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High CourtPartially AllowedCriminal Appeal (Eldama Ravine Principal Magistrate's Court Criminal Case No. 198 of 2015)· [2020] KEHC 2321 (KLR)

Nicholas Kipngetich Mutai v Republic

High Court of Kenya
23 October 2020
15,157 words in judgment
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·~61 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

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A conviction can be overturned if the prosecution's evidence is contradictory or fails to meet the high standard of proof required by Kenyan law.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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The appellant was convicted by the Eldama Ravine Principal Magistrate's Court (Criminal Case No. 198 of 2015) of defilement contrary to section 8(1) as read with 8(2) of the Sexual Offences Act and sentenced to life imprisonment, the complainant being a 10-year-old girl. On appeal to the High Court at Eldoret, the appellant raised six grounds: non-compliance with section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the transfer of the part-heard trial, a second voire dire examination, failure to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt, failure to call vital witnesses (Bukenya rule), unlawful review of the order recalling witnesses, and non-compliance with the proviso to section 124 of the Evidence Act. The State opposed the conviction but did not oppose review of the sentence. Muriithi J found that although the second voire dire was not invalid given the child's increased age, the trial court erred in failing to seek corroboration of the child's sworn evidence and in improperly invoking the section 124 proviso, treating the mother's evidence as cross-corroboration when evidence requiring corroboration cannot itself corroborate. The court catalogued glaring contradictions among the complainant, her mother and the investigating officer on the circumstances of the assault, the child's recovery and the arrest, found the identification evidence uncorroborated and the chain from the lighted kitchen to the dark scene broken, drew an adverse inference from the failure to call the key witness K, and doubted the prosecution's stranger storyline. The conviction and sentence were quashed, the appellant was ordered released forthwith, and a retrial was declined as not in the interest of justice.

Key legal issues

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01

Compliance with section 200(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code on transfer of part-heard trials

Holding

The succeeding magistrate took directions and the accused elected to proceed from where the trial had reached; the court considered whether the appellant was materially prejudiced under section 200(4)

Reasoning

The court examined the record of 8 November 2017 showing directions under section 200(3) were taken and the accused chose continuation. It then applied section 200(4), asking whether conviction on evidence partly recorded by a predecessor prejudiced the appellant, and found prejudice in the failure to caution itself over the un-recalled mother's evidence, but declined a retrial.

p. 8
02

Validity of the second voire dire examination and the sworn evidence of the child

Holding

The second voire dire was not invalid given the two-year gap and the child's increased age, but the trial court erred in not seeking corroboration of the child's sworn evidence

Reasoning

The court held that a child of tender years for oath purposes is under fourteen, and the complainant was 13 at the second examination, so the second voire dire finding was unsurprising. However, the trial court's invocation of section 124 and its truthfulness finding prejudiced the appellant, who was entitled to corroboration of evidence led by a child of tender age.

p. 11
03

Improper invocation of the section 124 Evidence Act proviso

Holding

The trial court did not properly invoke section 124; it wrongly treated the mother's evidence as corroborating the complainant's identification evidence

Reasoning

The proviso applies only where the victim's evidence is the only evidence. Here other evidence existed and the trial court found cross-corroboration between the complainant and her mother on identification, contrary to the cardinal rule that evidence requiring corroboration cannot itself corroborate other evidence. No reasons within the meaning of the proviso were recorded.

p. 20
04

Identification evidence and the unbroken chain from kitchen to scene of crime

Holding

The identification evidence was not corroborated and the circumstances of identification were not favourable; there was no unbroken chain of evidence from the lighted kitchen to the dark shamba

Reasoning

The defilement allegedly occurred outside the kitchen in darkness, yet the complainant claimed identification only via firewood light in the kitchen. No evidence established the distance or intensity of the light relative to the scene. Applying Abdalla Bin Wendo and Wamunga, the court held the single-witness identification required corroboration which was absent.

p. 19
05

Glaring contradictions in prosecution evidence

Holding

Extensive discrepancies between the complainant, her mother and the investigating officer on the circumstances of the assault, the recovery of the child and the arrest raised a doubt whether the incident happened as alleged and made conviction unsafe

Reasoning

The court catalogued conflicting versions: whether the child was pulled from the kitchen or attacked behind it while going for a short call, how she returned home, who arrested the appellant, and whether her pant was recovered. It found embellishment in the key witnesses' stories and held the benefit of the doubt must go to the appellant.

p. 18
06

Failure to call material witness K (Bukenya rule)

Holding

Failure to call K, who was central to the arrest and recovery narrative, attracted the adverse inference that his evidence would have prejudiced the prosecution case

Reasoning

K was the custodian of corroborative information about the appellant's presence, the recovery of the child and the arrest. A warrant had to issue for him. Applying Bukenya v Uganda, the court drew the adverse inference that his testimony or cross-examination would have been adverse to the prosecution.

p. 21
07

Implausibility of the stranger storyline and the defence

Holding

The prosecution's account that a total stranger was fed and left with the child without inquiry was implausible, casting doubt on the defilement story and lending credence to the appellant's alcohol-money dispute account

