Kiatu & Allied Products Ltd v Sangrajka & 2 others

e. the learned Judge erred in both law and fact in failing to take into account that the applicant were lay men and the mistakes of their Counsels ought not to be visited on them; f. the learned Judge erred in both law and fact in and failed to appreciate the discretion of the court to allow an application to set aside ex parte proceedings; g. the learned Judge erred in both law and fact and failed to consider the submissions of the 3rd respondent in support of the application by the applicant; h. the learned Judge erred in both law and fact the learned judge erred in both law and fact by failing to record and take into account the submissions of the appellant and the 3rd respondent before delivery of the ruling; i. the learned Judge erred in both law and fact in dismissing the applicant application with costs; j. the learned Judge erred in both law and fact in failing to consider the evidence on record and the submission of the appellant which disproved the 1st respondent’s claim for adverse possession, which failure occasioned a miscarriage of justice; k. in all the circumstances of the case, the learned Judge failed to do justice thereby denying the applicant the right to be heard. The appellant’s prayers are that the appeal be allowed, the judgment dated 23rd July, 2015 be set aside and costs be awarded to the appellant. 2. A brief summary of the facts is that the 1st and 2nd respondents entered into an agreement for sale on 15th September, 1988 with the appellant as nominees of Rasi Properties over parcel L.R. No. 337/660 Athi River for a consideration of Kshs 250,000/=. The transfer was executed by both parties and the same was registered in favour of the 1st and 2nd respondents and issued with a certicate of lease on 10th July, 2002. After the transfer, it was later discovered that an ocer from the Ministry of Lands had issued a letter cancelling the transfer and their names replaced from the land registry records. Consequently, the Director in the plainti’s company died and his estate took over the matter. 3. The 1st and 2nd respondent led a suit by a plaint dated 9th April, 2014 where they sought the following reliefs; a permanent injunction restraining the defendant/appellant herein from interfering, trespassing upon, entering, or interfering with the suit premises; declaration that the revocation of the transfer to the 1st and 2nd plaintis/respondents herein by way of a letter by an employee at the Ministry of Lands be declared illegal, null and void; an order to the 2nd defendant for reinstatement of the Transfer of the suit premises to the 1st and 2nd plaintis; any other order that the court deems t; and costs of the suit as well as interest at court rates from the date of ling the suit until payment in full. 4. The applicant then led an application on 14th April, 2015 seeking to set aside the interlocutory judgment entered in favour of the respondents and also leave to le defence out of time. The application was heard and a ruling delivered on 24th November, 2017 allowing the appellant’s application and granting them leave to le defence out of time. From the records, it appears that the defence was not led immediately. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1925/eng@2026-09-25 2

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5. In May, 2017, by way of a plaint dated 30th May, 2017, the appellant led another suit (ELC No. 255 of 2017) seeking the cancellation of the transfer and title No. LR No. 337/660 Athi River (hereinafter referred to as the suit property) made to the respondents on grounds that the title was obtained fraudulently. The appellant prayed for a declaration that the transfer made from the appellant to the respondents was illegal; an order directing the Chief Land Registrar to cancel the transfer made on 10th July, 2002; payment of punitive damages; and costs of the suit plus interest. The appellant was served but never entered appearance. Interlocutory judgment in favour of the respondents was entered on 11th July, 2014 and the matter set for formal proof on 15th April, 2015. The respondents led their defence on 28th June, 2017 on grounds that the suit was time barred having been led fteen years after the respondents’ transfer was registered and title issued under section 23 of the Registration of Titles Act. 6. On 10th December, 2019, the appellant led a Notice of Motion seeking for orders among other things to stay the judgment on the main suit scheduled to be delivered on 6th March, 2020 pending hearing and determination of that application; that the court review, vary or set aside the proceedings of 9th October, 2019 and all consequential orders, proceedings and the matter be re-opened for hearing “de novo”; that the appellant defence dated 13th April, 2015 be deemed as duly led and served upon payment of the requisite court fees; and costs be in the cause. In her supporting adavit in this application, the appellant deposed that by a ruling delivered on 24th November, 2017, the court allowed the appellant’s application; that the appellant had lost communication with its then advocates and that upon its present advocates perusing the court le, they had found the previous advocate had led an application dated 12th October, 2018 seeking leave to cease acting for the appellant. 