Wambura v Omari & 24 others & another (Environment and Land Case 196 of 2013) [2026] KEELC 5442 (KLR) (17 September 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELC 5442 (KLR) REPUBLIC OF KENYA IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT KISUMU ENVIRONMENT AND LAND CASE 196 OF 2013 EK WABWOTO, J SEPTEMBER 17, 2026 BETWEEN PETER WELLINGTON WAMBURA ...................................................... PLAINTIFF AND MARY ATIENO OMARI & 24 OTHERS ............................................ DEFENDANT AND DANIEL OTIENO AGOLA ..................................................... INTERESTED PARTY RULING 1. What falls for determination is the Notice of Motion dated 10th July 2026 taken out by Daniel Otieno Agola, the Interested Party herein (hereinafter “the Applicant”). The Motion is expressed to be brought under Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2022, sections 3A and 3B of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, Article 159 of the Constitution and all other enabling provisions of the law. 2. Before rehearsing the rival positions, it is convenient to set out the procedural history of this matter, for much of what I have to decide turns upon it. 3. The suit was commenced by a plaint dated 24th July 2013. The Plainti sought declarations impeaching the creation of Title No. Kisumu/Kanyakwar “B”/1410, the registration of the 1st and 2nd Defendants as proprietors thereof and the subsequent subdivision of and transfers arising from that title; permanent injunctions; general damages for trespass; and costs, all in respect of all that parcel of land known as L.R. No. 22929 comprised in Grant No. I.R. 73665. The Applicant was enjoined as an Interested Party and led a statement of defence on 29th October 2020, in which he asserted that the suit property had been carved out of land parcel Title No. Kisumu/Kanyakwar “B”/385, which had belonged to his late father, Gordon Mark Agola Hongo, and he prayed that the Plainti’s suit be struck out. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5442/eng@2026-09-17 1
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4. The suit proceeded to full trial. Judgment was delivered on 1st August 2025 (S. Okong’o, J.). The Court entered judgment for the Plainti against the 1st to 23rd Defendants; declared the creation, registration, subdivision and transfer of Title No. Kisumu/Kanyakwar “B”/1410 and the sub-parcels derived therefrom irregular, fraudulent, illegal, null and void; granted permanent injunctions against the Defendants named in the decree; awarded the Plainti Kshs. 4,200,000/- as general damages for trespass payable by the Defendants there specied; and awarded the Plainti the costs of the suit against those Defendants. As regards the Applicant, the Court found, in terms, that there was no proof that the suit property is part of, or was created from, land parcel Title No. Kisumu/Kanyakwar “B”/385, that the Applicant had failed to establish valid grounds for challenging the Plainti’s title, and that the parcels of land claimed by him were not related to the suit property. The only order touching the Applicant was that he bears his own costs of the suit. 5. On 10th November 2025 the Applicant took out a Notice of Motion seeking, in substance, an order staying this matter pending the determination of ELC Case No. E006 of 2023 and Winam MCELC Case No. 13 of 2021, upon the assertion that those proceedings concern the same subject matter. By a ruling delivered on 2nd July 2026 (E. Asati, J.) that application was dismissed with costs to the Plainti, the Court holding that the existence and status of the two suits had not been demonstrated, that no nexus between those suits and the present suit had been established, and that the present suit was in any event concluded. 6. The Motion now before me was led eight days after that ruling. The application 7. 8. The Motion seeks the following substantive orders: a) that pending the hearing and determination of the application, there be a temporary stay of execution and/or implementation of the judgment delivered on 1st August 2026 [sic] and the ruling delivered on 2nd July 2026; b) that pending the hearing and determination of the intended appeal, there be a stay of execution and/or stay of implementation of the whole judgment and the whole ruling aforesaid; c) that pending the determination of the appeal, the Respondents, their servants, agents or any person acting under their authority be restrained from transferring, alienating, subdividing, charging, disposing of, registering any dealings over, or in any manner interfering with the disputed parcels of land; and d) that the costs of the application abide the outcome of the appeal. The Motion is premised upon thirteen grounds on its face. In summary, the Applicant contends that he has lodged a notice of appeal and led an appeal against the whole judgment and the whole ruling; that the intended appeal is arguable and raises serious issues of law and fact; that the learned Judge failed to determine the principal issue of ownership of the disputed parcels; that the learned Judge failed to consider and determine the legal eect of the determination of the National Land Commission published in the Kenya Gazette on 17th July 2017 and 26th September 2017, which is said to have found that the impugned titles were illegally acquired and to have recommended their cancellation and reversion of the land to its lawful owner; that the learned Judge failed to evaluate material documentary evidence, including a letter dated 11th July 2013 relating to L.R. No. 22929; that the learned Judge erred in nding that no nexus existed between this suit, ELC No. E006 of 2023 and Winam ELC No. 13 of 2021; that unless the orders sought are granted the Respondents may eect dealings, transfers or subdivisions over the disputed land, so altering the status of the suit property and rendering the https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5442/eng@2026-09-17 2
