Kinyua v Waithiru

from the registered owner, Elijah Njuguna Gikaba, who resided on the larger parcel. Upon purchasing the property in 2011, the Applicant took immediate vacant possession, built a dwelling house, erected a fence, and moved in with her husband and children, remaining in continuous occupation ever since. 3. In January 2024, she received a demand letter dated 30/10/2023, issued on behalf of the Respondent, requiring her to vacate the property within ninety days on the basis of a Court award. After researching Kenya Law Reports, the Applicant discovered that on 30/10/2017, the Respondent had sued Mr. Gikaba for specic performance of a 1988 sale agreement for one acre. Despite the Applicant already being in physical occupation of her portion when that suit was led, the Respondent did not join her as a party. The case proceeded ex parte as Mr. Gikaba did not enter an appearance, resulting in an ex parte Judgment on November 8/11/2019, that ordered Mr. Gikaba to transfer one acre to the Respondent without specifying which portion of the 2.62-acre property was to be excised or granting any order of eviction. The Applicant contends that the 2017 suit was legally time-barred, having been led twentynine years after the 1988 agreement, and that the underlying transaction was null and void for lack of Land Control Board consent. 4. Following the death of Mr. Gikaba, whose estate remains unrepresented, the Respondent executed the ex parte Judgment by subdividing Parcel 1273 into Parcel 8059, which she transferred to herself, and Parcel 8070, which remained registered under Mr. Gikaba. In doing so, the Respondent allocated to herself the developed portion of the land occupied by various purchasers, including the Applicant, while leaving the undeveloped section under the deceased's name. On 29/01/2024, the Respondent further subdivided Parcel 8059 into twelve separate plots, numbered 9138 through 9149, with the Applicant's long-occupied plot being designated as Title Number Kiambu/Munyu/19142 according to the mutation form. Because the Applicant has maintained actual, open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the plot for over thirteen years since 2011, she asserts that she has acquired ownership through adverse possession, and she prays that her Originating Summons be granted as drawn, alongside an award of costs and interest. 5. In the Adavit the Applicant, Lydia Njoki Kinyua, a resident of Munyu, Kiambu, deposes that on 16/02/2011, she purchased a 40x80 ft plot excised from Title Number Kiambu/Munyu/1273 for Kshs 90,000/- fully paid from Reuben Kamau Kimondo, as evidenced by a copy of the sale agreement marked “LNK 1”. Mr. Kimondo had acquired the land from the registered owner, Elijah Njuguna Gikaba, who resided on the larger parcel. The Applicant took immediate vacant possession, built a dwelling house, fenced the property, and moved in with her family that same year, maintaining continuous residency. In January 2024, she received an eviction demand letter dated 30/10/2023, marked “LNK 2”, written on behalf of the Respondent on the basis of a Court award. Upon researching Kenya Law Reports, the Applicant discovered a Plaint, annexed as “LNK 3”, led by the Respondent on 30/10/2017, seeking specic performance of a 1988 sale agreement against Mr. Gikaba without enjoining the Applicant, despite her physical occupation. In response to the demand, the Applicant issued a formal reply letter, annexed as “LNK 4”. 6. The Applicant further states that the 2017 suit proceeded ex-parte and yielded a Judgment on November 8/11/2019, annexed as “LNK 5”, ordering the transfer of one acre without specifying the exact location within the 2.62-acre parent parcel or granting eviction orders. She contends that the underlying 1988 suit was time-barred after 29 years and void for lack of Land Control Board consent. Following the unrepresented death of Mr. Gikaba, the Respondent executed the Judgment by subdividing Parcel 1273 into Parcel 8059 (transferred to the Respondent) and Parcel 8060 (retained by the deceased), as shown on the green card for Parcel 1273 marked “LNK 6”. 7. The Respondent strategically allocated herself the developed portion occupied by buyers like the Applicant, leaving the undeveloped area to the deceased's name. On January 29/01/2024, the https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5551/eng@2026-09-21 2

