs hereof do abide the outcome of the main suit. Orders:44. In the circumstances, the following orders hereby issue from this court:a. The Defendant’s Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 16.04.2026 lacks merit and is hereby dismissed. b. The Plainti/Applicant’s Notice of Motion dated 09.02.2026 lacks merit and the same is equally dismissed. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5633/eng@2026-07-24 10

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c. 45. The costs of the Plainti’s Application and the Defendant’s PO shall both abide the outcome of the main suit. Orders accordingly. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT ELDORET THIS 24TH DAY OF JULY, 2026 VIDE MICROSOFT TEAMS. HON. C. K. YANO ELC, JUDGE In the virtual presence of:Mr. Murunga Makau for Plainti/Applicant. Mr. Kimitei for the 2nd Interested Party. Mr. Kariuki Mwaniki for the Defendant. No appearance for 1st & 3rd Interested parties. Court Assistant - Laban. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5633/eng@2026-07-24 11

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