7. The appellant further deponed that the pleadings had not closed because the appellant had never entered appearance and no request for interlocutory judgment was entered against the 2nd respondent then who was a director of the appellant. It was the appellant’s case that the court should set aside the ex parte hearing of 9th October, 2019 and all consequential proceedings and accord the appellant an opportunity to be heard on merit. 8. The respondents led their grounds of opposition and a replying adavit where they averred that the application is another attempt by the 1st appellant to cause unreasonable delay in the determination and conclusion of the suit; that they are the bona de purchasers of the suit property and that the appellant was granted leave to le defence on 24th April, 2017 but failed to do so. The 1st respondent deponed in his replying adavit that despite being granted leave to le a defence out of time, the 2nd defendant who is a director of the appellant failed to do so; that the pre-trial directions were made in the presence of the appellant’s advocates and that when the matter came up for hearing on 9th October, 2019, the appellant’s advocate sought for adjournment, which the court declined. The 1st respondent further deponed that the failure the 2nd respondent to participate in the suit cannot be a ground for nullifying the ensuing proceedings; that the draft defence annexed on the application does not raise any triable issues to warrant the grant of the orders and that the appellant has not challenged the resolution of the appellant’s Board which authorized the sale of the suit property. 9. The trial court while considering this application, gave a chronology of events in the matter and concluded that the appellant together with its advocates, did not conduct the business of this matter eciently. The court further observed that the justice of the case demanded that the proceedings of the trial court remain intact and judgment be delivered accordingly. He proceeded to dismiss the application dated 10th December, 2019 with costs. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1925/eng@2026-09-25 3

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10. Aggrieved by that decision, the appellant lodged the instant appeal before this Court. He led his Notice of Appeal dated 11th March, 2020. He also led his Memorandum of Appeal dated 29th June, 2020 raising ten grounds stated above, disputing the ndings of the trial court. 11. The appeal was heard virtually on 24th March, 2026. Learned counsel Mr. Githinji Mwangi holding brief for Mr. Chebii, appeared for the appellant while learned counsel Ms. Ngure holding brief for Mr. Njuguna, appeared for the 1st and 2nd respondents. Counsel for the appellant relied on his submissions dated 26th January, 2021 while the respondents relied on their written submissions dated 11th March, 2021, and also made oral highlights of the submissions. There was no appearance for the 3rd respondent neither did they le any written submissions. The Court was satised that service was eected upon all parties. 12. The appellant in its submissions has summarized the ten grounds of appeal into two as follows— a. Whether the learned Judge erred in law and in fact in failing to exercise his discretion to set aside ex parte proceedings; and b. Whether the learned judge erred in law and in fact in failing to take into account that the applicants were lay men and the mistakes of their counsel ought not to be visited on them. 13. On the 1st issue whether the learned judge erred in law and fact in the exercising of discretion to set aside ex parte proceedings, the appellant’s counsel submitted that the appellant had met the requisite threshold required in setting aside proceedings or orders in ex parte proceedings because the appellant did not have an opportunity to be heard and yet they had a defence that raises triable issues. He relies on the case of Shah vs Mbogo [1967] EA 116 where the court held that the discretion by a Judge is intended to be exercised to avoid injustice or hardship resulting from accident, inadvertence, or excusable mistake or error, but is not designed to assist the person who has deliberately sought, whether by evasion or otherwise, to obstruct or delay the course of justice. Counsel relies on the following authority to support his case; FM vs EKW [2019] eKLR. 14. Counsel for the appellant further contended that the appellant had an appeal which raised triable issues and that the court had allowed the appellant’s application dated 13th April, 2015 seeking to set aside the interlocutory judgment and leave to le defence. The appellant cites the case of Chemwolo & Another vs Kubende [1986] KLR 492 where the Court of Appeal held that in considering whether to set aside a judgment, the main concern was to do justice to the parties and that; “ Where a regular judgment had been entered, the Court would not usually set aside the judgment unless it was satised that there were triable issues raised a prima facie defence which should go for trial.” 15. The appellant, he avers, was that on 24th November, 2017, granted its prayer with further directions that the matter proceeds for pre-trial procedures to prepare for a fresh trial of the suit. It is counsel’s submission that the appellant lost communication with its then advocates Messrs. Philip Muoka Advocates and instructed another rm, the rm of Mugambi & Co. Advocates to take over the conduct of the matter. The rm of Mugambi & Co. Advocates did not render professional advice despite being on record and the appellant instructed again the rm of Kithinji Marete & Co. Advocates. 16. Counsel submitted that on the day when the matter was set for hearing, the rm of Marete sought for an adjournment which was not granted. The appellant nally appointed the rm of Chebii & Co. Advocates to take over the matter. It is counsel’s submission that whereas there were several errors that https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1925/eng@2026-09-25 4