page 2 of 9

Respondent further subdivided Parcel 8059 into twelve plots (Parcels 9138–9149), evidenced by the green card for Parcel 8059 and mutation form marked “LNK 7”. The Applicant's plot, occupied since 2011, was assigned Title Number Kiambu/Munyu/9142, as shown on the green card marked “LNK 8”. Having maintained open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession for 13 years, the Applicant asserts acquisition of title by adverse possession and prays for the suit to be allowed as drawn. 8. For the above and other reasons, the Plainti prays for the four orders in paragraph one [1] above. 9. The Summons is opposed by the Respondent who has sworn a Replying Adavit dated 16/09/2024. The Respondent, Nancy Wanjiru Waithiru, opposes the Originating Summons dated 9/04/2024, asserting that the application relies on speculative evidence and constitutes an abuse of the Court process. She deposes that she is the lawful registered proprietor of the suit property, having obtained ownership pursuant to the Judgment in Environment and Land Court Case Number 808 of 2017, as evidenced by a copy of the title deed marked “NWW”. 10. The underlying claim originated from a 1988 sale agreement between her late husband, Patrick Waithiru Muhoro, and the late Elijah Njuguna Gikaba for one acre of land out of parcel Kiambu/ Munyu/1273. Following Mr. Gikaba's failure to complete the transfer, Mr. Muhoro lodged a caution against the parent parcel in 2012, supported by ocial search records marked “NWW 1”. Prior to his passing, Mr. Muhoro sought administrative intervention from the local chief, who issued a letter dated 26/05/2011, marked “NWW 2”, recommending a caution be placed on the land until the dispute was resolved. The Respondent subsequently instituted a suit as legal representative of her husband's estate, securing a favorable Judgment on 8/11/2019, marked “NWW 3”. 11. Pursuant to the 2019 Judgment, parcel 1273 was subdivided into parcel 8059 (registered to the Respondent) and parcel 8060 (retained under Mr. Gikaba's name). The Respondent then subdivided parcel 8059 into twelve 40 by 80 feet portions as shown in the mutation form marked “NWW 4”, which yielded the suit plot, Kiambu/Munyu/9142. She obtained individual titles for these parcels and instructed her Advocates to notify the Applicant that her occupation constituted trespass, supported by the green card entry dated 16/08/2024, marked “NWW 5”. The Respondent rst encountered the Applicant in 2019 after Judgment was delivered, informing her of the Court decree dated 17/12/2019, marked “NWW 6”, which conrmed her ownership. 12. Addressing the adverse possession claim, the Respondent contends that time could not run in favor of the Applicant due to the active caution placed on parcel 1273, which remained until its removal post-Judgment, as shown by registration and payment receipts marked “NWW 7”. She denies that the Applicant’s possession was hostile or uninterrupted, highlighting repeated, unsuccessful attempts to evict her, including Chief-led interventions. Furthermore, she asserts that the Applicant's entry was based on misrepresentation through a transaction with Reuben Kamau Kimondo, who was never a registered owner on the green cards for parcel 1273 (marked “NWW 8”) or parcel 8059 (marked “NWW 9”). The Respondent maintains that the Applicant is a trespasser, and she prays for the suit to be dismissed with costs to protect her rights as the registered owner. 13. At the trial on 13/05/2026, the Applicant and the Respondent testied as per their respective pleadings and testimonies. The Applicant testied as the only witness and also the Respondent testied as the only witness. In their testimonies they did not deviate from the positions that they have taken in their witness statements even in the face of intense cross-examination by Counsel for the adverse party. 14. Counsel for the parties led written submissions dated 02/06/2026 and 19/07/2026 respectively. 15. The Applicant in her written submissions, asserts that she has met the statutory threshold to acquire title to the suit property, L.R. No. Kiambu/Munyu/9142, through the doctrine of adverse possession. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5551/eng@2026-09-21 3

