Chirchir & 10 others v Agricultural Development Corporation & another (Land Case E020 of 2025) [2026] KEELC 3431 (KLR)

1st application came up for the 1st time before the court on 18.11.2025, orders were given for the maintenance of the current status quo. 2. In the application dated 12.11.2025, the plaintifis seek orders that “ 1) 2) Pending the hearing and determination of this suit, an interlocutory injunction do issue restraining the defendant, whether by itself, its servants, agents, oficers, employees and or anyone acting under its authority, from; a. Evicting, removing or in any way interfering with the plaintifis and their livestock on the portions of Mutara Ranch which they currently occupy and use; b. Demolishing, removing or otherwise interfering with the plaintifi’s temporary or mobile structures thereon; and c. Alienating, leasing out, allocating to third parties or in any other manner dealing with the specific portions of Mutara Ranch presently occupied and used by the Plaintifis in a manner prejudicial to the plaintifi’s rights and interests Without prejudice to prayer 2 and 3 above, an order to issue directing that the status quo obtaining as at the date of the grant of interim orders be maintained pending the hearing and determination of this suit, in terms of; a. The plaintifi’s continued presence and grazing of their livestock on the portions of Mutara Ranch they presently occupy and use; b. The continued existence of their temporary and mobile structures thereon; and c. The defendant and its agents refraining from demolishing those structures or interfering with the plaintifi’s access to grazing and water” 3. The application is premised on the grounds on the face of the application and the supporting afidavit of the 1st plaintifi. The plaintifis contend that they have been lawfully occupying Mutara Ranch which is the suit property since year 2009 with knowledge and permission of the defendant. To this end, they have been paying grazing fees. However, the defendants have changed the tune whereby they are issuing receipts to the plaintifi with the wordings “ illegal grazing fees”, threatening the plaintifis with eviction and demolition of their structures while allowing new entrants including investors and high ranking government oficers to acquire leases thereon. They have also been told that ADC wants to utilize its land. They contend that their livelihood depends on Mutara Ranch. Thus, they have established a prima facie case and that the balance of convenience tilts in their favour. 4. In opposition thereof, the defendant filed Grounds of Opposition and Replying afidavit both dated 16.1.2026. It contends that it is not the registered owner of the suit property, that it did not permit the plaintifis to enter the suit land and that the plaintifis have no lawful or proprietary interests in the suit land capable of being protected. Further, it denies charging fees for grazing upon the plaintifis and that the question of leases should be directed to the registered owner of the suit land. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/3431/eng@2026-06-03 2

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5. The law on grant of interlocutory injunctions is provided for in Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010. The same provides as follows; “ Where in any suit it is proved by afidavit or otherwise – (a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged, or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree; or (b) that the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property in circumstances afiording reasonable probability that the plaintifi will or may be obstructed or delayed in the execution if any decree that may be passed against the defendant in the suit, The court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property as the court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until further orders.” 6. Therefore, under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules an order of temporary injunction may issue where the court is satisfied that there is a likelihood of the suit property being wasted or alienated before the suit is heard and determined. 7. Being an application for injunctive orders the same shall be weighed against the requisite essentials set out in the celebrated case of Giella vs Cassman Brown (1973) EA 358 thus: “ The conditions for the grant of an interlocutory injunction are now, I think, well settled in East Africa. First, an applicant must show a prima facie case with a probability of success. Secondly, an interlocutory injunction will not normally be granted unless the applicant might otherwise sufier irreparable injury, which would not adequately be compensated by an award of damages. Thirdly, if the court is in doubt, it will decide an application on the balance of convenience.” 8. The Plaintifi/Applicant in this case is expected to meet those three principles and surmount them sequentially. This was stated by the Court of Appeal in Nguruman Limited V Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR where the Court stated thus; “ In an interlocutory injunction application, the applicant has to satisfy the triple requirements to:(a) Establish his case only at a prima facie level, (b) Demonstrate irreparable injury if a temporary injunction is not granted, and (c) Ally any doubts as to (b) by showing that the balance of convenience is in his favour. These are the three pillars on which rests the foundation of any order of injunction, interlocutory or permanent. It is established that all the above three conditions and stages are to be applied as separate, distinct and logical hurdles which the applicant is expected to surmount sequentially. (See Kenya Commercial Finance Co. Ltd V. Afraha Education Society [2001] Vol. 1 EA 86) If the applicant establishes a prima facie case that alone is not suficient basis to grant an interlocutory injunction, the court must further be satisfied that the injury the respondent will sufier, in the event the injunction is not granted, will be https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/3431/eng@2026-06-03 3

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irreparable. In other words, if damages recoverable in law is an adequate remedy and the respondent is capable of paying, no interlocutory order of injunction should normally be granted, however strong the applicant’s claim may appear at that stage. If prima facie case is not established, then irreparable injury and balance of convenience need no consideration. The existence of a prima facie case does not permit “leap-frogging” by the applicant to injunction directly without crossing the other hurdles in between.” 9. Have the plaintifis met the threshold for issuance of the injunctive orders? To answer this question, I must pose another question; Do the plaintifis have any legal right over the suit premises capable of being protected by a court of law? The plaintifis have availed numerous receipts indicating how they have been paying fees to the defendant. However, no ascertainable land rights can be discerned from such transactions. What more, there is title document that has been availed to indicate that the defendant is the registered owner of the suit property. Further, the receipts availed by the plaintifis are for years 2021, 2024 and 2025, thus the apparent long period of occupation has not been proved. 10. In the case of Justus Ndoro Kalama & 2 others (Suing as Chairman, Secretary and Treasurer of Bahari Community Development, CBO) v Ministry of Lands and Physical Planning & 3 others [2021] eKLR, the court while dealing with the issue of squatters who had been promised some land cited the Court of Appeal case of Nelson Kazungu Chai & 9 Others –vs- Pwani University College (2017) eKLR where it was stated that; “ A right can only be protected when it exists in reality and not when it remains an illusion or a mere expectation. The right to property is not one of those rights that inherent to every human being upon birth. They are acquired in difierent ways after one comes into the world. One cannot acquire property rights over another property other than in the manner prescribed in law. In this case, the appellants claim to the suit property was in our view merely aspirational or rhetorical. This is so both under our very progressive Constitution and also under International law.” 11. And so it is in the current matter that the plaintifis have not established any legal right over the suit property capable of being protected. As such, they do not have a prima-facie case and the court need not interrogate the other criteria relating to issuance of injunctive orders. The net efiect is that the application dated 1`2.11.2025 is found to be unmerited, the same is hereby dismissed with costs to the defendant. 12. The contempt application was anchored on the first application of 12.11.2025. In view of the fact that the primary application has been dismissed, then the temporary orders issued on 18.11.2025 must collapse along with the contempt application which too is dismissed but with no orders as to costs. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NYAHURURU THIS 3RD DAY OF JUNE 2026 THROUGH MICROSOFT TEAMS. LUCY N. MBUGUA JUDGE In the presence of: Bedan C/A Gathoni for Plaintifis M/S Kolum h/b for Korubu for defendant https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/3431/eng@2026-06-03 4

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