Royal Media Services Ltd v Githii

the appellant. Page 2 of 33

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2. Upon hearing the parties, the learned Judge found that the impugned broadcasts had been made; that they referred to the respondent; that they were defamatory of him; and that the appellant had failed to establish any defence capable of defeating the claim. The awarded the respondent learned Kshs. Judge 5,000,000 consequently as general damages and Kshs. 2,000,000 as aggravated damages, together with costs and interest. 3. Aggrieved by that decision, the appellant lodged the present appeal. Its memorandum of appeal dated 2nd May 2022 contains thirteen grounds. Taken together, however, those grounds raise three principal issues: a) Whether the respondent proved, to the requisite standard, that the impugned broadcasts were made by the appellant's radio station; b) Whether the respondent established the essential elements of the tort of defamation and, correspondingly, whether the learned Judge improperly shifted the burden of proof from the respondent to the appellant; and c) Whether the learned Judge erred in awarding Kshs. 5,000,000 as general damages and Kshs. 2,000,000 as aggravated damages. Page 3 of 33

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Duty of this Court on a first appeal 4. This is a first appeal. Our mandate is therefore to reconsider and re-evaluate the evidence adduced before the trial court and to draw our own conclusions, while bearing in mind that, unlike the trial Judge, we neither saw nor heard the witnesses testify. 5. That jurisdiction does not permit us to approach the appeal as though no trial had taken place. Where findings turn materially upon credibility and demeanour, an appellate court ordinarily accords due respect to the advantage enjoyed by the trial court. Nevertheless, where the conclusions reached are unsupported by the evidence, are founded upon a misapprehension of the evidence or disclose an error of principle, this Court is entitled, and indeed obliged, to intervene. Background 6. The respondent was, at the material time, the Land Registrar at Nakuru. By a plaint filed in the High Court, he complained that on or about 6th, 13th, 20th and 25th May 2006, the appellant, through its Inooro FM radio station and a Page 4 of 33

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programme known as Page 5 of 33

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Kwamba Ndurika, broadcast words concerning him which were defamatory. 7. According to the respondent, the programme was presented in Kikuyu by Professor Ngugi Njoroge and Ndiritu Wachira. The material part of the broadcast was translated into English substantially as follows: “We have an old man from Subukia called Anthony Gathua Kariuki talking about his piece of land in Bahati-Subukia namely LR No. Bahati/Bahati Block 1/97 sold to him by one Peter Njogu Muchemi. That piece of land was taken away from him by the wife of Njogu Muchemi, using the Nakuru Land Registrar. The land was transferred to her instead of being transferred to Anthony Gathua Kariuki. Where did this registrar go to school? How could he transfer the land to a person who was not a buyer? This is corruption. Whenever this old man goes to the lands office for help, the registrar tells him to go to Court.” 8. The respondent further pleaded that during the final broadcast the presenters stated, in substance: “…on the coming Wednesday, we shall go to the Nakuru Lands Office and eject the said Registrar from his office. He had threatened to take us to Court if we mention his name again.” Page 6 of 33

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9. The respondent contended that those words, in their natural and ordinary meaning, portrayed him as corrupt, incompetent, dishonest, immoral, unworthy of public office and as a public officer who had abused his position for improper purposes. 10. Of particular significance to his complaint was the allegation that the broadcasts presented the transfer of the parcel of land as a corrupt administrative transaction when, according to him, the transfer had in fact been effected pursuant to an order of a competent court of law. 11. The respondent therefore sought general damages for defamation, aggravated damages, costs and interest. The defense 12. The appellant denied publishing the words complained of. In the alternative, it pleaded that, if the words were published, the publication was made in good faith, without malice and concerning a matter of legitimate public interest. 13. The appellant further pleaded that the public was entitled to information concerning the conduct of public officers such as Page 7 of 33

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the respondent and relied upon the defenses of qualified privilege and fair comment. 14. The structure of that defense is important. A defendant is entitled to plead inconsistent defenses in the alternative. The fact that the appellant denied publication while pleading that, if publication occurred, it was privileged or constituted fair comment did not, without more, amount to an admission of publication. Publication remained a fact which the respondent was required to prove. Evidence before the High Court 15. The respondent testified that he was the Land Registrar at Nakuru at the material time and that Inooro FM made the broadcasts complained of on various dates in May 2006. 16. He identified the presenters and testified that the broadcasts were made in Kikuyu. He also produced or referred to their English translation as pleaded in his plaint. 17. The respondent explained the transaction which gave rise to the broadcasts. His evidence was that, in the course of his official duties, he received orders issued in Nakuru CM Case No. 1 of Page 8 of 33