page 3 of 9

Tracing the title history via the abstracts of title (green cards), the Applicant demonstrates that parcel 9142 was excised from parcel 8059 (PEXH 7), which was itself a subdivision of the original parent parcel, Kiambu/Munyu/1273 (PEXH 6). 16. The parent parcel was registered under Elijah Njuguna Gikaba in 2002, and although a caution was registered in 2012 and withdrawn in 2021, the land was subsequently subdivided in December 2024 into parcels 8059 and 8060 pursuant to an ex parte decree in Thika ELC Case No. 808 of 2017. The Applicant maintains that she took actual physical possession of her 40 x 80 ft portion in February 2011 pursuant to a sale agreement with Reuben Kamau Kimondo who had purchased from Mr. Gikaba and immediately constructed a family dwelling house where she has continuously resided. The sale agreement was relied upon solely to establish the date of entry, with the Applicant arguing that the lack of Land Control Board consent is immaterial to an adverse possession claim. 17. The Applicant contends that her occupation was open, peaceful, and known to the registered owner, Mr. Gikaba, who took no steps to dispossess her. She argues that the Respondent obtained an ex parte Judgment for one acre against Mr. Gikaba in a time-barred suit and unilaterally directed a surveyor to excise that acre over portions already occupied and developed by third-party purchasers. The Respondent then subdivided parcel 8059 into plots, designating the Applicant’s developed land as parcel 9142 in an attempt to compel her to repurchase the property for Kshs 600,000/-. 18. To support her legal position, the Applicant relies on Thaitumu v. Iguathu & 8 Others [2014] eKLR (as cited in Joram v. Obadiah (Civil Appeal E021 of 2021) [2026] KECA 367 (KLR)) and Samuel Kihamba v. Mary Mbaisi [2015] eKLR, establishing that a claimant must prove open, nonpermissive, and uninterrupted dispossession of the registered owner with the intention to hold the land. Furthermore, addressing the Respondent's registration, the Applicant cites Mwangi Githu v. Livingstone Ndeete (Civil Appeal No. 24 of 1979) to submit that a change of ownership or subsequent subdivision does not interrupt adverse possession, as the purchaser takes the title subject to the overriding equitable interests of a squatter in possession. Having maintained continuous and exclusive occupation for thirteen years between February 2011 and the ling of the suit in April 2024, the Applicant prays for the suit to be allowed as drawn. 19. In response, the Respondent in her submissions submits that the Applicant has failed to establish a claim for adverse possession over the suit property, L.R. No. Kiambu/Munyu/9142, which was created from the lawful subdivision of parcel Kiambu/Munyu/8059 a portion excised from the parent parcel Kiambu/Munyu/1273 following an ex parte decree in Thika ELC Case No. 808 of 2017. Tracing her title to a 1988 transaction between her late husband, Patrick Waithiru Muhoro, and the original owner, the late Elijah Njuguna Gikaba, the Respondent contends that the Applicant’s initial entry onto the land arose from an agreement with a third party who lacked registered title or legal capacity to transfer ownership, rendering such entry incapable of founding an adverse possession claim. 20. To anchor the legal requirements for adverse possession, the Respondent relies on Muthini v. Karanja [2025] KEELC 4748 (KLR), arguing that a claimant must prove actual, open, peaceful, and continuous occupation without the owner's consent for at least twelve years, a burden she asserts the Applicant has failed to discharge through cogent evidence such as utility bills, dated photographs, or approvals. Distinguishing adverse possession from illegal entry, the Respondent cites Susan Moss v. Silas Siele Stephen & Another [2018] KECA 597 (KLR) to submit that entry via a person without title constitutes illegal occupation rather than adverse possession. Citing the classic test in Kimani Ruchine vs. Swift Rutherford & Co Ltd [1980] KLR, she argues that possession must be nec vi, nec clam, nec precario and remain unbroken by attempts to interrupt it. The Respondent asserts that no structures existed on the land between 2011 and 2018, and that she only discovered the Applicant's presence in 2019 post-Judgment. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5551/eng@2026-09-21 4

