Odhiambo v Republic

to go and identify it. PW1 went and identied the body as that of the deceased. She later identied the appellant in court and the panga he had on the material day because of its distinctive wooden handle which was wrapped in an animal hide. 3. Lawrence Ochieng Omamo, (PW2), one of the revelers who was at PW1’s place, testied that the appellant and the co-accused arrived together followed shortly thereafter by the deceased. The deceased greeted everyone and bought them chang'aa. The deceased jokingly pushed both the appellant and the co- accused, which prompted the appellant to pick a quarrel with him. PW1 asked the deceased, who was already drunk to leave but the appellant protested, questioning why PW1 had sent the deceased away. PW2 saw the appellant carrying a panga and an axe, which caused concern among the revelers. About 30 minutes after the deceased had left, the appellant and the co- accused also left but he spent the night in PW1's place because his home was far. The following morning, a neighbour informed PW1 that someone had been killed near the shopping centre. The area Chief also came and went with PW1 to the scene and PW1 identied the body as that of the deceased. 4. James Odhiambo Ouma, (PW3) who was also drinking chang’aa at PW1’s place, testied that he was with the appellant, the co-accused and other revelers when the deceased arrived and greeted them in his usual rough but jovial manner but when the deceased greeted the appellant, the appellant picked a quarrel with him prompting PW1 to ask the deceased who was already drunk to leave which he did. The appellant however protested against the decision to send the deceased away. When one customer called Owino asked why the appellant was carrying a panga and an axe in public, the appellant and the co-accused left together. The following morning, the area Chief called him and when he went, he found a body which he identied as that of the deceased. The body had a deep cut on the neck. Police ocers who were already at the scene asked him to go and record a statement. 5. On his part, Charles Onyango Ongor, (PW4), the deceased's father, testied that on the material day, the deceased spent the day at home constructing his house after which he sold sand and then he went to town. The following morning, while in the farm, he received a call from the area Assistant Chief inquiring whether the deceased was at home. PW4 went to check but he found the deceased’s house locked. When he informed the Assistant Chief that the deceased was not at home, the Assistant Chief told him that a body had been found at the shopping centre. PW4 went to the scene and identied the deceased’s body which had deep cut wounds on the neck and chest. Police ocers asked him to check the pockets which he did and he recovered Kshs. 200 and keys to his house. The body was taken to the mortuary and he later identied the body for purposes of post mortem examination. 6. Dr. Juma Gabriel Wekesa, (PW5) performed the post-mortem examination on the deceased’s body. The body had a deep cut wound measuring 15cm long and 20cm deep extending across the right side of the chest below the right clavicle through the manubrium; exposed right jugular and severed internal carotid vein; a right pulmonary tamponade with collapsed right lung and pleural hematoma; injuries to the right jugular vein and the right internal carotid and severed major blood vessels above the right side of the neck. He opined that the cause of death was severe cardiopulmonary failure due to shock as a result of sharp chest and neck vascular trauma and he produced the post mortem report as an exhibit. 7. Salvin Cheruto Kapkoi, (PW6) a senior government analyst at the Government Chemist, Kisumu, testied that on 14th September 2021, the laboratory received an exhibit memo from Police constable Joash Koriese (PW7), together with the deceased's ngernail sample and a rusted bloodstained panga with a wooden handle. Analysis of the items established that the panga was stained with human blood and the DNA prole generated from the blood from the panga and the ngernail matched the DNA prole of the deceased. He produced the report as an exhibit. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1987/eng@2026-09-25 2

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8. On his part, Police Constable Joash Koriese, (PW7), the investigating ocer, received a report on 8th September 2021 regarding murder. He proceeded to the scene together with other ocers and commenced investigations. The scene was documented; photographs were taken and the body was transferred to the mortuary. Investigations revealed that the deceased, the appellant and the co-accused had been drinking chang’aa at the home of PW1; that the appellant was involved in an altercation with the deceased; that the deceased was asked to leave which he did and shortly thereafter, the appellant and the co-accused also left only for the deceased’s body to be found the following morning. The body was taken to the mortuary and the post mortem was conducted which established the cause of death. The appellant who had disappeared from home was later arrested at his uncle’s home. The appellant led PW7 and other police ocers to his parents' house where he retrieved a panga which had blood stains from under the bed and handed it over to PW7. They were however unable to recover the axe. PW7 forwarded the bloodstained panga to the government chemist for forensic analysis. The co accused had earlier been traced and arrested. He charged the appellant and the co-accused with the oence. 