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1998 requiring the transfer of land parcel No. Bahati/Bahati Block 1/97 to the persons specified in the court order. 18. His case was therefore that he had not irregularly transferred the property at his personal discretion. Rather, he had acted in obedience to a court order. 19. He testified that the broadcasts nevertheless portrayed the transaction as corrupt and attributed the alleged corruption directly to the Nakuru Land Registrar. He maintained that, as the Land Registrar at Nakuru at the material time, the reference was unmistakable to him. 20. The respondent further testified that the broadcasts adversely affected his standing and reputation and caused him embarrassment in his family, professional and social circles. 21. The appellant called one witness, Njenga Njehia, its legal officer. He adopted his witness statement and the appellant's defense. 22. Mr. Njehia conceded, however, that he joined the appellant in 2012, approximately six years after the broadcasts complained of. He therefore had no personal knowledge Page 9 of 33

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of whether the Page 10 of 33

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programmes were aired in May 2006 or of the circumstances in which they were prepared and broadcast. 23. More significantly, he confirmed that people associated with the programme and who would have had direct knowledge of the broadcasts remained employees of the appellant. None was called to testify. 24. The appellant also did not produce the relevant broadcast records or any evidence from an officer responsible for its archives or programme records demonstrating that the broadcasts did not take place. Decision of the High Court 25. Upon evaluating the evidence, the learned Judge accepted the respondent's account and found that the broadcasts were made by the appellant's radio station. 26. The Judge further found that the words complained of were defamatory because they portrayed the respondent, a public officer, as corrupt and as having improperly exercised the powers of his office. Page 11 of 33

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27. The High Court consequently entered judgment for the respondent and awarded him Kshs. 5,000,000 in general damages and Kshs. 2,000,000 in aggravated damages, together with costs and interest. The appellant's submissions 28. Before us, the appellant's principal complaint is that publication was never proved. It submits that the respondent did not produce an audio recording of the broadcasts and that his assertion that Inooro FM aired the offending words was insufficient. 29. The appellant further submits that sections 107, 108 and 109 of the Evidence Act placed the burden squarely upon the respondent and that the learned Judge impermissibly shifted that burden to the appellant merely because the appellant did not call the presenters. 30. Reliance was placed, among other authorities, on Wycliffe A. Swanya v Toyota East Africa Ltd & another and Daniel N. Ngunia v KGGCU Ltd for the proposition that publication to a Page 12 of 33

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third party is an essential ingredient of defamation. Page 13 of 33

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31. The appellant also maintained that the respondent failed to call an independent witness to testify that he or she heard the broadcasts and formed a diminished opinion of the respondent. 32. In the alternative, the appellant submitted that the broadcasts concerned the performance of the functions of a public officer and were protected by qualified privilege, fair comment and the constitutional freedom of expression. 33. On quantum, the appellant argued that Kshs. 5,000,000 in general damages was excessive and suggested that, if liability were established, an award of Kshs. 500,000 would have been sufficient. 34. It further contended that aggravated damages were unwarranted because there was no evidence of malice or conduct justifying an additional award. The respondent's submissions 35. The respondent supported the judgment of the High Court. He emphasized that the appellant's only witness joined the media house six years after the broadcasts and possessed no direct knowledge of the events in issue. Page 10 of 33

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36. He further submitted that the appellant acknowledged that persons directly involved in the programme were still within its employment but elected not to call them. 37. According to the respondent, his direct evidence concerning the broadcasts therefore remained substantially uncontroverted. 38. He further broadcasting submitted the that allegations the appellant notwithstanding continued the true position that the transfer complained of had been effected pursuant to a court order. 39. On damages, the respondent argued that the award was a discretionary assessment by the trial court and that the appellant had not demonstrated any recognized basis upon which an appellate court could interfere. Analysis and determination 40. We have considered the record, the judgment of the High Court, the memorandum of appeal, the written and oral submissions and the authorities cited by counsel. 41. In our view, the appeal may conveniently be determined under the following questions: Page 11 of 33