page 4 of 9

21. The Respondent further contends that continuous assertion of title by her and her late husband through a 2012 caution, succession proceedings, the 2017 suit, the 2019 decree, and subsequent eviction notices defeated any claim of uninterrupted possession. Citing Mtana Lewa v. Kahindi Ngala Mwagandi [2015] eKLR per Makhandia JA, she emphasizes that adverse possession arises from an owner's inaction, whereas her family actively asserted rights. Relying on Andafu v. Akhulunya [2025] KECA 714 (KLR), the Respondent submits that active Court proceedings aggressively interrupt the running of statutory time under Sections 7, 13, 17, and 38 of the Limitation of Actions Act (Cap 22). Finally, she argues that the Applicant’s previous attempts to negotiate a purchase and set aside the 2019 decree amounted to an express recognition of the Respondent’s title, praying that the Originating Summons dated 9/04/2024, be dismissed with costs. Issues for Determination 22. The record presents two key issues for determination: a. Whether the Applicant has established the requisite elements of adverse possession over the suit property known as L.R. No. Kiambu/Munyu/9142 for the statutory period of twelve years under Section 7 and Section 38 of the Limitation of Actions Act; and, b. Whether the running of statutory time in favour of the Applicant was interrupted by the Respondent’s registration of a caution, the ling and prosecution of Thika ELC Case No. 808 of 2017, or the subsequent subdivisions and changes in title. Analysis and Determination 23. I have carefully considered all the evidence adduced in this case including the adavits, the witnesses statements, the documents and the testimonies at the trial. I have also considered the written submissions by both sides, the issues raised thereon as well as the law cited therein. I make the following ndings on the key issues identied. 24. Regarding the rst issue, a critical analysis demonstrates that the doctrine of adverse possession requires a claimant to establish exclusive, continuous, open, and non-permissive possession of the land for a period exceeding twelve years, accompanied by an intention to dispossess the true owner. In Sisto Wambugu v Kamau Njuguna [1983] KECA 69 (KLR), the Court of Appeal held that time for the purpose of adverse possession begins to run from the date the true owner is dispossessed or discontinues possession, provided the entry of the squatter is non-consensual or becomes hostile upon the expiry or determination of any underlying permission. The Court emphasized that proper possession must be nec vi, nec clam, nec precario meaning without force, without secrecy, and without permission. 25. This formulation, restated recently by the Court of Appeal in M'Riria & 5 Others v Muthomi (Civil Appeal 253 of 2019) [2025] KECA 951 (KLR), which rearmed that a claimant must prove nonpermissive or non-consensual actual, open, notorious, exclusive and adverse use for the statutory period without interruption. Applied to the present facts, the Applicant's evidence, corroborated by the sale agreement of 16/02/2011, establishes that she entered the suit portion in February 2011, erected a dwelling house and a fence, and has lived there continuously with her family to date, a period exceeding thirteen years by the time the Originating Summons was led. Nothing on record displaces that account; indeed the Respondent's own pleadings concede that the developed portion occupied by purchasers such as the Applicant was what she deliberately excised to herself, an implicit admission of long standing physical occupation on the ground. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5551/eng@2026-09-21 5

page 5 of 9

26. The Applicant testied that she entered upon the 40 by 80 feet portion in February 2011 pursuant to an agreement with a third party, Reuben Kamau Kimondo, who had no registered title. While the Respondent contends that such entry via an unauthorized vendor renders the occupation illegal, the decision in Mbui Mukangu v. Gerald Mutwiria [2004] eKLR claries that entry under an invalid transaction or from a person lacking title does not prevent the occupation from being adverse to the registered proprietor. The Court of Appeal in Mbui Mukangu held that where a purchaser enters into possession of land under a void contract or from a vendor who cannot pass good title, the purchaser’s possession is non-permissive as against the real registered owner, and time begins to run immediately in their favour from the moment of physical entry. The Applicant took physical possession in February 2011, constructed a residential home, erected perimeter fencing, and resided there openly with her family without any license or consent from the registered owner, Elijah Njuguna Gikaba. Applying the principle in Mbui Mukangu, the lack of legal title in the vendor Kimondo did not invalidate the adverse nature of the Applicant’s possession; rather, it fortied the hostility of her occupation against the registered title holder from February 2011 onwards. 27. The Court of Appeal addressed a closely analogous scenario in Situma v Cherongo (Civil Appeal 351 of 2002) [2007] KECA 486 (KLR) where the bench of Tunoi, Githinji and Onyango-Otieno JJA held that where a purchaser of agricultural land is let into possession pending completion of a sale and the transaction subsequently becomes void for want of Land Control Board consent, the permission under which the purchaser held the land is terminated by operation of law, and continued possession thereafter, being no longer permissive, becomes adverse from the date the transaction lapsed. The logic of that authority applies with equal force where, as here, an intermediate purchaser without registered title lets a sub-purchaser into occupation; what matters for purposes of the doctrine is not the validity of the private contractual chain between the Applicant and Mr Kimondo, but the relationship between her occupation and the interest of the registered proprietor, Mr Gikaba, who took no steps whatsoever to disturb her possession during his lifetime. This Court also draws guidance from Mbugua Njuguna v Elijah Mburu Wanyoike, Civil Appeal No. 27 of 2002, where it was held that where a sale transaction lapses for want of Land Control Board consent, time for purposes of adverse possession runs from the date the claimant was put into possession of the land, and not from the date on which consent ought to have been sought, conrming that the absence of Land Control Board consent to the underlying sale agreements in this matter is immaterial to the computation of the twelve-year period, which properly runs from February 2011. 28. Turning to the second issue, the Respondent's case rests substantially on the proposition that the 2012 caution, the institution of Thika ELC Case No. 808 of 2017, and the eviction demand of 30/10/2023 each interrupted the running of time against her. A critical analysis of whether the statutory period was interrupted requires an examination of the legal eect of cautions, Court suits, and subdivisions. The Respondent contends that time was stopped by the lodgment of a caution on the parent parcel in 2012, the ling of Thika ELC Case No. 808 of 2017, and the subsequent post-Judgment subdivisions that created title parcel 9142. On the eect of changing titles and subdivisions, the Court of Appeal in Titus Mutuku Kasuve v. Mwaani Investments Limited & 4 Others [2004] 1 KLR 184 unequivocally settled that the mere change of ownership, registration of transfers, or subsequent subdivisions of land occupied by an adverse possessor does not interrupt the running of statutory time in favour of the squatter. The Court stated that a purchaser or new registered proprietor takes the title subject to the overriding equitable interests and physical rights of the person in actual occupation under Section 28 of the Land Registration Act. Thus, the Respondent’s excision of parcel 8059 and its further subdivision into parcel 9142 in 2024 did not reset the clock against the Applicant. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5551/eng@2026-09-21 6

