Skip to content
AI-generated case briefs sourced from Kenya Law · Not legal advice
AI-generated case brief
Case Brief · caselaw.co.ke
High CourtDismissedNot stated in the extract (Notice of Motion dated 6th June 2008 in HCCC over LR No.1870/VIII/15 Spring Valley, Nairobi)

Susan Jane Shah & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 3 others

High Court of Kenya
27 May 2009
2,082 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~8 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

#

The High Court refused to undo a 2002 settlement, confirming that consent orders are binding contracts that can only be set aside for fraud or similar serious grounds.

What this practically means

#

Executive summary

#
By consent order recorded on 13th February 2002 before Ringera J, the suit and a chamber summons application were marked settled: the plaintiffs were to redeem the charge over LR No.1870/VIII/15 Spring Valley, Nairobi within ninety days, failing which the 1st defendant (the bank) could realize the security, with costs to the 1st and 4th defendants. On 6th June 2008 the 2nd plaintiff, Susan Jane Shah, moved under sections 3A and 80 of the Civil Procedure Act and Orders I Rule 10 and XLIV of the Civil Procedure Rules to review and set aside the consent order, alleging she never instructed A. N. Ngunjiri & Co. Advocates, never swore or approved the plaint, and never authorized the compromise; she also sought to enjoin the 2nd defendant as a party. The advocate and the bank opposed. Kimaru J framed two issues: whether the 2nd plaintiff proved lack of instructions, and whether grounds for review existed. The court found a letter of 9th November 2001 authorized the firm; her forgery allegation was unsupported as she never obtained a document examiner's report. Applying Flora N. Wasike v Destimo Wamboko and Hirani v Kassam, the court held a consent order has contractual effect, settable only on grounds justifying setting aside a contract; fraud was not made out. The six-year delay and the applicant's indolence, with the application conveniently filed after her husband's death, defeated the discretionary remedy. Further, O. P. Ngoge & Associates came on record without leave under Order III rule 9A after judgment, rendering the application incompetent. The application was dismissed with costs to the respondents.

Key legal issues

#
01

Authority of advocate to compromise suit

Holding

The 2nd plaintiff authorized A. N. Ngunjiri & Co. Advocates to act and the firm had full instructions when the consent was recorded; her forgery allegation against a letter of 9th November 2001 was unsupported

Reasoning

The court evaluated the letter of 9th November 2001 and found it authorized the firm. The 2nd plaintiff's forgery allegation was untested: she could easily have obtained a document examiner's report but did not. Her conduct, including multiple suits against the bank, showed awareness of the consent over six years.

p. 3
02

Review of consent order

Holding

The court could not review the consent order: consent orders have contractual effect and none of the recognized grounds (fraud, collusion, misapprehension of material facts) was established; delay of over six years also disentitled the applicant

Reasoning

Applying Wasike and Hirani, the consent could only be set aside on grounds justifying setting aside a contract. Fraud allegations against the firm failed on the facts. The late husband conducted the suit, and the application was brought only after his death, after inordinate delay, showing indolence.

p. 3
03

Advocate improperly on record

Holding

O. P. Ngoge & Associates came on record without leave after judgment had been entered, rendering the application incompetent

Reasoning

The consent order terminated the proceedings, so any new advocate wishing to come on record for the 2nd plaintiff required leave under Order III rule 9A. Ngoge's firm did not seek leave and is improperly on record, so the application it filed is incompetent.

p. 4

Legal principles established

#
  • A consent judgment or order has contractual effect and can only be set aside on grounds which would justify setting aside a contract
  • An order made in the presence and with the consent of counsel is binding and cannot be varied or discharged unless obtained by fraud, collusion, or in misapprehension of material facts
  • An advocate who wishes to come on record for a party after judgment must first seek leave of the court under Order III rule 9A; failing which the application filed is incompetent

Court orders

#
  1. 1.The notice of motion dated 6th June 2008 made purportedly on behalf of the 2nd plaintiff is dismissed
  2. 2.Costs of the application to the respondents
Jurisdiction invoked
Sections 3A and 80 of the Civil Procedure Act and Order I Rule 10 and Order XLIV of the Civil Procedure Rules (application for review)

Key timeline

#

Practical implications

#

Frequently asked questions

#

Cite this brief

#

Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Susan Jane Shah & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 3 others", Case Analysis (2009). Not stated in the extract (Notice of Motion dated 6th June 2008 in HCCC over LR No.1870/VIII/15 Spring Valley, Nairobi). Source: 

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.