9. When called to defend himself, the appellant and the co accused gave sworn testimonies and the appellant called two witnesses. The appellant testied that on the material day, he left home carrying a panga and an axe which were tools he used to cut trees for charcoal burning. He worked until about 5 pm after which he went to house of PW1 to drink chang'aa while still carrying the panga and axe. Since the place was small, PW1 asked him to give her the panga and axe to keep for him in order to create space for him to sit. He drunk chang’aa until he got drunk and as he prepared to leave, PW1 demanded Kshs. 400 for the chang’aa he had consumed but he gave her Kshs. 200 which she declined. He told her that he had Kshs. 1,000, which he could change but PW1 took away the panga and axe and kept them until when he would pay the full amount. Since the curfew hour was fast approaching, he decided to leave without the panga and the axe, intending to collect them the following day when he was to pay the outstanding balance. He left followed by the co-accused before they later parted ways. He arrived home at 8 pm and took supper at his mother's house before going to sleep. The following day, he went to bake bricks and spent the night at the site but Police ocers arrested him that night. 10. According to the appellant, he informed the police ocers that he had left the panga and axe at PW1's house but they assaulted him before escorting him to his mother's house where they conducted a search and recovered a panga in the bedroom. He denied that the panga was his, and although he maintained that he had not seen the panga in the house for 3 years, he was forced to carry the panga to the police station where he found the co-accused. He was taken to court and charged with the oence. After 7 days PW7 showed him the panga with bloodstains and when he asked PW7 where the blood stains had come from, PW7 told him that he was all knowing and he must be jailed. The appellant denied that the deceased was at PW1's house; maintained that there was no scue at PW1’s chang’aa drinking place and that he neither killed the deceased nor knew how the deceased met his death. 11. The co-accused, (DW2) testied that on the material day he went alone to home of PW1 where he was served with chang’ aa outside before everyone moved into the house when it started raining. While inside, he noticed the appellant's panga and axe on the oor and cautioned PW1 that it was unsafe to have such weapons where people were drinking. PW1 went outside briey and when she returned, she informed them that alcohol had run out and asked everyone to leave. The co-accused and the appellant left together before parting ways. The following day, he was arrested by the Assistant Chief and taken to Siaya Police Station. He told the police that he did not know the appellant well, since he only met him when they were drinking chang’aa at the home of PW1 before leaving when the alcohol got nished. 12. The appellant called his father Joseph Odhiambo, (DW3) who testied that on 7th September 2021, police ocers went to his home with the appellant; that they assaulted both the appellant and him before searching his bedroom where they recovered a panga which children go with to https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1987/eng@2026-09-25 3

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school. He maintained that the panga was one of his working tools. While Rosemary Anyango Odhiambo’ (DW4), the appellant's mother testied that she was at home when police ocers took the appellant home at about 1am while beating him asking where the panga was and that they also assaulted DW3. She went outside and police ocers entered the bedroom and came out carrying a panga. She admitted that the panga was recovered from under the bed in her house. 13. In its judgment dated 29th June 2022, the trial court was satised that the prosecution had proved the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, convicted the appellant and sentenced him to fty (50) years imprisonment. The co accused was however acquitted. 14. Aggrieved by both the conviction and sentence, the appellant has lodged the present appeal raising three (3) grounds contending that the trial court erred in law and fact in: admitting the DNA results that had been obtained in contravention of sections 122A and 122D of the Penal Code, rendering it inadmissible under Article 50(4) of the Constitution; convicting him on mere suspicion and meting out the sentencing of 50 years imprisonment which was harsh, excessive and infringed his right to the least severe punishment under Articles 25(c) and 50(2)(p) of the Constitution. 15. At plenary hearing, Ms. Anyango, learned counsel appeared for the appellant while Ms. Busienei, held brief for Ms. Mumu learned prosecution counsel for the respondent. The appellant appeared from prison through the Court’s video link platform. Both counsel relied entirely on their written submissions in urging their respective clients’ positions in this appeal. 16. Ms. Anyango, submitted that the appellant's conviction rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, particularly the panga allegedly recovered from his parents' house and which was found to contain the deceased's blood, notwithstanding the fact that none of the prosecution witnesses witnessed the murder. Counsel argued that PW7 did not produce the Occurrence Book (OB) number and an inventory of the exhibits that were recovered and, therefore, the forensic examination of the panga lacked proper foundation and was of no evidential value. 