Patrick Muiruri Kamau & 2 others v National Police Service Commission & 5 others [2019] KEELRC 1950 (KLR)
The bottom line
#Kenya's High Court dismissed police officers' challenge to their interdiction, ruling it was lawful and that their petition was too vague to succeed.
What this practically means
#Executive summary
#Key legal issues
#Whether the 4th respondent had the legal mandate to interdict the petitioners
Yes. As Formation Commander of the rank of Senior Superintendent of Police with powers of command over the petitioners, he was an authorized officer under Regulation 14 of the NPSC (Discipline) Regulations 2015 and paragraph 47(i) of the SSOs.
The court examined Regulation 14 of the NPSC (Discipline) Regulations 2015 which allows interdiction by the Inspector General or an authorized officer, and Regulation 2 defining corrective action and immediate/commanding officer. It found the 4th respondent, being an SSP with command powers, had authority under paragraph 47(i) of the SSOs to interdict pending inquiry. Interdiction was a temporary corrective measure, not removal from office, and required no prior hearing under any cited law.
Whether the interdiction violated the petitioners' constitutional rights
No violation was proved. The petition fell below the Anarita Karimi Njeru competence threshold for lack of particulars, and the affidavit evidence did not prove the general allegations. No law or regulation requiring a prior hearing before interdiction was cited.
The court found the petition merely cited constitutional provisions (Articles 21, 22, 23, 31, 47, 48, 49, 50) without particulars of specific violations, thus failing the Anarita Karimi Njeru standard as reaffirmed in Mumo Matemu. Further, the petitioners neither cited any provision entitling them to a prior hearing nor proved their allegations; indeed they refused to acknowledge the Notice to Show Cause served under paragraph 15(1) of the SSOs and abandoned the internal disciplinary process.
Whether the interdiction was premature because it preceded any corruption charges under section 62(1) of the Anti-Corruption and Ethics Act 2003
No. The petitioners produced no evidence or law supporting that proposition; interdiction pending disciplinary process or criminal trial is lawful.
The court held the petitioners cited no law proving that interdiction could only follow a charge under the ACEC Act. The NPS Act, Regulations and SSOs formed part of the employment contract, and interdiction was a lawful temporary measure after the petitioners were arrested for alleged corruption and untidiness. The disciplinary process had been set in motion by the Notice to Show Cause before the suit.
Legal principles established
#- A constitutional petition must plead with reasonable degree of precision the provision said to be infringed, the manner of infringement and particulars of the violation, failing which it falls below the competence threshold.
- An employer in the public service can interdict or suspend an employee pending disciplinary process or trial of a criminal case.
- Under Regulation 14 of the NPSC (Discipline) Regulations 2015 and paragraph 47(i) of the SSOs, an officer may be interdicted by the Inspector General or an authorized officer of the rank of SSP or above to facilitate investigation, and interdiction is a temporary corrective action not amounting to removal.
Court orders
#- 1.Dismissal of the petition with no costs
- Jurisdiction invoked
- Constitutional petition under Articles 21, 22 and 23 of the Constitution (Bill of Rights enforcement)
Key timeline
#Practical implications
#Frequently asked questions
#Cite this brief
#Cite this brief
Caselaw, "Patrick Muiruri Kamau & 2 others v National Police Service Commission & 5 others [2019] KEELRC 1950 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2019). Cause No 111 of 2017. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2019/1950/eng@2019-03-08
Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.