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i. Whether publication of the impugned words by the appellant was proved; ii. Whether the words were defamatory of the respondent; iii. Whether the appellant established any of the defences pleaded; and iv. Whether there is a proper basis for interfering with the award of damages. Whether publication was proved 42. Sections 107 and 108 of the Evidence Act embody the elementary rule that he who asserts must prove. The legal burden of proving the essential elements of defamation remained throughout upon the respondent. 43. Accordingly, the appellant's failure to call a witness could not, by itself, establish a case which the respondent had otherwise failed to prove. A weakness in the defence is not a substitute for proof of the plaintiff's case. 44. Equally, however, the evidential burden is not static. Once a party adduces evidence which, if unanswered, is capable of establishing a fact on a balance of probabilities, the evidential burden may shift to the party against whom that evidence Page 12 of 33

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operates. That does not reverse the legal burden; it is simply an incident of the judicial evaluation of evidence. 45. The established elements of the tort of defamation include that the words complained of are defamatory; that they refer to the claimant; and that they are published by the defendant to at least one person other than the claimant. Falsity and malice also arise according to the nature of the claim and the defences advanced. 46. In Patani & another v Patani [2019] KECA 480 (KLR), this Court restated the essential elements as being that the statement; must be defamatory, must refer to the plaintiff, must have been published by the defendant and must be false. 47. Similarly, in Wycliffe A. Swanya v Toyota East Africa Ltd & another, this Court emphasized that publication, for purposes of defamation, means communication of the defamatory material to someone other than the person defamed. 48. We therefore agree with the appellant that publication was not a peripheral matter. It was an indispensable element of Page 13 of 33

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the respondent's cause of action. Page 14 of 33

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49. The appellant argues, however, that publication could only have been proved by production of the actual audio recording or by calling an independent listener. We do not accept that proposition as an inflexible rule of law. 50. The fact of a radio broadcast is a question of fact and, like other facts, may be proved by any admissible evidence of sufficient probative value. An audio recording will ordinarily provide powerful evidence, but the law does not make production of a recording the exclusive means by which a historical broadcast may be proved. 51. That distinction is particularly relevant here because the broadcasts occurred in 2006 and the matter came to trial many years thereafter. The court was required to determine, from the totality of the admissible evidence, whether publication had been established on a balance of probabilities. 52. The respondent gave direct evidence identifying the radio station, the programme, the presenters, the language of broadcast, the dates and the substance of the words spoken. His evidence was not a generalized allegation that an Page 15 of 33

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unidentified radio station had defamed him. It contained particulars capable of being specifically answered by the broadcaster. 53. The appellant was uniquely placed to challenge those particulars through persons involved in the programme or through its relevant programme records. Yet the witness it elected to call joined the organization six years after the event and candidly lacked personal knowledge of the broadcasts. 54. More importantly, the appellant's witness confirmed that persons associated with the broadcasts remained employees of the appellant. No satisfactory explanation was offered for their absence. 55. We reiterate that their absence did not relieve the respondent of the burden of proof. But once the respondent had given positive and sufficiently particularized evidence of the broadcasts, the failure to call readily available witnesses with direct knowledge was a matter which the trial court was entitled to take into account in evaluating whether that evidence had been displaced. Page 16 of 33

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56. The familiar evidential principle is that where a party fails, without reasonable explanation, to call evidence which is peculiarly within its knowledge or control and which would naturally be expected to elucidate a disputed matter, a court may, in an appropriate case, draw the inference that such evidence would not have assisted that party. 57. Such an inference is supplementary. It cannot manufacture a prima facie case where none exists. Here, however, there was affirmative evidence from the respondent before the question of the appellant's failure to call the presenters arose. 58. The learned Judge was therefore entitled to assess the respondent's positive testimony against evidence from an appellant's witness who could neither affirm nor credibly rebut what occurred in 2006. 59. We are accordingly unable to accept the submission that the trial court reversed the burden under sections 107 to 109 of the Evidence Act. Properly understood, the Judge assessed the evidence placed before her and concluded that the respondent's evidence had not been displaced. Page 17 of 33