page 6 of 9

29. This Court is unable to agree that any of these steps availed the Respondent or her late husband against this particular Applicant. It has been held that a mere demand or eviction letter, even where issued by an Advocate or a local administrator, does not amount in law to an assertion of title capable of interrupting time, and that only eviction, or the institution of a suit against the particular trespasser in occupation, will suce; as was stated in an Environment and Land Court decision at Nairobi, a letter by the proprietor does not amount to assertion of title in law and cannot interrupt the passage of time, whereas the institution of a suit against a trespasser does interrupt and stop time from running, because eviction is not always achievable without a breach of the peace. The diculty for the Respondent is that neither she, her late husband, nor Mr Gikaba ever sued the Applicant, evicted her, or took any step directed at her personally at any time before the ex parte Judgment of 8/11/2019; the 2017 suit was directed exclusively at Mr Gikaba for specic performance of the 1988 agreement, and did not name, join or serve the Applicant, despite her being visibly settled on the ground with a dwelling house and a fence since 2011. A decree obtained against a registered proprietor in a suit to which an occupant already in adverse possession was not made a party cannot, as a matter of law, operate to interrupt time running in that occupant's favour, since assertion of title requires action directed at the actual possessor. 30. As regards the caution registered in 2012, this Court nds that registration of a caution, being a purely protective entry on the register that does not itself involve eviction, recovery proceedings, or physical reassertion of control over the occupied portion, cannot on its own interrupt time running against an occupant who was neither aware of it nor disturbed by it. Nor can the death of Mr Gikaba, or the Respondent's subsequent self-transfer and repeated subdivisions of the parent parcel, avail her, for it is settled that a change in registered proprietorship, whether by death, succession or transfer, does not interrupt an already accruing claim of adverse possession. This principle nds support in the decision citing Peter Thuo Kairu v Kuria Gacheru, [1988] KECA 124 (KLR) where it was held that once adverse possession has begun to run, neither the death of the registered proprietor nor the subsequent registration of new owners can interrupt the running of time, and that by the time new proprietors are registered, if the twelve years have already lapsed, the original and successor owners alike lose the capacity to recover the land. 31. The same principle was applied where a registered proprietor transferred suit land to a third party after an occupant's rights had begun to accrue; it was held in a decision of brahim Wachira Karaguri v Mary Mwihaki Simon & Another [2020] KEELC 111 (KLR) the Court held that the transfer of the suit land to a subsequent proprietor neither stopped time from running in favour of the person in possession nor extinguished the rights of adverse possession already accruing to her, the land at the point of transfer being subject to an overriding interest in the form of adverse possession under section 28 of the Land Registration Act, a holding traceable to the earlier authority that adverse possession runs with the land irrespective of any change in proprietorship. 32. Applying that reasoning here, the Respondent's self-transfer of Parcel 8059 to herself, and the subsequent creation of the twelve daughter titles including Kiambu/Munyu/9142, being acts occurring long after the Applicant had already commenced and substantially completed the running of the statutory period, could not defeat or interrupt an interest that had already begun to crystallise as an overriding interest binding on successive registered proprietors. 33. The Court further observes, without making it determinative of the two framed issues, that the manner in which the estate of the late Mr Gikaba was dealt with following his death raises its own questions as to the sanctity the Respondent seeks to attach to her paper title, since the subdivision of land in which a deceased person retained a registered interest, executed without evidence of a grant of representation over his estate, is itself an irregular exercise of proprietary power. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5551/eng@2026-09-21 7