17. Counsel contended that police ocers assaulted the appellant before leading them to his parent's house where the panga was recovered. She reiterated the appellant’s position that he left his panga at the house of PW1 and that in light of the allegations of coercion, the trial court ought to have conducted a trial within a trial to determine whether the recovery of the panga complied with the constitutional guarantee of fair trial under Article 50(4) of the Constitution. It was counsel’s further contention that the evidence touching on the panga constituted the fruit of a poisonous tree which ought to have been excluded. Counsel cited Kirwa v Republic [2025] KEHC 15530 (KLR), which adopted the holding in Robert Akumu Asembo v Political Parties Tribunal & 2 Others [2013] KEHC 5218 (KLR), that unlawfully obtained evidence should be excluded, and urged this Court to nd that the appellant's right to fair trial was violated. 18. Regarding sentence, Ms. Anyango submitted that the sentence of 50 years imprisonment the trial court imposed against the appellant was harsh; that both the appellant and the deceased had been drinking before the incident, suggesting that they were intoxicated and were more inclined to overreact; that the appellant was a rst oender who had expressed remorse during mitigation and cited Kithumbi v Republic [2025] KECA 1229 (KLR), where this Court reduced life sentence for murder to 25 years imprisonment. Counsel urged that should this Court uphold the conviction; it should reduce the sentence to 25 years while taking into account the period the appellant has already served. 19. Opposing the appeal, Ms. Mumu submitted that in a rst appeal, the duty of this Court is to undertake a fresh and exhaustive re-evaluation of the entire evidence and draw its own conclusions and cited Josephat Manoti Omwancha v Republic [2021] eKLR in this regard. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1987/eng@2026-09-25 4

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20. Counsel submitted that according to PW7, it was the appellant who led the police to his parents' house where the blood-stained panga was recovered and when the panga was submitted for forensic analysis, the blood stains on the panga matched the DNA prole of the deceased thereby linking the appellant to the deceased’s murder; that PW1 identied the panga as the one the appellant had at her home on the material day; that PW1, PW2 and PW3 who were at the drinking place with the appellant witnessed the quarrel between the appellant and the deceased; that they saw the appellant removing the panga and the axe from a sack thereby rendering the appellant's defence a mere denial. Counsel maintained that the circumstantial evidence pointed to the appellant's guilt and no one else. 21. Regarding sentence, Ms. Mumu asserted that the complaint over the severity of the sentence has no merit and cited Republic v Mwangi; Initiative for Strategic Litigation in Africa (ISLA) & 3 Others (Amicus Curiae) [2024] KESC 34 (KLR), for the proposition that sentencing is a matter of fact and judicial discretion exercised within the parameters established by Parliament. It was the view of counsel, therefore, that the sentence of fty (50) years imprisonment was lawful, lenient and proportionate taking into account the gravity of the oence. Counsel cited Odede v Republic [2026] KECA 623 (KLR) to support those submissions and urged this Court to dismiss the appeal in its entirety. 22. As a rst appellate court, we are expected to submit the entire evidence to a fresh and exhaustive evaluation, reanalyze and reevaluate it, and draw our own independent conclusions, while bearing in mind that we did not have the opportunity to observe the witnesses as they testied and therefore give due allowance in that regard. (Gabriel Kamau Njoroge v Republic [1987] eKLR). 23. We have considered the record, submissions made on behalf of the parties and the applicable law. The issues that fall for our determination are; whether the prosecution proved the information of murder against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt; whether the circumstantial evidence relied upon met the legal threshold to sustain a conviction and whether the sentence imposed against the appellant was lawful and appropriate in the circumstances. 24. On the rst issue, section 203 of the Penal Code provides as follows: “ Any person who of malice aforethought causes the death of another person by an unlawful act or omission is guilty of murder.” 25. In an information for murder, the prosecution must prove therefore three ingredients beyond reasonable doubt in order to secure a conviction, namely; the death of a person and its cause therefore, that the death was as a result of an unlawful act of commission or omission by the deceased and that it was actuated by malice aforethought. 26. The issue of the deceased’s death was not in dispute in this appeal. PW1, PW3, and PW4 saw the deceased’s body. PW4 identied the deceased’s body for purposes of postmortem examination, PW7 also saw the body and organized for it to be taken to the mortuary for preservation and the post-mortem, and he was present during the postmortem. PW5 conducted the post mortem on the deceased’s body and observed several cut wounds including on the head and the neck and he opined that the cause of death was severe cardiopulmonary failure due to shock occasioned by sharp chest and neck vascular trauma. This evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt the fact of death and that the cause thereof being an unlawful act of commission. 27. The next issue is whether the appellant was responsible for the deceased’s death. The trial court appreciated as we also do,that the prosecution’s case was solely based on circumstantial evidence. This Court has consistently held that circumstantial evidence, if properly evaluated, is as good as any https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1987/eng@2026-09-25 5