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intended appeal nugatory; that the Applicant will suer substantial and irreparable prejudice incapable of compensation in damages; that no prejudice incapable of compensation will be occasioned to the Respondents; that the application has been brought without unreasonable delay and in good faith; and that this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter. 9. The Motion is supported by the adavit of the Applicant sworn on 10th July 2026. He deposes that he led a notice of appeal dated 9th July 2026; that the appeal raises substantial issues of law and fact with overwhelming chances of success; that the dispute concerns ownership of land comprised in Kisumu/ Kanyakwar, Mamboleo, South Kajulu, Kasule and Kolwa Plots Nos. 844, 384, 385, 390 and 469; that he produced at the trial documentary evidence of the investigations and ndings of the National Land Commission published in the Kenya Gazette; that the learned Judge failed to evaluate those ndings or explain why they were rejected; that unless execution and implementation are stayed there is a real likelihood of further transfers, registrations, subdivisions or other dealings aecting the suit property; that the subject matter of the appeal would thereby be irreversibly altered; and that the balance of convenience favours preserving the existing status of the land. 10. The Applicant subsequently swore a further supporting adavit in response to the Plainti’s replying adavit. In it he maintains that his memorandum of appeal raises substantial issues; that the trial court failed to determine the legal eect of the National Land Commission’s ndings; that the Respondent’s assertion that the issues were fully determined merely reects disagreement with his grounds of appeal; that the disputes in the three suits concern substantially the same parcels of land, the same ownership issues and substantially the same parties; that the contention that he failed to demonstrate ownership is itself among the matters challenged on appeal and cannot be conclusively determined at an interlocutory stage; that the objection as to the competence of his notice of appeal is a matter for the appellate court and should not defeat the present application; and that, in any event, the present application also challenges the ruling of 2nd July 2026 and is founded upon a notice of appeal led in respect thereof. The response 11. The application is opposed by the Plainti, who led grounds of opposition dated 27th July 2026 and a replying adavit sworn on the same date by Ruth Akinyi Olum, an advocate having conduct of the matter on his behalf. The 2nd to 25th Defendants did not respond to the application. 12. The sixteen grounds of opposition may be compressed as follows. The application is frivolous, misconceived and an abuse of the process of the Court. It is incompetent, there being no valid and competent notice of appeal against the judgment delivered on 1st August 2025, the purported notice having been lodged almost eleven months after delivery of the judgment, without leave, and being therefore incurably defective in so far as it relates to the judgment. In the absence of a competent notice of appeal, it is said, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the prayer for stay of execution of the judgment under Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules. The Applicant has disclosed no order enlarging time. He has failed to satisfy the principles governing relief under Rule 5(2)(b), having demonstrated neither an arguable appeal nor that the intended appeal would be rendered nugatory. The application seeks to re-litigate issues conclusively determined at the trial, and repeats matters that were the subject of the Notice of Motion dated 10th November 2025, dismissed on 2nd July 2026. No imminent threat of alienation, transfer or waste has been demonstrated; the allegations of substantial loss are speculative and unsupported by evidence; the Plainti, as the successful litigant, is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his judgment; and the application has been brought solely to delay and obstruct implementation of the judgment. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5442/eng@2026-09-17 3
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13. The replying adavit traverses the Applicant’s depositions along the same lines. It emphasises that the judgment sought to be stayed was delivered on 1st August 2025; that the notice of appeal is dated 10th July 2026 and is hopelessly out of time in so far as it relates to that judgment; that no order extending time has been exhibited; that the Court held there was no proof whatsoever that the suit property forms part of or was created from Kisumu/Kanyakwar “B”/384, 385 or 844; that the Applicant has merely reproduced arguments fully canvassed at the trial and in his application dated 10th November 2025; that no evidence of any impending dealings with the suit property has been exhibited; that the parcels are in any event identiable and traceable through the land registration system; and that the Plainti, having litigated since 2013, would be seriously prejudiced by further