REPUBLIC OF KENYA IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT KISUMU ELC CASE NO. 357 OF 2015 NIZAR HASHAM VIRANI........1ST PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT SHAMSUDIN GULAMHUSEIN NANJI........2ND PLAINTIFF -VERSUSKENYA PIPELINE COMPANY LIMITED ..........................................DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT RULING 1. Two matters fall for determination in this ruling. The first is the plaintiffs’ notice of motion dated 19th March, 2026 seeking a stay of execution of the decree and the certificate of costs issued in this suit pending the hearing and determination of an appeal. The second is the defendant’s notice of preliminary objection dated 13th May, 2026, by which the defendant contends that the said motion is incompetent because the firm that filed it is not properly on the record. 2. The background may be shortly stated. The plaintiffs instituted this suit against the defendant in 2015. Judgment was delivered on 25th March, 2025 by Okong’o, J. (as he then was). The outcome was adverse RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 1
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to the plaintiffs and costs were awarded to the defendant. The defendant’s bill of costs was thereafter taxed and a certificate of costs issued. 3. On 9th March, 2026, warrants of attachment and sale of movable property issued out of this court in execution of the decree, commanding Chartless Auctioneers to realise the sum of Kshs. 345,455/= being the amount stated to remain unsatisfied. On 18th March, 2026, the said auctioneers issued a proclamation of attachment listing various items of movable property. It is that execution process that provoked the motion now before me, which was filed on 19th March, 2026, a day after the proclamation. The application 4. The notice of motion dated 19th March, 2026 is expressed to be brought under Order 42 rule 6 and Order 51 rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 and all enabling provisions of the law. It seeks the following orders: 1. Spent… RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 2
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2. The honourable court be pleased to order for a stay of execution of the decree and certificate of costs herein pending the hearing and determination of this application inter-partes. 3. The honourable court be pleased to order for a stay of execution of the decree and certificate of costs herein pending the hearing and determination of the appeal. 4. Costs of the application be provided for. 5. Prayers 1 and 2 are spent. What remains for determination is prayer 3, and the question of costs. 6. The motion is premised on the grounds set out on its face, namely that the plaintiffs have filed an appeal against the judgment of this court; that the defendant has commenced an aggressive execution process for recovery of the costs taxed in the matter; that the 2nd plaintiff is deceased; that the 1st plaintiff will be greatly prejudiced if execution is not stayed because the amount sought is substantial; that it will serve the interests of justice for a stay to issue pending the appeal; and that warrants for the sale of the 1st plaintiff’s property have already been issued and served. RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 3
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7. The motion is supported by the affidavit of the 1st plaintiff, Nizar Hasham Virani, sworn on 19th March, 2026. He deposes that an appeal has been filed against the judgment delivered on 25th March, 2025, and annexes a bundle marked ‘NHV1’ said to comprise the notice of appeal and a memorandum of appeal; that the defendant has commenced an aggressive execution process, the warrants of sale and proclamation notice being annexed as ‘NHV2’; that the 2nd plaintiff is deceased; that he will be greatly prejudiced if execution is not stayed; that he is ready and willing to provide security for the due performance of the decree; and that the application is made in good faith. The Preliminary Objection 8. The defendant did not file a replying affidavit or grounds of opposition to the motion. It instead filed a notice of preliminary objection dated 13th May, 2026, taking the following grounds: 1. This application has been instituted contrary to the mandatory requirement of Order 9 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Rules. RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 4
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2. The application has been instituted contrary to the mandatory requirements of Order 9 Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Rules. 3. The application has been instituted contrary to Order 9 Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Rules. 4. The pleadings and/or application filed by N.E. Mogusu & Associates is improperly on record and should be struck out with costs. 5. The application dated 19th March, 2026 is a non-starter and ripe for striking out with costs. 9. When the matter came up before me, directions were taken that both the motion and the preliminary objection be canvassed together by way of written submissions. Both parties complied. Submissions The Defendant/Respondent’s submissions 10. The defendant filed submissions dated 8th July, 2026. Counsel submitted that the firm on the record at the point of judgment was M/s Hussein B. Indimuli & Company Advocates, and that Order 9 rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules governs any change of advocate after judgment. That rule, it was urged, is mandatory: a change after judgment may only be effected by an order of the court upon application with notice to all RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 5