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evidence and can prove a case with mathematical exactitude. (Musili Tulo v Republic, [2014] eKLR; Ndurya v Republic [2008] eKLR). 28. In order for the circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, the chain of the circumstances must consistently point only to the guilt of the accused; they must be inconsistent with the innocence of the person; the circumstances must be cogently and rmly established and when cumulatively taken into consideration, they must lead to the inescapable conclusion that the accused committed the oence (see Sawe v Republic [2003] eKLR). 29. In this appeal, PW1 saw the appellant at her place with a panga and an axe and she served him and other customers with chang’aa. The deceased came to her place but she declined to sell chang’aa to him because he was already drunk. The deceased had some altercation with the appellant but she intervened and asked the deceased to leave and he obliged. Shortly thereafter, the appellant took his panga and the axe and left together with the co-accused, only for the deceased to be found dead the following morning. PW2 and PW3 who were also at the home of PW1, witnessed the altercation between the appellant and the deceased and the intervention by PW1 who asked the deceased to leave. They also saw the appellant with a panga and an axe; that he left shortly after the deceased had left and that the deceased’s body was discovered the following morning not far away from the home of PW1 where they were drinking. 30. Although the evidence on record showed that the appellant had a quarrel with the decease and that the appellant left shortly after the deceased had left, there was no direct evidence pointing to the appellant as the person who killed the deceased. The evidence nonetheless shows that the appellant had a panga and the postmortem on the deceased’s body revealed that the deceased suered deep cut wounds that had been inicted with a sharp object. Upon being arrested, the appellant led PW7 and other police ocers to his parents’ house where a bloodstained panga was recovered. The panga was subjected to forensic analysis; the blood stains on the panga were found to be human blood and the DNA analysis conducted on the bloodstained panga matched the DNA prole of the deceased. 31. The fact that the appellant was together with the deceased at the home of PW1 where they had an altercation and that he left shortly after the deceased had been asked to leave and having led the police to his parents’ house where he retrieved the panga with bloodstains matching the deceased’s DNA prole, this evidence put the appellant in a position that required him to explain how the deceased’s blood ended up on that panga which PW1 identied as the panga the appellant had on the material day at her place. 32. The obligation to explain those circumstances is a requirement of the law under Section 111(1) of the Evidence Act which provides as follows: “ When a person is accused of any oence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any exception or exemption from, or qualication to, the operation of the law creating the oence with which he is charged and the burden of proving any fact, especially within the knowledge of such person is upon him: Provided that such burden shall be deemed to be discharged if the court is satised by evidence given by the prosecution, whether in cross-examination or otherwise, that such circumstances or facts exist, Provided further that the person accused shall be entitled to be acquitted of the oence with which he is charged if the court is satised that the evidence given by either the prosecution or the defence creates a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused person in respect of that oence.” https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1987/eng@2026-09-25 6

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33. The appellant testied that after leaving PW1’s place, he went to his mother’s house where he had supper before he went to sleep and it was in his parents’ house that the bloodstained panga was recovered. The appellant did not explain how the deceased’s bloodstains ended up on the panga he was last seen with, given the fact that he was the last person who was seen quarrelling with the deceased and he had also left shortly after the deceased left the PW1’s place. The appellant’s parents (DW3) and (DW4) admitted that the panga was recovered from their house but they did not also explain the source of the bloodstains found on the panga. 