delay. The submissions 14. The Applicant led written submissions dated 23rd July 2026 and a further set of written submissions led together with his further supporting adavit. He frames two issues: whether the intended appeal is arguable, and whether it will be rendered nugatory if the orders are not granted. On the rst, he submits that the intended appeal raises bona de issues, namely whether the learned Judge failed to determine the central issue of ownership; whether the legal eect of the National Land Commission determination published in Kenya Gazette Notice Vol. CXIX No. 97 dated 17th July 2017 and the subsequent Gazette Notice dated 26th September 2017 was considered; whether the documentary evidence, including the letter dated 11th July 2013 relating to L.R. No. 22929, was properly evaluated; whether the nding that there was no nexus between this suit and the other two suits was erroneous; and whether the evidence concerning Kisumu/Kanyakwar Plot No. 385 and the derived parcels was properly considered. He relies on Stanley Kang’ethe Kinyanjui v. Tony Ketter & 5 Others [2013] eKLR and Ishmael Kagunyi Thande v. Housing Finance Company of Kenya Ltd, Civil Application No. NAI 156 of 2006 for the proposition that an arguable appeal is not one that must necessarily succeed but one which raises at least one bona de issue deserving consideration, and that the Court is not at this stage called upon to determine the merits of the appeal. 15. On the nugatory aspect, the Applicant submits that unless the orders sought are granted the Respondents may transfer, alienate, subdivide, charge or otherwise deal with the suit property; that third party interests may thereby arise and fundamentally alter the subject matter; that the dispute concerns immovable property whose preservation is necessary pending appeal; and he relies on Reliance Bank Ltd (In Liquidation) v. Norlake Investments Ltd [2002] 1 EA 227 and Oraro & Rachier Advocates v. Co-operative Bank of Kenya Ltd [1999] eKLR for the proposition that the jurisdiction exists to preserve the subject matter of the intended appeal. He adds that the Respondent’s objection to the competence of the notice of appeal is misconceived and does not defeat the present application. 16. The Plainti led submissions dated 28th July 2026 framing three issues: whether there is a competent notice of appeal against the judgment; whether the Applicant has satised the principles under Rule 5(2)(b); and whether the application is an abuse of the process of the Court. He submits that Rule 77(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2022 requires a notice of appeal to be lodged within fourteen days of the impugned decision; that no compliance and no enlargement of time has been demonstrated; and that, relying on Equity Bank Limited v. West Link MBO Limited [2013] eKLR and Mae Properties Limited v. Joseph Kibe & Another [2017] eKLR, the jurisdiction under Rule 5(2)(b) is predicated upon the existence of a competent notice of appeal and that compliance with the timelines prescribed by the Rules is mandatory. He further submits that the intended appeal merely rehashes issues conclusively determined after a full trial; that no imminent danger of transfer or disposal has been demonstrated; that implementation of the judgment has already commenced, negotiations having been undertaken with aected parties, payments made and the process of subdivision begun; and that https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5442/eng@2026-09-17 4
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the present application repackages the complaints rejected on 2nd July 2026 and is intended only to delay the Plainti’s enjoyment of the fruits of a judgment obtained after more than twelve years of litigation. Issues for determination 17. I have carefully considered the Motion, the grounds on its face, the supporting and further supporting adavits, the grounds of opposition, the replying adavit, the rival written submissions and the authorities cited. In my view the following issues arise for determination: (i) Whether this Court is possessed of jurisdiction to entertain and determine an application brought under Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2022; (ii) Whether, if it is not, the application may nonetheless be saved and treated as one brought under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules; (iii) Whether, so treated, the Applicant has established a case for stay of execution and injunctive relief pending appeal; and (iv) Who should bear the costs of the application. Analysis and Determination (i) Whether this Court has jurisdiction under Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2022 18. I begin with jurisdiction, as I must. The question is squarely raised on the pleadings: ground 4 of the grounds of opposition asserts that “this Honorable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the prayer for stay of execution of the Judgment under Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules”, and ground 13 of the Motion asserts the converse. In any event, jurisdiction is a matter that a court is entitled, and indeed obliged, to satisfy itself upon on its own motion at any stage, since no amount of consent, acquiescence or industry of counsel can confer it. 19. The locus classicus remains Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v. Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1, where Nyarangi, J.A. observed: “ Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court has no power to make one more step. Where a court has no jurisdiction, there would be no basis for a continuation of proceedings pending other evidence. A court of law downs tools in respect of the matter before it the moment it holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction.” 