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parties, or upon a consent filed between the outgoing and the incoming advocate. 11. It was submitted that M/s N.E. Mogusu & Associates came on the record after judgment without leave of the court and without a consent, and that the document they filed, styled a “notice of appointment of additional advocates”, is alien to the Civil Procedure Act and the Rules made thereunder. Counsel submitted that although the law may permit counsel or firms to act alongside each other, the pleadings ought to bear the name of the advocate on the record. The court, it was urged, must first determine whether the incoming advocate is properly on the record before considering any substantive prayer, and that an application filed in breach of Order 9 rule 9 must be struck out as incurably defective. 12. On the merits, the defendant submitted that there is no appeal to speak of. Counsel stated from the bar that the defendant has never been served with the notice of appeal, and that it first encountered the document as an annexure to the present motion. It was submitted RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 6
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that the applicants did not apply for typed proceedings and a certified decree, that the Court Tracking System discloses no such application, and that no record of appeal has been lodged. Relying on rules 77, 84 and 85 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2022, counsel submitted that the notice of appeal lodged on 2nd April, 2025 is deemed to have been withdrawn, so that there is no appeal upon which an order of stay may be anchored. Counsel invoked the well known dictum of Lord Denning in Benjamin Leonard Macfoy v United Africa Company Limited [1961] 3 All ER 1169 to the effect that nothing can be built upon nothing. 13. The defendant further submitted that the motion, having been filed on 19th March, 2026, a year after the judgment of 25th March, 2025, is inordinately late and that no explanation has been offered for the delay; that the applicants have not pronounced themselves on their ability to furnish security for costs, from which the court should infer that they have none to offer; and that costs should follow the event. The Plaintiffs/Applicants’ submissions RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 7
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14. The plaintiffs filed submissions dated 12th July, 2026. Counsel submitted that M/s N.E. Mogusu & Associates are properly on the record. The suit was prosecuted to judgment by M/s Hussein B. Indimuli & Company Advocates, who remain on the record. After judgment, the plaintiffs instructed M/s N.E. Mogusu & Associates to come on the record to work alongside the existing firm in pursuing the appeal, and a notice of appointment of additional advocates dated 19th March, 2026 was filed to that end. 15. It was submitted that the additional firm had no instructions to replace M/s Hussein B. Indimuli & Company Advocates, and that Order 9 rule 9, which speaks of a “change”, “such change” and an “outgoing advocate”, is directed at the replacement of an advocate and not at the appointment of an additional advocate to act alongside a firm that remains on the record. Counsel relied on Order 9 rule 7, which applies the provisions on notice of change to a notice of appointment “with the necessary modifications”, and on Order 48 rule 3, which permits the forms in the RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 8
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appendices to the Rules to be used with such variation as the circumstances of each case may require. The addition of the word “additional” to the prescribed form was, it was submitted, precisely such a necessary modification, comparable to the accepted use of supporting, further and supplementary affidavits, none of which appears in the appendices in those terms. 16. Counsel further relied on the ruling in Kisumu CMCC No. 599 of 2017, Caleb Ombiro Ombati v Ouko Okusa & Nation Media Group, where the court held that where there is nothing to show that an incoming firm came in place of the firm already on the record, and where the latter has raised no complaint, neither a consent nor leave of the court is required, and the appearance of the incoming firm is not irregular. 17. Finally, it was submitted that since the defendant filed neither a replying affidavit nor grounds of opposition, the averments in the supporting affidavit stand uncontroverted, and that if the preliminary objection fails the motion stands unopposed and should be allowed as prayed. RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 9
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Analysis and Determination 18. I have considered the notice of motion dated 19th March, 2026, the supporting affidavit and its annexures, the notice of preliminary objection dated 13th May, 2026, the rival written submissions and the authorities cited, as well as the record of this suit. 19. In my view, the following issues arise for determination: (i)Whether the defendant’s preliminary objection dated 13th May, 2026 is merited; (ii) If not, whether the plaintiffs have made out a case for a stay of execution pending appeal; and (iii) Who should bear the costs. (i) Whether the preliminary objection dated 13th May, 2026 is merited 20. The nature of a preliminary objection is settled. In Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, Law, J.A. stated that a preliminary objection consists of a point of law which has been pleaded, or which arises by clear implication out of the pleadings, and which if argued as a RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 10