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60. On our own reconsideration of the record, we arrive at the same conclusion. On a balance of probabilities, the respondent established that the broadcasts complained of were aired on the appellant's Inooro FM station. Whether the words referred to the respondent 61. There is little difficulty with the requirement of identification. A claimant need not invariably be expressly named if reasonable persons acquainted with the relevant circumstances would understand the publication to refer to him. 62. The broadcasts referred to the “Nakuru Land Registrar” and accused that office holder of effecting the impugned transfer. The respondent's evidence was that he was the Land Registrar at Nakuru at the material time. 63. The subject matter was not an abstract discussion of the Lands Office. It concerned a particular parcel of land, a particular transfer and the conduct attributed to the officer who effected or was responsible for that transfer. 64. We are satisfied that a reasonable listener acquainted with the respondent's office would Page 18 of 33 have understood the

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broadcasts as Page 19 of 33

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referring to him. The identification element was therefore established. Defamatory meaning 65. The governing test is objective. The question is not merely whether the claimant felt insulted or offended. Reputation concerns the estimation in which a person is held by others. 66. The court asks whether the words, in their natural and ordinary meaning and in their context, would tend to lower the claimant in the estimation of reasonable members of society, cause him to be shunned or avoided, or expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule. 67. The impugned criticism of broadcasts bureaucratic went considerably inefficiency. They beyond expressly characterized the transaction as “corruption” and questioned how the Land Registrar could have transferred the property to a person said not to have purchased it. 68. The unmistakable sting of the broadcast was that the Land Registrar had corruptly or improperly manipulated the land registration process. Page 110 of 33

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69. Corruption is a grave accusation against any person. It assumes even greater significance when directed against a public officer entrusted with the integrity of land records and the exercise of statutory powers affecting proprietary rights. 70. A reasonable listener would understand such an accusation to impute dishonesty, abuse of public office and unfitness to hold the position of Land Registrar. 71. The suggestion that the presenters would attend the Lands Office and “eject” the Registrar from office reinforced the message that the respondent had committed misconduct sufficiently serious to render him undeserving of his office. 72. We therefore have no hesitation in agreeing with the learned Judge that the words were defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning. Falsity and the underlying court order 73. There is a further feature of this case which cannot be overlooked. The respondent explained that the transfer forming the basis of the broadcasts had been undertaken pursuant to an order of a competent court. Page 111 of 33

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74. That evidence went directly to the factual premise upon which the accusation of corruption rested. A public officer who carries out a transfer in obedience to a court order stands in a materially different position from one who arbitrarily or corruptly manipulates the register to benefit a person who has no entitlement to the property. 75. No evidence was adduced by the appellant demonstrating that the respondent fabricated the existence of the court order, acted outside it, colluded with any beneficiary or obtained any personal benefit from the transaction. 76. The accusation of corruption was therefore not established as true. Qualified privilege, fair comment and public interest 77. The appellant pleaded qualified privilege, fair comment and public interest. We accept at once that administration of land, alleged corruption in public offices and conduct of public officers are matters of legitimate and substantial public concern. Page 20 of 33

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78. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression and freedom of the media is indispensable to democratic government. The media performs a vital public-watchdog role and must have sufficient latitude to investigate, question and criticize the exercise of public power. 79. Public officers cannot demand immunity from scrutiny merely because damaging to criticism their is uncomfortable, robust or standing. Accountability frequently requires persistent and searching journalism. 80. But constitutional protection of expression is not a licence to destroy reputation through false statements of fact. Article 33 itself requires regard to the rights and reputation of others, while human dignity is protected by Article 28 of the Constitution. Article 34 guarantees freedom and independence of the media; it does not confer immunity from the ordinary law of defamation. 81. The judicial task is consequently one of principled balance. Courts must avoid imposing liability merely because a publication is critical of government or a public officer. At the Page 21 of 33

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same time, a media defendant relying on a recognized defence must bring itself within the legal requirements of that defence. 82. Qualified privilege protects communications made on an occasion where the maker has a legal, social or moral duty or interest to communicate the information and the recipient has a corresponding duty or interest to receive it, subject to the applicable limitations of the defence. 83. Even where the subject is plainly one of public interest, the existence of public interest does not automatically establish that every allegation made about it is protected. 84. Likewise, the defence historically described as fair comment protects honestly held comment or opinion on matters of public interest where the requisite factual foundation exists. A bare allegation of fact does not become protected opinion merely by being broadcast in the course of a discussion programme. 85. Here, the central sting was not simply an expression of opinion that the respondent had exercised poor judgment. The presenters were alleged to have represented the Page 22 of 33