20. The source of jurisdiction was authoritatively stated by the Supreme Court in Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another v. Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 Others [2012] eKLR: “ A Court’s jurisdiction ows from either the Constitution or legislation or both. Thus, a Court of law can only exercise jurisdiction as conferred by the Constitution or other written law. It cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that which is conferred upon it by law.” 21. Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2022 provides that, subject to sub-rule (1), the institution of an appeal shall not operate to suspend any sentence or to stay execution, but that the Court may, in any civil proceedings where a notice of appeal has been lodged, order a stay of execution, an injunction or a stay of any further proceedings on such terms as the Court may think just. The expression “the Court” in those Rules means the Court of Appeal. The Rules are subsidiary legislation made by the Rules Committee under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, and they regulate the practice and procedure https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5442/eng@2026-09-17 5
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of the Court of Appeal alone. Sections 3A and 3B of that Act, likewise invoked in the Motion, are the overriding objective provisions applicable to the exercise of the Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction. Neither the Rules nor those sections confer any power whatsoever upon this Court. 22. The point is placed beyond argument by Equity Bank Limited v. West Link MBO Limited [2013] eKLR an authority relied upon by the Plainti himself in which the Court of Appeal, having examined the constitutional foundation of the jurisdiction, characterised an application under Rule 5(2)(b) as an interlocutory application within the intended appeal, brought before the Court of Appeal, in which that Court exercises an original and independent discretion as a court of rst instance. The Court expressly identied Rule 5(2)(b) as “the counterpart” of Order 42 Rule 6(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, the latter being the provision under which the court appealed from may grant a stay. To the same eect are Safaricom Limited v. Ocean View Beach Hotel Limited & 2 Others [2010] eKLR and Githunguri v. Jimba Credit Corporation Ltd (No. 2) [1988] KLR 838. 23. This Court is established under Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and the Environment and Land Court Act, 2011. It is a court of the status of the High Court. It is emphatically not the Court of Appeal, and it cannot exercise the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal. An application asking this Court to grant relief under Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules asks it to do something it has no power to do. 24. That diculty is compounded by the form of the Motion itself. It is headed “In the Court of Appeal of Kenya at Kisumu, Civil Appeal No. … of 2026” and describes the Applicant as “Appellant/Applicant”. The supporting submissions are similarly headed “In the Court of Appeal of Kenya at Kisumu, Civil Application No. … of 2026” and are addressed to “this Honorable Court” as the court seised of the intended appeal, referring throughout to “the learned Judges” in the plural. The document on its face is a pleading intended for the Court of Appeal. It has, however, been led in this Court, under this Court’s case number, and served upon the Plainti’s advocates as a proceeding in this suit. 25. I am alive to the caution that a court should not lightly defeat a litigant particularly a lay litigant, as the Applicant appears to be on grounds of form. Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution enjoins courts to administer justice without undue regard to procedural technicalities. But Article 159(2)(d) is not, and has never been, a licence to disregard the law. As the Court of Appeal observed in Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat v. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 7 Others [2014] eKLR, the provision is not a panacea for all procedural shortfalls, and it cannot be invoked to clothe a court with a jurisdiction it does not possess. Jurisdiction is not a technicality. It is the foundation upon which everything else rests. 26. I therefore hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain, much less to grant, an application brought under Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2022 and sections 3A and 3B of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act. To that extent the Motion is incompetent. 27. For the same reason I decline the invitation, pressed by the Plainti, to pronounce upon the competence of the Applicant’s notice of appeal and upon whether it was lodged within the time prescribed by Rule 77 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2022. The validity of a notice of appeal, and the consequences of any failure to comply with the Rules governing its lodgement, are matters for the Court of Appeal in the exercise of its own jurisdiction. Nothing in this ruling is to be taken as expressing any view upon that question, one way or the other. (ii) Whether the application may be treated as one under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules 28. A nding of want of jurisdiction would ordinarily end the matter, and the Court would down tools. I am, however, conscious that the substantive relief the Applicant seeks a stay of execution of a decree https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5442/eng@2026-09-17 6
