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3. 3. That an order of injunction be issued restraining the defendants from transferring, charging, selling and or interfering with the plaintifi’s quiet possession of Title No. Eusonyiro Suguroi/Block IV/234 pending the hearing and final determination of this suit. 4. That this Honourable Court be pleased to transfer Nanyuki Chief Magistrate (CM ELC Case Number E068 of 2025) to this Honourable court and consolidate the same with this suit. 5. That the costs of this application be provided for.” I have considered the rival arguments and submissions. In ET v Attorney General & another [2012] eKLR, the court had this to say of a consent order; “ The law concerning the status of consent orders has been stated in several cases among them Flora Wasike v Destino Wamboko (supra) where the Court of Appeal stated as follows, “ It is now settled law that a consent judgment or order has contractual efiect and can only be set aside on grounds which would justify setting a contract aside, or if certain conditions remain to be fulfilled, which are not carried ........” In Purcell v FC Trigal Ltd (1970) 3 All ER 671, Winn LJ said at 676: “ It seems to me that if a consent order is to be set aside, it can really only be set aside on grounds which would justify the setting aside of a contract entered into with knowledge of the material matters by legally competent persons, and I see no suggestion here that any matter that occurred would justify the setting aside or rectification of this order looked at as a contract.” 4. This suit was filed by the plaintifis as against the defendants of which the two parties recorded the consent dated 27.5.2022. Clause 10 of the said consent stated that; “ This consent binds all the parties named in these proceedings and immediate members of parties respective families including their respective assigns and legal representatives.” 5. The orders sought herein would amount to variation of the consent recorded by the main parties. And as noted in previous rulings in the matter, the court cannot rewrite contracts for the parties. What more, from the pleadings and the consent, the court has not been called upon to determine any other issues. It therefore matters not that a judgment and a decree have not been issued. 6. In the case of Geoffrey M. Asanyo & 3 others v Attorney-General [2020] eKLR, the Supreme Court of Kenya stated as follows while nullifying the judgment of the Court of Appeal which was delivered yet parties had filed a consent which had not been adopted as an order of the court; “ Adoption of a consent by a Court is a process, in the course of which a Court discharges the duty of evaluating the clarity of the consent placed before it by parties, and giving directions on the manner of adoption. This circumvents the risk of an unlawful Order, and validates the mode of adoption and compliance. Thus, a consent by parties becomes an Order of the Court only once it has been formally adopted by the Court. It is only from that stage, that the Court becomes functus officio. This Court having ruled that the Judgment of the Court https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/3023/eng@2026-05-13 2

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of Appeal (dated 13 November 2015) was a nullity; and that Court having not formally adopted the consent by parties, was not yet functus officio.” 7. The court went on to state that ; “ The functus officio doctrine is one of the mechanisms by means of which the law gives expression to the principle of finality. According to this doctrine, a person who is vested with adjudicative or decision-making powers may, as a general rule, exercise those powers only once in relation to the same matter…. The [principle] is that once such a decision has been taken, it is (subject to any right of appeal to a superior body or functionary) final and conclusive. Such a decision cannot be reviewed or varied by the decision-maker.” 8. As noted in the ruling of this court dated 18.3.2026, the consent made by the parties on 27.5.2022 was adopted by the court on 7.6.2022. It is a decision of the court which can only be set aside in accordance with the holding in the cited case law. In essence, the applicant has no basis to be joined in these proceedings as none exist save in terms of execution of the consent. The application dated 11.11,2025 is therefore found to be unmerited, the same is hereby dismissed with costs to the defendants. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NANYUKI THIS 13TH DAY OF MAY, 2026 THROUGH MICROSOFT TEAMS. LUCY N. MBUGUA JUDGE In the presence of: M/s Njuguna h/b for Wahome Gikonyo – Plaintifi. Karaya Maina – Defendant. Gathumbi – Intended Interested Party. Nancy Mwangi – C/A. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/3023/eng@2026-05-13 3

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