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preliminary point may dispose of the suit. Sir Charles Newbold, P. added that a preliminary objection cannot be raised if any fact has to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion. Those principles have been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Independent Commission Electoral v Jane and Boundaries Cheperenger & 2 others [2015] eKLR. 21. Applying that test, only part of what the defendant urges qualifies. The question whether M/s N.E. Mogusu & Associates are properly on the record turns on facts that are common ground, namely that judgment was delivered on 25th March, 2025, that M/s Hussein B. Indimuli & Company Advocates were then on the record, and that M/s N.E. Mogusu & Associates filed a notice of appointment of additional advocates dated 19th March, 2026 without leave of the court and without a consent. To that extent a pure point of law arises and I may determine it. 22. The same cannot be said of the balance of the defendant’s submissions. Whether the notice of appeal RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 11
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was served, whether an application for typed proceedings was made within thirty days, and whether a record of appeal has been lodged, are all questions of fact. They are not pleaded in the notice of preliminary objection at all, and the defendant, having elected not to file a replying affidavit, has placed no evidence before me in support of them. Assertions from the bar are not evidence. Those contentions cannot found a preliminary objection. I shall revert to them, so far as is proper, when considering the exercise of discretion on the motion itself. 23. I observe next that grounds 1, 2 and 3 of the notice of preliminary objection invoke Order 9 rules 10, 7 and 5 of the Civil Procedure Rules, yet not a word was said in the submissions about those rules. The entire argument was built upon Order 9 rule 9, which is nowhere pleaded in the objection. Ordinarily that mismatch would be fatal, since a preliminary objection must be confined to the point pleaded. As both parties have, however, fully addressed the substance of the complaint under Order 9 rule 9, and as neither has suffered prejudice on that RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 12
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account, I prefer to determine the real question in controversy rather than dispose of the objection on a pleading point. 24. Order 9 rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 provides: When there is a change of advocate, or when a party decides to act in person having previously engaged an advocate, after judgment has been passed, such change or intention to act in person shall not be effected without an order of the court — (a) upon an application with notice to all the parties; or (b) upon a consent filed between the outgoing advocate and the proposed incoming advocate or party intending to act in person as the case may be. 25. The purpose of the rule has been explained in a consistent line of decisions. In S. K. Tarwadi v Veronica Muehlmann [2019] eKLR, the court observed that the essence of Order 9 rule 9 is to protect advocates from clients who would wait until judgment is delivered and then discharge the advocate, and to ensure that there is no confusion after judgment as to who represents a party. The rule is mandatory where it applies, and RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 courts have repeatedly declined to 13
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entertain proceedings filed by advocates who came on the record after judgment in disregard of it. 26. Everything therefore turns on whether the rule is engaged on the facts before me. By its plain terms, the rule bites in two situations only: where there is “a change of advocate”, and where “a party decides to act in person having previously engaged an advocate”. The internal language of the rule confirms as much. It speaks of “such contemplates a change”, consent and paragraph “between the (b) outgoing advocate and the proposed incoming advocate”. The rule presupposes an advocate going out and another coming in. 27. On the record before me there is no outgoing advocate. M/s Hussein B. Indimuli & Company Advocates prosecuted this suit to judgment; they lodged the notice of appeal dated 28th March, 2025; and nothing on the record shows that they have ceased to act. They have filed no notice of cessation, they have entered no consent, and, significantly, they have raised no complaint about the presence of M/s N.E. Mogusu & RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 14
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Associates. The 1st plaintiff has not elected to act in person. What has occurred is the instruction of a second firm to act alongside the first. That is not a “change of advocate” within the meaning of Order 9 rule 9, and the mischief at which the rule is aimed the displacement of an advocate after judgment, and confusion as to who speaks for the party does not arise. 28. The authorities pressed upon me by the defendant are, with respect, distinguishable. Each of them concerns a firm that purported to come on the record in place of a firm that had acted up to judgment. None addresses the situation of an additional advocate joining a firm that remains on the record. 29. Nor am I persuaded that the document filed is a nullity merely because the words “notice of appointment of additional advocates” do not appear verbatim in the appendices to the Rules. Order 9 rule 7 provides that where a party appoints an advocate to act on his behalf he shall give notice of the appointment, and that the provisions relating to a notice of change apply to such a notice “with the necessary modifications”. Order 48 rule RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 15