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of this Court and an injunction, both pending an intended appeal is relief which this Court does have power to grant, under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Order 42 Rule 6(4) deems an appeal to the Court of Appeal to have been led when, under the Rules of that Court, a notice of appeal has been given. The Applicant has cited “all other enabling provisions of the law”, and a court should look to the substance of what is sought rather than to the label axed to it. 29. I am fortied in taking that course by the consideration that the Applicant appears before the Court in person. Were the application to be disposed of solely upon the jurisdictional point, he might well be left with the impression that his case has not been looked at. It has. I therefore proceed, ex abundanti cautela and without deciding that the Motion is capable of being so converted, to consider whether, if it had been properly brought under Order 42 Rule 6, it would have succeeded. I do so in the alternative, and in the event that I am wrong on the rst issue. 30. The governing principles are settled. Order 42 Rule 6(2) permits a stay only where the Court is satised that substantial loss may result to the applicant unless the order is made; that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and that such security as the Court orders for the due performance of the decree has been given by the applicant. In Butt v. Rent Restriction Tribunal [1982] KLR 417, the Court of Appeal set out the considerations governing the exercise of the discretion, among them that the Court should not refuse a stay where refusal would render nugatory a successful appeal, and that it must weigh the competing interests of the parties. In Kenya Shell Limited v. Benjamin Karuga Kibiru & Another [1986] KLR 410, it was emphasised that substantial loss is the cornerstone of the jurisdiction and must be demonstrated; it is not established by bare assertion. (iii) Whether a case for stay and injunction has been made out 31. The rst and, in my judgment, insuperable diculty confronting the Applicant is this: as against him, there is nothing to stay. 32. A stay of execution presupposes a decree or order capable of execution against the party seeking the stay. I have set out at paragraph 4 above the terms of the decree of 1st August 2025. The declarations, the permanent injunctions, the award of Kshs. 4,200,000/- in general damages and the order for costs all operate in favour of the Plainti and against the Defendants there named. The Applicant is not among them. The sole order made in respect of the Applicant is that he bears his own costs of the suit. No execution can issue against him, and none is threatened. His claim, such as it was, was rejected; and a decision rejecting a claim is a negative order incapable of execution. In Western College of Arts and Applied Sciences v. E. A. Oranga & Others [1976] KLR 63 the former Court of Appeal for East Africa put the matter thus: “ What is there to be stayed? … there is nothing arising out of the High Court decision for this Court, in an application for stay, to enforce or restrain by injunction.” 33. The same reasoning was applied in Raymond M. Omboga v. Austine Pyan Maranga [2010] eKLR. It applies with still greater force to the ruling of 2nd July 2026, which simply dismissed the Applicant’s Motion of 10th November 2025 with costs. Save for the costs which have not been taxed, and in respect of which no execution has been shown to be threatened there is nothing in that ruling capable of execution at all. 34. What the Applicant is in truth seeking is not protection against execution but the arrest of the implementation of a decree obtained by the Plainti against other parties. That is a dierent thing altogether. Signicantly, not one of the Defendant the parties actually bound by the decree, and the only parties against whom it can be executed has appealed against the judgment, sought a stay, or https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5442/eng@2026-09-17 7
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supported this application. The 2nd to 25th Defendants have not led anything in response to the Motion. 35. Turning to substantial loss, the Applicant deposes that unless the orders are granted he stands to suer substantial and irreparable loss “including loss of ownership, occupation”. But the premise of that assertion is precisely what the judgment rejected after a full trial: the Court found that there was no proof that the suit property is part of, or was created from, Kisumu/Kanyakwar “B”/385, and that the parcels claimed by the Applicant are not related to the suit property. Unless and until that nding is set aside, the Applicant cannot found a claim of loss upon an interest the Court has held he does not have. Beyond the assertion itself, no evidence whatever has been placed before me of any threatened or impending transfer, subdivision, charge or other dealing. As Kenya Shell Limited v. Benjamin Karuga Kibiru & Another makes plain, apprehension unsupported by evidence does not amount to substantial loss. 36. I should add, in fairness to the Applicant, that the Plainti’s assertion that implementation of the judgment has commenced that negotiations have been concluded with aected parties, payments made, subdivision begun and fraudulent titles cancelled appears only in his written submissions. It is nowhere deposed to in the replying adavit, and no supporting documents were exhibited. Submissions from the bar are not evidence, and I have disregarded those assertions entirely. But their exclusion does not assist the Applicant, on whom the burden of demonstrating substantial loss rests, and who has discharged it no better. 