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transaction itself as “corruption.” Page 23 of 33

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86. Yet the respondent's evidence was that the transfer was effected pursuant to a court order. There was no evidence from the presenters explaining the investigation undertaken before the broadcast, the material upon which they relied, whether they had seen the court order, whether clarification had been sought from the respondent, or why the corruption allegation was repeated. 87. The appellant's witness, having joined the organization in 2012, could provide no such evidence. 88. Pleading a defence is not proof of it. Once the appellant invoked privilege and fair comment, the factual foundation necessary to sustain those defences had to emerge from the evidence. It did not. 89. We therefore agree with the High Court that the appellant did not establish a defence sufficient to defeat the respondent's claim. Malice 90. Malice in defamation is not confined to spite or personal ill will. Depending upon the circumstances, it may be inferred from a Page 24 of 33

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reckless disregard of whether an allegation is true or false, from failure to inquire into facts which plainly call for verification, or from persistence in an accusation after information undermining its factual foundation has become available. 91. We would nevertheless caution against treating every journalistic error as malice. The constitutional importance of free expression demands that courts distinguish between an honest error in responsible public-interest reporting and a reckless or deliberately false attack upon reputation. 92. In the present case, the accusation was serious. It alleged corruption by a named or readily identifiable public officer in relation to a specific land transaction. The true legal basis upon which that transaction was effected was therefore a matter of obvious importance. 93. The respondent maintained that the appellant had been informed that the transfer was made pursuant to a court order yet the broadcasts continued. The appellant placed no direct evidence before the trial court rebutting that assertion or demonstrating the steps taken to verify the allegation. Page 25 of 33

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94. In those circumstances, the learned Judge was entitled to regard the manner and persistence of the publication as aggravating the wrong. Whether independent indispensable third-party evidence was 95. The appellant placed considerable emphasis upon the respondent's failure to call his wife, vicar, friends or another listener to testify to the effect of the broadcasts upon his reputation. 96. There is an important distinction between proof of publication and proof of actual pecuniary loss. The tort protects reputation, not merely financial interests, and defamatory statements of the kind actionable without proof of special damage do not require the claimant to quantify financial loss as a condition precedent to liability. 97. Nevertheless, publication to a person other than the claimant remains indispensable. Patani & another v Patani illustrates the importance of that requirement in circumstances where the allegedly defamatory material consisted of private letters Page 26 of 33

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and Page 27 of 33

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there was no adequate evidence that their contents had reached a third party. 98. The circumstances here are materially different. The communication complained of was not a private letter addressed solely to the respondent. It was alleged to have been transmitted as part of a programme on a commercial radio station. 99. Once the court was satisfied, on the evidence, that the programme was in fact broadcast by the radio station, the nature of radio broadcasting itself was relevant to the question of communication. The trial court was not dealing with a sealed private communication whose receipt by a third party had to be independently established. 100. The absence of testimony from the respondent's wife, vicar or friends was therefore a matter relevant to the assessment of the extent of reputational injury and, ultimately, damages. In the circumstances of this case it was not fatal to the finding that the broadcast had been published. Page 28 of 33

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Damages 101. We turn to the final issue: whether this Court should interfere with the award of Kshs. 5,000,000 as general damages and Kshs. 2,000,000 as aggravated damages. 102. Assessment of damages is an exercise of judicial discretion. An appellate court does not substitute its own figure merely because, had it been sitting at first instance, it might have awarded a different amount. 103. The principles governing appellate interference are settled. In Jabane v Olenja [1986] KECA 71 (KLR), this Court reaffirmed that interference is justified where the trial court acted on a wrong principle, misunderstood relevant evidence, or arrived at an award so inordinately high or low as to represent an erroneous estimate. 104. The same broad principle has consistently informed appellate review of discretionary awards. The threshold is deliberately high because assessment primarily entrusted to the trial court. Page 29 of 33 of damages is

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105. In defamation, the assessment must take into account the nature and gravity of the libel or slander, the standing of the claimant, the extent and mode of publication, the conduct of the defendant before and after publication, the effect of the publication upon the claimant and all other relevant circumstances. 106. The medium of publication is particularly relevant. A statement broadcast over radio is capable of reaching an audience substantially wider than a private conversation or letter. That does not automatically justify a large award, but it is a legitimate consideration. 107. Equally relevant is the nature of the imputation. The respondent was accused, in substance, of corruption in the performance of his duties as Land Registrar. Integrity lay at the heart of the public office which he occupied. 108. An accusation that a land registrar corruptly manipulates ownership records attacks the very attribute upon which public confidence in that office depends. The learned Judge was entitled to regard that as a serious injury to reputation. Page 210 of 33

