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High CourtDismissedNotice of Motion dated 7th October 2019 (in the suit by Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission against Mbuyu Farms Limited)· [2020] KEHC 9831 (KLR)

Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission v Mbuyu Farms Limited & others (Application by Sammy Michugu Njenga, Interested Party)

High Court of Kenya
6 May 2020
2,604 words in judgment
View original judgment Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~10 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

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A settlement signed by your lawyer is generally binding, even if you didn't give specific instructions, unless fraud or mistake is proven.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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Sammy Michugu Njenga, an interested party who purchased LR No.209/10611/30 at a public auction on 28th October 2016 conducted by Sumac Microfinance Bank (the secured creditor exercising its statutory power of sale over Mbuyu Farms' charged land), moved to set aside a consent order of 23rd July 2019. That consent compromised KACC's application alleging the auction breached section 97 of the Land Act (duty to obtain best price), setting the auction aside and requiring Sumac to re-exercise its statutory power of sale. Njenga argued he never instructed his advocates, Ngani and Olouch, to consent; that the consent contradicted his pleaded position as an innocent purchaser in possession; and that parties cannot by consent usurp the Court's role in determining the legality of a sale. KACC, Mbuyu and Kinyua opposed, and Mr Ngani defended the consent as entered in good faith. Applying Kenya Commercial Bank v Specialized Engineering, Tuiyott J held that a duly instructed advocate has ostensible authority to compromise an action unless an express limitation is brought to the other side's notice. Although the Court accepted Njenga probably did not authorise the consent, no fraud, misrepresentation or mistake was alleged, and the loss of the property was a defining fact known to all who entered the consent. The Kibiego authority was distinguished. The application was dismissed with costs, with an oblique suggestion that Njenga may have redress against his former advocates.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether counsel's entry of the consent without specific instructions binds the client

Holding

The consent binds the client because counsel had ostensible authority and no express limitation was communicated to the other side

Reasoning

The Court accepted that Njenga did not specifically instruct his advocates to consent, and counsel admitted he did not seek instructions on the consent. However, following Kenya Commercial Bank v Specialized Engineering, an advocate with general conduct of a matter has implied authority to compromise. Since Njenga never communicated any reservation limiting that authority to the other parties, the consent stands unless grounds for setting aside a contract exist.

p. 2
02

Whether the consent order was vitiated by fraud, mistake, misrepresentation or disregard of material facts

Holding

No - the material fact that the purchaser would lose the property was central to the consent and known to all who entered it

Reasoning

The application never alleged fraud or misrepresentation; the claim was disregard of material facts, but none were elaborated. The Court reasoned that the very essence of the consent was setting aside the auction, so giving up the property was a defining fact all participants necessarily knew. The compromise of KACC's undervalue application was within counsel's ostensible authority and not contrary to statute or public policy.

p. 2
03

Whether parties by consent usurped the Court's role in declaring the auction non-compliant with section 97 of the Land Act

Holding

No - the consent was a lawful compromise of KACC's application in which each party assessed its position

Reasoning

The consent compromised KACC's application alleging the sale at Kshs 5,200,000 was at undervalue against forced sale valuations of Kshs 9,000,000 and 6,000,000. In consenting, Sumac assessed that the sale was at undervalue and Njenga gave up his innocent-purchaser defence. Such a compromise could be made within counsel's ostensible authority and was no affront to statute or public policy.

p. 3
04

Whether the Julius Kigen Kibiego decision required the consent to be tested on its merits

Holding

Distinguished - that consent was set aside because it infringed the rights of a non-party school; here Njenga was represented and a party to the consent

Reasoning

Counsel for the applicant relied on Julius Kigen Kibiego v Angeline Korir to urge the Court to examine the merits of the consent. The Court read that decision and found Munyao J set aside the consent there because it infringed the rights of a school not party to it. In the present case Njenga was represented by counsel and was in that sense a party to the consent, so the precedent did not apply.

p. 3

Legal principles established

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  • A solicitor has an implied general authority to compromise and settle an action on behalf of his client, and a client cannot rely on a private limitation of that authority unless it was brought to the notice of the other side
  • A consent order binds all parties and can only be set aside on grounds that would justify setting aside a contract - fraud, collusion, ignorance of material fact, misapprehension, or being against court or public policy
  • A duly instructed advocate has ostensible authority to compromise an action unless the authority is expressly circumscribed and that limitation is brought to the notice of the other side

Court orders

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  1. 1.The Notice of Motion dated 7th October 2019 is dismissed
  2. 2.Costs of the application to the respondents (dismissed with costs)

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Land Actsection 97

Cases cited (2)

  • Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd v Specialized Engineering Company Ltd
    [1980] eKLR

    Implied general authority of solicitor to compromise actions; client cannot rely on uncommunicated limitations

  • Julius Kigen Kibiego v Angeline Korir & another
    [2012] eKLR

    Setting aside a consent order; distinguished because that consent infringed rights of a non-party

Jurisdiction invoked
Inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to set aside consent orders; application under the court's case-management powers in the suit (no specific statutory provision invoked for the Motion)

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission v Mbuyu Farms Limited & others (Application by Sammy Michugu Njenga, Interested Party)", Case Analysis (2020). Notice of Motion dated 7th October 2019 (in the suit by Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission against Mbuyu Farms Limited). Source: 

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.