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3 provides that the forms used for the purposes of the Act shall be those in the appendices “with such variation as the circumstances of each case may require”. The insertion of the word “additional” is a variation of exactly that character: it describes accurately, rather than obscures, the capacity in which the firm comes on the record. 30. I would add this. A party is entitled to instruct more than one advocate, and the Rules nowhere confine a litigant to a single firm. What the Rules and the interests of orderly practice require is clarity: the other party and the court must know at all times who is authorised to act and where process is to be served. That clarity exists here. The notice of appointment was filed and served, it names both firms, and the defendant has been able to serve and to be served throughout. 31. Even if I were wrong, and the filing of the notice of appointment of additional advocates were an irregularity, I would decline to strike out the motion on that account. The defect, if any, would be one of form RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 16
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and not of substance. It has occasioned the defendant no prejudice whatsoever; the defendant has appeared, taken directions and filed submissions. Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution require this court to administer justice without undue regard to procedural technicalities and to give effect to the overriding objective. Striking out is a draconian remedy, to be reserved for cases in which the vice complained of goes to the root of the proceedings. This is not such a case. 32. For those reasons the preliminary objection dated 13th May, 2026 fails. (ii) Whether a stay of execution pending appeal should issue 33. I turn to the motion. I should say at once that I do not accept the applicants’ submission that, because no replying affidavit was filed, the motion “stands unopposed and should be allowed as prayed”. An order of stay under Order 42 rule 6 is discretionary and is granted only where the statutory conditions are satisfied. The absence of a response relieves an RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 17
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applicant of the burden of answering contrary evidence; it does not relieve him of the burden of making out his case. 34. Order 42 rule 6(1) empowers the court to order a stay of execution of a decree on such terms as may be just. Order 42 rule 6(2) provides that no order for stay shall be made unless: (a) the court is satisfied that substantial loss may result to the applicant unless the order is made and that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and (b) such security as the court orders for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on him has been given by the applicant. 35. The discretion is judicial and must be exercised on the recognised principles. In Butt v Rent Restriction Tribunal [1979] eKLR, the Court of Appeal held that the court has an unfettered discretion which must be exercised so as not to prevent an appeal, that the general principle is to preserve the status quo, and that a judge should balance the competing interests of the parties. At the same time, a successful litigant is not lightly to be denied the fruits of a judgment: see RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 18
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Machira t/a Machira & Co. Advocates v East African Standard (No. 2) [2002] KLR 63. 36. I take first the defendant’s contention that there is nothing to stay because the notice of appeal has, by operation of rule 85 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2022, been deemed withdrawn. This court is not the forum in which that question falls to be decided. Rule 85 confers the power to make such an order upon “the Court”, which is the Court of Appeal, and it is settled that the competence of proceedings before the Court of Appeal, including the fate of a notice of appeal lodged in that court, is a matter for that court and not for this one. I therefore make no finding, and none of what follows should be read as a finding, that the notice of appeal is or is not spent. 37. That said, the passage of time is not irrelevant to the exercise of my discretion. The notice of appeal was lodged in April 2025. Some seventeen months later, the material before me does not establish that a record of appeal has been lodged, or that certified proceedings were applied for, or that any application for extension of RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 19
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time has been made. The 1st plaintiff’s bare averment that “an appeal has been filed”, supported by a bundle said to contain a memorandum of appeal, does not on its own demonstrate an appeal that is being actively pursued. A court will not grant an open-ended stay in aid of an appeal that may never be prosecuted. That consideration goes to the terms on which relief should be granted rather than to the refusal of relief altogether. 38. As to substantial loss, it is trite that substantial loss is the cornerstone of the jurisdiction and that it must be demonstrated rather than merely asserted: see Kenya Shell Ltd v Benjamin Karuga Kibiru & another [1986] KLR 410. The 1st plaintiff’s affidavit says no more than that the amount sought is “quite substantial”. Standing alone, that would not suffice. The decree in question is a money decree for taxed costs, and the defendant is a state corporation whose ability to refund the sum, should the appeal succeed, has not been and could not seriously be questioned. RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 20