34. Although none of the prosecution witnesses saw the appellant with the deceased immediately before the deceased’s death, the appellant being the last person to have quarreled with him (deceased), and he left immediately after the deceased had left only for the deceased to be found dead, this circumstantial evidence presupposes that the appellant must have been the person who was last with the deceased before his death and was expected to provide an explanation on what happened to him (deceased). 35. In Moingo & Another v Republic [2022] KECA 6 (KLR), this Court stated as follows: “The fact that the deceased was last seen in the hands and restraint of the appellants, a prima facie case was established to require the appellants to give a reasonable explanation as to what befell him. Even though the onus of proof in criminal cases always rests squarely on the prosecution at all times, the Last Seen doctrine in the prosecution of murder or culpable homicide cases is that, where the deceased was last seen with the accused, there is a duty placed on the accused to give an explanation relating to how the deceased met his/or her death. In the absence of any explanation, the court is justied in drawing an inference that the accused killed the deceased).” 36. In the present appeal, the appellant followed the deceased while armed with a panga and an axe and since the panga was found with bloodstains which forensic examination determined to be that of the deceased, the appellant was presumed to be the last person with the deceased when he was alive. The appellant had a duty to explain how the deceased met his death, but he did not do so. 37. The appellant tried to explain that he left the panga at the home of PW1 because he had not settled the bill for the chang’aa he drunk and further that he never saw the deceased at the home of PW1. The trial court rejected this explanation as a lie and his defence as a mere denial and we agree with the trial court. 38. We have reevaluated the evidence ourselves and we are satised that the trial court was justied in concluding that the evidence by the prosecution witnesses pointed to the appellant as the person who caused the deceased’s death. We are further satised that the discovery of the bloodstained panga in the appellant’s parents’ house whose forensic analysis matched the DNA proles of the deceased, could only lead to the inescapable conclusion that the deceased died in the hands of the appellant. The chain of the circumstances right from the time the appellant was with the deceased at the home of PW1; the fact that the appellant followed the deceased immediately he left PW1’s place to the discovering of his body with severe cut wounds caused with a sharp object which was linked to the panga that was recovered with bloodstains that matched the deceased’s DNA prole, was so complete that no other inference could be drawn from those circumstances, except that the appellant was responsible for the commission of the oence. 39. The appellant argued that the prosecution did not produce the OB entry number to show that exhibits had been recovered during the investigations or an inventory of the recovered exhibits, which rendered the forensic analysis of the panga worthless. It was also his submission that police ocers assaulted him prior to the recovery of the panga which violated his right to fair trial guaranteed under Article https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1987/eng@2026-09-25 7

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50(4) of the Constitution and that the evidence obtained under such circumstances should not have been admitted. 40. We have considered this argument and perused the record. The appellant did not complain when he rst appeared in court on 15th September 2021. He did not raise the issue of being assault when he appeared before the trial court for plea on the following day,16th September 2021 despite being represented by counsel. Throughout the trial, the appellant who was represented, did not raise the issue of assaulted, torture or violation of his rights. The issue was also not put to PW7, during cross examination yet he was the investigating ocer and he was present when the panga was recovered. Even during submissions, the appellant’s counsel did not raise the issue of the violation of the appellant’s rights. The appellant and his father (DW3) only stated that they were assaulted when they were testifying in defene. 41. To our minds, the argument that the search and recovery of the panga violated the appellant’s constitutional rights was raised as an afterthought and has no merit. The issue having not been raised before the trial court and the trial court having not considered it, it cannot be raised for the rst time on appeal. 42. The next issue is whether the appellant’s act of commission was actuated by malice aforethought. Under section 206 (a) of the Penal Code malice aforethought includes an intention to cause the death of or to do grievous harm to any person, whether that person is the person actually killed or not. 43. In Nzuki v Republic [1993] KLR 171, this Court held as follows: “ Before an act can be termed as murder, it must be aimed at someone and it must be an act committed with the following intentions, the test of which is always subjective to the actual accused: i. The intention to cause death; ii. The intention to cause grievous bodily harm; iii. Where the accused knows that there is a serious risk that death or grievous bodily harm will ensue from these acts, and commits those acts deliberately and without lawful excuse the intention to expose a potential victim to that risk as the result of those acts. It does not matter in such circumstances whether the accused desires those consequences to ensue or not and in none of these cases does it matter that the act and the intention were aimed at a potential victim other than the one who succumbed. (See also Musa v Republic [2023] KECA 262(KLR)). 