Reasoning

The court found it unusual to treat a total stranger as PW1 and PW2 described, and held the witnesses were either untruthful about his stranger status or hiding the true nature of his visit, consistent with the appellant's claim of a dispute over alcohol money sold by the child's mother. The doubt was resolved in the appellant's favour.

p. 20

Legal principles established

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  • Evidence which itself requires corroboration cannot corroborate other evidence; the section 124 Evidence Act proviso cannot be used to find cross-corroboration between a child victim and her mother
  • The section 124 proviso is properly invoked only where the victim's evidence is the only evidence available; where other evidence exists, the court must weigh it as a whole against the victim's evidence
  • An order for recall of a witness under section 146(4) of the Evidence Act may be set aside where the witness is shown on oath to be unavailable, but the court must then caution itself and examine the un-cross-examined evidence with the greatest care
  • Failure by the prosecution to call a material witness attracts an adverse inference under the Bukenya rule where the evidence adduced barely suffices
  • A retrial is ordered only where the interest of justice requires it, not to facilitate the prosecution to fill gaps or correct contradictions

Court orders

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  1. 1.The conviction and sentence of the appellant for the offence of defilement contrary to section 8(1) as read with 8(2) of the Sexual Offences Act are, respectively, quashed and set aside
  2. 2.There shall be an order for the release of the appellant from custody forthwith, unless he is otherwise lawfully held

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Sexual Offences Actsection 8(1) as read with 8(2)
  • Sexual Offences Actsection 11(1)
  • Criminal Procedure Code, Cap. 75section 200 (including subsections (3) and (4))
  • Criminal Procedure Code, Cap. 75section 215
  • Evidence Act, Cap. 80section 124 (including proviso)
  • Evidence Act, Cap. 80section 146(4)
  • Oaths and Statutory Declarations Act, Cap. 15section 19
  • Constitution of KenyaArticle 50(2)(k)
  • Children Actsection 2

Cases cited (17)

  • Ndegwa v Republic
    (1985) KLR 534

    Section 200 CPC to be used sparingly; half-heard short trials should start de novo; protection of the liberty of the subject

  • Wamunga v Republic
    (1989) KLR 424

    Where the only evidence is identification or recognition, the court must examine it carefully and be satisfied circumstances were favourable and free from error

  • Wamunge v Republic
    (1980) KLR 424

    Same identification-evidence caution principle (cited by the appellant)

  • Maitanyi v Republic
    (1986) KLR 198

    Inquiry into the nature, intensity and position of light is essential in testing identification evidence

  • Tekerali s/o Korongozi & 4 Others v Republic
    (1952) 19 EACA 259

    Importance of first reports as a test of truth of later statements, guarding against embellishment

  • Ndungu Kimani v Republic
    [1979] KLR 282

    A witness who creates doubt about trustworthiness makes it unsafe to accept the evidence

  • Paul Ndogo Mwangi v Republic
    [2016] eKLR

    Section 124 Evidence Act proviso requires recorded reasons that the victim is telling the truth

  • Bukenya v Uganda
    (1972) EA 549

    Duty to call material witnesses; adverse inference where witnesses not called and evidence adduced is inadequate

  • Kibageny arap Kolil v R
    (1959) EA 92

    Child of tender years for oath purposes is under fourteen; no corroboration required for sworn child evidence

  • Maripett Loonkomok v R
    Court of Appeal at Mombasa Criminal Appeal No. 68 of 2015

    Children Act definition of tender years does not apply to section 19 Oaths and Statutory Declarations Act

  • Patrick Kathurima v R
    Court of Appeal at Nyeri Criminal Appeal No. 131 of 2014

    Child of tender years under section 19 is one under fourteen

  • Samuel Warue Karimi v R
    Court of Appeal at Nyeri Criminal Appeal No. 16 of 2014

    Children Act definition not applicable to section 19

  • Isaac Nyoro Kimita v R
    Court of Appeal at Nairobi Criminal Appeal No. 187 of 2009

    Reasons for satisfaction that the victim is truthful must be recorded in the proceedings

  • Julius Kiunga M'birithia v R
    High Court at Meru Criminal Appeal No. 111 of 2011

    Same requirement to record reasons under section 124 proviso

  • Abdalla Bin Wendo v R
    [1953] 20 EACA 166

    Need to test single-witness identification evidence with greatest care and seek corroboration where conditions are difficult

  • R v Turnbull
    (1976) 3 ALL ER 549

    Caution on identification evidence of a single witness

  • Fatehali Manji v R
    (1966) EA 343

    Retrial ordered only where interests of justice require, not to enable prosecution to fill gaps

On appeal from
Eldama Ravine Principal Magistrate's Court
Criminal Case No. 198 of 2015
Jurisdiction invoked
First appellate jurisdiction over conviction and sentence from the Senior Resident Magistrate's Court under the Criminal Procedure Code (section 200(4) considered)

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Nicholas Kipngetich Mutai v Republic", Case Analysis (2020). Criminal Appeal (Eldama Ravine Principal Magistrate's Court Criminal Case No. 198 of 2015). Source: 

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.