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109. We have considered the appellant's proposal that Kshs. 500,000 would have constituted adequate general damages. No sufficient basis has been demonstrated for concluding that the learned Judge applied a wrong legal principle in fixing general damages at Kshs. 5,000,000. 110. Nor, viewed against the gravity of an accusation of corruption, the respondent's public office, the medium through which the words were disseminated and the repeated nature of the broadcasts, can we say that the award was so manifestly excessive as to justify appellate intervention. Aggravated damages 111. Aggravated damages serve a distinct function. They may be justified where the defendant's conduct increases the claimant's injury, including where publication is repeated, persisted in recklessly, inadequately retracted, or where the manner in which the defence is conducted compounds the original injury. 112. Such damages must not, however, be awarded automatically in every successful defamation action. There must be some Page 211 of 33

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aggravating feature over and above the mere fact of publication. Page 212 of 33

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113. In the present case, the publications were alleged to have been repeated on several dates. The respondent's case was also that the broadcasts continued notwithstanding the appellant being made aware that the transfer was founded upon a court order. 114. The appellant called no presenter or other witness with direct knowledge to explain the basis for continuing the accusation, nor did the evidence disclose a correction or retraction commensurate with the seriousness of the allegation. 115. In those circumstances, we are not persuaded that the learned Judge lacked a proper basis for making an award of aggravated damages. 116. The figure of Kshs. 2,000,000, considered together with the general award and the circumstances of the publication, has not been demonstrated to be so disproportionate as to warrant interference by this Court. Conclusion 117. Ultimately, this appeal turns substantially upon the appellant's invitation to this Court to substitute its evaluation Page 30 of 33

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of the evidence for that of the learned trial Judge. Page 30 of 33

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118. We have undertaken the required independent reevaluation. We are satisfied that the respondent bore the legal burden of proving his claim and that the learned Judge did not impermissibly reverse that burden. 119. The respondent gave direct and detailed evidence identifying the radio station, programme, presenters, dates and substance of the broadcasts. The appellant's only witness had no personal knowledge of events occurring in 2006, while witnesses within the appellant's employment who could directly address the broadcasts were not called. 120. In the circumstances, the learned Judge was entitled to conclude, on a balance of probabilities, that publication had been proved. 121. The broadcasts referred sufficiently to the respondent, and their natural and ordinary meaning conveyed the serious allegation that he had corruptly manipulated transaction in the exercise of his public office. Page 31 of 33 a land

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122. The evidence that the transfer had been undertaken pursuant to a court order fundamentally undermined the factual basis of that accusation. 123. While the administration of land and conduct of public officers are undoubtedly matters of legitimate public interest and while the media must remain free to investigate and criticize public administration vigorously, neither freedom of expression nor freedom of the media confers a licence to publish defamatory statements without the factual or legal foundation required to sustain the defences invoked. 124. On the evidence placed before the High Court, the appellant failed to establish qualified privilege or fair comment sufficient to defeat the respondent's claim. 125. Finally, no error of principle has been demonstrated in the assessment of damages. Neither the general damages of Kshs. 5,000,000 nor the aggravated damages of Kshs. 2,000,000 have been shown warranting appellate interference. Disposition Page 32 of 33 to cross the threshold

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126. Accordingly, we find no merit in this appeal. 127. The appeal is hereby dismissed in its entirety. 128. The judgment and decree of the High Court dated 10th June 2021, including the award of Kshs. 5,000,000 as general damages and Kshs. 2,000,000 as aggravated damages, are hereby upheld. 129. The respondent shall have the costs of this appeal. 130. Orders accordingly. Dated and delivered at Nakuru this 25th day of September, 2026. J. MATIVO .................................. JUDGE OF APPEAL MURUNGI B. KAIRARIA .................................. JUDGE OF APPEAL AHMED ISSACK ................................. JUDGE OF APPEAL I certify that this is a Page 33 of 33

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True copy of the original Signed DEPUTY REGISTRAR Page 34 of 33

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