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were made by their advocates, the said mistakes should not be visited on the appellant who were lay people and entirely depended on the advocates’ legal advice. Counsel further submitted that in the application dated 10th December, 2029, the learned Judge failed to record the appellants’ submissions when writing the ruling the subject of this appeal. 17. The appellant in his closing submissions seeks for the fundamental rights to be heard before the High Court Judge concludes the matter by writing of judgment. The appellant prays that the appeal be allowed and the ruling delivered on 6th March, 2020 set aside and allow the appellant to defend their suit in the High Court. 18. The appeal is opposed vide the 1st and 2nd respondents’ submissions. The 1st and 2nd respondents led their written submissions where they have given a detailed chronology of events in the instant case. As a preliminary issue, the 1st and 2nd respondents submitted that this Court has no jurisdiction because the appellant did not seek leave to le the appeal. They rely on the case of Nyutu Agrovet vs Airtel Networks Kenya Limited & 2 Others [2024] KECA 523 (KLR). The respondents further urge this Court to down its tool on grounds that the appellant did not seek leave of the Court prior to lodging the present appeal and as such, did not properly invoke this Court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine the present appeal. (See Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” vs Caltex Oil (K) Limited [1989] eKLR). 19. The respondents have also submitted on the two grounds of appeal us summarized by the appellant. On whether the learned judge erred in law and fact in failing to exercise his discretion to set aside exparte proceedings, the respondents submitted that the trial court considered all the facts of the case and held that there was no plausible explanation given throughout for the delays at every step of the hearing. The respondents further submitted that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in the exercise of its discretion the trial court having taken into account all the relevant matters in the case. They submitted that it was the appellant’s conduct that was undeserving of the judge’s discretion in its favour. See case of Shah vs Mbogo [supra]. 20. On whether the appellant have a defence that raises triable issues, the respondents submitted that this was well dispensed with by the trial court in the ruling of 24th November, 2017 when the trail court granted the appellant orders directing it to le its defence and have the matter proceed for pre-trial to set the matter for hearing a fresh. The respondents invited this Court to take judicial notice of the fact that the trial court vide the above ruling granted the appellant leave to le the said defence out of time but it failed to do so. Accordingly, the respondents aver that the issue of the appellant’s defence raising triable issues did not form the basis of the dismissal of the appellant’s application dated 10th December, 2019. 21. On whether the learned Judge erred in law and fact in failing to take into account that the applicant were lay men and the mistakes of their counsels ought not to be visited on them, it is the respondents’ submissions that the appellant is a juristic person and not lay men as pleaded. Accordingly, it is undisputed according to the respondents, that the appellant was aware of the hearing date scheduled for 9th October, 2019 even as it appointed the third advocate M/s Kithinji Marete & Co. Advocates to act for it. The respondents further submitted that there was an advocate who was present in court representing the appellant and the trial court allocated time for the hearing. The respondents aver that it is the duty of a litigant or a party to proceedings to actively be involved in the progress of its case. They further averred that the appellant’s conduct demonstrated a lack of interest in defending the suit pending before the trial court. See Christopher Murithi Ngugu vs Eliud Ngugu Evans [2016] eKLR and Charles Maina Muriuki vs Jamleck Muchira Wanjau [2014] eKLR. 22. The respondents closed their submissions by observing that the learned Judge exercised his unfettered discretion judiciously and within the ambits of the law and they urge this Court to uphold the ruling delivered on 6th March, 2020 and dismiss the appeal with costs. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1925/eng@2026-09-25 5