37. As to delay, the position must be considered separately in respect of each of the two decisions sought to be stayed. The ruling of 2nd July 2026 was followed by this Motion within eight days; as regards that ruling, the application was brought promptly. The judgment, however, was delivered on 1st August 2025. The Motion was taken out on 10th July 2026, some eleven months and nine days later. No explanation whatever has been oered for that interval not in the grounds, not in the supporting adavit, and not in the further adavit. The bare assertion in ground 12 that the application “has been brought without unreasonable delay” is, on this record, untenable so far as the judgment is concerned. 38. As to security, none has been oered, and the Applicant has not addressed the requirement at all. 39. There remains the prayer for an injunction restraining dealings with the suit property pending appeal. That prayer suers from a further and distinct diculty. It would, in substance, confer upon the Applicant the very protection which this Court, after a full trial on the merits, declined to give him. This Court delivered its judgment on 1st August 2025 and is functus ocio in respect of the matters there determined. As the Court of Appeal held in Telkom Kenya Limited v. John Ochanda [2014] eKLR, once a court has determined the matter before it and pronounced judgment, it cannot reopen or revisit its decision save in the limited circumstances provided by law, none of which is invoked here. To grant the injunction sought would be to do indirectly what the Court has no power to do directly. 40. Nor can the Applicant derive assistance from the ndings of the National Land Commission published in the Kenya Gazette Notices of 17th July 2017 and 26th September 2017, or from the letter dated 11th July 2013, upon which so much of his argument rests. Those materials were before the trial court. Whether they were adequately evaluated, and what legal eect ought to have been given to them, are quintessentially grounds of appeal. They are for the appellate court. They are not a basis upon which this Court may now suspend its own concluded judgment. 41. I would, nally, record certain irregularities apparent on the face of the Applicant’s papers, not because they are decisive, but because the record should be accurate. The Motion and the written submissions variously describe the judgment as having been delivered on “1st August 2026”, a date then still in the future; the supporting adavit describes it as having been delivered on “1st March 2026”; the Plainti’s https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5442/eng@2026-09-17 8
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submissions at one point repeat the date “1st August 2026”. The judgment was in fact delivered on 1st August 2025. The further supporting adavit is expressed to have been sworn on 3rd July 2026, yet it responds in terms to a replying adavit sworn on 27th July 2026, which is a chronological impossibility. The Motion pleads that the Applicant “has led an appeal”, while the submissions speak only of an intended appeal, and no record of appeal has been exhibited. I have taken the substance of the Applicant’s case notwithstanding these matters, but they illustrate the want of care with which the application was assembled. 42. Drawing the threads together: had the Motion been properly brought before this Court under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, it would have failed. There is nothing capable of execution against the Applicant to be stayed; no substantial loss has been demonstrated; the application is, as regards the judgment, grossly and inexcusably belated; no security has been oered; and the injunction sought would require this Court to revisit a judgment in respect of which it is functus ocio. The balance, far from favouring the Applicant, lies decidedly with the Plainti, who obtained judgment after more than twelve years of litigation and is entitled, subject to whatever orders the Court of Appeal may see t to make, to the fruits of it. (iv) Costs 43. Costs follow the event under section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, and the discretion is to be exercised judicially. Considering the circumstances herein; I direct each party to bear own costs of the application. DISPOSITION 44. In the result, I make the following orders: i. The Notice of Motion dated 10th July 2026 is hereby struck out for want of jurisdiction, this Court having no power to grant relief under Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2022. ii. Each party shall bear own costs of the application. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT KISUMU THIS 17TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2026. E. K. WABWOTO JUDGE In the presence of; N/A for the Interested Party/Applicant. Ms, Olum for the Plainti/Respondent. Mr. Abande for the 4th, 7th and 12th Defendants/Respondents. No appearance for the other Defendants. Court Assistant; Joanne Omondi. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/5442/eng@2026-09-17 9
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