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39. There is, however, more on this record than a bare assertion. What is threatened is not the payment of money but the attachment and sale by public auction of movable property furniture, fittings and what appears to be stock in trade employed in a going business. Goods sold at a forced sale are seldom sold at their worth, they cannot be restored in specie, and the auctioneer’s charges endorsed on the proclamation, at Kshs. 163,090/=, are themselves very nearly half of the sum sought to be realised. Should the appeal succeed after such a sale, the 1st plaintiff could not be restored to the position he occupied before it. In my judgment that is capable of amounting to substantial loss within the meaning of Order 42 rule 6(2)(a), though it is loss of a kind that can be wholly answered by the provision of adequate security. 40. On delay, the defendant’s complaint that the motion was brought a year after judgment misapprehends what is sought to be stayed. What is sought to be stayed is execution of the decree for costs, and costs did not become executable until they were taxed and a RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 21
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certificate issued. The warrants issued on 9th March, 2026 and the proclamation was made on 18th March, 2026. The motion was filed on 19th March, 2026, the very next day. Measured against the execution complained of, there was no delay at all, let alone unreasonable delay. The applicants have satisfied the second limb of Order 42 rule 6(2)(a). 41. That leaves security. The 1st plaintiff states that he is ready and willing to provide security for the due performance of the decree. The offer is in the most general terms and is unaccompanied by any proposal as to form or amount. The requirement of security is not a formality; it is the condition upon which the decreeholder is asked to hold his hand. Given that the decretal sum is a modest and readily ascertainable one, the appropriate security is a deposit of the full sum in an interest-earning account held jointly by the advocates for the parties, or a bank guarantee in equivalent terms. 42. There is one further matter. The 1st plaintiff deposes that the 2nd plaintiff is deceased. No application for substitution RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 or for the appointment of a legal 22
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representative of the deceased’s estate has been placed before me, and the motion, though intituled as one by both plaintiffs, is sworn by the 1st plaintiff alone. Execution is levied against the 1st plaintiff, and he is competent to move the court in his own right. I therefore treat the motion as competently brought by him. It will be for those advising the plaintiffs to regularise the representation of the 2nd plaintiff’s estate, without which the intended appeal may itself encounter difficulty. 43. Weighing all of the above, I am satisfied that this is a proper case for a conditional stay. The sum at stake is modest; the applicant offers security; the appeal, if it is genuinely intended, would be rendered nugatory by a forced sale of the attached goods; and the defendant can be fully protected by a deposit of the decretal sum together with the costs already thrown away in the execution. Equally, the defendant should not be kept out of its money indefinitely by an appeal that is not being prosecuted, and the stay will therefore be limited in the manner set out below. RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 23
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(iii) Costs 44. Costs are in the discretion of the court under section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, and ordinarily follow the event. Success here has been divided: the defendant’s objection has failed, while the applicants have obtained relief materially less than that which they sought and only upon conditions. In the circumstances the just order is that the costs of both the preliminary objection and the motion abide the outcome of the intended appeal. Disposition 45. In the result, I make the following orders: i. The defendant’s notice of preliminary objection dated 13th May, 2026 is hereby dismissed. ii. There shall be a stay of execution of the decree and of the certificate of costs issued in this suit, including the warrants of attachment and sale dated 9th March, 2026 and the proclamation dated 18th March, 2026, pending the hearing and determination of the plaintiffs’ RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 24
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intended appeal, subject to the conditions in orders (iii) and (iv) below. iii. The 1st plaintiff shall, within thirty (30) days of the date of this ruling, deposit the sum of Kshs. 345,455/= in an interest-earning account in the joint names of the advocates for the parties at a reputable bank as security for the due performance of the decree. iv. The 1st plaintiff shall, within thirty (30) days of the date of this ruling, pay the auctioneer’s charges and costs thrown away as may be agreed between the parties or, in default of agreement, as assessed in accordance with the Auctioneers Rules, 1997. v. Upon compliance with orders (iii) and (iv), the movable property attached under the proclamation dated 18th March, 2026 shall forthwith be released to the 1st plaintiff. vi. In default of compliance with either of orders (iii) and (iv), the stay granted in order (ii) shall RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 25
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lapse automatically without further reference to the court, and the defendant shall be at liberty to execute. vii. The costs of the preliminary objection dated 13th May, 2026 and of the notice of motion dated 19th March, 2026 shall abide the outcome of the intended appeal. It is so ordered. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT KISUMU THIS 24TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026. E. K. WABWOTO JUDGE RULING ELC 357 OF 2015 26
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