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23. This is a rst appeal, therefore, this Court’s mandate as a rst appellate court is settled as being rehearing or retrial of the case based on the material on record. This duty is provided for in rule 31(1) (a) of the Court of Appeal Rules (2022) which requires this Court to re-examine both issues of law and fact. While this Court has the power to arrive at its own independent decision, we must exercise caution and be slow to overturn a trial court’s ndings of fact because we did not have the advantage of seeing or hearing the witnesses. In Gitobu Imanyara & 2 others vs Attorney General [2016] eKLR, the Court observed thus; “ ...being a rst appeal, it is trite law, that this Court is not bound necessarily to accept the ndings of fact by the court below and that an appeal to this Court from a trial by the High Court is by way of retrial and the principles upon which this Court acts in such an appeal are well settled. Briey put, they are that this court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowances in this respect.” 24. We must also be guided by the Court of Appeal for East Africa decision in Peters vs Sunday Post Limited [1958] EA page 424, where the court stated that: “It is a strong thing for an appellate court to dier from the nding, on a question of fact, of the judge who tried the case, and who has had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. An appellate court has, indeed, jurisdiction to review the evidence in order to determine whether the conclusion originally reached upon that evidence should stand. But this is a jurisdiction which should be exercised with caution; it is not enough that the appellate court might itself have come to a dierent conclusion.” 25. Conscious of the provisions of rule 31(1)(a) of the Court of Appeal Rules (2022) and the plethora of authorities in this area, we will only overturn a trial court’s nding if it is shown to be clearly wrong, or if the judge failed to take into account material circumstances or probabilities. 26. We have carefully considered the record of appeal, the grounds of appeal, the rival submissions and the law. We discern two issues for determination, to wit, whether the trial court erred in failing to exercise its discretion to set aside the ex-parte judgment; and whether the learned judge erred in law and fact in failing to take into account that the appellants were lay men and the mistakes of their counsel ought not to be visited on them. 27. Before delving on the two issues identied, we must dispense with the preliminary issue submitted by the respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction because the appellant did not seek leave to le an appeal. Without saying much, Rule 77 of this Court’s Rules provides; “ (1) A person who desires to appeal to the Court shall give notice in writing, which notice shall be lodged in two copies, with the registrar of the superior court. (2) Each notice under subrule (1) shall, subject to rules 84 and 97, be lodged within fourteen days after the date of the decision against the decision for which appeal is lodged…” From the records, the appellant led its Notice of Appeal dated 11th March, 2020 and the Memorandum of Appeal dated 29th June, 2020. Both these documents were led within the requisite timelines provided by law and their authenticity has not been challenged. We are therefore satised that there is a proper notice of appeal and this Court is properly seized of the matter. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1925/eng@2026-09-25 6

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28. Back to the issues we have identied for consideration, we will deal with the two issues together. On whether the trial court erred in failing to exercise its discretion to set aside the ex parte judgment, it is trite law that a judge’s discretion to set aside an ex-parte judgment is wide and unfettered, aimed at avoiding injustice or hardship caused by mistake or excusable absence. This power is meant to balance fairness to both parties and not to reward a party who willfully delays or evades justice. Though the power is broad, it must be exercised judiciously, rationally, accountably and must be based on specic facts of the case. The primary aim as already stated, is to prevent a party from suering severe hardship due to genuine errors, minor oversights or accidental defaults. In Farah Awad Gullet vs CMC Motors Group Limited [2018] eKLR the Court stated that: “ In Edward Sargent v Chotabha Jhaverbhat Patel [1949] 16 EACA 63, it was held that an appeal does lie to an appellate court against an order made in the exercise of judicial discretion, but the Appeal Court will interfere only if it be shown that the discretion was exercised injudiciously. The principles that guide the appellate court in the exercise of this mandate were set by the predecessor of the Court in Mbogo & Another vs Shah [1969] EA 93, where it was held at page 96 that: “An appellate Court will interfere if the exercise of the discretion is clearly wrong because the Judge has misdirected himself or acted on matters which he should not have acted upon or failed to take into consideration and in doing so arrived at a wrong conclusion. It is trite law that an appellate Court should not interfere with the exercise of the discretion of a judge unless it is satised that the Judge in exercising his discretion has misdirected himself and has been clearly wrong in the exercise of the discretion and that as a result, there has been injustice.” 