44. Although the post mortem report showed that the deceased had deep and severe injuries, it was undeniable that both the appellant and the deceased had been drinking for the better part of that day. According to PW1, the deceased was already drunk when he went to her place and she even declined to sell him chang’aa on that account. He had an altercation with the appellant but she intervened and asked him to leave. While the injuries the deceased sustained were grave, the account of the events leading to the commission of the oence casts doubt on whether the appellant deliberately inicted the fatal injuries or he had the motive of acting as he did, thereby weakening the intention to commit the oence. 45. In other words, there was no evidence of premeditation towards the commission of the oence since what happened between the appellant and the deceased at PW1’s place was a spontaneous altercation https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1987/eng@2026-09-25 8

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between two people who were drunk that must have degenerated out of control, thereby lessening the intention to kill the deceased. 46. In Nzuki v Republic (supra), this Court observed that without an intention of one of these three types, (earlier mentioned) the mere fact that the accused’s conduct is done in the knowledge that grievous harm is likely or highly likely to ensue from his conduct is not by itself enough to convert a homicide into the crime of murder. And in Obuyi v Republic [2023] KECA 682 (KLR), this Court underscored that lack of motive may weaken proof of malice aforethought. 47. In the circumstances, we are therefore satised that malice aforethought was not proved as required by law and therefore, the prosecution did not prove the oence of murder beyond reasonable doubt. 48. There is no doubt, however, that the appellant caused the deceased’s death for which he must bear criminal responsibility. Taking into account the circumstances under which the oence was committed, we are satised that the evidence on record disclosed the oence of manslaughter as opposed to one of murder. 49. Regarding sentence, the appellant submitted that the sentence of fty (50) years was harsh and excessive, while the respondent maintained that the sentence was lawful, lenient and proportionate to the gravity of the oence committed. We appreciate that sentencing is at the discretion of the trial court. The circumstances under which an appellate court will interfere with the discretion of the trial court on sentence were set out by this Court in Bernard Kimani Gacheru v Republic [2002] eKLR as follows: “ It is now settled law, following several authorities by this Court and by the High Court, that sentence is a matter that rests in the discretion of the trial court. Similarly, sentence must depend on the facts of each case. On appeal, the appellate court will note easily interfere with sentence unless, that sentence is manifestly excessive in the circumstances of the case, or the trial court overlooked some material factor, or took into account some wrong material, or acted on a wrong principle. Even if, the Appellate Court feels that the sentence is heavy and that the Appellate Court might itself not have passed that sentence, these alone are not sucient grounds for interfering with the discretion of the trial court on sentence unless, anyone of the matters already states is shown to exist” 50. The appellant was sentenced to fty (50) years imprisonment upon being convicted for the oence of murder. However, this Court having found that the evidence proved the oence of manslaughter rather than murder and taking into account the circumstances under which the oence was committed, the mitigating factors, aggravating circumstance, proportionality and the principles of sentencing, we are inclined to interfere with the sentence. In that regard, we consider the sentence of twenty (20) years appropriate and commensurate with the oence and the objectives of sentencing. 51. The upshot therefore is that this appeal partially succeeds. The conviction for murder is quashed and substituted with a conviction for manslaughter under section 202 as read with section 205 of the Penal Code. The sentence of fty (50) years imprisonment is hereby set aside and in place therefor, the appellant is sentenced to twenty (20) years imprisonment, to run from the date of his arrest, that is; 8th July 2021 as the trial court directed. DATED AND DELIVERED AT KISUMU THIS 25TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026. ASIKE-MAKHANDIA .................................... https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1987/eng@2026-09-25 9

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JUDGE OF APPEAL E C. MWITA .................................... JUDGE OF APPEAL B. ONGAYA .................................... JUDGE OF APPEAL I certify that this is a true copy of original. DEPUTY REGISTRAR. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1987/eng@2026-09-25 10

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