Republic v Obado & 17 others (Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Case E018 of 2020) [2026] KEMC 96 (KLR)
The bottom line
#Kenya's Anti-Corruption Court approved a plea deal letting Okoth Obado and 17 others have all charges withdrawn after forfeiting over Kshs. 235 million in property.
What this practically means
#Executive summary
#Questions the Court framed
#The issues the Court set itself to decide, in its own words.
- 1.Whether the Plea Agreement has surmounted the procedural/formalities legality test, and in particular: (i) whether EACC has locus standi to challenge the Plea Agreement; (ii) who are the proper parties to a Plea Agreement and whether EACC must sign it; (iii) whether the Plea Agreement meets the statutory requirements of sections 137D, 137F and 137H of the CPC, including whether EACC was consulted and whether the DPP must concur with EACC; (iv) whether the Plea Agreement meets the requirements of section 137A(1)(a), (b) and (2) of the CPC, in particular whether a proper Plea Agreement must result in admission of criminal liability; (v) whether section 87(a) of the CPC can be invoked when the withdrawal option under section 137A(1)(b) is the agreed option in a plea negotiation
- 2.Whether the Plea Agreement has surmounted the substantive legality test — whether there is a sound legal basis and/or justification for adopting it, in particular whether it surmounts the triple-conditions test of public interest, interests of administration of justice and the need to avoid abuse of the legal process under Article 157(11) of the Constitution
Key legal issues
#EACC's locus standi to challenge the Plea Agreement
EACC has locus standi, founded on the right to be consulted under section 137D of the CPC, distinguishable from the Chapia decision where EACC lacked standing to oppose withdrawal under section 87(a).
The court distinguished its earlier Chapia decision, which denied EACC standing to oppose a section 87(a) withdrawal. In the plea-bargaining context, section 137D imposes a mandatory obligation on the DPP to consult the investigating agency, thereby conferring a right on EACC. Breach or threatened breach of that right grounds standing, an exception to the general rule in Chapia.
Proper parties and signing requirements of a Plea Agreement
A valid Plea Agreement is bipartite (DPP and Accused) or tripartite (with the complainant where compensation under section 175(2)(b) is included); EACC need not sign and its refusal does not invalidate the agreement.
Relying on the plain text of sections 137A, 137B, 137E and rules 2, 5, 6 and 14 of the Plea Bargaining Rules, the court held that only the prosecutor and the Accused Person (or representative) must sign. Attestation is not required. EACC's execution, while a goodwill best practice, is not a legal requirement, so its refusal to sign does not vitiate the agreement.
Whether EACC was consulted and whether the DPP must concur with it
EACC was consulted; consultation does not entail concurrence, and the DPP may depart from EACC's views for sound reasons consistent with Article 157(11).
Applying Aylesbury Mushrooms, consultation is a genuine invitation with a receptive mind to give advice. EACC participated in the negotiation meetings and did not disclose the specific factors it had tabled that were left out of the agreement. Its objection was a mere protest; the DPP's independence under Article 157(10) survives meaningful consultation.
Whether a proper Plea Agreement must result in admission of criminal liability
No; section 137A(1) is disjunctive and withdrawal under 137A(1)(b) is a lawful outcome of plea bargaining without admission of criminal liability.
A plain, disjunctive reading of section 137A(1)(a) and (b) shows that reduction of a charge and withdrawal of the charge are independent options. Parliament could have expressly required admission of criminal liability but did not. Circumstances consistent with Article 157(11) may legitimately favour withdrawal, and restitution secured elsewhere cannot be barred from informing that choice.
Whether section 87(a) of the CPC may be invoked to withdraw charges agreed under section 137A(1)(b)
No. Withdrawal under section 137A(1)(b) is sui generis and carries the finality of a judgment; section 87(a), which produces a discharge without a bar to further proceedings, is incompatible with that finality and cannot be used for plea-bargaining withdrawals.
The court identified four typologies of withdrawal (sections 87(a), 87(b), 204 and 137A(1)(b)). Section 87(a) yields a discharge open to re-arrest, inconsistent with the finality of judgment underpinning section 137L and the doctrine of autrefois. However, under Article 159(2)(d), the parties' unmistakable intention was withdrawal under 137A(1)(b), so the mislabeling as section 87(a) does not defeat the agreement.