page 7 of 9

34. Courts have consistently emphasised that transactions touching the estate of a deceased registered proprietor undertaken outside the framework of the Law of Succession Act, and without a grant, are liable to be treated as void, a principle reected in the reasoning applied where the impact of a party in a suit without locus standi is equated to that of a Court acting without jurisdiction, rendering the resultant proceedings null and void, a diculty that becomes especially acute where the estate of a deceased person is involved. While this observation is not strictly necessary to the disposal of the two issues for determination, it reinforces the conclusion that the equitable claim of a long-settled occupant such as the Applicant ought not to yield to procedurally doubtful paper transactions eected years after her rights had already begun to accrue see Dokhole & Another v Usinfecha & 5 Others [2025] KEELC 3266 (KLR) 35. Furthermore, regarding whether administrative cautions or suits against third parties interrupt possession, the Court of Appeal in Githu v. Ndeete [1984] KLR 776 armed that to eectively interrupt adverse possession, the registered proprietor must either re-enter the land peaceably or institute eective legal proceedings directly seeking eviction or recovery of possession against the actual occupant before the twelve-year period lapses. In Githu v. Ndeete, the judges observed that mere protests, demand letters, administrative cautions, or suits that do not culminate in physical dispossession or structural eviction orders against the specic possessor leave the occupant's physical hold over the land unbroken. In the instant matter, the 2017 suit led by the Respondent was purely for specic performance against the estate of Elijah Njuguna Gikaba, to which the Applicant was never joined as a party, nor were any eviction orders granted against her. As the Applicant maintained physical, open, and exclusive occupation from February 2011 to April 2024 - a period of thirteen years - without any decree of eviction being executed against her, statutory time accrued fully under Section 7 of the Limitation of Actions Act, extinguishing the registered proprietor's title and vesting an indefeasible equitable right in the Applicant. 36. Based on the foregoing critical legal analysis, the nal determination of this Court is that the Originating Summons dated 09/04/2024, is meritorious and ought to be allowed as prayed. The Applicant has successfully demonstrated on a balance of probabilities that she has been in actual, continuous, open, exclusive, and hostile possession of the suit property for an uninterrupted period exceeding thirteen years, thereby extinguishing the Respondent’s title to that specic portion by operation of law under Section 7 and Section 38 of the Limitation of Actions Act. 37. Consequently, the Court issues the following nal orders: i. A declaration is hereby issued that the Applicant, Lydia Njoki Kinyua, has acquired ownership and is entitled to be registered as the proprietor of all that portion of land measuring 40 feet by 80 feet, designated as Title Number Kiambu/Munyu/9142 (excised from Kiambu/ Munyu/8059 and originally part of Kiambu/Munyu/1273), by virtue of the Doctrine of Adverse Possession. ii. An order is hereby issued compelling the Respondent, Nancy Wanjiru Waithiru, to execute all necessary transfer documents, consents, and forms required to vest full absolute ownership of the plot known as L.R. NO. Kiambu/Munyu/9142 into the name of the Applicant within thirty days from the date of this Judgment, and in default, the Deputy Registrar of this Honorable Court be and is hereby authorized to execute all such necessary transfer and registration documents on her behalf. iii. An order is hereby issued directing the Land Registrar, Kiambu, to dispense with the production of the original title deed for Title Number Kiambu/Munyu/9142 held by the https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5551/eng@2026-09-21 8

page 8 of 9

Respondent, and to register the transfer and issue a new Certicate of Title for L.R. NO. Kiambu/Munyu/9142 directly in the name of the Applicant, LYDIA NJOKI KINYUA. iv. The Respondent shall bear the costs of this suit. v. Orders Accordingly. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED IN VIRTUAL COURT AT THIKA THIS 21ST DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026. ……………………… MOGENI J. JUDGE In the presence of:Mr. Gakenia holding brief for Mr. Waichungo for the Applicant Ms. Njuguna for the Respondent Mr. Melita - Court Assistant https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5551/eng@2026-09-21 9

page 9 of 9