29. We have taken time to read the record of the trial court and noted the reasons the trial court advanced for dismissing the application by the appellant. The trial court undertook a detailed analysis of the case and advanced reasons for dismissing the appellant’s application. The trial court noted, after analysing the application and the evidence adduced by both parties as placed before it, that the appellant together with its advocates did not conduct the business of this matter eciently and that in the circumstances, the justice of the case demanded that the proceedings in the case remain intact, and judgment be delivered accordingly. The learned judge proceeded to dismiss the application, the subject of this appeal, with costs. 30. We are persuaded that the learned Judge applied the law correctly in his ruling. In the case of James Kanyiita Nderitu & Another vs Marios Philotas Ghikas & Another [2016] eKLR, while making a distinction between a regularly entered default judgment and an irregularly entered one, this Court stated in relation to regular default judgment— “In such a scenario, the court has unfettered discretion in determining whether or not to set aside the default judgment, and will take into account such factors as the reason for the failure of the defendant to le his memorandum of appearance or defence, as the case may be; the length of time that has elapsed since default judgment was entered; whether the intended defence raises triable issues; the respective prejudice each party is likely to suer; whether on the whole it is in the interest of justice to set aside the default judgment, among others.” 31. The instant case falls under the category of regular default judgment because the appellant was served right from the initial suit led by the 1st and 2nd respondents in ELC Case No. 444 of 2014 led in Nairobi and later transferred to Machakos as ELC No. 138 of 2018 in Machakos. Despite being served through their lawyers and by substituted service, the appellant did not enter appearance. When the https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1925/eng@2026-09-25 7

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matter was scheduled for formal proof on 15th April, 2015, the appellant appeared with an application to be allowed to le their defence out of time, which application, was successful. 32. Just to demonstrate the indolence by the appellant, it did not le its defence within the prescribed timelines. The appellant then instructed the rm of Philip Muoki & Co. Advocates to take over the matter. The appellant hired another rm of advocates, Mugambi & Company Advocates who again were red without taking any action. The game of hire and re continued when the appellant instructed another rm of advocates that is the rm of M/s Kithinji Marete & Co. Advocates. When the matter came up for hearing on 9th October, 2019, the appellant’s counsel sought for an adjournment, which adjournment, was denied and the matter listed for hearing on the same day at 11.30 a.m. 33. The appellant’s lawyers did not appear. They were red and another rm of Advocates i.e., M.K. Chebii & Company Advocates were hired to appear for it when the matter came up for mention on 14th November, 2019. The appellant’s advocates withdrew a preliminary objection that they had raised and the matter was scheduled for judgment on 6th March, 2020. Once again, on 15th January, 2020, the appellant served the respondents with the instant application dated 10th December, 2019. The application sought to stay the delivery of judgment scheduled for 6th March, 2020, set aside or vary the proceedings of 9th October, 2019 and that the appellant’s defence dated 13th April, 2015 be deemed as duly led and served upon payment of the requisite court fees. The application was heard and determined on 6th March, 2020 and dismissed the application with costs. 34. We have taken the liberty to go through the journey this case has travelled in order to demonstrate the indolence of the appellant herein. Looking at the issues to consider when exercising discretion whether or not to set aside a regular ex parte judgment, we are guided by the principles as laid down in James Kanyiita Nderitu & Another vs Marios Philotas Ghikas & Another (supra). The factors to take into account include the reason for the failure of the defendant to le his memorandum of appearance or defence, as the case may be; the length of time that has elapsed since default judgment was entered; whether the intended defence raises triable issues; the respective prejudice each party is likely to suer; whether on the whole it is in the interest of justice to set aside the default judgment among others. 35. From the facts of the case, the appellant did not give any plausible reasons for not ling its defence. As to the length of time, the defendant clearly has taken inordinately long. The appellant had the opportunity to le its defence after being granted leave and yet again it went to slumber only to appear almost four years later with the instant application. The conduct of the appellant must not be encouraged. He who comes to equity must come with clean hands. We are not convinced that the appellant is being honest here. All these actions point to abuse of the court process. Equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd vs East African Underwriters (Kenya) Ltd [1985] E.A., Madan J.A (as he then was) expounded the applicable principles when an appellate court may interfere with an award by a trial court as follows; “ The Court of Appeal will not interfere with a discretionary decision of the judge appealed from simply on the ground that its members, if sitting at rst instance, would or might have given dierent weight to that given by the Judge to the various factors in the case. The Court of Appeal is only entitled to interfere if one or more of the following matters are established: rst, that the Judge misdirected himself in law; secondly, that he misapprehended the facts; thirdly, that he took account of considerations of which he should not have taken account; fourthly, that he failed to take account of considerations of which he should have taken account, or fthly, that his decision, albeit a discretionary one, is plainly wrong.” https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1925/eng@2026-09-25 8

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36. In the circumstances, we uphold the learned Judge’s nding and dismiss this ground. The learned Judge exercised his discretion within the law and acted judiciously while exercising his discretion and dismissing the appellant’s application. 37. On whether the learned Judge erred in law and fact in failing to take into account that the appellants were lay men and the mistakes of their counsel ought not to be visited on them, the general rule is that a mistake or inadvertence of counsel should not be visited upon an innocent client. The rule however is not absolute and clients may still bear the consequences depending on the nature of the error, the conduct of the litigation and whether there is clear evidence of the lawyer’s individual fault. Where a client fails to give instructions or fails to attend court, or if the advocate completely abandons a case or ignores clear court orders over a long period of time, we will not stop from blaming the litigant to bear the nal outcome if no credible, cogent proof excuses the default. We require cogent proof of a genuine mistake by counsel rather than last-minute excuses invented to revive a dead claim or cover up a party’s own neglect. 38. We must be conscious of the fact that litigants retain a residual duty to monitor their cases and check in with their counsel the progress of their matter. A client cannot use an advocate’s prolonged inaction as a blank cheque after remaining completely dormant. The instant case demonstrates a client who by design or by neglect did not bother to follow up on the status of its case. In the process, the appellant has changed legal counsel at least four times without any reasons being advanced. The appellant has not attempted at all to demonstrate that it attempted to follow up on the status of its case with the various advocates acting for it. This level of indolence cannot be tolerated. 39. An analysis of the appellant’s application, supporting adavit and submissions demonstrates indolence and a lack of candidness by the appellant. There is no explanation what the appellant was doing from the time they were served with the initial suit, no explanation as to what they were doing after being granted leave to le their defence and no explanation at all why the constant change of legal representations throughout the case. Without explanation, this Court has no basis for exercising discretion. In Bi-Mach Engineers Limited vs James Kahoro Mwangi [2011] eKLR, this Court observed — “ The applicant had a duty to pursue his advocates to nd out the position on the litigation but there is no disclosure that the applicant bothered to follow up the matter with his erstwhile advocates. It is not enough simply to accuse the advocate of failure to inform as if there is no duty on the client to pursue his matter. If the advocate was simply guilty of inaction, that is not an excusable mistake which the court may consider with sympathy. The client has a remedy against such advocate.” 40. Our re-evaluation of the evidence leads us to the same conclusion arrived at by the trial court that the appellant has never been keen in defending this suit. The appellant, together with its advocates did not conduct the business of this matter eciently. The justice of this case therefore demands that the proceedings of the case remain intact. We cannot, in the circumstances, interfere with the ndings of the trial court for reaching the decision and dismissing the application dated 10th November, 2019 with costs. 41. Thus, having considered the record of appeal, the impugned judgment, the parties’ submissions, the highlights by counsel, the authorities cited and the law, we are persuaded that this appeal lacks merit. 42. In conclusion, we nd that the appeal is without merit and is hereby dismissed. We uphold the trial court’s judgment. Each party shall bear its own costs of the appeal. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1925/eng@2026-09-25 9

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DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 25TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026. L. ACHODE ...................................... JUDGE OF APPEAL PAUL LILAN ...................................... JUDGE OF APPEAL DR. J. O. OKELLO ...................................... JUDGE OF APPEAL I certify that this is a true copy of the original. Signed DEPUTY REGISTRAR https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1925/eng@2026-09-25 10

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