Substantive legality and the interface between civil and criminal forfeiture
The Plea Agreement passed the triple test; civil forfeiture achieved through ADR may constitute a pivotal factor in choosing the plea-bargaining pathway where both proceedings arise from the same facts.
The court found the eight reasons advanced (chiefly the forfeiture of property worth over Kshs. 235,000,000 plus two motor vehicles, more than three times the alleged loss) non-speculative and compelling. Civil and criminal anti-corruption tools are not mutually exclusive; the civil settlement bore a consequential effect on the plea negotiations, and EACC failed to demonstrate abuse of power on a preponderance of probabilities.
Legal principles established
#- EACC's locus standi to challenge a Plea Agreement rests on the right to be consulted under section 137D of the CPC, not on being a party to the agreement
- Proper parties to a valid bipartite Plea Agreement are the DPP and the Accused Person (or legal representative); the complainant signs only where a compensation order under section 175(2)(b) is included; investigator signature is not mandatory
- Consultation does not mean concurrence; the DPP has no obligation in law to concur with the views of the investigating agency
- A Plea Agreement need not result in an admission of criminal liability; withdrawal under section 137A(1)(b) of the CPC is a lawful option
- Withdrawal agreed under section 137A(1)(b) in a Plea Agreement is sui generis and must not be effected under section 87(a) of the CPC, which would be inconsistent with the finality of a judgment
- Successful civil forfeiture pursued through ADR under Article 159(2)(c) may be a pivotal factor in selecting the pathway in plea bargaining
Court orders
#- 1.Adopted the Plea Agreement dated 28th August 2025 as a Judgment of the Court
- 2.Deemed all charges against all the Accused Persons withdrawn under section 137A(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code
The bench
#One judgment of the whole court — no separate or dissenting opinions.
Wrote the judgment
- Jurisdiction invoked
- Sections 137D(3), 137A–137O of the Criminal Procedure Code; Articles 157(11), 159(2)(c) of the Constitution
Relief refused
#EACC's objection to the adoption of the Plea Agreement
EACC failed to demonstrate denial of consultation or breach of the triple test; its objection remained a protest driven by disagreement with the terms rather than illegality
EACC's contention that withdrawal must proceed under section 87(a) of the CPC or that the Plea Agreement was invalid for want of EACC's signature
The proper parties to a bipartite Plea Agreement are the DPP and the Accused Person; withdrawal under a plea agreement is sui generis and section 87(a) is inappropriate in that context
Costs
No order on costs was made; the judgment makes no mention of costs.
Quotable passages
#Verbatim from the judgment, each located to the page it appears on in the official PDF — so these can be cited and checked directly.
Wherefore, this Court Adopts the Plea Agreement as a Judgment of this Court. It follows that all the charges are deemed withdrawn against all Accused Persons under section 137A(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
the locus standi of EACC to challenge the Plea Agreement is not based on the fact that it must have been a party to the Plea Agreement, but rather the right to be consulted
It is now an established principle that consultation does not mean concurrence or consensus.
invoking section 87(a) of the CPC was and remains inappropriate in the circumstances of plea bargaining
the forfeiture in the civil case ought constitute one of the pivotal or cornerstone factors in determining the pathway to take in plea bargaining, but certainly not the only one
this Court is persuaded on a preponderance of probabilities that the exercise has passed the triple test
An abuse of process occurs when the process of the Court is put in motion for a purpose which, in the eye of the law, it is not intended to serve or when the process is incapable of serving the purpose it is intended to serve.
I thus find the thesis advanced by EACC that a proper Plea Agreement must result in admission of criminal liability, unfortified by law.
Issues in the judgment
#The judgment inconsistently cites the second civil suit number: at one point as E010 of 2022 and elsewhere as E010 of 2021
The judgment states the Settlement Agreement was for properties 'worth Kshs 235,600,000' in the submissions summary but records 'Kshs. 235,000,000' elsewhere
Key timeline
#Practical implications
#Frequently asked questions
#Cite this brief
#Cite this brief
Caselaw, "Republic v Obado & 17 others (Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Case E018 of 2020) [2026] KEMC 96 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2026). Not stated in the judgment (Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes case, Milimani). Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/96/eng@2026-05-15
Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.